

**INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL POLICY ON
PRIMARY EDUCATION IN LAGOS STATE, NIGERIA, 1999-2015**

BY

ADEBAYO OLUMIDE ADEDEJI (86741)

B.Sc. (Hons), M.Sc. (Ibadan)

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CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this study was carried out by Adebayo Olumide ADEDEJI in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ibadan.

Professor Emmanuel Remi AIYEDE

Supervisor

B.A (Hons), M.Sc, Ph.D(Ibadan)
Department of Political Science,
University of Ibadan, Nigeria

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to the power and authority of God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, who stood by me throughout my academic pursuit.

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ABSTRACT

Intergovernmental relations (IGR), the interaction among multiple levels of government, is an important factor in the implementation of public policy in federations and effective collaboration among multiple agencies of government is essential for the achievement of policy goals. Although studies have examined the role of IGR in public policy making processes in Nigeria, few have examined the framework of IGR in educational policies. This study was, therefore, designed to investigate the IGR framework as an important factor in the implementation of National Policy on Primary Education in Lagos State, Nigeria.

The study was anchored to the Administrative Federalism and Contingency Models of collaborative governance while a case study design was adopted. Primary data were collected using in-depth interviews. Seventeen interview participants were purposively selected from the management cadre of the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) (5); Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board (LSUBEB) (6); and Public Primary Schools (6) under selected Local Government Education Authority (LGEA). The interviews focused on starting conditions, institutional design, facilitative leadership and collaborative process. Secondary data on the intergovernmental relations framework dynamics for implementing the National Primary Education Policy were obtained from official publications such as; Nigerian Education Sector Diagnosis, UBEC statistical bulletin, Nigerian Digest of Education Statistics, 2006-2010 and Nigerian Education Data Survey. Data were content analysed.

With regard to starting conditions, there was power and resource imbalance between UBEC and LSUBEB, and between LSUBEB and LGEAs. Relations among these agencies had been frosty. However, the conditional matching grant was the main incentive for collaboration. The UBE Act and Lagos State UBE law, though intended to ensure accountability and assign functions to respective agencies, created a superordinate-subordinate relationship among these agencies officials. To ensure accountability, the Commission withheld matching grants when States failed to account for previous grants. Accountability deficit led to the inability of Lagos State to consistently access its matching grants during the period. Facilitative leadership through effective coordination of interagency activities by UBEC was hampered by the multiplicity of agencies as the institutional design failed to clearly define the functions of these agencies. Duplication of functions amongst implementing agencies undermined efficiency. Total primary school enrolment for Lagos State, which was 133,339 in 1998, reduced to 108,312 in 2003 and increased to 502,347 in 2013 but reduced to 400,277 in 2014. The trend indicated that the collaborative process was not yielding expected outcome due to the fluctuations. Low level of trust between the Commission, Board and Education authority undermined collaboration in the intergovernmental structures and processes, thereby limiting the actualisation of primary education goals.

The Intergovernmental Relations framework in Lagos State was characterised by low level of trust between the implementing agencies, and this undermined the achievement of the primary education policy goals. Increased dialogue among officials of the levels of government to achieve buy-in of all implementing agencies would raise the trust level needed for effective collaboration.

KeyWords: Trust and collaboration, Intergovernmental relations, Education policy implementation, Lagos State

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ABBREVIATION

AGF – ACCOUNTANT GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION
COE – COLLEGE EDUCATION
CBO - COMMUNITY BASED ORGANISATION
DFID – DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ERC – EDUCATIONAL RESOURCE CENTRE
FME – FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
FMF – FEDERAL MINISTRY OF FINANCE
FMH – FEDERAL MINISTRY OF HEALTH
FMWA – FEDERAL MINISTRY OF WOMEN AFFAIRS
FBO – FAITH BASED ORGANISATION
LG – LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LGEA – LOCAL GOVERNMENT EDUCATION AUTHORITY
NERDC – NIGERIAN EDUCATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
COUNCIL
NCCE – NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR COLLEGES OF EDUCATION
NTI – NATIONAL TEACHERS INSTITUTE
NGO – NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION
NIEPA – NIGERIAN INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATIONAL PLANNING AND
ADMINISTRATION
NINLAN – NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR NIGERIAN LANGUAGES
NUC – NATIONAL UNIVERSITIES COMMISSION
NOUN – NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA
NBTE – NATIONAL BOARD FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION
NCNE – NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR NORMADIC EDUCATION
NMEC – NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR MASS LITERACY, ADULT NON-
FORMAL EDUCATION
NPC – NATIONAL POPULATION COMMISSION
PTA – PARENTS’ TEACHERS ASSOCIATION
SBMC – SCHOOL BOARD MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
SMoE – STATE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
TRCN – TEACHERS REGISTRATION COUNCIL, NIGERIA
SUBEB – STATE UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION BOARD

UBEC – UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION COMMISSION

UNICEF – UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN FUND

UNESCO – UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND
CULTURAL ORGANISATION

USAID – UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The issues affecting public policy implementation tends to be more exacerbated in a multi-level system of government than in a unitary political system. The reason for policy implementation issues in multi-level system of government is because the system comprises two to three levels of government and officials from these levels of government have to relate with each other to achieve the policy objectives. This relationship is referred to as intergovernmental relations. It is a chain of structures and processes created to enable elected and appointed governmental officials to harmonise their operations for effective service delivery. However, this web of systems and processes makes so many ‘clearance’ points in implementing public policy (Lundin, 2007). The consequence of this is what is referred to as the Joint Decision Trap (Scharpf, 1985). It is a situation where the central government requires the inputs of the governments at the lower levels in the formulation and implementation of public policies. Consequently, when inputs from these lower levels of government tend to be at variance with the inputs from the central governments, there is a high probability that the goals of the policy may not be attained.

The literature identified cooperation among officials in this kind of system of government as a vital variable in the implementation of public policies (Lundin, 2007). This is premised on the supposition that activities of these levels of government will be better coordinated and will enhance service delivery. The challenge, however, is how to ensure that the intergovernmental structures and processes operate within an atmosphere of cooperation in the implementation of public policies. The National Education Policy (2013) enunciated the goals of primary education in the country and recognised the vital role the State and Local governments have in the implementation process. Similarly, the Act, which formally established the Universal Basic Education programme in 2004, created the intergovernmental structures for the implementation of basic education comprising of pre-primary, primary and junior secondary education and recognised the inputs of the

State and Local governments in the actualisation of the objectives of the programme. The Universal Basic Education Commission, which is a federal agency, is to provide policy guidelines and ensure standards across the country. The State Universal Basic Education Board and Local Government Education Authorities ensure the implementation of the policy objectives. The foregoing arrangement shows a network of structures operating on agreed rules for the implementation of the National policy on primary education. Furthermore, the National Education Policy and Universal Basic Education Act recognise an intergovernmental relations framework to achieve primary education objectives. The issue that then arises is how to ensure that these agencies work together to implement the National policy on primary education successfully.

The objectives of primary education, as stated in the National Education Policy (2013), is to develop in children aged 6 – 12 years the ability to read, write and perform basic numerical skills which will enable the child to perform effectively in society and to increase the accessibility of these children to primary education. With the introduction of the Universal Basic Education programme, the medium through which the objectives of the National policy on primary education will be implemented, it was assumed that there would be a gradual decrease in the number of out-of-school children. However, available figures indicate that Nigeria is one of the countries with a high number of out-of-school children (See table 4.3.2.1). These figures show that there are issues worth addressing in the implementation process. One of these issues could be ineffective collaboration among implementing agencies. For instance, Joel (2015) observed that the country had experienced many Intergovernmental conflicts and believes that this may not enhance collaboration among intergovernmental institutions in the implementation process. Similarly, Ikelegbe (2004) observed that the framework for managing intergovernmental relations in the country was poor in orientation and practice because it was not goal-oriented, programmed and integrated. These observations raise concern on the character of the intergovernmental relations framework established for implementing the National policy on primary education. Consequently, this research aims to examine the effect the character of the Intergovernmental relations framework has on the implementation of the National policy on primary education using Lagos state as a case study.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Kurt (2000) believed that a definition of policy implementation problems would determine the outcome of the analysis of critical issues and the recommendations given. Thus, a research model that does not adequately define the implementation problems may likely have a flawed analysis. Stoker (1983) identified two basic ways implementation problems could be determined. The first is the problem of organisational management. This deals with the ability of single authority structures like the national government to effectively manage the implementation process. Based on this perspective, policy managers identify lack of goal specification and inability to control subordinates as the primary implementation problems. Consequently, analysis with this kind of policy implementation problem definition will postulate more effective ways of managing, communicating, bureaucratic disposition and utilisation of resources and bureaucratic tendencies. In other words, the adoption and improvement in these factors will solve policy implementation problems.

The second way the implementation problem could be determined is when a conflict of interest arises among the agencies involved in the implementation process. Therefore, the analysis arising from the conflict of interest as the problem in the implementation process is how to facilitate collaboration between implementers. Collaboration is about achieving synergy between the central and provincial governments to reduce conflicts and overlap, as both are trying to accomplish the same goal. Therefore, a fundamental issue in the business of running a country with several tiers of government is how to ensure that each level of government works harmoniously with the others to generate intended policy outcomes. In other words, how to coordinate the inputs of the central, provincial and local governments into policy outputs that will advance the delivery of educational services. The arguments of the second perspective of defining policy implementation problems appear valid as issues bothering on conflict of interest is more likely to affect implementation than issues relating to organisational management. The solution prescribe from this analysis is to build mechanisms that enhance collaboration between officials involved in the implementation process (Kurt, 2000)

From the preceding, the second perspective on defining the implementation problem offers better insight into the challenges confronting the implementation of the National Policy on Primary Education in Nigeria. Catherine (1999) thought that

one of the implementation challenges encountered in a multi-level system of government is when the central government is assigned managerial responsibilities. Still, constituent government take up most of the operational responsibilities. Thus, the problem of implementing national policies in a federal system like Nigeria should also be examined from the perspective of whether the intergovernmental structures and processes enhance collaboration among the officials from the three levels of government in the country.

Since the country's return to democratic rule in 1999, there have been several instances of conflict between the Federal and State governments. For example, there was the withholding of Local governments funds meant for Lagos state Local councils by the Federal government. The Federal government took this action due to the creation of other Local councils by the Lagos state government. This action by the Federal government could affect the implementation of National policy objectives on primary education as part of the Local government funds is meant for primary schools in the state. The state government instituted a suit against the Federal government at the Supreme Court and got a ruling in its favour (Alabi, 2006). This kind of action by the Federal government is not likely to enhance collaboration with the Lagos state government.

Elaigwu (2007), in his analysis of the state of the Nigerian federation 1999-2007, observed that the intergovernmental relations framework was not properly utilised in the delivery of public services. In the same vein, Elaigwu (2013) observed that introducing the Universal Basic Education programme, subsumed under primary education, by former President Obasanjo in 1999 did not receive wide acceptance among the state governors. The governors assumed that since the programme depended on their operational support for successful implementation, they should have been consulted before the president announced its introduction. This posture by the state governors may affect the performance of National policy on primary education in these states. Commenting on the Universal Basic Education programme, Enemuo (2000) raised a question that bothers states' scheming to operate alternative primary education programmes that may make redundant the Universal Basic Education programme. This question was based on the author's analysis of the Universal Primary Education scheme in the late 1970s. It raises concern on the character of the structure of the intergovernmental relations in the country.

In the literature, intergovernmental collaboration has been identified as an essential variable in policy implementation. Lundin (2007) argued that intergovernmental relations interfere with policy implementation, and collaboration among implementing agencies would achieve better results. With this understanding, a lot of research has gone into how to conduct effective collaboration. While collaboration is vital in implementing public policy, it has also been argued that its impact depends on the policy to be implemented. This is based on the assumption that organisations collaborating to implement a policy incur certain costs to maintain the relationship. The complexity of the policy would upset the cost as neither organisation could have achieved the policy goals working alone. However, if the implementation process is less complex, the benefits of collaboration are defeated as there would be no justification for the costs incurred (Lundin 2007).

Freinkman (2007) emphasised the importance of coordination and cooperation in service delivery in Nigeria. The Nigerian constitution shares responsibilities for significant sectors of the economy and social sphere among the three tiers of government. This has necessitated a need for interdependence in service delivery. The challenge, however, lies in the weak capacity of the intergovernmental structures and processes to achieve desired outcomes. Freinkman identified several factors as being responsible for the ineffective intergovernmental processes and structures. For instance, a number of the intergovernmental councils created by the Constitution to oversee economic programmes had become “talking shops”. Fewer implementation activities were taking place.

Similarly, information sharing, particularly between the federal and state governments, was insufficient. State governments often believe that national government initiatives are attempts to usurp state responsibilities, limiting their willingness to share information. The DFID (2009) report published by the British House of Commons International Development Committee observed that the state governments have the primary responsibility to deliver essential services. However, a lack of coordination and cooperation hinders the delivery of these services. This observation was also corroborated by Frank Nweke Jnr, who was the Minister of Inter-Governmental Affairs, Youth Development and Special Duties. The Minister observed that structures established to facilitate collaboration and integration of inputs amongst the different tiers of government in service delivery had achieved limited success. Evidence show duplication, frictions and overlaps have characterised the

activities of the various levels of government in service delivery. Consequently, there is a need to understand factors that breed frictions and achieve effective collaboration between the federal, state and local governments in Nigeria.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the above narratives, this study intends to provide answers to the following research questions;

1. What is the framework and character of Intergovernmental relations for implementing National policy on primary education in Lagos state?
2. What are the Intergovernmental issues and challenges observed in implementing the National policy on primary education in Lagos state?
3. Are the existing structures or processes of Intergovernmental relations sufficient to ensure effective collaboration in implementing National policy on primary education in Lagos state?
4. How can the intergovernmental relations structures and processes be improved upon to ensure effective collaboration in implementing National policy on primary education in Lagos State?

1.4 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

The study's general objective is to examine the character of the intergovernmental relations framework and its role in implementing the National policy on primary education using Lagos state as a case study.

However, the specific objectives of the study are as follows:

1. To examine the framework and character of the Intergovernmental relations for implementing National policy on primary education in Lagos state.
2. To identify the intergovernmental issues and challenges observed in the implementation of National policy on primary education in Lagos state
3. To determine if the existing structures and processes of Intergovernmental relations are sufficient to achieve effective collaboration in implementing National policy on primary education in Lagos state.
4. To ascertain how effective collaborative relations in implementing National Policy on Primary Education in Lagos State could be achieved.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

This research examines the effect the character of the Intergovernmental relations framework has on the implementation of the National policy on primary education using Lagos state as a case study. Although the literature establishes a nexus between Intergovernmental relations and policy implementation, most studies on intergovernmental relations in Nigeria focus more on jurisdictional conflict and authority delineation. Similarly, studies on policy implementation in Nigeria examine the administrative issues that hinder the successful performance of public policies. The research serves as a bridge to the studies done on Intergovernmental relations and policy implementation in Nigeria. It examines the factors that breed conflicts between the levels of government and how these factors can be reduced to achieve effective collaboration and national policy objectives.

1.6 JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY

The narratives on the problems affecting policy implementation in Nigeria have been dominated by perspectives focusing on organisational issues, while intergovernmental relations have not been thoroughly interrogated. Although the literature identifies a weak intergovernmental relations structure in Nigeria, factors responsible for this has not been fully explored. This research examined these issues and identified the characteristics that determine the character of the intergovernmental relations framework for implementing national policies in Nigeria.

1.7 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

In the course of carrying out this research, there were certain limitations encountered. The major hurdle had to do with the unwillingness of a few government officials, particularly those of the Local Government Education Authority, to be available for an interview. Even so, a number of them granted the interviews. However, secondary qualitative and quantitative data obtained from the Universal Basic Education Commission, Federal and State Ministry of Education and other relevant publications provide sufficient basis for the claims made in this study.

1.8 DEFINITION OF TERMS

This study seeks to interrogate the implications of the intergovernmental relations framework established for implementing the National policy on primary education has on the actualisation of the policy's objectives. Key concepts in this study are intergovernmental relations, cooperation or collaboration and policy implementation. Intergovernmental relations could be defined as an arrangement that encompasses structures, processes, institutions and procedures for handling unavoidable overlap and interdependence common to contemporary reality (Cameron 2001). This definition by Cameron identifies certain salient features of intergovernmental relations. These include a complex web of structures that cut across the levels of government, operating under rules and procedures that over time become institutionalised, all with the intent of providing public services to the citizens. Wright (1978) identified specific characteristics of intergovernmental relations. First of all, intergovernmental relations incorporate many governmental units from the National and Sub-national levels. Secondly, it is aimed at ensuring that the officials involved work with a common goal in mind. And finally, it establishes a channel of communication between these officials to share information and achieve target goals.

Another important concept of this research is policy implementation. However, before attempting a definition of policy implementation, there is the need to understand what a policy is. A policy could be described as a course of action with stated goals and objectives and contains procedures for their actualisation (Nicolaidis, 1960). In summary, a policy is a statement of aims, purposes, principles, or intentions that guide implementers in accomplishing objectives. Similarly, Anderson (2003) defines policy as a constant and predetermined course of action guideline an actor or actors towards solving a problem or an issue of concern. From this definition, Anderson identified three features of public policy. One, a policy is a purposive or goal-oriented action and not a random behaviour or chance occurrence. Two, a policy consists of patterns of activity taken over time by governmental officials devoid of their separate, discrete decisions. And finally, public policies are responses to demands for action or inaction on some public issue made by the citizens, group representatives or legislators on government officials and agencies.

Policy implementation involves the actions taken by public and private individuals to realise goals and objectives stated in the policy document (Van Meter

and Van Horn, 1975). O'Toole (2000), on his part, defines policy implementation as the events that occur between when government enact a policy to do something or stop doing something and the eventual effect it has in the world of action. The general feature of policy implementation is converting financial, material, human and technical resources into outputs that resolve societal problems.

Cooperation and collaboration are two terms that are often used synonymously with one another. While some scholars use the term cooperation (Kurt, 2000, Lundin, 2007), others use the term collaboration (Ansell and Gash, 2008, Wanna, 2008). However, the terms share many similarities, so scholars often use them interchangeably (Polenske, 2004). The two words carry the same meaning for this research: working with others to achieve a common goal. It involves aligning activities between actors. (Wanna, 2008).

Organisational structures refer to the relationship between units that forms part of an organised whole. The organised whole is divided into teams to determine the functions or tasks assigned to each department and facilitate coordination (Monavarian, Asgari and Ashan, 2007). Consequently, the structure of the Intergovernmental relations is the organised whole of federal, state and local government agencies that serve as the units with assigned responsibilities, line of authority and channel of communication to facilitate coordination. Therefore, it is essential to avoid duplication of efforts and sub-optimal utilisation of resources. Intergovernmental processes refer to activities requiring federal, state, and local government officials to achieve a specified outcome. A summary of these activities includes planning, designing implementation guidelines, holding meetings, performance evaluation and budgeting. The character of the framework of the Intergovernmental relations as used within the context of this research refers to the behavioural traits, attitudes and disposition exhibited by these officials as a result of the framework. In other words, the structures and processes established to implement the policy have generated specific responses from these officials, which could have negative or positive consequences for the implementation processes. The impact of the character of the framework of Intergovernmental relations on policy implementation forms the basis of this research.

1.9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This research focuses on the intergovernmental structures and processes established for implementing the National policy on primary education. It seeks to understand how the character of the relationship between the federal, state and local government agencies affects the implementation process. This relationship could be conceptualised as a collaboration between the various levels of government to achieve the objectives of the policy. Consequently, this research seeks to understand the factors that may hinder or enhance effective collaboration between the various levels of government.


Diverse models and theories have been developed to describe and explain intergovernmental relations and /or intergovernmental collaboration. The essence of these theories is to enable researchers to identify the crucial variables and their interrelationship in determining the policy outcomes of intergovernmental relationships. Consequently, in studying intergovernmental relations, attention is often paid to structures and processes established to facilitate interactions between officials across governmental levels with the intent of delivering public services. In describing the structural arrangement created to implement the National Policy on primary education subsumed under Universal Basic Education, the administrative federalism model was adopted. Newton (1978) observed that in American federalism, a great deal of attention was given to programme objectives, and less attention was paid to methods and processes for implementation. However, the neglect of designing appropriate strategies and techniques of implementation could inadvertently hinder the attainment of programme objectives. It is based on implementing federal programmes that Newton prescribed a framework that could facilitate the implementation of these programmes in terms of management prerequisites and principles for monitoring, reporting, directing and approving and utilisation of resources that deals with allocation of responsibilities.

The model focused on three salient aspects of federal, state, and local relations: Grant-type relationships, Cooperative agreement-type relationships, and Procurement contract-type relationships. The model identifies the basis on which each of the relationships should be established. In a Grant-type relationship, the federal intent should be on giving financial assistance to lower-level governments to perform functions that serve national objectives, which are the responsibilities of federal agencies. Likewise, the lower-level governments should be given the mandate to

manage the federally supported programmes with little or no federal interference when performing the functions. The requirement necessary in this regard is for such programmes to be done based on approved proposals and administrative standards, which the federal agency shall enforce. For the cooperative agreement-type relationships, the federal intent should be on stimulating lower-level governments to perform functions that serve national objectives, which are the responsibilities of federal agencies, and they collaborate in terms of performing specific roles and responsibilities, coordination and integration of projects with related projects and ensuring activities are in tandem with intended outcomes. Finally, the procurement contract-type relationships focus mainly on providing that products and services purchased to meet the requirements stipulated by the federal agency. The prescription offered by this model is to achieve effective coordination and uniform policy outcomes (Bakvis and Brown, 2010). The model was used to examine the structural arrangement and rules designed for implementing the National Policy on primary education subsumed under Universal Basic Education.

In the same vein, to better understand the factors that may enhance or inhibit effective collaboration between the government agencies implementing the National

Figure 1.1: Contingency model of collaborative governance



policy on primary education, the Contingency model of collaborative governance by Ansell and Gash (2008) was chosen. The model offers valuable insight into variables that could affect the outcome of such collaborative efforts. The model was developed based on a meta-analytical study of existing literature on collaborative governance. It is based on four broad variables with sub-sets of variables that determine the success or failure of the collaborative process. Figure 1 gives a visual representation of the model

The contingency model is premised on the assumption that these variables have a high probability of determining the success or failure of a collaborative process. According to Ansell and Gash (2008), these broad variables could be broken down into specific variables that affect the collaborative process. These general and specific variables are described below:

STARTING CONDITIONS

This represents the conditions under which collaboration may commence. This is crucial to the collaboration process as it may enhance or impede cooperation among the agencies or stakeholders involved. These starting conditions comprise three broad variables, namely, resources or power imbalances, incentives to collaborate and previous history of conflict or cooperation among stakeholders. Each of these variables could be considered as the base upon which the collaboration process is built.

(i). Power/Resource Imbalances

Power or resource imbalance is a situation whereby some of the stakeholders do not have the technical know-how, managerial skills, position or funds to participate or to engage in the collaboration on an equal footing. Thus, resulting in the manipulation of the partnership by more vital actors. Eventually, these imbalances create distrust or weak commitment to the collaboration process (Gray 1989, Warner 2006). Thus, to address these imbalances, specific strategies need to be introduced to empower the weaker stakeholders. Based on this argument, Ansell and Gash proposed that a situation that the power/resource imbalance is significant to the extent that it affects the meaningful participation of critical stakeholders, then there is a need to put in place a positive strategy that will empower and give representation to weaker or disadvantage stakeholders.

(ii) Incentives to Participate

While an act of parliament could mandate collaboration among public agencies, participation by various stakeholders is still voluntary. The mechanism to coerce is significantly reduced, and incentives most times catalyse the involvement. Therefore, factors that shape these incentives are essential. Incentives range from financial gains to concrete, tangible policy outcomes resulting from the collaborative process. For instance, a power or resource imbalance between the various stakeholders reduces their incentive to participate in the collaborative processes (Imperial 2005).

Similarly, incentives to participate are affected by the expectation from the stakeholders that the joint effort will yield meaningful results considering the time and energy involved, in a situation where the stakeholders perceive a relationship between their participation and concrete results, the incentive to participate increases. However, if they consider their role to be merely advisory or ceremonial, the incentive to participate declines, likewise, when stakeholders believe that they can achieve their goals acting alone or by means outside the collaborative process, incentives to participate may be low. However, this could be avoided when stakeholders are convinced that achieving their goals depends on cooperation with other stakeholders (Logsdon, 1991). Thus, Ansell and Gash argue that if there are alternative avenues for stakeholders to achieve their goals independently, the collaborative process will only succeed once they see themselves as mutually dependent. Similarly, suppose interdependence is based on the collaborative forum being an exclusive platform for all the stakeholders. In that case, initiators of the collaborative process must ensure that alternative venues like the Courts, Legislators and Executive respect the outcomes from the collaboration.

(iii). Prehistory of Antagonism and Cooperation

Based on findings in the literature, there is the assumption that if a prior history of antagonism or cooperation exists among stakeholders, then the collaborative process could end up as a success or failure. For instance, if there is a prehistory of conflict, the tendency for trust to be low is high. This will also affect the level of commitment which may also be low. On the other hand, prehistory of cooperation builds social capital and increases trust, which translates to a functional cycle of collaboration. Based on these assumptions, the authors postulate that if the previous history of relations among stakeholders is antagonistic in nature,, then the

collaboration process will succeed when there is an increase in the degree of interdependence and measures are taken to address the low level of trust among stakeholders.

FACILITATIVE LEADERSHIP

The essence of leadership in the collaborative process is to ensure that stakeholders come together and engage each other in an atmosphere of collaboration. In other words, the leader is responsible for establishing procedures, facilitating trust, initiating dialogue, and showcasing areas of mutual benefits. Chrislip and Larson (1994) identify the critical attribute of the style of leadership needed for the collaborative process, which is about ensuring that the process is not aborted but safeguarded and promoted among participants. This is contrary to a leadership style that is individualistic and takes decisive action without consultation. Ryan (2001) listed effective management of the collaboration that reflects technical credibility and can make decisions that are appealing, honest and acceptable to the stakeholders as the hallmark of effective collaborative leadership. The role of leadership in the collaborative process is to safeguard its integrity and ensure that the stakeholders remain committed to the collaboration. Ansell and Gash (2008) noted that in situations of weak incentives for participants to be fully involved, the power and resources available between participants is unevenly distributed, and adversarial relations pre-exist, then leadership serves as the remedy. Thus, they propose that when these factors are present, there is a need for an honest broker or leader that each stakeholder accepts and trusts. Alternatively, when the incentive to participate is weak, and power distribution appears seemingly equal, there is a need for a 'natural' leader that has the trust and respect of the diverse stakeholders at the beginning of the collaboration. This kind of leadership usually evolves among the stakeholders.

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

This deals with the structure and processes put in place for the collaborative process. This is crucial in the collaboration as it determines who can participate and to what extent their participation will be. Reilly (1998, 2001) believed that groups who perceived that they have a lawful right to be involved in the collaboration are likely to be committed. Similarly, Reilly (2001) observed that when there is a tendency to exclude critical stakeholders, the partnership may fail. Thus, there is a need to ensure

that the partnership involves major stakeholders who perceive their participation has been legitimate.

In the same vein, when stakeholders perceive that the collaborative process is not optimal for the resolution of issues or differences, they may pursue alternative avenues for resolution. When this happens, they may be a drop in the level of commitment of individual stakeholder. This can be avoided if there are clear ground rules and the process is transparent (Busenberg, 1999; Imperial, 2005).

THE COLLABORATIVE PROCESS

The collaborative process could be divided into the following stages; background to the problem, direction to take and implementation (Gray, 1989). This process flows in a cyclical way rather than in a linear way. Imperial (2005) states this cycle revolves around interpersonal contact, trust, commitment, mutual respect, and results. Thus, Ansell and Gash (2008) categorise the collaborative process into:

(i) Face-to-Face Dialogue

Communication serves as the basis for the various stakeholders to negotiate and arrive at a consensus. Through this process, stakeholders can identify avenues for mutual gains. Similarly, the face-to-face dialogue could build trust, understanding, and sharing the same perspective on issues and commitment to the process (Gilian *et al.* 2002, Warner, 2006). These observations from the literature informed the arguments of Ansell and Gash that face-to-face dialogue is a condition that could enhance collaboration but is not sufficient to guarantee it. This is because while it tends to reinforce stereotypes or increase antagonism, there cannot be effective collaboration without this two-way communication channel.

(ii) Trust Building

Another vital aspect of the collaborative process is trust-building among stakeholders. It is not enough to negotiate and arrive at a consensus. Trust must also be built among stakeholders, mainly if there is a prehistory of antagonism. However, trust-building takes time to develop and requires a long term commitment to actualising collaborative outcomes. Consequently, Ansell and Gash believe that once antagonism is the prior relationship between the stakeholders, adequate time is needed to build trust. However, if this cannot be put in place, there is no justification to collaborate with each other.

(iii) Commitment to the Process

Stakeholders' level of commitment plays a vital role in determining whether the collaboration will succeed or fail. Ansell and Gash observed from the literature that a fundamental issue that needs to be addressed at the initial stage of the collaboration is getting the stakeholders' resolve to put up with the outcomes of the deliberation even if the result of such reviews does not support their views. In a situation like this, trust among stakeholders becomes vital as their commitment to the collaborative process will base on it. Another aspect that affects the commitment of stakeholders to the collaborative process is 'ownership'. Stakeholders must see themselves as owners of the process and not antagonise other stakeholders whose views differ from theirs (El Ansari 2003; Geoghegan and Renard 2002). Where collaboration is mandated because of weak incentives to participate, there is a likely probability that this can disguise stakeholders' lack of real commitment. Based on this observation, Ansell and Gash argue that although collaborative governance can be mandated, ensuring that the stakeholders buy into the process. Also, they say that instances of high interdependence among stakeholders may increase their level of commitment to collaboration; however, it may create avenues for them to manipulate and assimilate others. This can be avoided if collaboration is seen as ongoing cooperation and not a one-off deal. Therefore, the strategies of collaborative governance are apt for situations of continuing collaboration.

(iv) Shared Understanding

This involves a clear understanding among stakeholders of the problem (same perspective on the definition of the problem) or the required knowledge needed for solving the problem. This is to facilitate a clear understanding among stakeholders of what their collective action will achieve.

(v) Intermediate Outcomes

Collaborative efforts must anticipate "small wins" for the stakeholders involved. These "small wins" may be critical outcomes that could be achieved in the shortest possible time and encourage a continuous commitment and trust building (Vangen and Huxham 2003). Based on these considerations, Ansell and Gash drew the following conclusion that if prehistory of antagonism is high and trust-building over a more extended period is essential, short term results that demonstrate accomplishments are crucial. Otherwise, when initiators of collaboration cannot show these accomplishments, embarking on a collaborative process may prove futile.

In conclusion, while Ansell and Gash (2008) observed some problems collaborative efforts could encounter, such as manipulation by influential stakeholders, lack of real commitment by public agencies and distrust, they believe that this analytical framework could serve as a guide to practitioners and scholars on the factors that are likely to generate successful collaboration at least in terms of outcomes and areas of departure from the intended outcome. Based on the output generated, one could verify if this was achieved with the presence or absence of these variables. It offers a broader and deeper insight into all the possible variables that could affect the implementation of the National policy on primary education in Lagos state based on the collaboration between the three tiers of government. Notwithstanding, the model has its limitations, as the authors noted that it is not an attempt to have a complete set of generalisations or establish cause-effect relationships. On the contrary, it provides a basis for observation and theory building, which is part of this research's objectives.

1.10 STUDY OUTLINE

The study has six chapters with a breakdown as follows:

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduced the work covering the background, statement of the problem, research questions, objectives of the study, the definition of terms and theoretical framework.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter reviewed the literature on the relationship patterns among the three tiers of government and how it affects policy implementation. The chapter examined in-depth the implementation strategies over the years and the outcomes with particular reference to Nigeria. This was to ascertain the level of interface between intergovernmental relations and policy implementation in Nigeria.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.

This chapter highlighted the research design adopted for this study, the case study approach, and data was collected and analysed using the qualitative method. Similarly, the state of primary education in Lagos was examined, emphasising the policy goals enunciated in the National Education Policy (NPE). This was to ascertain

the progress and challenges confronting the policy by reviewing up-to-date reports and publications on primary education in Lagos state.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK AND PERFORMANCE OF THE NATIONAL POLICY ON PRIMARY EDUCATION

This chapter examined the structures and processes to implement the National policy on primary education, emphasising the intergovernmental design. Similarly, it evaluated the policy from 1999-2015 using secondary qualitative and quantitative data.

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

This chapter embodied the practical aspect of the work. Here analysis was done on the data collected from the field to ascertain the effectiveness of the intergovernmental structures and processes for the implementation of the National policy on primary education. Deductions and conclusions were made on the results obtained.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

The chapter served as a postscript to the study, summarising the findings and offering new insight into intergovernmental relations in policy implementation.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN NIGERIA

2.1. Preamble

The study of intergovernmental relations and its impact on public policy implementation is not new to political science discourse. Studies dating back to the 1970s were done to understand better the role of intergovernmental relations in public policy implementation. Van Horn and Van Meter (1976), who belonged to this dispensation of the study, believed that research on intergovernmental relations should focus on the policy implementation process. They believe that an analysis of policy implementation is about explaining how policies translate to public services and identify factors responsible for the actualisation and non-actualisation of policy objectives. Thus, the essence of intergovernmental relations is to implement public policies.

However, studies on intergovernmental relations in Nigeria focus more on fiscal matters and constitutional jurisdiction, while little is known about how intergovernmental relations impact the policy implementation. For instance, Otobo (2002) identified poor intergovernmental relations as one of the weaknesses noticed in the Nigerian public sector. The emphasis of his study was on Federal government encroachment into State and Local governments' jurisdiction. This pattern of examination is observed in the works of Akinsanya (2005), Ogbuishi (2007) and Suberu and Agbaje (1998) and. While these studies have identified a weak intergovernmental relation in the country, further study is needed to explain the factors responsible for the weakness.

On the other hand, studies on policy implementation tend to focus more on the administrative processes with little or no mention of how the nature of the relationship among the tiers of government affects the implementation process. For example, Ikelegbe (1994:81) stated that "the policy is derailed or becomes ineffective when

desired actions and standards are not adhered to by those implementing them”. Thus, his emphasis was on the disposition of those implementing the policy. Okoroma (2006) also expressed a similar view that the absence of a political will, discontinuity of policies, and corruption are the reasons for poor implementation of the policies in the education sector. Makinde (2005) also shares this view. While these views give us an insight into problems confronting policy implementation in Nigeria, it leaves out the impact of intergovernmental relations, which is crucial in the opinion of Sundquist and Davis (1969). In a Federal system, one central problem will be how to ensure that the actions of state and local governments, who are constitutionally separate from one another and sometimes maybe politically hostile, are in tandem with actualising the goals and objectives set by the national government. Thus, another salient variable that needs to be examined in public policy implementation in Nigeria is the pattern of intergovernmental relations.

Ogbuishi (2007) identified three patterns of intergovernmental relations in a federal system. These are dual, cooperative and competitive federalism. Dual federalism is a clear separation of powers and functions among the tiers of government. Corwin (1950) identified specific attributes of dual federalism. These include; a central government with particular capabilities, two levels of government within its sphere of jurisdiction ‘sovereign and equal’ and a relationship based on ‘tension rather than collaboration’. In other words, Dual federalism is a clear delineation of authority and responsibilities among the tiers of government. However, Kincaid (2017) disagrees with the postulation that tension characterises the relationship between the central and constituent governments. The author thinks that Dual federalism exhibits tendencies of collaboration, cooperation and even collusion as it is practically impossible for the various levels of government to function in watertight compartments.

Similarly, Ugwu (1998) argues that Dual federalism is not feasible considering that interdependence has come to characterised intergovernmental relations within a federation. The period during which the Lyttelton constitution of 1954 was in operation is described as the era when a semblance of Dual federalism occurred. During this period, the regions exercised considerable powers, and there was the perception that the federal government played second fiddle to the regional governments. A combination of factors was responsible for this pattern of relationship. One, the dominant political parties (NCNC, AG and NPC) was regional

in outlook. Two, the regions had a considerable level of financial independence. Third, these political parties' leadership chooses to remain in their areas than seek election into the central government (Akinsanya 1989). Although these observations by Akinsanya are debatable, it is still the era many commentators on Nigerian federalism allude that the country operated 'true' federalism.

Another variant of federalism reflecting intergovernmental relations is competitive federalism. Wagner (2001) used the Wicksell framework to describe competitive federalism. The premise of the Wicksell framework is that the scope of government activities is a function of the ability of political entrepreneurs to gain support for their projects. Thus, which level of government performs a role and to what extent is the competitive process. The implication of this is that the central government and the constituent governments can expand their sphere of jurisdiction as long as they can galvanise support for their programmes, which may be the constitutional responsibility of another level of government. From the above description, it could be deduced that the federal government could expand its sphere of jurisdiction into the state and Local governments' jurisdiction based on its financial capability. On the other hand, cooperative federalism emphasises an interdependent relationship among the tiers of government despite the constitutional division of powers and functions. It encompasses a division of responsibilities as well as structures. It is a system of sharing capabilities between the federal and state governments, which could be formal like intergovernmental agreements and informal like sharing information and experiences. A central premise of cooperative federalism is that cooperation is negotiated and not coerces (Elazar,1992). A situation where cooperation is forced shifts to another variant of federalism which Kincaid (1990) conceptualise as Coercive federalism. Intergovernmental relations under this federal arrangement are characterised by the federal government's dominance in policymaking and the compulsion of state and local governments as 'unwilling' partners in the implementation process. The opportunity for sub-national governments to negotiate cooperation with the national government is restricted. Kincaid (2017:1062) observed that the communication channel between officials from the federal and sub-national levels is characterised more by instructions for the latter to follow than negotiations which are at variance with the concept of intergovernmental cooperation.

The study of intergovernmental relations has often been to understand the interaction pattern among the tiers of government. This pattern of relationship affects service delivery. Arising from the definition of intergovernmental relations by Cameroon (2001), most public policies involve multiple organisations and institutions in their implementation. Similarly, Freinkman (2007) believed that it is imperative to create a system that motivates government agencies at various levels of authority to cooperate in designing their policies and delivery of services. Thus, a broader understanding of the relationship pattern among the tiers of government could offer more profound insight into the problems of public policy implementation in Nigeria. This chapter examines the structures and processes for Intergovernmental relations, the patterns and dimensions, the pattern of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria and the problems of public policy implementation in Nigeria.

2.2: INTERGOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

Over the years, there has been an increasing recognition that a single level of government cannot implement many public policies and programmes. Multiple levels of government exercise simultaneously managerial responsibilities over more and more policies and programmes which has created interdependence among levels of government which has necessitated the need to have structures and processes that would manage these interactions. These structures and processes are what Rabin (2007) referred to as instruments of intergovernmental relations and are categorise into structural, programmatic, research and capacity building and behavioural mechanisms.

The structural instrument of Intergovernmental relations deals with formal roles and relationships, mode of authority and leadership, agreements, guidelines, rules, and strategies for separation and fusion of legal functions, responsibilities and relationships. The legal roles and relationships are not static but subject to change as organisations for intergovernmental relations are designed and redesigned. Likewise, the mode of authority and leadership are altered as organisations undergo these changes. Current needs and priorities often necessitate these changes. For instance, reorganisation may occur based on the need to align programmes that appear related to achieve better performance and maximise resources. This often affects horizontal relationships as new participants are added to the structure, thus changing the dynamics of the connections. For example, the redesign of the administrative

arrangements for primary education from the National Primary Education Commission to the Universal Basic Education Commission has affected horizontal and vertical relationships. The former emphasised primary education while the latter incorporated pre-primary and post-primary education into its mandate. This has led to the redesigning of roles, responsibilities and the inclusion of more participants. For instance, at the state level, the State Universal Basic Education Board oversees both primary and junior secondary education with inputs from the agency in the State Ministry of Education in charge of secondary education.

Similarly, at the Local government councils, there are multiple units involved in primary education like the Local Government Education Authority, school board management committee and Parents' Teachers Association. Coordination is another aspect of the structural instruments of intergovernmental relations. Coordination is the mechanism for integrating units differentiated along the lines of function, level or geography. The essence of the coordination mechanism is to avoid duplication of efforts. It could also improve horizontal relationships when agencies on the same governmental level are brought together and assigned specific responsibilities towards achieving a goal. Finally, regulation and oversight are tools under structural instruments done within political/ideological consideration. In Nigeria, where there is the suspicion of state government officials by federal officials, stringent rules are attached to grants giving to the former. In the case of the Universal Basic Education programme, withholding matching grants should a state fail to account for the expenditure of previous grants is a tool to ensure accountability and exercise oversight over state governments.

The programmatic instruments are tools that deal with the utilisation of resources and redesign of policies. The aim is to ensure that sub-national and local governments are provided with help by the national government to resolve economic and social problems. This is done through intergovernmental grants from federal to sub-national and local governments. The grants could be conditional, whereby the funds are meant for specific projects or programmes and cannot be used otherwise. An example is the matching grants giving to state governments to fund basic education within their states. Unconditional grants are those the state governments could exercise discretion on how the funds are to be spent.

Research and the capacity-building instrument are premised on the notion of empowerment. This is to ensure that officials across the various tiers of government

can perform their tasks. Consequently, these officials train these officials to carry out research, collection, storage and dissemination of information and capacity building in managerial capabilities. Research is an indirect tool of intergovernmental management to help these officials understand the challenges and issues, likely outcomes, and options associated with public policies. Capacity building is also needed, particularly at the state and local government levels. This is to help these officials acquire requisite skills to manage programmes with minimal or no supervision from the national level. In the standard action plan for implementing the Universal Basic Education programme, capacity building is one of the objectives needed to achieve primary education goals.

The last instrument identified by Rabin (2007) is a behavioural instrument. This behavioural instrument is based on the dilemma national officials are confronted with when designing the structures and processes of intergovernmental relations. For instance, issues of accountability and autonomy in terms of discretion open to lower-level officials present a difficult challenge. Oftentimes, national officials have to decide between having more or less accountability and autonomous mechanisms in the framework. This is why attention needs to be placed on individual and group communication processes and conflict management processes. Conflict is an inevitable aspect of intergovernmental relations that requires mechanisms for managing it. Without these mechanisms, the intergovernmental framework for implementation may not achieve its stated goals. Based on this perspective, framers of the framework must give attention to building consensus among participants. This is achieved by asking participants to identify and overcome barriers to the effective workings of the intergovernmental framework. Similarly, instructions from the national level should be done within the context of negotiations rather than a command and control approach. This could also affect communication between these officials as there is a tendency for state officials to conceal information once communication is perceived as a monologue.

2.3: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: PATTERNS AND DIMENSION

Studies done on intergovernmental relations had initially focused on formal structures and processes, emphasising financial arrangements (Painter, 2012). However, the informal channels of interaction also have considerable influence on the pattern of intergovernmental relations. This has made generalisations of the practice

of intergovernmental relations complex with each case study exhibiting its uniqueness. Notwithstanding, the relationship between levels of governments must occur within a framework. It is this framework that most studies on intergovernmental relations have examined to identify a pattern. Several issues come to bear in intergovernmental relations. Notably among these issues is the need to achieve uniformity of policy outcomes across the federation and guarantee the constituent units' autonomy in their sphere of jurisdiction. The extent to which these issues can be resolved depends a lot on the actors and the principles guiding the relationship between these levels of government.

Bakvis and Brown (2010) undertook a comparative study of intergovernmental processes and outcomes in Canada and the United States. The study was premised on two models of coordinating policies in a federation. The purpose of coordinating policies is to ensure that institutions and processes align across levels of governments, attain a reasonable level of horizontal objectives, minimise overlap and duplication and eliminate actions of one or more units that could jeopardise the achievement of horizontal objectives (Bakvis and Juillet, 2004). These models are based on specific identifiable patterns that federations use to achieve desirable policy outcomes. The two models are administrative and jurisdictional federalism.

Administrative federalism is a model designed to facilitate closer scrutiny of governmental relations' structure and operational dynamics in several federations. Notable federations that exhibit this form of intergovernmental relations are Germany, Austria, Mexico, Brazil and the United States. It typifies an arrangement of financing and implementing programmes with the active involvement of two or more levels of government. Public policies and programmes are designed at the national level involving the executive and legislative branch of government. In contrast, sub-national governments assume the responsibility of administering and implementing these national policies and programmes. The features of administrative federalism appear more prominent in the German federation. The federal government in Germany makes laws for most policy fields in the federation, while the duty of administration and implementation rests on the Lander (sub-national) governments. Features of administrative federalism could also be seen in the Nigerian federation. The federal government formulates policies in major policy sectors like health,

education, water supply and sanitation. The state governments assume the responsibility of administering these policies.

Jurisdictional federalism, on the other hand, typifies an arrangement where each level of government assumes responsibility for policies within its sphere, and avenues for different levels of government to have input in policy-making at the national level does not exist. Canada represents the ideal example of a federation that operates jurisdictional federalism. The Canadian federation has been influenced a great deal by the dual federalism doctrine. This has manifested in a detailed enumeration of constitutional powers for provinces and federal governments. Thus, each level of government is expected to function within its sphere of constitutional powers. However, this does not negate opportunities for interaction as evident in specific policy sectors of the country like agriculture, immigration and criminal justice.

The coordination of policies under the two models also differs. Under administrative federalism, policy coordination is achieved through centralised coordinative instruments like conditional grants transfer, joint deliberative institutions and binding regulations. The intention is to ensure consistency and uniformity of policy outcomes across the federation. Coordination of policies under jurisdictional federalism is done non-hierarchical, with bargaining and trade-off typifying negotiations between the federal and provincial governments. Policy outcomes under jurisdictional federalism are assumed will show variations across the federation. However, findings by Bakvis and Brown (2010) indicate that policy coordination under the two models does not always generate the intended policy outcomes. There was evidence of policy variations in the United States and policy uniformity in Canada. This highlights the need to examine intergovernmental relations beyond the structures and processes established to coordinate policies and programmes (Gamklar and Viekers, 2010).

Bolleyer and Thorlakson (2012) examined interdependence in federation within the assignment of legislative and administrative competencies and fiscal powers. The authors noted that the way state institutions assign these functions across levels of government could shape the relationship between them. The essence of focusing on interdependence was necessitated by the need to capture the relationship between levels of government which often receives minimal attention. Interdependence is defined as a reciprocal process involving government agencies

from different levels whose participation could be willingly or compelled to perform collectively. As stated earlier, the way these competencies – legislative and administrative competencies and fiscal powers – are allocated determines the pattern of relationship between the levels of government. A situation of issuing competencies on operational basis could lead to an intense form of interdependence. In other words, the national government is assigned the legislative responsibility of formulating policies, and the sub-national governments are delegated the administrative duty of implementation. This may generate a closer working relationships as each level of government performs functionally distinct tasks. However, in situations where competencies are shared- each level of government exercises authority over a sub-set of the same policy – between the central and constituent governments could lead to cooperation or competition depending on the type of actors involved and the political dynamics of the system. For example, in Switzerland, where competencies are shared between the central and constituent governments, evidence of cooperation exists. In contrast, Canada, which also has shared competencies, manifest high competitiveness between levels of government and may lead to inter-jurisdictional conflict. This shows the difficulty of concluding that adequately captures all the nuances of intergovernmental relations.

The above description of intergovernmental relations shows the difficulty at arriving at a conclusion that sums up the various dimension and patterns. Although the prism through which intergovernmental relations is examined may arrive at different conclusions, there is the agreement that intergovernmental relations is shaped by a blend of formal and informal processes (Phillimore, 2013).

2.4: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

Heinemann-Gruder, Keil, Kossler and Woelk (2017) view intergovernmental relations as an arrangement based on formal and informal channels of interaction to achieve coordination and cooperation between multiple levels of governments in a federalized and decentralized political system. In other words, intergovernmental relations is the interaction that occurs between elected and appointed government officials across the different tiers of government. This interaction takes place within a certain institutional framework that may have been established by the constitution, Act of the National Assembly or set up as an ad hoc body. The mechanism for intergovernmental relations may be intra-jurisdictional; that is, arrangements that

federalize the centre by bringing in representatives from the states into federal institutions like the National Assembly in Nigeria. It could also be inter-jurisdictional, arrangements between officials at the federal, state and local governments.

The pattern of intergovernmental relations could take the form of

- 1. Federal – State,**
- 2. Federal - Local,**
- 3. Federal – State - Local,**
- 4. State - Local,**
- 5. Inter-State,**
- 6. Inter - Local.**

While this study focuses on 1999-2015, it is pertinent to examine historically how the federal, state and local governments have related to one another before this period.

According to Ayoade (2005), 1946-1966 was when the relationship between the federal and regional governments could be described as coordinated. This was due to specific constitutional provisions which accord the regions a semblance of equality with the central government. For instance, Richard's constitution of 1946 gave supremacy of regional law over central legislation. In another word, in the event of a conflict between the law enacted by the provincial assembly and that promulgated by the central assembly, the provincial law prevails. However, this was revised by the Lyttleton constitution of 1954. Although it allowed the regions to have their own constitution, the central laws took precedence over regional laws.

The dynamics of federal-state relations was drastically altered at the collapse of the first republic in 1966. It became more of a centralized federation as the powers of the constituent units were gradually eroded. While many factors could be adduced have been responsible for the concentration of powers at the centre, two observable characteristics stand out. First of all, at the end of the civil war, the federal government broke the existing regions into states. This action was taken with the intent to checkmate secession tendency by any part of the federation. By this act, the states were seen as the creation of the federal government and not an aggregation of the constituent units coming together to form a federation. Consequently, the stage was set for an ordinate-subordinate relationship between the federal and state governments (Osaghae, 1992). The second factor is the advent of military rule. The military structure by design is hierarchical, which is antithetical to the practice of

federalism. Thus, the outcome of military rule in Nigeria has been the concentration of powers at the centre and the weakening of the states.

While the trend under military rule had been the subordination of the state governments to the federal government, the tendency under civilian administration has been quite different. The relationship between the federal and state governments since the return to civil administration exhibited a high incidence of conflict, with the former adopting extra-constitutional means to coerce the latter. The contentious issues between them had arisen in the area of fiscal relations and sphere of jurisdiction.

2.4.1: INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

In the area of fiscal relations, a federal structure presupposes that each tier of government has certain functions allotted to it, which requires the necessary resources to perform it. Similarly, each level of government is expected to be independent of other levels in exploiting or utilizing these resources. In other words, each level of government should exercise financial autonomy to be able to fulfil its constitutional responsibilities. However, there are no universal principles that suffice to make a general prescription on finance for all federations. The trend is often to have alterations in the federation's fiscal relations to adapt to prevailing conditions. Wheare (1963) argued that federalism could not be seen as an absolute instead, there are adjustments and re-allocation within the context of present circumstances. This implies that as the circumstances change, so do the principles guiding the fiscal relations change. The constitution is only meant to establish the framework around which revenue can be shared among the various tiers of government which can be reviewed on periodical basis.

One of the principles of fiscal federalism is to evaluate the provision of public goods and services concerning coverage and then assign resources to the tier of government with the capacity to provide them. The federal government is saddle with the responsibility for delivering public goods and services that are beneficial to all citizens. These include foreign affairs, defence, population census and currency. With these responsibilities, the central governments in most federations have taxing powers over elastic and buoyant taxes. The state governments, on the other hand, have constitutional functions which have an extensive coverage but are not national in scope. In contrast, the local government are given tasks that are localized in area. Therefore, their resource base is aligned to meet these functions. While this is ideal, the practice in most federations does not conform to these principles. Federations

across the world experience fiscal imbalance either at the vertical level or horizontal level. In Nigeria, there is the presence vertical and horizontal budgetary imbalance, which has generated substantial conflicts between the federal and state governments.

A chronicle of events in revenue sharing among the three tiers of government shows the indelible mark left by the military on Nigeria's fiscal federalism. During this period, there was a concentration of resources at the centre, leaving the federating units with fewer resources. This created a mismatch between resources and constitutional responsibilities given to state governments thus, setting the stage for a conflict between the federal and the state governments upon return to civilian rule. At the onset of the current democratic dispensation in 1999, the country began to witness agitation from different quarters on how to create a balance in the federation in terms of resources at the disposal of the states. The request emanating from the geo-political zones varied as each zone based its argument for more funds on the peculiarities of their environment. The agitation became fierce as discordant voices began to emanate from the Northern part of the country against the clamours from the Southern region. The major issues were the derivation formula for the oil-producing states, unlawful withdrawal from the federation account and concentration of resources at the centre. So far, a balance is yet to be achieved in this sphere as there are still areas of disagreement between the federal and state government on these issues.

In the year 2000, the seventeen Southern Governors of Nigeria rose from their meeting to demand that national interest, derivation and need be used in allocating revenue to States. They were not favourably disposed to the arrangement, which made the Northern states have more revenue accruing to it than their counterparts in the South, despite the fact that the bulk of the revenue comes from that region. This tentatively gave birth to resource control agitation. The Southern Governors' define resource control as the operation of an ideal federal practice where the constituents units have direct oversight on their resources and remit to the national government funds be used for the maintenance of shared services (Dafinone, 2001). At the centre of the resource control agitation is the derivation principle, which the south-south governors were pushing for an upward review. Their argument was based on the negative impact of oil exploration on the environment and the need to compensate them by increased allocation to the region. The Northern Governors were not in support of this clamour for a change in the present arrangement as they maintained that this could lead to chaos in the country. A new twist was added to the resource

control cum derivation increase when the Federal government based its sharing of the 13 per cent derivation formula on the resource exploited on-shore, leaving the off-shore as the exclusive preserve of the Federal government. This compounded the issue of resource control as some states in the south-south geopolitical zone whose oil fields were located off-shore stand to lose proceeds from derivation. While the debate and controversy raged, the Federal government, through the then attorney-general, filed a suit at the Supreme Court to determine the oil-producing states' seaward boundary. The lawsuit was to establish if these states were entitled to resources derived from Nigeria's territorial waters, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. The Supreme Court judgment affirmed that the Federal government had exclusive right over the nation's territorial waters and continental shelf. Egwaikhide (2004) in his analysis of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Nigeria, stated the likely effect of the judgment. The ruling was that oil-producing states should not expect the federal government to apply derivation to revenue collected from crude extracted from Nigeria's territorial waters. Thus, the interpretation of this ruling is that the revenue from this source is deposited into the federation account and shared based on stipulated formula among each tier of government.

Consequently, income from off-shore oil exploration was out of the derivation framework, thereby creating a loss for some oil-producing states.

Similarly, more revenue will accrue into the federation account for vertical sharing, which is to the advantage of non-oil producing states. This is probably why elements from the North were not favourably disposed to the agitation for resource control and the increase in the percentage of derivation. Their displeasure also manifested when a political solution was sought over the Supreme Court judgment. Former President Obasanjo had forwarded a bill to the National Assembly abrogating the on-shore/off-shore dichotomy. However, the Federal lawmakers changed the contiguous zone to continental shelf. The implication is that littoral states will derive revenue from up to 200 nautical miles as against the contiguous zone of 24 nautical miles. The pressure was mounted on the Northern Federal legislators by their leaders not to pass the bill, which was also vetoed by the president. The Northern political elite based their displeasure against the resource control because it could lead to strong federating units (south-south) and could result in the demand for secession from the federation. Therefore to forestall such an event from happening, they advocated a strong centre.

Another sour spot in Nigeria's fiscal relations is the federal government's federation account's illegal deduction. Nigeria has a federation account into which resources are pooled and then shared among the three tiers of government using an agreed formula. The essence of this account is to ensure even development in the country. This is by re-distribution of resources to create a balance, particularly at the horizontal level. The federation account has enshrined in the 1999 constitution, is an account where accruals to the federal government from stipulated proceeds are to be paid into and disbursed to all the tiers of government using an agreed formula. Accruals into this account according to the constitution should be shared among the Federal, State and Local Governments such that zero balance remains in the account after each month's sharing. However, the federal government under the leadership of former president Obasanjo did not adhere to this principle. First of all, monies realized from other sources such as signature bonus, sales of government properties, privatization proceeds, dividends from the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas, waivers and concession between 2004 and 2007 were alleged not to have been paid into the federation account.

Consequently, what was to be shared among the three tiers of government was not the full accrual into the account. Secondly, the Federal government-operated special accounts like the Excess Crude Account. This is an account into which was paid earnings from crude oil sales, petroleum profit tax and royalties above the expected benchmark of each fiscal year. In other words, the surplus from these revenue sources was deposited into the account while the benchmark for the budget was paid into the Federation Account. The worth of note is that while the excess crude account was operated in dollars, there was also the Excess Domestic Account operated in naira. From this enormous wealth, former President Obasanjo was able to pay the Paris Club of Creditors, fund the contentious National Integrated Power Project, and finance the extra days of the National Census exercise in 2006.

This trend of unilateral decision or action by the federal government over the federation account is considered an offshoot of the military era, which has not diminished with the return to civil rule. Oladeji (2006) observed that with the present provisions of the 1999 constitution, related fiscal crisis might be constant phenomenon shaping relations between the federal and state governments in Nigeria's fourth republic. An indication that the immediate past conflict between the federal and state governments over the revenue sources and management of such funds is not

likely to abate. In the same vein, the ability of state governments to fund national programmes and policies may be limited unless there is financial assistance from the federal government.

2.4.2: SPHERE OF JURISDICTION

The sphere of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria is also punctuated by conflict over jurisdiction. The probability of this happening is high considering the constitutional provisions of the 1999 constitution, which is vague and open-ended with specific clauses, which allows the federal government unfettered access to state and local governments' jurisdiction. Painter (1991) expressed the view that the constitution basically designs the process of intergovernmental relations, which eventually also determines the output it will generate. Therefore, the constitution largely dictates the pattern of intergovernmental relations that exists in a federation. Aiyede (2004), in his description of the constitutional and institutional basis of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria, identified certain factors necessary for the adoption of a federal structure. One of the factors is a need to achieve equilibrium between unity and diversity as a panacea to crisis-prone multi-ethnic societies. This is by providing a platform for component political units to participate in the political process in a cooperative manner and militate against divisive tendencies common in plural societies. This is arguably the main reason for the adoption of the federal structure in Nigeria. Therefore, in fulfilment of this factor, there is a constitutional delineation of the powers and functions of the central and federating units' powers and functions to give political expression to the various cleavages. However, embarking on a legal tracing of powers does not translate into a stable federation as evidence has shown that it is the political actors within the national and sub-national levels that determine the federation's stability. Historical antecedence of federalism in Nigeria, particularly after the demise of the first republic, was the central government's ascendancy over the constituent units, which have resulted in fierce competition among the various ethnic groups for the control of federal institutions. This has elevated the federal government's status and made the state and local governments play subordinate roles in the federation.

The advent of military rule logically metamorphosed into a centralised federation due to the inherently hierarchical nature of the military establishment. This has given the centre more pre-eminence over the federating units and thus making contestation for power at that level highly volatile. With the return to civil rule in

1999, some elements of the military era were still evident as state and local government were treated like appendages of the federal government. This created a lot of conflicts between the federal and state governments. The 1999 constitution is instrumental to the kind of intergovernmental relations experienced in the country. It establishes the framework for relations by clarifying the powers and limits of each tier of government and creates specific intergovernmental agencies to enable interaction and cooperation among the levels of government. However, the 1999 constitution vested too much power in the federal government. The exclusive list has sixty-eight items reserved for the federal government, while thirty items are on the concurrent list for the federal and state government to legislate upon. This creates de jure federalism and a de facto unitarism (Akinsanya, 2005).

The Nigeria political landscape is filled with the federal government's encroachment into state and local governments' sphere of jurisdiction. Primary education is the constitutional responsibility of the local government, as stated in the fourth schedule of the 1999 constitution. Nonetheless, primary education is technically under the federal government's grip by launching the Universal Basic Education Programme (UBE), covering pre-primary, primary and junior secondary education. The programme's launch was not a welcome development with the state governors as they were not duly consulted. Similarly, they argued that such a programme requires their administrative capacity to implement. A situation whereby they were not brought on board to harmonize interests and opinions may impede the programme's success. Another instance of conflict that erupted under the Obasanjo administration was the issue of minimum wage. The President, under pressure from the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), and without consulting, the state governors, announced a new minimum wage of 5,500 naira for state government officials and 7,500 naira for federal government officials. In the opinion of the state governors, they should negotiate and fix the minimum wage for the state public service without interference from the federal government.

Consequently, state governments had to contend with a new minimum wage they were not prepared for, which led to labour strikes in some states. These were some of the fallouts of federal-state relations under the fourth republic, which reflects Elaigwu's view that the antecedence of the military in Nigeria's politics, which reflects executive militarism in its action, was still manifesting in the relations among the federal, state and local governments. (Elaigwu, 2007). The framework of

intergovernmental relations patterned by the 1999 constitution creates a hierarchical relationship. Although the constitution establishes several institutions to facilitate connections among the tiers of government, its leadership is vested with the federal government. Therefore, depending on the disposition of the political actors at the federal and state level, the constitution has given the former an undue advantage over the latter. This implies that conflicts noticed at the beginning of the fourth republic is not likely to dissipate.

The above historical account of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria has shown it to be highly conflictual with adverse implications for public policy implementation.

2.5. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS IN NIGERIA

In analyzing policy implementation in Nigeria focus will be on the identified problems affecting policy implementation in the country. While extant literature on policy implementation in Nigeria has identified many factors affecting the process, the effect of these factors varies across policies. Notwithstanding, two factors are constant in the implementation process. First is the organization responsible for carrying out specified tasks that will lead to the attainment of the policy goals. Public policy is not executed in a vacuum; an organization must be assigned the responsibility or authority for the policy. The second factor is the personnel that occupy these organizations; whether they can fulfil the tasks assigned to them. It is from these two factors that a series of implementation problems could be identified. For instance, Ikechukwu and Chukwemeka (2013) argued that organisational problems have been the critical factor negating successful policy implementation. Their argument is premised on certain identified obstacles inhibiting public organizations from executing public policies. Some of these factors include ineffective and corrupt political leadership, over-ambitious public policies, lack of requisite workforce and financial resources, e.t.c.

This argument forms the thread of discussion on policy implementation problems in Nigeria. Emphasis most often is on the bureaucratic structure and how it affects the capacity or behaviour of the bureaucrats. A similar perspective is also held by Sule *et al.* (2013). They have the view that certain factors are responsible for the failure of government policies. These include vague or unrealistic goals, environmental factors, forces in the economic environment, poor implementation, the

complexity of intergovernmental actions, bureaucratic problems, inadequate funding, communication problem, political instability and disposition of implementors. Worthy of note among these factors listed is the complexity of intergovernmental action and personality of implementor. These two factors are crucial to the success of public policy implementation in Nigeria. Government agencies working together to implement a public policy need better coordination so as not to duplicate efforts or create a conflictual atmosphere. Likewise,, the kind of relationship among the tiers of government can potentially affect the disposition of implementors. This disposition is shaped by the value orientation, state of mind and feeling of implementors. A situation whereby the relationship among the officials from the various tiers of government creates a sense of distrust, the resonating effect could be seen during the implementation process.

To buttress the importance of disposition of implementors, Dibia (2000) in his study of the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) by the Babangida administration, highlighted some of the factors that mitigated the success of the policy. The challenges confronting policy implementation at the federal level could be seen in the intra, and inter-ministerial conflict arising from the perceptions bureaucrats (civil servants) have of their ministerial mandates and compliance with the policy. His research focused on implementing the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which was an IMF/World Bank initiative to rescue the country from economic decline and rising debt profile. A specific aspect of the policy was the transfer of new research and development activities from the public sector to the private sector. The aim was to engineer adequate technological development for the country's ailing industry. In line with this objective, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), the apex policy-making organ of the government, issued a set of implementation guidelines in 1987. The ministries adhered to these implementation guidelines, which required them to develop the various research and development contracts with the private sector firms. The coordinating ministries responsible for supervision and evaluation during that period were the ministry of science and technology and the ministry of trade and industry. The interviews of senior officials of the ministry of defence, communication, Agriculture and Energy, Mines and Resources indicated that while some ministries had no conflict with the policy, other ministries had a conflict with the policy. For instance, the ministry of defence and communication had minimum or no conflict with the policy. This could be adduced

from the fact that the policy of contracting out research and development activities to private sector firms posed no threat to the ministry mandate.

On the other hand, the ministries of Agriculture and Energy, Mines and Resources gave very little support to the policy as officials' perceived it was at variance with their ministerial mandate. These officials viewed their ministries basically as research institutions with capabilities that private sector firms could not match. Thus, these ministries did little in the area of awarding research and development contracts to private firms. (Dibie 2000).

The deductions from Dibie's research show the importance of the disposition of government officials or implementers to the policy, thus highlighting the importance of organizational behaviour in the implementation process. While the catalogue of problems affecting policy implementation is in-exhaustive depending on the context of the study, the following problems discussed in the subsequent section of this thesis were identified as some of the main challenges of policy implementation. These problems will be situated within the context of Nigeria.

2.5.1 ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

An administrative problem in terms of compliance with management directives by lower-level officials is considered by some scholars as a fundamental issue affecting policy implementation. The ability of top-level officials to control subordinates is crucial to the success or failure of a policy. Etzioni (1964) noted that the effectiveness of an organization is seen in its ability to exercise considerable control over its personnel. Thus, the organisation saddled with the responsibility of implementing a policy must put measures to ensure that its officials carry out the tasks assigned to them. In other words, the top-level officials should minimise the discretion available to lower-level officials. Elmore (1978) identifies administrative control as one of the critical factors necessary for the success of a policy. This is based on the assumption that when the lower-level officials act in line with instructions communicated from the top, it reduces the chances of policy failure as tasks will be directed towards actualising the intent of the policymakers. This line of reasoning lends credence to a similar argument that policymakers should structure the implementation process to minimise the discretion open to lower-level bureaucrats. While this proposition is at variance with the tenets of the bottom-up theorists, top-down theorists argued that it is essential to limit the discretion open to implementors. Evidence from research on policy implementation in Nigeria highlights the

significance of administrative control in the implementation process. This was one of the observations made by Makinde (2005). She observed that the negative attitude of local government officials towards the women in Osun state is considered one of the reasons for the failure of the Better Life Programme and Family Support Programme in the state. This attitude Makinde noted could have resulted from the discontinuity of previous programmes. A deduction that can be made from the observation of Makinde is that while the two programmes were initiated at the federal level, it was difficult for federal officials to control the actions of local-level officials.

Another dimension of administrative control is the disposition of implementers to the policy. This also tends to inhibit control by top-level bureaucrats. According to Paki and Ebiefa (2011), the nature of implementers is a fundamental factor in the implementation process. Their argument is that once the implementers are negatively disposed to a policy, the commitment level to the implementation process will be low or lacking. The solution to this problem is for policymakers and top-level officials to put in place a system of direct controls, sanctions and incentives to ensure that subordinate officials comply with the directives of the policy. This was the same view expressed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975). They argue that superiors must put in place mechanisms and procedures to ensure that subordinates act in a manner consistent with policy standards and objectives. Therefore, controlling the action of implementers is crucial to the outcome of a policy.

2.5.2 COMPLEX NATURE OF PUBLIC POLICY

The nature of the policy also poses a problem to the implementation process. According to Lowi (1964), the form of relationships is determined by the expectations participants derived from it. Thus, in the case of public policy implementation, the expectation of the policymaker and implementers is shaped to a large extent by factors such as; the substantive matter in the policy content, the goals and expectations of the policy, extent of goal consensus on the policy, the change or complexity associated with the policy, the distributive, redistributive or regulatory nature of the policy and the policy concerns goods/services that can be provided collectively or divisibly (Morah, 1990).

These factors indicate the extent to which a policy's substance matter will affect the expectations to be derived by the policymakers and implementers. What this substance is, be it education, health, agriculture, etc, not only determines the participants, organisation and interest that will be involved in the implementation and

shapes the dimension of the process. For instance, the degree of conflict/consensus over the goals and expectations could affect the implementation. Again using the findings of Dibia (2000) as an example, it was observed that part of the reasons the ministries of agriculture and energy, mines and resources were not supportive of the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy is they disagree with one of the goals of the programme. This goal states that "the transfer of government research and development work to the private sector would lead inevitably to the development of indigenous technology that would be useful for Nigerian industries"(ibid:204). This, the officials of the ministries, felt, was a usurpation of their mandates and a covert way of saying they were not performing to expectations.

Consequently, few contracts were awarded rather than give their total commitment to the implementation process by awarding more contracts for research and development to the private sectors. Another instance of the expectation of participants been dashed is the monetisation policy of the Obasanjo administration. The policy was meant to monetise the fringe benefits of civil servants at the federal level. The federal government argued that the monetization policy would stem the rising tide of recurrent expenditure and free up resources for capital projects (Maikudi, 2012). Since the commencement of the policy, the expectation of federal workers has not been fulfilled as a result of the failure of the government to pay their monetized benefits. According to Fayomi (2013), the expectation of most of the workers was that they will be paid at once their monetized benefits. The contrary was the case as the Federal spread the payment over a twelve-month period, thereby dashing the expectation of the workers. The findings from the survey conducted by Fayomi showed that the workers liked the policy's goals but felt the implementation was poorly carried out. So far, the propaganda surrounding the policy's launch is dead down, and there are even speculations in some quarters that the policy has died. Thus, the expectation to be derived from a policy by the participants could affect the implementation process.

2.5.3 SHORTAGE OF RESOURCES

This is perhaps the most celebrated problem of policy implementation in Nigeria. Most studies on policy implementation in Nigeria have identified the inadequacy of resources as the bane of public policies. This is due to the observation that developing countries like Nigeria often do not have sufficient resources to execute their policies. They often have to make do with what is available or rely on

loans sourced from developed countries or international financial organizations. Consequently, the shortage of resources could truncate the implementation process even with essential variables (Makinde 2005).

Policy resources consist of three components. Firstly, monetary resources have to do with the capital and operating cost needed to actualize the policy. Secondly, the human resources deal with the available manpower with the requisite skill and technical knowledge to carry out the tasks geared towards achieving policy goals and objectives. Finally, there is the need to ensure that the issues or problems the policy was meant to address are done within a specified period.

In terms of monetary resources which deal with financing the capital and recurrent components of a policy, the trend in Nigeria has shown an inconsistent pattern. While the general outlook has been a marginal increase in financing some policies, the expenditure had been on recurrent items at the expense of capital projects. The observation made by Olaniyan and Busari (1999) was that although the federal government made available grants to the universities, it was not proportional to the enrolment rate. Despite this shortfall, the bulk of the funding still went to recurrent expenses, leaving little or nothing for capital projects. This was the same view expressed by Odoko and Nnanna (2009) that the number of classrooms had remained stagnant between 1999 and 2005 because of the low percentage of expenditure allocated to capital projects. While recurrent spending has a vital role in the implementation process, it is the capital expenses that concretize the policy goals. Notwithstanding how much the Federal, State and Local government pay their staff, the amount spent on building roads, classrooms, health centers, and water facilities indicates the level of government commitment to reducing illiteracy or maternal mortality. Another dimension to the monetary resources for policy implementation is when it is not released on time. It is a common practice in Nigeria for funds not to be released as or when due. This could stifle the whole process. For instance, Eminue (2006) examine executive-legislative relations using the budget process as the basis of his analysis. His observation was that, for the most part, funds meant for federal ministries and parastatals were not released on time, or a small fraction of the amount will be released before the end of the budget year. The bulk of the funds in the budget usually go to recurrent expenses. In summary, when financial resources are inadequate and not released on time, it could short circuit the implementation process.

The staffing aspect of resources has not done too well in comparison with the expectations of Nigerians. There is the tendency to have public agencies or organizations inadequately staffed in terms of quantity and quality (Aluko and Adesopo, 2002). Part of the reason for this trend is that recruitment into the public service is based on the state of origin or ethnicity rather than on qualification and professional competence (Anikeze, 2011). This manifests in the low-level bureaucrats' inability to fully comprehend the tasks needed to implement the policy. The pattern has been conformity to obsolete rules and procedures, which does not correspond with the rising challenges confronting policy implementation. The fact that the nation's public sector is made up of personnel who are not in tune with the current best practices is an indication that old techniques will be used to achieve modern ideas. Despite government efforts at downsizing the civil service and attracting fresh graduates, the recruitment system has a way of maintaining the status quo. The allegation against the former head of Nigeria immigration service indicates merit been sacrificed on the altar of primordial sentiments. She was accused of recruiting staff more from her ethnic background into the immigration service. Clearly, these individuals may not possess the necessary skills for implementing government decisions and may be shielded by the leadership from been sacked.

The time frame for implementing public policies is another major problem and an essential resource for implementation. Most public policies are often structured into a particularly political time frame of incumbent administration such that successive administrations either pay lip service to it or discontinue it outrightly. According to Aminu *et al.* (2012), policy in-continuity, which came about as a result of a change in administration, is one of the major problems affecting policy implementation in the country. Their argument is premised on the observation that each successive administration comes in with its policies and neglect the existing policies initiated by their predecessor. For example, the late president Yar Adua had a seven-point agenda covering education, health, and security during his brief stay in office. However, the Jonathan administration that succeeded that administration started its programme called the transformation agenda. In Oyo state, there is a similar trend of policy adjustment where an administration stops the policy inherited from its predecessor. The Ladoja administration introduced a policy of splitting the secondary schools into junior and senior secondary schools, with each having a separate principal. The Ajumobi administration has reversed that trend by merging the schools

back to a single secondary school with one principal. These instances validate the arguments of Aminu *et al.* (2012). This argument is similar to the observation made by Olaoye (2010). According to him, a public policy may have a cycle life of more than four years before it is subject to evaluation to ascertain if it's achieving its stated goal. However, a change in government brings a break in the implementation of the policy. This is because the new administration will introduce a new policy, thereby discarding the old policy. This creates confusion in the bureaucracy as the same organization implementing the old policy will implement the new one. Thus, creating a sought of systemic failure as public institutions will have to institutionalize the past administration's policy. The Nigeria political landscape is filled with short-circuited public policies. Each administration embarks on a new policy once it assumes power and surreptitiously terminates the policy of its predecessor. The outcome often is that it will take public officials to readjust to the new policy since they have already imbibed the doctrine of the old policy.

2.5.4 INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS

The crux of this thesis is to explore the effect of intergovernmental and concurrently inter-organizational relations on the implementation of the National Policy on primary education in Lagos state. The issues surrounding this relationship are not new. Most times, public policies are implemented by two or more organizations that collaborate to actualize the policy goals. Similarly, it could be collaboration between the levels of government (federal, state and local government) working together to implement a policy. Goggin, Bowman, Lester and O'Toole (1990) believed that most public policies are implemented within the framework of intergovernmental or inter-organizational relations. Thus, the more organizations involved in the implementation process, the less likelihood of achieving success.

The major contending issue under this arrangement is ensuring cooperation among the organizations or tiers of government and avoiding conflict, which can ultimately malign the whole implementation process. For instance, when tiers of government are not synthesizing their priorities, the policy outcome is often at variance with the national goals. The situation with national policies is that the federal government formulates these policies and leaves operational modalities like implementation to the State government. The State governments must adapt the policy objectives to local circumstances without negating the overall national goal. However,

rather than act in accordance with policy goals, the State governments pursue their agenda. For example, Nwosu (1977) observed a scenario between the federal government and the mid-west region. According to him, there exist asymmetric priorities between the federal and state government, which will not lead to the attainment of the desired national objectives. The federal government, on its wants to achieve modernized agriculture by providing infrastructure and communication of the benefits of research to farmers. The Mid-West state wanted to accomplish the same objective through commercial farming. This trend, he concludes, has given rise to problems of control and coordination. Osaghae (1992) also made a similar observations along this line. The statement he made touches on the control exercised by chief executives of public organizations who tend not to cooperate with other agencies in actualizing national goals. This trend, he argues, depicts a system without effective coordination of government activities. This lack of intergovernmental or inter-organizational coordination is affecting the success rate of developmental programmes negatively. One of the reasons adduced for this lack of intergovernmental cooperation is a political consideration. A situation whereby the political party that controls the federal government is different from the one at the State level creates a dichotomy of interest. Rather than focus on delivering public services through cooperation, these parties prefer to distance themselves from policies of other political parties. The aim is to take credit for developmental programmes or policies initiated by them. This attitude fosters conflicts and defects the essence of a relationship. The challenge before policymakers in Nigeria is how to ensure that the tiers of government work together to implement national policies.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This research seeks to examine how intergovernmental relations affect the implementation of National policy on primary education. It aims to explain how the character of the intergovernmental structures and processes affects the implementation process. The research used a case study approach to examine in detail the issues been investigated. To facilitate the collection and analysis of primary data, the qualitative collection and analysis of data was used. This is to enable a better understanding of the salient issues affecting intergovernmental relations and its impact on policy implementation.

3.1.1 SOURCES OF DATA

Data for this research came from multiple sources. This is to ensure that the overall quality of the study is high. This is because research that relies on a single source is rated low while multiple sources are rated higher (Yin, 2003). Consequently, this study obtained data from primary and secondary sources. The primary data were obtained from in-depth interviews, using semi-structured questions, of officials of the federal and state agencies established to implement the National policy on primary education. Likewise, headteachers of selected public primary schools were also interviewed. These agencies were created by the Universal Basic Education Act (2004) and serve as the Intergovernmental structure for the actualisation of basic education, which covers pre-primary, primary and junior secondary education. The Universal Basic Education Commission and Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board are the federal and state agencies, respectively.

Secondary qualitative and quantitative data for this research were derived from relevant literature on intergovernmental relations, policy implementation and primary education in Nigeria. These include government publications (Nigerian Education Sector Diagnosis, UBEC statistical bulletin, Nigerian Digest of Education Statistics, 2006-2010, Nigerian Education Data Survey (NEDS) report), journal articles,

research institutions, and international development organizations, media outfits and Non-governmental organizations. Data from these secondary sources complemented data from the primary source and served as the basis for the findings of this research.

3.1.2 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE/SAMPLE SIZE

The respondents for the in-depth interviews were drawn using purposive sampling from the Universal Basic Education Commission, Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board and Public primary schools. Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling technique that is used based on the discretion of the researcher. This kind of sampling is adopted when the subset of the population the researcher wants to study are easily identifiable; however, difficult to enumerate all of them (Babbie, 1990). Palys (2008) identified stakeholder sampling as a variant of Purposive sampling, a strategy of knowing the key stakeholders involved in designing, giving, receiving or administering a service or program being evaluated and the likely beneficiaries. This informed the decision to select Directors heading the various departments at the Universal Basic Education Commission, Abuja, Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board and Public primary schools. The interviews were conducted using semi-structured questions derived from the contingency model of collaborative governance.

At the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), these officials were interviewed; two officials from Academic services, one official each from Special programmes, Quality Assurance and Special projects. Thus, a total of five (5) interviews were conducted at UBEC. At Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board (LSUBEB), the following officials were interviewed: Planning, Research and Statistics, two from School support services, one each from Finance, Human Resources and Administration. Making a total of six (6) officials interviewed. Finally, the Head-teachers/teachers of public primary schools under the following Local Government Education Authority were also interviewed; Agege (1), Kosofe (1), Oshodi-Isolo (1), Ifako-Ijaiye (1) and Shomolu (2). This brings the overall interviews conducted to Seventeen (17). See Table 3.1.2.1 below:

3.1.3 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

Qualitative data derived from the primary and secondary sources were analyzed using qualitative content analysis. For the in-depth interviews, the analysis took the form of identifying a pattern in the interviewees' responses to know the issues affecting the character of the intergovernmental structures and processes established for the implementation of the National policy on primary education. This was complemented with qualitative and quantitative data from secondary sources to have a deeper understanding of the character of the framework of the Intergovernmental relations.

3.1.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION AND CONFIDENTIALITY REPORT

This study was guided by the ethics of research. A letter of consent was written to the respective agencies seeking approval to interview their officials on the relationship between them and government officials on other levels. The consent letter was sent along with the interview guide to allow respondents to peruse the questions to be asked. Subsequently, the appropriate authority issued approval to conduct the interviews (See appendix for approval letter). In conducting the interviews, the respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their responses and that their views and opinions were purely for academic purposes.

Table 3.1.2.1: Distribution of Respondents

SN	AGENCY/DEPARTMENTS	NO. OF PERSONNEL INTERVIEW
	UBEC	
1.	ACADEMIC SERVICES	1
2.	ACADEMIC SERVICES	1
3.	SPECIAL PROGRAMMES	1
4.	QUALITY ASSURANCE	1
5.	SPECIAL PROJECTS	1
	LSUBEB	
6.	PLANNING, RESEARCH & STATISTICS	1
7.	SCHOOL SUPPORT SERVICES	1
8.	SCHOOL SUPPORT SERVICES	1
9.	FINANCE	1
10.	HUMAN RESOURCES	1
11.	ADMINISTRATION	1
	LGEA	
12.	AGEGE	1
13.	KOSOFE	1
14.	OSHODI-ISOLO	1
15.	IFAKO-IJAIYE	1
16.	SHOMOLU	1
17.	SHOMOLU	1
	TOTAL	17

Source: Author's Field work

3.2: SITE OF STUDY

Education is a social good that creates so many externalities which manifests in all spheres of the society. Thus, education is a public service that government must ensure that it is delivered in an efficient and effective manner. To achieve this, government must put in place the right structure and management processes geared towards meeting the educational needs of its citizens.

Primary education, according to the National Policy on Education (2004) is the level of education where children aged 6 to 11 plus are taught how to read and write. This is the foundation upon which other levels in the education system build. Once this level in the educational system is faulty or not adequately managed, it creates dysfunctional citizens. Therefore, it is crucial for policymakers and practitioners to ensure the proper functioning of the primary education system.

Lagos state, as the case study of this research, is considered the commercial nerve centre of Nigeria. It has a population of over 21 million, the majority of who are young people. The State government is constantly under pressure to deliver social services to an ever-increasing population; whose expectations centre on equal access to these services. The challenge before the State government is how to plan and implement programmes that will meet these expectations.

The following sections describe in detail the history and development of primary education in Lagos state. This is to understand the context within which primary education is being delivered in the state. This will be done through a historical account of the state of primary education before the return to civilian rule in 1999. The analysis to be drawn from this historical account is how primary education has evolved in the state. This will be followed by a description of primary education from 1999 till date. The essence is to evaluate the performance of the State government in improving the level of primary education in the state. Issues such as overcrowding of pupils in classrooms, dilapidated structures, inadequate funding and recruitment of qualified teachers was discussed. This is to ascertain if these issues have been resolved or are still recurring problems.

3.3: PROFILE AND HISTORY OF LAGOS STATE

Lagos state is located in the southwest region of Nigeria and, by its population size, is considered the largest city in Nigeria. The 2006 census carried out by the National Population Commission put the city's population at over nine million. This figure has risen to 24.6 million by 2015 based on the estimates carried out by international agencies. The city's major land spaces are separated by creeks and other water bodies dividing the city into mainland and island. The city's coastal area is sheltered from the Atlantic ocean by the bar beach, which serves as the long sand splits covering an area of 100 kilometres. With the increasing migration into the city, Lagos expanded towards the mainland west of the lagoon, encompassing Ikeja, the capital of the state and Agege, extending as far as 40 kilometers northwest of the Island.

Historians recorded that the Aworis, who migrated from Isheri located along the Ogun river, were the early dwellers on Lagos Island. Apart from the Aworis, other ethnic groups had migrated into the area. At the turn of the 15th century, the city drew of Portuguese explorers, notably Rui de Sequeira, who arrived in 1472. Later on, the British arrived, and in 1861, the city was formally annexed as a British colony. The 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorate of Nigeria by the British necessitated capital for the country. Lagos was chosen as the capital of Nigeria and remained so even after the country gained independence from the British in 1960. (Filani 2012). The state has experienced rapid growth from the 1960s upwards, with most commercial activities and companies in Nigeria operating within the city. The state lost its federal capital status in 1991 when the federal government relocated its ministries and parastatals to Abuja, the new Federal Capital Territory.

In terms of administration, Lagos is not administered as a single municipality instead, it is divided into several municipalities. The Lagos city council administered the Lagos municipality covering Victoria Island, Ikoyi and Lagos Island, extending to some areas on the mainland. However, the council was disbanded in 1976 when the federal capital was changed from Lagos to Abuja. This led to the creation of several Local Government Areas (LGA) were created out of it. The Local Government Areas created are Lagos Island, Lagos Mainland and Eti-Osa LGAs (Olowu, 1992). On the other hand, the Mainland had several separate towns and settlements that had continued to grow and expand as a result of migration. Some of the cities and

settlements include Mushin, Ikeja and Agege. The oil boom in Nigeria in the 1970s led to a population explosion in Lagos as many people migrated into the city. The outcome was a rapid growth of the surrounding towns and settlements, thereby creating the Lagos metropolis of today.

The 20 Local Government Areas were further divided into Local Council Development Areas (LCDAs) in 2003 to ensure that governance is closer to the people at the grassroots. Thus, the number of local councils increased to 56. The growth and development of these areas have not been equal. The spatial distribution of amenities and public services at the early stage of the state showed a skewed pattern favouring Lagos metropolis. The reason could be the federal government's presence who invested a lot, particularly on roads, before relocating to Abuja. According to Olowu (1990), the period 1970-74 showed the Federal government taking over all the expensive road projects in the metropolis.

Furthermore, in respect of water and other environmental services, such attention was more on the Lagos municipal area (Federal territory) before creating the state. The Federal part was administered by Northern People's Congress, which was the ruling political party that controlled the federal government. The party's interest was at variance with that of the Action Group, which administered the rest of Western Nigeria. Filani (2012) observed that based on the fragmented political authority, there was a lack of coordination in providing public services.

Thus, the contrast in terms of quality in Urban services between federal territory and the rest of the city. This trend has created a dichotomy of services to Lagos residence. Those residing within the former Federal territory have access to benefits that exist and need improving upon. For those living outside these areas, the challenge had been how to provide these services, which did not exist initially, coupled with the pressure for a rapidly growing population. To bridge this gap, successive governments, particularly the civilian administration, had embarked on an expansion of public services in areas outside the former federal territory. Olukoju (2003) observed that the Jakande administration, which administered the state from 1979 to 1983 constructed ten water supply stations in Lagos' low and middle class areas.

Similarly, the Jakande administration built more primary schools than the former military governors of the state. Thus, the government's policy thrust in Lagos state over the years has been on expanding the provision of public services in the mainland

and urban renewal on Lagos Island and Victoria Island. This has not been particularly easy considering the daily influx into the city of migrants from other states searching for better economic opportunities. This has created a situation of existing infrastructure not meeting the demands of the population. The return to civil rule in 1999 came with high expectations from the citizens on the improvement in the level of public service delivery. Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu assumed the political leadership of Lagos state in 1999 under the Alliance for Democracy (AD) political party. The administration met a chaotic situation as the rate of urbanization was going out of control with attendant consequences. The traffic situation in the city was problematic as citizens spent long hours commuting from one part of the city to another. Many shanties were springing up to accommodate citizens from other parts of the country who could not afford the high-cost residential apartments. The solid waste collection was poor as a lot of refuse littered significant streets in the state. Educational and other social infrastructures were not adequate to meet the demands of this population. To address this situation, the Bola Ahmed Tinubu administration initiated reforms in the state such as review of the tax administration system in the state to capture more taxable citizens and increase the state's revenue base and establishment of new agencies to address public service delivery in the state (Filani, 2012). The subsequent administration of Babatunde Raji Fashola (2007 to 2015) had built on these reforms.

Within this context, this research seeks to understand the state of primary education before the return to civil rule in 1999 and the progress made from 1999 to 2015.

3.4: PRIMARY EDUCATION IN LAGOS STATE: PRE-1999 PERIOD

Historically, the education system in Lagos state evolved from Christian missionary activities dating back to the latter part of the 19th century. Before the creation of the state in 1967, there were two different educational systems in place. One was operating under the old federal territory and the other under the colony division of the ancient western region (Adedokun, 2013). These two systems differ in terms of duration and syllabi. While that operated under the old Western Region had a duration of six years, the one run under the federal territory had eight years duration. Consequently, the first primary task of the state government was to bring the two systems one uniform system that will cater for the primary education of school-age children. The state adopted a uniform school system in 1969 (Adeoti, 2014).

The creation of the state in 1967 began the process of urbanization as other ethnic groups from across the country migrated into the city in search of education and employment opportunities. This incidence of urbanization brought with it new problems for the primary education sector. Adeoti (2014) observed that there was a high rate of drop-out from schools. Part of the reasons for this is the unduly high school fees charged by schools in Lagos state. As a result, many parents had to withdraw their children from school. Apart from the high school fees, the academic performance of these pupils was also low. A Lagos state ministry of education report (1972, cited by Adeoti, 2014) showed that out of 1,165 children that enrolled in schools in January of 1971, 558 had dropped out by December of the same year. Therefore, the fundamental problem confronting the Lagos state government was how to make accessibility to primary education convenient for the poor and reduce the drop-out rate. Within this context, the federal government introduced the Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme in 1976.

The UPE scheme was introduced in September 1976 to address the issues of accessibility to primary education as a way of resolving geographical imbalance and making it free of charge to primary school pupils. (Ityavyar, 1986). The UPE scheme was welcomed with great enthusiasm by parents as before this period, an estimated 15,000 school-age children could not gain admission. Consequently, there was an upsurge in the number of children seeking entry into primary schools (See table 3.4.1). However, the UPE brought new challenges for the state government to handle. First was the high turn-out of children for the scheme. The state was ill-prepared for the vast enrollment rate that heralded the UPE scheme. As a result, existing facilities could not accommodate the additional number. The state government had to adopt a temporary measure of operating a shift system. Selected schools within the state were to run on shifts between 7:15 am and 1:15 pm, with each shift been for three and a half hours, thus totalling three in a day. The implication was that pupils could only stay in school for three and a half hours a day. In the same vein, the number of schools in the state rose from 544 in 1975 to 598 in 1976 and 624 in 1977. Similarly, the number of pupils increased from 355,645 in 1975 to 388,429 in 1976 and 411,416 in 1977.

The quality of primary education under the UPE scheme was questioned as many observers noted that there was a lack of teaching aids and materials, a shortage of teachers and a lack of adequate accommodation. The ratio of teachers/students

stood at 1:37, and the state government had to maintain the shift system during this period to address the persistent shortage of classrooms. However, this practice eroded the standard of primary education. Adeoti (2014) observed that this system fell short of an acceptable standard and those pupils had to trek many miles to schools in the city as the number of schools in rural Lagos was inadequate. In 1979, a democratically elected government came into power and established a committee to review the education system in the state. According to Shodipe (1997), the committee found out that the schools were not adequately administered, coupled with overcrowded classrooms where pupils had to go through an unripe system of morning, afternoon and evening sessions. The effect was that pupils did not inculcate the requisite knowledge as the mode of instruction was based on recitation than learning. Clearly, the observation of this committee shows that the goal of developing permanent literacy in these children was not achieved. To address the shortage of classrooms, which was considered the main problem confronting primary education in the state, the democratically elected government embarked on building 4,984 classrooms for primary schools by 1980.

Table 3.4.1: Lagos State: Growth of Primary School Education, 1967-1981.

Year	No. of Schools	Annual increase	No. of pupils	% Increase	Pupils Per School	Pupils Per Teacher
1967	442	-----	195,655	---	442.7	30.3
1968	446	4	207,126	5.9	464.4	32.0
1969	450	4	231,560	11.8	514.6	32.4
1970	453	3	237,560	2.6	524.4	32.7
1971	456	3	240,941	1.4	528.4	33.1
1972	472	16	270,533	12.3	573.1	34.1
1973	471	-1	309,455	14.4	657.0	33.6
1974	524	53	318,270	2.9	607.3	30.0
1975	544	20	355,645	11.7	653.8	31.3
1976	598	54	388,429	9.2	649.5	33.9
1977	624	28	411,416	5.6	659.3	36.9
1978	605	-19	434,543	5.6	719.4	37.5
1979	725	120	477,371	9.8	658.4	32.1
1980	812	87	527,649	10.5	649.8	33.9
1981	911	99	583,816	10.7	640.9	36.9

Source: The World Bank, 1989

Table 3.4.1 above shows that the total number of schools increased gradually except for 1973 when there was a decline of schools by one and in 1978 a drop of 19 schools. However, the ratio of one teacher to pupils shows a large number ranging from 30 pupils to one teacher to 37 pupils to one teacher. This could affect learning as pupils may find it challenging to comprehend in an overcrowded class. The design of these classrooms was devoid of elegance or aesthetics. On the contrary, the state government was thinking in terms of functionality which led many critics to call these classrooms “chicken Houses”. The policy thrust of the civilian administration did not last long as the government was overthrown through a *Coup d’etate* in December 1984.

The era of military rule from 1984 to 1999 (except for a brief period of civil administration in 1992) witnessed a lot of policy inconsistencies in primary education. The country began to experience an economic downturn that affected government revenue and finance primary education. A World Bank report (1994) observed that the gross enrollment ratio (GER) into primary schools as high as 93% in the 1982/83 session, declined to around 78% in 1990. Similarly, the period witnessed a lot of strikes by primary school teachers as salaries were not paid for several months. This was because the Federal government had withdrawn from financing primary education in 1981 and gave State and Local governments the responsibility of financing the sector. However, most State and Local governments found it difficult to fulfil their financial obligations to the primary education sector. This compelled the Federal government to intervene by creating the National Primary Education Commission (NPEC) to handle primary education in the country regarding management, policy formulation and disbursement of funds.

In Lagos, the State government had to contend with rising the enrollment rate without an increase in the number of classrooms. The option for other States in the country after the Federal government stopped financing primary education was to introduce tuition and levies. However, the Lagos state government did not introduce any levy. Therefore, the state government had to provide funds for the primary education sector. The World Bank (1989) noted that the decline in the financing of primary schools led to a downward spiral in enrolment. This was not because pupils were not offered admission, but the quality of schools had dropped. This was attributed to the poor state of physical infrastructures- toilets, roofs, fences,

Table 3.4.2: Primary School Age Population in Lagos

YEAR	NUMBER
1975	357,750
1982	470,774
1985	529,557

Source: World Bank, 1989.

Table 3.4.3: Primary School Enrolments in Lagos state

YEAR	FIGURE
1975/76	374,645
1982/83	570,921
1985/86	662,380

Source: World Bank, 1989.

Table 3.4.4: Number of Local government areas, schools and classes in Lagos state

LAGOS	NO. OF LGAs	NO. OF SCHOOLS	NO. OF CLASSES
	8	951	17,293

Source: World Bank, 1989.

Table 3.4.5: Number of Teachers in Lagos state 1987

GENDER	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
FIGURE	5,223	11,421	16,844

Source: World Bank, 1989.

Table 3.4.6: Number of Students in Lagos state 1987

GENDER	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
FIGURE	384,616	387,615	772,299

World Bank, 1989.

Table 3.4.7: Students Per Class, Teacher, LGA and School in 1987

CLASS RATIO	TEACHER RATIO	LGA RATIO	SCHOOL RATIO
45	46	96,537	812

World Bank, 1989.

Table 3.4.8: Number of Schools 1975/76 – 1985/86 in Lagos state

YEAR	1975/76	1982/83	1985/86
FIGURE	244	909	888

World Bank, 1989.

Table 3.4.9: Pupils per school 1975/76 – 1985/86 in Lagos state

YEAR	1975/76	1982/83	1985/86
FIGURE	1535	628	746

World Bank, 1989.

Table 3.4.10: Class size, Teachers per class and Pupils per Teacher 1982/83 in Lagos state

ENROLLMENTS	NO. OF CLASS	AVERAGE CLASS SIZE	TEACHERS PER CLASS	PUPILS PER TEACHER
570,921	14,273	40.0	1.06	38.0

World Bank, 1989.

Table 3.4.11: Pupils per class by state, 1982/83

STATE	FIGURE (Approx.)
ANAMBRA	28
BAUCHI	40
BENDEL	30
BENUE	38
BORNO	40
CROSS-RIVER (including Akwa-Ibom)	38
GONGOLA	35
IMO	30
KADUNA (including Katsina)	38
KANO	55
KWARA	40
LAGOS	39
NIGER	50
OGUN	37
ONDO	35
OYO	68
PLATEAU	25
RIVERS	38
SOKOTO	38

Source: World Bank, 1989.

playgrounds, classrooms- and teachers' salaries which were falling into arrears such that teachers were being retrenched. This clearly indicates the deteriorating situation in the primary education sector in the country.

Lagos State was not immune to this precarious situation as it had to manage overcrowding in the classrooms (Table 3.4.2). Available data shows that the number of pupils in the classrooms was above the recommended number of 36 pupils per class. Similarly, the state government could not sustain the financing of primary education. Under the military administration of Col. Olagunsoye Oyinlola, primary school teachers threatened to go on strike after one week notice if the state government failed to clear several months of unpaid salaries (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006). The state government defaulted in paying primary school teachers' wages due to the inability of the federal government to fulfil its financial obligation of remitting funds for paying teachers' salaries to states under the re-introduced UPE programme.

Another noticeable trend during the period under review was that there was no clear delineation of management of primary education between the federal, state and local governments.

Table 3.4.11 shows that apart from Anambra and Plateau states which had 28 pupils and 25 pupils respectively, the remaining states in the country had over 30 pupils per class. This is an indication of an increase in enrollment without a commensurate rise in classes and teachers

3.5 PRIMARY EDUCATION IN LAGOS STATE: 1999-2015

The successive challenge administration in Lagos state had in primary education was how to provide enough classrooms for the growing number of pupils and ensure quality in terms of teachers and learning outcomes. The observation in the previous section was that the significant challenge facing the Lagos state government was the funding and administration of primary schools. The Universal Basic Education (UBE) programme was launched in 1999 by the federal government under the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo. According to Asodike and Ikpitibo (2014), the UBE scheme intends to ensure that learners inculcate functional literacy, ability to communicate and vocational skills. It was structured into a nine-year programme covering six years of primary education and three years of junior secondary education.

Similarly, the programme was made compulsory and free for children age's six to twelve. Although the UBE programme was launched in 1999, the Act stipulating the objectives, responsibilities and functions of each tier of government was enacted in 2004. The Act provided for the establishment of the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), the State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) and the Local Government Education Authority (LGEA). The Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board (LSUBEB) was established on the 30th day of December 2005 and inaugurated on the 30th day of January 2006. This shows that though the programme was launched in 1999, it took another six years after the launch for the programme to commence at the state level since the structures were not yet in place.

Before the commencement of the UBE programme, the state government, on return to civil rule in 1999, made efforts in improving the standard of primary education in the state. The major challenge confronting the state government was the overcrowding in the classrooms, teachers' quality, and pupils' performance. In addressing these issues, the state government embarked on the construction of new schools and renovation of existing ones. Similarly, the state government introduced free education to ensure accessibility to children whose parents could not afford school fees. Under the free primary education policy, all fees and levies were abolished by the state government (Ige, 2015). Consequently, funding of all aspects of the public primary education sector in the state was financed by the state government. A NISER (2005) report on the effectiveness of public expenditure in Nigeria observed that Lagos state was one of the states that exhibited a reasonable level of autonomy in financing the public primary education sector. In other words, it was not dependent on the allocation from the federation account. The report also highlighted the effectiveness of the state government's expenditure on primary education vis-à-vis the output generated. In ascertaining the effectiveness of public expenditure, it examined the percentage deviation between the amount budgeted and the actual releases to the sector. A percentage deviation that returns a zero score shows no difference between what was budgeted and the the amount released. However, a percentage deviation that returns a negative score shows that the government spent less than what it budgeted, while a positive score shows that the government spent more than what it budgeted. (ibid: 23). Tables 3.4.1 below shows the percentage deviation of Lagos state government releases against the budget for the year 1998 to 2003 on primary education.

Table 3.5.1: Actual Government Releases to Primary schools compared with facility Reported

Year	personnel cost % Deviation	overhead cost % Deviation	capital cost % Deviation
1998	-61.9	-3.5	-99.7
1999	-94.3	-73.8	-99.9
2000	-95.3	-2.5	-99.9
2001	-95.3	-84.9	-99.9
2002	-95.7	-7.5	-99.9
2003	-94.9	-42.1	-99.9
AVG	-52.3	-21.7	-99.9

Source: Compiled from EC-EMCA/NISER, 2005

Table 3.5.2: Total enrolment, the number enrolled for final exams and number of students who passed final exams in Lagos state, 1998 – 2003

YEAR	TOTAL ENROLMENT	NO. ENROLLED IN FINAL EXAMS	NO. OF STUDENTS WHO PASSED
1998	133,339	28,958	25,092
1999	131,929	27,406	23,946
2000	127,906	26,955	22,916
2001	120,046	26,967	22,408
2002	116,341	25,003	20,586
2003	108,312	22,347	18,098
MEAN	122,979	26,356	22,174

Source: Compiled from EC-EMCA/NISER, 2005

The table above shows that the state recorded a negative percentage deviation score between the amounts budgeted and the amount released. An indication that the state government was spending less than what it budgeted. Thus, it could be deduced that the budget preparation did not follow a rational process of aligning expenditure with anticipated output. On the contrary, the budget preparation may be more of a routine exercise of itemizing areas government intends to spend funds on without necessary justifying those expenditures with target goals. The table shows the output recorded in the primary education sector from 1998 to 2003 in terms of total enrolment, number of students enrolled for the final exams and number of students who passed. The output showed a gradual decline in output for all the variables from 1998 to 2003. This also correlates with the negative percentage recorded in government expenditure within the same period. Thus, an indication that as the state government was spending less on primary education, the anticipated results was also declining.

In a study done by Tooley, Dixon and Olaniyan (2005), they observed the ‘mushrooming’ of private unregistered primary schools in Lagos. They attributed this to the poor quality of public schools for the poor. Factors such as teachers not being available during class periods and low commitment levels were more prevalent in government primary schools than private registered and unregistered primary schools. The authors also found out that the rate of teacher absenteeism at primary 4 was higher than unregistered and registered private schools. The percentage was 8.2 per cent at government schools and 1.1 per cent and 1 per cent at unregistered and registered private schools, respectively. It was also observed that the number of hours teachers gave to teaching was more minor in these government schools than in private schools. This is because a high percentage of the teachers in government schools were engaged in other activities like selling domestic items when they were supposed to be teaching. The observation from these findings is that despite the teachers in public schools earning higher wages than those in private registered and unregistered schools within these poor communities, there was less teaching activity there. This could result from ineffective monitoring and enforcement of standards by the Lagos State Primary Education Board in these schools. Although the Lagos state government made a significant financial contribution to the primary education sector, the outcome recorded did not indicate an effective utilization of these funds (NISER, 2005).

In a similar study done by Harma (2011) on the growing number of private schools in the Lagos state, her findings revealed not much distinctive change in the

state of primary education compared with the year 2006. The number of private registered and unregistered private schools had increased, and more children of school age were enrolled in these schools than public schools. She traced this development to the perception parents residing in Lagos state had of public schools. According to the author, most low-income families choose private schools over public schools because of overcrowding in the classrooms and poor quality of instruction. On the other hand, the private schools offered them closeness to their homes, smaller classes in size and quality (Harma, 2011). This probably explains why Sixty-Two (62) per cent of school-age children were in private registered and unregistered primary schools compared with only Thirty-Nine (39) per cent in government schools in the 2010-2011 academic sessions. Table 3.5.3 below shows the gradual decline in enrollment in government primary schools in the Makoko area, Lagos state.

Table 3.5.3: Enrollments at public primary schools serving Makoko, 2008-2011.

YEAR	2008/2009	2009/2010	2010/2011
Primary School I	1,084	877	774
Primary School II	620	594	438
Primary School III	697	389	395
Totals	2,401	1,860	1,607

Sources: Lagos State Government (2010 and 2011)

Table 3.5.4: NUMBER OF PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOLS, PUPILS AND TEACHERS BY SEX:
2004/2005 - 2010/2011 ACADEMIC SESSIONS

	No.of Sch.	M	F	MF	M	F	MF	PER. School	PER. Teacher
2004/05	983	3,095	13,885	16,980	206,410	217,798	424,208	432	25
2005/06	1,010	2,854	12,942	15,796	215,043	232,026	447,069	443	28
2006/07	1,030	2,841	13,389	16,230	222,472	232,336	454,808	442	28
2007/08	1,045	2,808	13,543	16,351	228,126	238,075	466,201	446	29
2008/09	1,081	2,633	12,570	15,203	234,992	244,264	479,256	443	32
2009/10	986	2,372	11,397	13,769	189,033	198,548	387,581	393	28
2010/11	1,001	2,247	11,068	13,315	203,908	213,258	417,166	417	31
2011/12	1,001	2,213	11,025	13,238	261,542	262,818	524,360	524	40

Source: Lagos State Ministry of Education, 2013

Table 3.5.4 above shows a fluctuation in the number of schools within the state, number of pupils (male and female), pupils per school and pupils per teacher. The 2011/2012 session data indicates that the number of pupils per teacher had gone beyond the twenty-seven standard pupil per teacher. Thus, showing that overcrowding in classrooms is a significant issue for the Lagos state government.

In the Lagos Annual Education Sector Performance Report (2010), the state government evaluated its input against the output generated. The primary input was the amount of funds expended on the education sector in terms of recurrent and capital expenditure.

The recurrent expenditure covers salaries, allowances and overheads to cover day to day activities. Similarly, the report stated that a sum of N484, 671,485 was expended on infra-structure while N103,858,175 was spent on instruction materials/furniture and N103, 858,175 was paid on teacher training.

With this expenditure on personal and overheads, the expected output should be seen in the learning achievements outcome, retention rate and transition rates of primary school pupils to junior secondary schools. However, the report measured its output in available classrooms, water and sanitation and pupils per teacher. These factors are intended to create the right environment for the pupils to learn and not indicate what the pupils learnt or the skills acquired. Tables 3.5.5 and 3.5.6 showed the state of the classrooms across the various LGEA and pupil-teacher ratios.

Table 3.5.5: Recurrent Expenditure by LGEA

LGEA	Personal	Overheads	Total
Agege	935,811,433	14,376,000	950,187,433
Ajeromi Ifelodun	878,290,930	20,040,000	898,330,930
Alimosho	988,952,623	18,600,000	1,007,552,623
Amuwo Odofin	437,511,259	15,144,000	452,655,259
Apapa	411,341,280	10,843,200	422,184,480
Badagry	604,018,467	15,705,600	619,724,067
Epe	575,459,647	21,916,800	597,376,447
Eti-Osa	351,502,182	15,156,000	366,658,182
Ibeju-Lekki	231,416,138	12,868,800	244,284,938
Ifako-Ijaiye	525,910,892	10,603,200	536,514,092
Ikeja	606,722,388	12,883,200	619,605,588
Ikorodu	831,577,208	19,723,200	851,300,408
Kosofe	966,882,578	15,163,200	982,045,778
Lagos Island	488,690,397	13,257,600	501,947,997
Lagos Mainland	687,940,253	17,097,600	705,037,853
Mushin	1,057,472,068	21,312,000	1,078,784,068
Ojo	604,724,343	15,103,200	619,827,543
Oshodi-Isolo	794,233,938	20,433,600	814,667,538
Shomolu	810,367,729	14,078,400	824,446,129
Surulere	812,933,625	21,772,800	834,706,425
Total	13,601,759,379	326,078,400	13,927,837,779

Source: Lagos Annual Education Sector Performance Report , 2010

Table 3.5.6: State of Classrooms

LGEA	Pupil- Classroom ratio	Share of classroom in need of Major repairs	Mud/earth floor (%)	Classrooms with Adequate Seating (%)	Classrooms with Good Blackboard (%)
Agege	36	24	3	31	75
Ajeromi- Ifelodun	69	46	4	37	56
Alimosho	64	40	17	21	54
Amuwo- Odofin	37	50	15	19	54
Apapa	44	38	0	36	63
Badagry	45	47	9	26	48
Epe	31	36	1	24	50
Eti-Osa	41	21	1	58	57
Ibeju_Lekki	53	47	1	42	62
Ifako-Ijaiye	42	44	6	35	56
Ikeja	28	25	7	59	74
Ikorodu	55	46	0	24	79
Kosofe	44	39	7	51	71
Lagos-Island	29	18	4	71	70
Lagos- Mainland	32	25	2	42	54
Mushin	32	39	0	51	70
Ojo	59	47	5	21	45
Oshodi-Isolo	36	32	5	59	55
Shomolu	30	46	2	31	39
Surulere	38	37	3	50	60
Total (AVG)	42	37	4	39	60

Source: Lagos Annual Education Sector Performance Report , 2010

Table 3.5.7: Teachers in Lagos State Schools (Primary)

LGEA	Pupil-Teacher ratio	Pupil-Qualified Teacher ratio	Teachers who received Training (%)
Agege	22	23	51
Ajeromi- Ifelodun	36	37	25
Alimosho	36	37	35
Amuwo-Odofin	33	34	55
Apapa	28	29	40
Badagry	36	38	30
Epe	30	36	32
Eti-Osa	39	42	61
Ibeju_Lekki	46	57	52
Ifako-Ijaiye	22	22	42
Ikeja	18	19	64
Ikorodu	38	39	29
Kosofe	25	25	13
Lagos-Island	21	23	64
Lagos-Mainland	29	30	43
Mushin	21	22	29
Ojo	34	35	37
Oshodi-Isolo	25	25	39
Shomolu	20	21	25
Surulere	22	23	26
Total (AVG)	28	29	37

Source: Lagos state Annual Education Sector Performance Report 2010

In table 3.5.5, only a few LGEAs had a pupil-classroom ratios below 30 (Ikeja and Lagos-Island). The two LGEAs also had a more significant percentage of adequate seating for pupils. Most LGEAs had above 50% classrooms with Blackboard. This shows that sufficient attention needs to be paid to overcrowding and more adequate seating.

A critical examination of these figures shows a level of disparity in the distribution among the LGEAs. For instance, Ikeja, which recorded 28 for pupil-classroom ratio and 25 per cent of the classroom in need of significant repairs, 64 per cent of the teachers received training. On the other hand, Ajeromi-Ifelodun recorded a 69 pupil-classroom ratios and 46 per cent of classrooms in need of significant repairs, about 25 of the teachers received training. Consequently, these teachers in Ajeromi-Ifelodun LGEA are faced with the challenge of overcrowding in the classrooms, and a small percentage of them received training. The likely implication is that the ability to inculcate into these children life-long skills of numeracy and verbal aptitude is reduced. This is because learning in an overcrowded classroom may be complex and the majority of the teachers have not received additional training to cope with this large number.

Similarly, this set of figures cast doubt on whether this data or political preferences informed government decision. This observation is similar to the findings of Oguntade (2005). He observed that rural/agricultural LGAs in Lagos state were at a disadvantage in distributing primary schools and infrastructures. There were more primary schools in urban LGAs than rural/agriculture LGAs. Thus, prompting some parents to send their children to other communities to obtain education. It appears little has been done over the years to redress this lopsided distribution of primary schools and infrastructure.

The 2011 National Assessment of Learning Achievements in Basic Education stated the mean performance of pupils in the English language from primary 4 to 6 across the country. It noted that Lagos state recorded a mean of 58.04, 69.83 and 68.72 for primary 4, 5 and 6 respectively. These scores were above the national mean score for these classes. Thus, indicating that the state government was making progress in some indicators of learning among pupils. Similarly, the performance of pupils in Mathematics was above the national mean score of 51.03, 50.36 and 52.94 for primary 4, 5 and 6, respectively. The state recorded 54.41 for primary 4, 54.87 for

primary 5 and 56.47 for primary 6. In the same vein, the 2014 Quality Assurance report on the performance of the State Basic Education Board observed that the Lagos state Basic Education Board made significant progress in the monitoring of primary schools. However, the report noted that the board needed to do more in the recruitment of qualified teachers and renovation of dilapidated buildings in certain schools. While efforts were made to recruit more teachers for the public primary schools in the state, this appears to be insufficient.

In conclusion, primary education in Lagos state has evolved from minimal government involvement at inception to full-scale administration of primary schools. While a lot has been achieved in terms of enrolment, pupil-teacher ratio, learning outcome of pupils, the number of qualified teachers and infrastructural development, specific areas still need improvement. Efforts still need to be made in reducing the number of children age six years and above not in primary school in the state. The percentage for the state of 23.4, is higher than the national average percentage of 17.2 (FMWA, 2015). This may require the state government to build more schools and rehabilitate existing ones.

Similarly, the state government needs to address the distribution of infrastructure and adequate funding of these schools. Funding is a critical input in the administration of primary education in the state. Therefore, funds must be utilized in a prudent way to achieve specific results. Overall, the state government needs to develop closer collaboration with the federal government to achieve better results in its primary education sector.

CHAPTER FOUR

**THE IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK AND PERFORMANCE OF THE
NATIONAL POLICY ON PRIMARY EDUCATION**

4.1: Preamble

The aim of every public policy is the actualization of the enumerated goals and objectives contained in it. Anything short of this is considered a policy failure by the initiators and beneficiaries. This is why for every public policy, there are implementation guidelines that serve as a framework for public officials to ascertain their tasks and responsibilities in the implementation process. Apart from assigning duties and responsibilities, resources in terms of human and capital will also have to be determined. The level of funding available and the source of funding are crucial to the success of any policy. Likewise, the capacity of the personnel to discharge their duties is vital to the outcome of the policy. In summary, implementing a public policy requires adequate planning, efficient management and timely release of funds.

However, despite the presence of these factors, in certain situations, it appears that there is a gap between the formulated public policy and the outcome it generates. This poses a fundamental issue to policy formulators who have to ascertain the problems confronting the successful implementation of public policy. The argument of Kurt (2000) is an indication that apart from these factors, conflict of interest in the implementation process is more likely to occur before issues on organizational management do. The solution to this issue lies in building institutions and strategies that will foster cooperation between the implementing agencies.

The National Policy on Primary Education (2004, 2013) is pursued under the compulsory free Universal Basic Education Act of 2004. The Act provides for a child's basic education at the primary and junior secondary school level, which must be accessible and compulsory (UBE Act, 2004). The Act went further to list the various organizations responsible for the implementation and the sources of funding. According to the Act, the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) is to,

among other functions, design the policy framework that will guide the implementation of the Universal Basic Education programme across the federation. In the same vein, the commission manages the federal allocation to basic education in terms of receiving blocks grants from the federal government and disbursing to states, local governments and other agencies participating in the implementation process. This indicates the enormous role the commission has to play in the implementation process. The State and Local governments also have important roles to play, considering that the Act also stipulates the establishment of a State Universal Basic Education Board and a Local Government Education Authority. These agencies are responsible for translating the goals of the UBE into tangible outcomes. Therefore, the success or failure of this programme depends on the effective coordination of activities of these agencies. One of the measures put in place to achieve this is the Standard Action Plan to streamline the efforts of the agencies towards achieving the goals of the Act. The Action Plan stipulates the action necessary for each task and the agency responsible for it. The aim is to eliminate poor planning and duplication of efforts.

This chapter begins with an examination of the era before the introduction of the Universal Basic Education programme in the country. This will be followed by a description of the Standard Action Plan for implementing the Universal Basic Education programme and an evaluation of the programme's performance with an emphasis on primary education from 1999 to 2011.

4.2: BACKGROUND OF PRIMARY EDUCATION: PRE-UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION PROGRAMME

Before the commencement of Universal Basic Education, the state of primary education needs to be highlighted to measure the performance of the policy. While chapter three of this research examined the state of primary education in Lagos state, this chapter focuses on the performance of the UBE across the country.

The history of Primary education in Nigeria could be traced back to the missionary schools which were established in 1842. The missionaries were in charge of the management of the schools. They handled issues relating to the school curriculum, teachers' salaries, code of conduct and finance (Onoguere, 2014 citing Abiri 2010, Fafunwa 1974, Kosemani and Okorosaye-orubite 1995, Nwangwu 1976, Osokoya 2002 and Taiwo, 1980). The interest of the colonial government in these missionary

established schools was seen in 1872 and 1877 when it granted financial aid to some of them. In 1887 after the second education ordinance was enacted, that government became more involved in education. According to Osokoya (2002) and Taiwo (1980), the 1887 education ordinance could be regarded as the “first education ordinance for Nigeria”. The ordinance created a structure and a system of management of primary schools in the country. This led to the establishment of more schools. Fafunwa (1974) and Ogunsola (1977) observed that the number of primary schools in the colony and protectorate of Southern Nigeria by 1913 was 150 (59 belonged to the government while the missionaries owned 91). The pupils’ enrollment into these schools was 35,714. However, the Northern protectorate had mainly Qu’ranic schools during this period. There were 19,073 Qu’ranic schools with an enrollment of 143,312 pupils. The reasons for this disparity between the Northern and Southern protectorate Onoguere (2014) observe could be traced to the lukewarm attitude to education displayed by the then High Commissioner for Northern Nigeria and Director of Education, Northern Nigeria; Sir Fredrick Lugard and Sir Hanns Vischer, respectively. This was coupled with resistance to education shown by the emirs. This created a dichotomy in the development and spread of primary education between Nigeria's Northern and Southern part.

The era of regionalism, which arguably started in 1946 by the Richard’s constitution and reinforced by the Macpherson constitution, further widened the divide in the number of primary schools and pupil enrollment between the North and South. During this period, the Southern part of the country was divided into the West and East, with the former taking the lead in the establishment of primary schools. Table 4.2.1, 2 and 3 below shows the number of primary schools and pupils in the Western, Eastern and Northern regions, respectively:

TABLE 4.2.1: WESTERN REGION

Year	No. of Pry. Schools	No. of Pupils
1954	3550	456,600
1955	6407	811,432
1956	6603	908,022
1957	6628	982,755
1958	6670	1,037,755
1959	6518	1,080,303

Sources: Government of Western Nigeria (1959) in Taiwo (1980) and Oyan (2013)

cited by Onoguere (2014)

TABLE 4.2.2: EASTERN REGION

Year	No. of Pry. Schools	No. of Pupils
1955	52	742,542
1956	59	904,235
1957	68	1,209,167
1958	82	1,221,272
1959	89	1,378,403
1960	96	1,430,514

Source: Digest of Statistics, Federal Ministry of Education In Osokoya (2002) cited by Onoguere (2014).

TABLE 4.2.3: NORTHERN REGION

Year	No. of Pry. Schools	No. of Pupils
1955	25	168,521
1956	27	185,484
1957	27	205,769
1958	31	230,000
1959	36	250,912
1960	41	282,949

Source: Digest of Statistics, Federal Ministry of Education in Osokoya (2002) cited in Onoguere (2014).

The tables above show that while the Western region had more primary schools between 1954 and 1960, the Eastern part had more pupils enrolled. The Northern part lagged in both indices. The increase in the number of primary schools and enrollment of pupils was due to the introduction of the Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme in the Western and Eastern regions. However, the success recorded was short-lived as inadequately trained teachers, facilities and statistics for effective planning (Taiwo 1980, Kosemani and Okorosaye-orubite 1995 and Osokoya 2002). Despite the lapses recorded in the regional UPE programmes, the Federal government in 1976 commenced a nationwide UPE scheme to improve access to education. The country had just emerged from a civil war (1967-1970) which saw the devastation of primary school structures in the Eastern region.

Similarly, the regions were broken up into twelve states and later increased to nineteen in 1976. Data from the Federal Ministry of Education (2004, cited by Onoguere, 2014) show that the number of pupils enrolled and primary schools when the scheme commenced in 1976/1977 academic session stood at 811,304 and 20,888 respectively. This increased to 15,664,424 pupils enrolled and 37,480 primary schools by 1980/1981 academic session (see table 4.2.4 and 4.2.5). However, the nationwide UPE scheme did not last long as issues such as inadequate teachers, infrastructures and finance were some of the factors identified as responsible for the scheme's collapse. Fafunwa (2004) observed that the Federal government underestimated the number of pupils enrolling on the system. While 2.3 million school-age children were expected, 3 million children turned up to register. Consequently, there was not enough classroom and teachers to handle the increase of pupils enrolled in each academic session.

TABLE 4.2.4: Primary School Pupils' Enrolments in Nigeria. 1975/1976 to 1980/81

States	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81
Anambra	641,725	826,783	907,252	903,014	1,036,789	1,777,263
Bauchi	126,300	220,211	329,611	357,212	438,522	510,238
Bendel	606,115	676,373	751,712	792,921	891,893	994,899
Benue	256,747	535,096	629,243	838,723	1,120,915	1,406,402
Borno	136,964	121,982	369,052	589,620	693,130	854,626
Cross River	597,182	719,55	768,292	863,700	977,988	1,091,645
Gongola	158,200	265,335	322,313	397,705	488,805	573,200
Imo	739,031	938,400	1,003,824	1,014,467	1,107,774	1,207,406
Kaduna	218,204	460,349	613,091	747,125	870,073	1,000,613
Kano	160,340	341,806	472,813	667,998	788,132	910,333
Kwara	181,050	250,716	494,030	493,241	599,405	709,767
Lagos	355,645	388,429	400,405	442,057	476,822	509,240
Niger	55,377	113,852	181,731	277,495	376,196	478,877
Ogun	240,701	282,333	299,015	345,393	385,959	427,113
Ondo	332,611	403,200	428,119	465,395	533,539	604,930
Oyo	-----	699,267	866,840	966,362	1,123,716	1,249,198
Plateau	147,873	317,487	365,554	455,500	563,387	673,552
Rivers	275,591	346,961	430,388	470,438	574,024	677,019
Sokoto	138,138	206,117	301,542	397,401	499,243	608,082
Total	5,367,794	8,114,307	9,845,838	11,457,772	13,546,312	15,664,424

Sources: Federal Ministry of Education, Planning Statistic Unit. Lagos in Kosemani and Okorosanye-Orubite (1995), Osokoya (2002) and Oyan (2010).

Table 4.2.5: Number of Primary Schools by State: 1975/1976 to 1981/1982

States	1975/1976	1977/1978	1979/1980	1981/1982
Anambra	1,708	1,900	1,931	2,054
Bauchi	1,086	2,235	1,889	1,805
Bendel	1,562	1,594	1,665	1,754
Benue	1,200	2,667	2,688	2,703
Bornu	1,526	1,854	1,886	2,088
Cross River	1,505	1,620	1,478	1,690
Gongola	1,568	1,868	1,849	1,864
Imo	1,880	1,925	1,939	1,958
Kaduna	859	2,821	2,857	2,875
Kano	679	3,028	3,050	3,063
Kwara	539	1,123	1,215	1,487
Lagos	244	1,033	1,725	1,863
Niger	245	1,033	1,033	1,067
Ogun	1,161	1,203	1,222	1,262
Ondo	1,159	1,388	1,471	1,595
Oyo	1,955	2,318	2,445	2,701
Plateau	685	2,422	2,455	1,661
Rivers	595	870	946	1,001
Sokoto	732	2,692	2,865	3,939
Total	20,888	35,594	35,589	37,430

Sources: Federal Ministry of Education, Planning Statistic Unit. Lagos in Kosemani and Okorosanye-Orubite (1995), Osokoya (2002) and Oyan (2010).

Olaniyan and Obadara (2008), in their review of the management of primary education in Nigeria, observed inconsistencies in the system. For instance, the responsibility for primary education was given to the Local government councils in 1979 at the inception of the second republic. However, by 1986 the Federal government again took up the responsibility of funding primary education by abolishing tuition fees introduced by the State governments and making direct grants to local governments. Similarly, in 1988 the Federal government established the National Primary Education Commission to oversee primary education in the country. However, the organization was disbanded by the Federal government in 1991 and re-established in 1993. This inconsistency in the management of primary education makes it difficult to hold accountable the various tiers of government. The delineation of responsibility is not clear cut as there is duplication of efforts and a lack of coordination. Issues that result from these inconsistencies range from a delay in payment of teachers' salaries to dilapidated structures. Against this background, the Universal Basic Education was launched in 1999 to address these issues and reduce the number of school-age children out of school. The following section describes the Standard Action Plan for the implementation of the Universal Basic Education programme. It examines the performance of the UBE programme by highlighting salient issues affecting the attainment of its stated objectives.

4.3. IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK: UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION COMMISSION STANDARD ACTION PLAN

The vision of the Universal Basic Education programme in Nigeria as contained in the Act is to ensure that every child acquires the appropriate skills in literacy, numeracy, manipulative and communicative abilities that will be essential for life. It is around this goal that every activity of the commission is target. The Standard Action Plan is a detailed framework of most activities needed to actualize the programme's vision. The plan itemizes the activity necessary for each section of the Act, the time it should commence, the nature of the activity and the target group. Through the Universal Basic Education commission, the federal government developed this standard action plan to identify the various activities and stakeholders for the successful implementation of the programme. The plan listed several operational activities derived from the Act and the required institutions to perform them. Worthy of mention is that each activity listed has multiple actors involved,

which will require effective coordination. Below is a highlight of some of the features of the plan, the target group (public and private institutions involved) and what is expected of them:

1. The plan noted that every government in Nigeria provides free, compulsory and Universal Basic Education for every child of primary and junior secondary school age. To achieve this, the state and local governments must establish more primary and secondary schools to improve access and cater to the anticipated 100% transition rate. The federal government is to intervene through the Universal Basic Education Commission by assisting states and local governments with implementing the programme.

2. The intervention by the federal government is to assist the state and local governments for a uniform and qualitative basic education throughout Nigeria. This will require the participation of the following institutions:

- * FME/SMOE – to formulate policy and monitoring
- * FMF – to release funds for the implementation of the programme
- * UBEC – to provide intervention programmes
- * NERDC – to develop and review curricula
- * SUBEBs – to implement policy, monitor and evaluate the programme and provide reports
- * LGEAs - to implement policy, monitor and evaluate the programme and provide reports
- * NCCE – pre-service training
- * NTI – in-service training
- * TRC – licensing of teachers

3. To formulate policy guidelines for Universal Basic Education, the following institutions will be involved: FME, UBEC, SMOEs, SUBEB, LGEAs and other stakeholders like UNICEF, UNESCO, ERC, NERDC, FMH, FMWA, NGOs, CBOs, PTAs and SBMCs

4. To develop a policy programme for out-of-school children, the following institutions will be involved: FME, SMOEs, SUBEBs, UBEC and LGEAs

5. In teacher development, the following institutions are involved: UBEC, NCCE, NTI, COEs, SMOEs, NIEPA, NINLAN, NUC, Polytechnics and TRN.

6. To provide guidelines for infrastructural development, the following institutions are involved: UBEC, SUBEB, SMoEs, LGEAs, Development partners, NGOs, CBOs, PTAs and communities.
7. To handle teacher demand and supply, the following institutions will be involved: FME, SMoEs, UBEC, SUBEB, NTI, NCCE, NUC, NOUN, LGEAs, NBTE and TRCN.
8. To provide greater access, quality and equity in basic education, the following institutions achieve this objective: UBEC, SUBEBs, LGEAs, PTAs, CBOs, FMH and other stakeholders.
9. To receive block grants from the federal government and to allocate to states and local governments and other relevant agencies implementing basic education would involve UBEC, SUBEB, FMF, AGF, Auditor General, FME and others.
10. To prescribe minimum standards for basic education would involve: SUBEBs, LGEAs, NCNE, NMEC, NERDC, NCCE, NTL, UBEC, NUC, TRCN and FME.
11. To coordinate the implementation of the UBE related activities in collaboration with non-governmental and multilateral agencies would involve UBEC, SMoEs, SUBEBs, LGEAs, schools, CBOs, NGOs, FBO, FME, FMF, NPC, UNICEF, UNESCO, World Bank, DFID, USAID, etc.

From the above description, it will be observed that the Standard Action Plan involves several relevant stakeholders whose activities have to be coordinated to ensure effective collaboration between them. It deals with managerial, financial and human resource areas of the programme. Similarly, it creates so many avenues for officials of the various agencies at the Federal, State and Local governments to interact. These are the intergovernmental units' set up to facilitate the implementation of the policy. A significant highlight of the Standard Action Plan is the capacity development of individuals and organizations for effective service delivery. This is important considering that the success of the policy lies in government officials' ability to comprehend the policy's goals and translate them into tangible outcomes.

Capacity-building or development is crucial in any organization. It is the bedrock of achieving efficiency and effectiveness in any organization. The Standard Action Plan developed by representatives from the various Federal government agencies recognize the importance of capacity building and outlines measures for achieving it. All these measures, it is assumed, will enable public officials across the three tiers of government to accomplish their tasks. However, these measures and the

goals of the policy, have to be implemented to achieve the desired end. Therefore, the next section will attempt an in-depth analysis of the performance of the National policy on primary education under the UBE programme.

4.4: PERFORMANCE OF THE NATIONAL POLICY ON PRIMARY EDUCATION

4.4.1. FUNDING ISSUES

The Universal Basic Education comprises six years of primary education and three years of junior secondary education. Primary education is divided into two parts of lower basic education (primary 1-3) and middle basic (primary 4-6). At the end of the six years of basic education, the child is expected to have acquired, among other things, permanent literacy and numeracy and the ability to communicate effectively. To achieve these goals, human and material resources in terms of building of new classrooms, administrative blocks and sanitary facilities, purchase of books and recruitment of competent teachers were to be deployed. These items will involve finance and effective management to be able to achieve it. However, the challenge often encountered in implementing public policies is how the output or outcome appears to differ from the intent of the designers of the policy. This is why it is vital to have proper planning at the formulation stage. This, the Universal Basic Education Commission had sought to achieve by developing the Standard Action Plan. The plan is meant to highlight the roles and responsibilities of each agency involved in the implementation of the UBE act. An appraisal of the implementation process since its inception has shown a disparity in the designers' intents and the reality on the ground. Starting with the area of finance, funding of the UBE was to come from the Federal and State governments with support from foreign donors. However, the evidence so far indicates inadequate financing of the programme. Generally, government allocation to primary education has been low compared with other levels in the education system. The Federal government budgetary allocation to primary education between 1996 and 2002 was 11.5% of the budget for education. Within the same period, distribution to tertiary and secondary levels (federal unity schools) stood at 68% and 14.5%, respectively (FME, 2005). The funding to tertiary education by the federal government is bound to be high considering that it's within its constitutional jurisdiction and only plays an interventionist role in primary education. The State governments have not fared better in the area as more funds go to the secondary level

than the the primary level. Furthermore, 67% of State governments' expenditures on education went to secondary schools while 11% went to primary education (ibid). Similarly, State governments that operate tertiary institutions expend on the average 34% of their education budget on them, thereby further reducing allocation to primary and secondary education (Hinchcliffe, 2002).

The issue of funding is crucial to the success of the UBE. George, Olayiwola, Adewole and Osabuohien (2013) stated, citing the World Bank (2006) estimates, that the country needs an additional 251,000 classrooms at the cost of 3 billion dollars. However, the country could only construct 4,222 new primary and 2,463 junior secondary classrooms in 2006 (FME, 2006). Thus, according to George *et al.* (2013), the country at this current pace of construction will need 40 years to achieve that target, thereby reducing the probability of achieving universal education. Another challenge confronting States, allocating a low percentage of their education budget to primary education, is their inability to access the matching grant for the universal basic education in their respective States. The 2004 UBE act stipulates in section 3, sub-section two that states in the federation could access the block grant from the federal government once they commit not less than 50 per cent of the total project cost towards the execution of the project. It is the fulfilment of this condition that gives State access to this fund. The reports emanating from the Universal Basic Education Commission show a high level of default on the part of States in accessing these funds. Idoko (2014) observed based on a UBEC report that from 2005 to 2013, a total of 44.9 billion naira has not been accessed by the State governments. This makes it difficult for states to expand access to primary education.

Similarly, the construction and renovation of classrooms will be significantly hampered. So far, instances abound of pupils learning under an uncondusive environment like dilapidated classrooms, overcrowding, and holding classes in the open field. This frustrates the efforts of teachers in imparting knowledge to these children (Adirika and Oluwatayo, 2013).

The issue of funding has been highlighted by some researches on universal basic education. Odekunle and Okuwa (2012) noted that funding was among the most problematic issue affecting the UBE programme. This is because all other activities of the UBE rest on financing them to get the desire results. A summary of the Federal Ministry of Education (2008) report showed that the performance of Nigerian learners in English, Mathematics and life skills was below 40%, the proliferation of

unqualified teachers in the system, low morale/motivation, un-conducive teaching and learning environments and funding was grossly inadequate.

The above report indicates how inadequate funding is negatively affecting the accomplishment of the programme. However, the issue of financing goes beyond insufficiency. There are other pertinent issues relating to funding the education sector. One of such issues is corruption, as funds meant for particular projects and training of teachers is either misappropriated or embezzled. Secondly, there are cases of deviation of funds intended for the education sector to other sectors by State governments. In the first instance, Dayo Olagunju, the former Executive Secretary of the National Commission of Mass Literacy, Adult and Non-formal Education, posed a question along this line. This question indicated a mismatch between what has been expended on the UBE programme since inception (totalling 90 billion naira) and the actual results on the ground from 2004 to 2008. (The Nation, Thursday, October 16, 2008). A suggestion that there is a miss-match between what was expended and what was on the ground. Thus, while the sector is facing inadequate funding, the eventually released amount is siphoned away for private gains. Trocaire (2013) observed that corruption is damaging to the ability of government to meet the basic needs and rights of poor people.

Furthermore, it is an additional burden on people living in poverty as they have to contend with gratification demands to access essential services such as education. Instances of this are seen when the school authorities demand additional money from parents for their wards as the allocation from the government is not enough to meet the running cost of the school. This is despite the government pronouncement that education at those levels is free. Clearly, the issue of corruption is a significant obstacle to the attainment of the policy goals of the Universal Basic Education Programme.

The whole essence of having free and compulsory basic education is to guarantee equal access for every child irrespective of their parents' socio-economic status. However, these individuals are now denied that access because funds meant for providing classrooms and other educational materials are deviated to other areas. There are instances in some States where pupils still sit on the bare floor or in the open field to receive lessons. The Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN) review of school infrastructure and maintenance in 2009 stated that infrastructure for basic education is below acceptable standard (ESSPIN, 2009). This

indicates the shortage of funding available to schools. In another study by Adepoju and Fabiyi (2009) on infrastructure in the primary education sector, they observed that about of all the classrooms, 38 per cent had no ceiling, 12 per cent of pupils sat on the floor, and overcrowding was in 87 per cent of classrooms.

The issue of adequate funding is paramount to the successful implementation of the National Primary Education Policy vis-a-vis Universal Basic Education. The situation will most likely remain if government at the Federal, State and Local level do not eliminate or reduce to the barest minimum cases of corruption in funds allocated to basic education. Similarly, a review of what is given to this sector is necessary to meet the goals stated in the Universal Basic Education Act.

4.4.2: ENROLMENT ISSUES

The issue of enrolment is not only about the number of pupils admitted into these primary schools but also about other problems salient like attendance, transition into JSS 1, retention etc. its effect on the National Primary Education policy is essential, considering that pupils are the primary beneficiary of the policy. The UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) estimates that approximately 8.7 million primary school-age children in Nigeria are out of school. In the same vein, 11.8 million children aged 5-16 had never attended school, according to the 2010 NEDS estimate. This shows the enormous task before the UBEC and SUBEB officials to ensure a drop in these figures. Table (4.4.2.1) below indicates the number of out of school children in selected countries.

A particular feature from the above table is that the countries selected are classified as developing countries like Nigeria. However, Nigeria has the highest figure for out-of-school children. An indication the country is not doing enough to reduce these figures.

Under activity 16 in the UBEC Standard Action Plan, one of the objectives is full enrolment/retention and completion of all school-age children. The achievement indicator is 100% access and completion rate with a timeframe of 2015. This is a laudable objective considering the number of out-of-school children in the country. The issue, however, is that enrolment in public primary schools in Nigeria declined between 2006 and 2010. In the Northwest, there was a rise in the number of enrolments attributed to recent development efforts such as the Girls Education Project.

Table 4.4.2.1: Out-of-School Children of Primary school age in selected countries, 2013 or latest year.

COUNTRY	NUMBERS
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	0.7
SUDAN	2.7
PHILIPPINES	1.2
INDONESIA	1.3
BANGLADESH	0.5
INDIA	1.7
PAKISTAN	5.5
SENEGAL	0.5
ANGOLA	0.5
MOZAMBIQUE	0.7
UGANDA	0.7
COTE D'IVOIRE	0.7
MALI	0.8
BURKINA FASO	0.9
SOUTH SUDAN	1.0
KENYA	1.1
NIGER	1.1
TANZANIA	1.4
NIGERIA	8.7

Out-of-school children (millions).

Note: Data for selected countries range from 2010 to 2014.

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics database.

Table 4.4.2.2: Pupil enrolment* in public primary schools 2006/07 to 2009/10

ZONE	2006/07			2007/08			2008/09			2009/10		
	F	M	TOTAL	F	M	TOTAL	F	M	TOTAL	F	M	TOTAL
NORTH	1.91 (39.7)	2.91 (60.3)	4.83 (100)	2.00 (40.5)	2.94 (59.5)	4.94 (100)	2.23 (41.8)	3.10 (59.2)	5.33 (100)	2.67 (43.5)	3.47 (56.5)	6.14 (100)
WEST												
NORTH	1.41 (42.1)	1.94 (57.9)	3.35 (100)	1.29 (43.3)	1.69 (56.7)	2.97 (100)	1.35 (41.7)	1.90 (58.3)	3.25 (100)	1.41 (44.1)	1.79 (55.9)	3.20 (100)
EAST												
NORTH	1.78 (47.0)	2.01 (53.0)	3.80 (100)	1.70 (46.8)	1.93 (53.2)	3.63 (100)	1.46 (47.7)	1.60 (52.3)	3.06** (100)	1.47 (46.6)	1.69 (53.4)	3.16** (100)
CENTRAL												
SOUTH	1.71 (50.6)	1.67 (49.4)	3.38 (100)	1.49 (50.6)	1.45 (49.4)	2.94 (100)	1.32 (50.7)	1.28 (49.3)	2.60 (100)	1.41 (50.5)	1.38 (49.5)	2.79 (100)
WEST												
SOUTH	1.54 (50.4)	1.52 (49.6)	3.06 (100)	1.22 (36.5)	2.12 (63.5)	3.34 (100)	1.24 (50.8)	1.20 (49.2)	2.44*** (100)	1.04 (50.3)	1.03 (49.7)	2.07 (100)
SOUTH***												
SOUTH	1.02 (49.6)	1.04 (50.4)	2.06 (100)	1.12 (49.4)	1.14 (50.6)	2.26 (100)	1.06 (49.7)	1.08 (50.3)	2.14 (100)	0.83 (49.2)	0.86 (50.8)	1.69 (100)
EAST												
TOTAL	9.38 (45.2)	11.09 (54.2)	20.47 (100)	8.81 (43.9)	15.22 (56.1)	20.08 (100)	8.67 (46.04)	10.16 (55.06)	18.82 (100)	8.83 (46.35)	10.22 (53.65)	19.04 (100)

* Figures in millions

** Figures for Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau states for 2008/2009 and Plateau state for 2009/10 in North Central not included

*** Figures for the South-South for 2008/2009 from Bayelsa and Edo states also not included.

Note: Figures not likely to add up perfectly due to rounding.

Source: FME (2011)

Part of the reasons given for the decline in enrolment of pupils in the Southern and Central States is the migration of some children to low-fee private primary schools in urban areas(Larbi *et al.* 2004, Tooley *et al.* 2005, Urwick 2002). Table (4.4.2.2) above shows the pupil enrolment in public primary schools 2006/2007 to 2009/2010.

Analysis of the data above gives a picture of the lack of consistency in some regions, while there is a decline in enrolment in others. For instance, only the North West had a steady growth in enrolment. The North-East and South-East had enrolments that fluctuated while the North-Central and South-West experienced a decline in enrolment. The South-South though, showed an initial increase, it began to decline in the subsequent years. While the figures in the table above show significant improvement in net enrollment compared with figures from the 1990s, there is still a considerable number of children out of school. This indicates that more effort needs to be directed at enrolling more children into public primary schools. Similarly, it is also an indication that measures such as compulsory enrolment of pupils through sanctions on parents who fail to enrol their children and abolition of fees have either not been effective or underutilized.

Another observable trend is that the percentage number of pupils tend to decrease from class one to class six. According to FME/UBE (2003) National School Census, the total enrolment in class one was about 5.51 million. This decreased to 4.96 million, 4.37 million, 3.75 million, 3.31 million and 2.88 million in class 2, class 3, class 4, class 5 and class 6, respectively. This is illustrated in Table 4.4.2.3. This shows that school retention is a significant issue as pupils tend to drop out of school as they progress.

4.4.3: TEACHING AND LEARNING ISSUES

The major reason children of school age are in public primary schools is to learn. This is achieved through the medium of teaching, which teachers perform. In other words, the dependent variable in this relationship is acquisition of knowledge by pupils, while the independent variable is the teacher (measured in terms of quantity and quality). A Federal Ministry of Education (FME) report in 2011 noted that the intention of education is the total development of a learner with emphasis on intellectual, physical, social and moral aspects of personal development. Consequently, a pupil is supposed to emerge from the school system demonstrating these skills. On the contrary, observations and comments from stakeholders indicate a shortage of learning in the school system. JaiyeOba's (2011) study of the primary

Table 4.4.2.3: Total Enrolment by Class

CLASS	TOTAL ENROLMENT
1. Primary one	5,505,886
2. Primary two	4,960,968
3. Primary three	4,369,498
4. Primary four	3,746,721
5. Primary five	3,313,227
6. Primary six	2,876,788
Total	24,773,088

Source: FME/UBE, Abuja, 2003, National School Census.

school teachers' knowledge of primary education objectives and pupils' development observed that there is a great concern among members of the public of the products coming from the public primary schools. While a pupil is to demonstrate literacy and numeracy skills, these abilities gradually diminish among these pupils. Some of the factors acknowledged as being responsible for this abnormality range from lack of critical working materials, poor implementation of policy, conflict of management to unqualified teachers, inadequate monitoring and lack of political will (Bassey *et al.*, 2008). These factors are the general trend noticed for the failure of most educational policies. However, certain elements that stand out has been crucial to the successful delivery of primary education. For instance, the management of public primary schools has been an issue among the three tiers of government in the country. The 1999 constitution had vested the responsibility of primary education with the Local government councils. However, the LGAs have been accused of being unable to effectively manage and finance primary education over the years. Cases of unpaid salaries, inadequate infrastructure, shortage of teaching staff were among the issues raised when the LGAs managed the primary schools. Based on these issues, the Federal government initiated the Universal Basic Education with a framework that has the input of the Federal, State and Local governments. Although the LGAs still participate in the delivery of primary education, their role has reduced significantly. This will be examined further in the subsequent section of this chapter. This section will discuss in details issues that affect the teaching and learning process under the following sub-sections; quality of teachers in primary schools, the performance of students in public primary schools, teacher/pupil ratio, learning environment and incentives (salaries and allowances) for teachers and the management of these schools.

4.4.4: QUALITY OF TEACHERS

A fundamental aspect of the learning process is the quality of teachers deployed to teach these pupils. Okeke and Adaka (2012) stated equivocally that the quality of the educational system is directly related to the quality of its teachers. This observation was informed by studies on teachers' quality and role in primary education and the significant role they play in the learning process. The teachers in primary school are considered as the fulcrum of that level of the educational system. They are the most vital component of imparting knowledge in the pupils. In a similar study done on the role of teachers in the educational system, UNICEF (2001)

discovered that among all the inputs in the delivery of education, teachers were seen as the most important inputs. In evaluating the impact of teachers on the learning process, two aspects are commonly examined. These are quality (Knowledge and skills possessed by the teacher) and quantity (the number of teachers available to teach a minimum number of pupils).

In terms of quality, Okon (2008) observed that the quality of teachers is linked to the preparation given to them. Okeke and Adaka (2012) examined this quality issue by raising specific questions on preparations given to teachers. These questions are:

1. Do teachers have adequate knowledge of the pupils as learners to impact knowledge into pupils?
2. What skills do teachers have in instruction and assessment?
3. Are communication techniques issues in teaching and learning clear to teachers?
4. Do teachers understand the place of the profession and community in effective teaching and learning?

The questions listed above formed the premise of their assessment of the quality of teachers in public primary schools. In the area of teachers' knowledge of pupils as learners, it was observed that the teacher preparation programme is not sufficient to give teacher trainees the skills and competence required for effective teaching and learning. Thus, teachers lack the capability to comprehend the learning process and tend to have a uni-directional learning perspective. Pupils have different learning needs, and it is the responsibility of teachers to understand these needs. A similar observation was made by Adeyanju (2006, cited by Okeke and Adaka, 2012). Omo-ojugo (2009), commenting on teachers' quality also emphasises the need for more qualified teachers in public primary schools. Citing Dike (2002), Omo-ojugo noted that a high percentage of these teachers lacked the Teachers' Grade Two certificate even though the Nigeria Certificate of Education (NCE) is the minimum qualification a teacher must possess to teach in primary school. Table (4.4.4.1) highlights the percentage of qualified teachers in public primary schools in Nigeria.

Table 4.4.4.1: Number of Qualified Teachers in Public Primary Schools In Nigeria

SN	ZONE	NO. OF PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOLS	NO. OF TEACHERS	NO. OF QUALIFIED TEACHERS	NO. OF UNQUALIFIED TEACHERS	% OF QUALIFIED TEACHERS
	NORTH					
	CENTRAL					
1	MINA ZONE					
	FCT	301	5825	5252	573	90.2%
	KOGI	1613	10574	10501	73	99.3%
	KWARA	1288	5349	3335	2014	62.3%
	NIGER	1512	16,717	11,084	5633	66.3%
	TOTAL	4714	38,465	30,172	8293	78.4%
2	JOS ZONE					
	BENUE	2363	23,148	21,111	2037	91.2%
	NASARAWA	981	6943	3424	3519	49.3%
	PLATEAU	1534	7963	6123	1840	76.9%
	TOTAL	4878	38,054	30,658	7396	80.6%
	NORTH EAST					
3	YOLA ZONE					
	ADAMAWA	1315	21,762	14,741	7021	67.7%
	GOMBE	942	9428	6551	2877	69.5%
	TARABA	1425	18,739	13,097	5651	69.9%
	TOTAL	3683	49,929	34,389	15,540	68.9%
4	MAIDUGURI ZONE					
	BAUCHI	1145	21,172	17,783	3389	84.0%
	BORNO	1215	7172	5727	1445	79.9%
	YOBE	777	11401	3400	3001	73.7%
	TOTAL	3137	39,745	31,918	7835	80.3%
	NORTH WEST					
5	KADUNA ZONE					
	JIGAWA	1489	12,683	7015	5668	55.3%
	KADUNA	1682	20,303	11,416	8887	56.2%
	KANO	2270	16,865	11,215	5650	66.5%
	KATSINA	1813	14,045	8,694	5351	61.7%
	TOTAL	7254	63,896	38,340	25,556	61.5%
6	SOKOTO ZONE					
	KEBBI	992	10,946	5763	5183	52.6%
	SOKOTO	2088	9662	5713	3949	59.1%
	ZAMFARA	831	7099	4882	2217	68.8%
	SOUTH EAST					

7	OWERRI					
	ZONE					
	ABIA	1114	14,273	12,119	2154	84.9%
	IMO	1220	13,271	13,041	230	98.3%
	TOTAL	2334	27,544	25,160	2384	91.3%
8	ENUGU ZONE					
	ANAMBRA	1501	12,956	12,796	160	98.8%
	EBONYI	754	5914	3964	1950	67.0%
	ENUGU	1015	12,733	12,511	222	98.3%
	TOTAL	3270	31,603	29,271	2332	92.6%
	SOUTH-					
	SOUTH					
	SOUTH-					
	SOUTH					
9	UYO ZONE					
	AKWA-IBOM	1092	14,543	14,376	167	98.9%
	CROSS-RIVER	807	14,260	11,264	2996	79.0%
	RIVERS	1027	21,000	17,100	3900	81.3%
	TOTAL	2926	49,803	42,740	7063	85.8%
10	BENIN ZONE					
	BAYELSA	496	6311	4647	1664	73.6%
	DELTA	1015	20,795	20,795	----	100.0%
	EDO	1034	1499	1436	63	95.8%
	TOTAL	2545	28,605	26,878	1727	94.0%
	SOUTH WEST					
	AKURE ZONE					
	EKITI	631	10,794	10,545	249	97.7%
	ONDO	1129	13,905	13,811	94	99.3%
	OSUN	1348	13,323	13,323	----	100.0%
	TOTAL	3108	38,022	37,679	343	99.1%
12	LAGOS ZONE					
	LAGOS	2210	35,983	34,399	1584	95.6%
	OGUN	1309	16,627	16,430	197	98.8%
	OYO	1849	28,405	27,992	413	98.5%
	TOTAL	5365	81,015	78,821	2194	97.8%
	GRAND	47,803	514,388	422,384	92,012	82.1%
	TOTAL					

Source: Teachers Registration Council of Nigeria, Vol 1, No.3, 2007.

From the table above, only the FCT and the following States of Kogi, Imo, Akwa-Ibom, Edo, Ekiti, Ondo, Ogun and Oyo have unqualified teachers less than a thousand. The others (excluding Delta and Osun States, which recorded 100% qualified teachers) had a thousand and above unqualified teachers.

This trend implies that this group of unqualified teachers may not be exposed to the modern methods of teaching knowledge into pupils. Similarly, their ability to adapt to these modern methods may be difficult as they may already be fixated on a particular teaching method. A change from this method is limited as they have not developed the mental capacity for it. An instance to illustrate the shortage of qualified teachers in the public primary was the request by Governor of Edo State, Adams Oshiomole, for a teacher in a public primary school to read the content of an affidavit she presented which she could not read (The Vanguard newspaper, 2013). This shows the level to which teachers in the education sector have fallen. The situation is compounded by the inability of the inspectorate unit of the ministry of education to check the inflow of these unqualified teachers into the system.

In conclusion, the trajectory of primary education in Nigeria has oscillated from regional control to Federal and State governments cooperation in the management of public primary schools. However, despite introducing the Universal Basic Education (UBE) in 2000, primary education has not experienced significant improvement nor fully attained stated policy goals. While there were marginal improvements in certain areas, the country still has the highest number of school-age children out of school. This could be attributed to several factors, some of which were examined under this section. More efforts need to be made to reverse the present trend of out-of-school children and other factors affecting primary education in the country.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.1 Preamble

This chapter presents a discussion of the findings of this research. It highlights the salient factors that affect the character of the intergovernmental relations framework put in place to implement the National Primary Education policy in Lagos state. The discussion starts by examining the framework of intergovernmental relations established for implementing the National Primary Education policy. This will offer valuable insight into the character of the relationship that exists between officials of the federal and state governments. This will be followed by a description of the observed nature of the intergovernmental relations framework. The narrative focuses on whether the character of the relationship is cooperative or conflictual. The following section then examines the sufficiency of the intergovernmental relations framework in achieving a collaborative relationship among the officials of the two tiers of government. The concluding section identifies the issues and challenges observed in the intergovernmental relations framework in implementing the National Primary Education policy. This is the crux of this research which seeks to understand the effect of intergovernmental relations on the implementation of national policies in Nigeria.

5.2: THE FRAMEWORK AND CHARACTER OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL POLICY ON PRIMARY EDUCATION IN LAGOS STATE

The framework of intergovernmental relations comprises the structures and processes established to facilitate the coordination of the three tiers of government activities. Aiyede (2004) stated that constitutional and non-constitutional structures are found within the sphere of intergovernmental relations. The constitutional arrangements are those created by the constitution to ease the relationship among the tiers of government and engage the lower level of government in implementing

national policy objectives. Usually, membership of these institutions is drawn from each level of government, with the central government maintaining the leadership position. Examples of such constitutional structures are the Council of State and Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC). The second categories of mechanism for intergovernmental relations are those that are classified as Non-constitutional. These structures are established primarily to serve as a forum for consultations on policy issues between the Federal and State governments or between State governments or Local Governments.

In most cases, these structures are entities that do not have the backing of the constitution. According to Inyang (2014), these entities serve as a consultative forum whose membership could be drawn from the vertical and horizontal levels of government. Examples of these non-constitutional bodies are the Nigerian Governors' Forum and the Association of Local Governments of Nigeria.


The Universal Basic Education Act (2004) stipulates the creation of the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) and Local Education Authority (LGEA) as the institutions saddled with the responsibility of implementing the programme. Through a creation of the UBE Act, these institutions are under the supervision of the Federal and State governments, respectively. The Local Education Authority, according to the Act, is under the supervision of the State Universal Basic Education Board, which falls under the jurisdiction of the State government. Consequently, the Local Education Authority is directly under the control of the State government and not the Local government council (ESSPIN, 2009a). Within this institutional arrangement, the goals of Universal Basic Education vis-à-vis National policy on primary education will be achieved. It also serves as the framework of Intergovernmental relations for the implementation of the programme.

At the top of the administrative structure overseeing the implementation of basic education under which is subsumed primary education is the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC). It was created by the federal government through the Universal Basic Education Act of 2004 and is under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Education. In broad terms, the agency sets policy guidelines for basic education, ensures that minimum standards for basic education are attained in states, and regulates activities relating to basic education. In terms of policy guidelines, the commission designed the standard action plan that identifies the various activities

needed and institutions responsible for them to implement basic education. Similarly, the commission receives from the State Universal Basic Education Board an action plan for each year detailing the projects to be executed and areas of needs the FG-UBEC intervention fund will be utilized. In this respect, the commission manages the block grant from the federal government and disburses to states based on an approved formula. Figure 2 shows the procedure for distributing funds to states. The Act stipulates that the commission can withhold further disbursement to a state that violates provisions of the approved procedure. Other responsibilities assigned to the commission include; prescription of minimum standards for basic education, coordination of the implementation process, monitoring and evaluation of the various aspects of basic education, presentation of progress reports to the president through the minister of education, development of curriculum and instructional materials for basic education.

Next in the hierarchy of institutions implementing basic education is the State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB). The Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board was established in 2005 and performed functions similar to that of UBEC, which are contained in the Lagos Compulsory Basic Education law, 2005. The board also formulates policy guidelines for basic education in the state, receives the block grant from the federal government through the state government, monitors and evaluates basic education in the state, and manages public primary and secondary schools in the state. At the bottom of the intergovernmental framework for implementing basic education is the Local Government Education Authority (LGEA). Although the UBE Act (2004) stipulates the creation of this agency, it gives the state government the responsibility of making laws guiding its function, administration and finance. The Local Government Education Authority, as stipulated in the Lagos, UBE law (2005), is saddled with the day to day running of primary and junior secondary school within its council area, appointment, posting, transfer, promotion and regulation of non-teaching staff on grade levels 01-06, recommendations on the promotion and code of teaching and non-teaching staff on grade levels 07 and above, payment of remuneration, allowances and benefits of all teaching and non-teaching staff, undertaking general maintenances of primary schools and junior secondary schools buildings and infrastructure; ensuring that yearly reports are given to the board on all actions of the authority during the preceding year especially on teaching and non-teaching staff and monitoring of all education committees at the

FIGURE 5.1: UBE INTERVENTION FUND FORMULA FOR DISBURSEMENT



authority level. Worthy of mention here is that, unlike UBEC and SUBEB, which are directly under the supervision of the federal and state governments, respectively, the LGEA is not directly under the control of the local government council. On the contrary, the education secretary who manages the affairs of the authority is appointed by the board and renders reports of its activities to the board. Finally, there is the Community Education Development Committee (CEDC) which is to operate under the local education authority and performs the functions of notifying the authority of necessary repairs and renovations in schools; good teaching and non-teaching equipment and materials; quality enrolment, and total attendance in schools and informing the management of all educational problems in its area.

These institutions highlighted to serve as the leading intergovernmental framework for implementing basic education. The officials from these institutions interact regularly and maintain a formal channel of communication between them. Notwithstanding, other institutions like the federal ministry of education, the state ministry of education and finance and Local Government Council also have functional roles in implementing basic education. However, these roles tend to be supervisory and not clearly articulated to achieve the goals of basic education. The commission, board, and local education authority are directly responsible for implementing basic education as stipulated in the UBE Act (2004) and Lagos UBE law (2005). Figure 3 highlights the roles of the three agencies in the implementation process. While the UBEC plays more of a supervisory and regulatory role, operational responsibilities lay with SUBEB. The LGEA is under the administrative control of SUBEB. These structural arrangement and rules follow the prescription of the Administrative federalism model to achieve effective coordination and uniform policy outcomes. However, evidence shows that effective coordination was not attained, and policy outcomes varied across the states (FME, 2011 and 2012, Orbach, 2004 and Santcross *et al.*, 2010)

To better understand the character of the intergovernmental relations framework, the contingency model of collaborative governance was used to analyse. The model highlights four broad variables with specific variables that could facilitate effective collaboration in the implementation process.

5.2.1: Starting Conditions


These are the conditions under which the collaboration may start. They represent a vital aspect of the partnership regarding how it could facilitate or impede

effective cooperation. The specific variables under this broad variable are resources or power imbalances, incentives to collaborate and previous history of conflict or cooperation among participating agencies. Power or resources imbalance connotes a situation where one stakeholder lacks the capacity, organization, status or resources to participate or collaborate on an equal footing. The effect of these imbalances is that it creates distrust or weak commitment to the collaborative process. This power or resource imbalance is evident in the funding arrangement for the implementation of basic education under subsumed primary education. A major highlight in the list of functions assigned to the commission by the Act is the disbursement of the federal government intervention fund for basic education.

The commission determines the release of the funds to the board to provide basic education based on specific guidelines. These guidelines are based on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between UBEC and SUBEB detailing the state's specific needs upon which the funds will be applied. However, when the board defaults in adhering to the guidelines as stated in the MOU, a clause empowers the commission to use appropriate means such as suspension or outright stoppage of grants to such states. This provision by the Act creates a superior-subordinate relationship between the commission and board. In other words, the clause tilts the balance of power in favour of the commission. Although the clause intended to enhance synergy and transparency in implementation, most states cannot fulfil the provision of the MOU (UNESCO, 2015). This reduces the probability of attaining the basic education goals as a significant percentage of the funds expended on primary education come from the federal government through the commission. Once these funds are not released, or there is a delay, it affects funding for infrastructure and training of teachers.

In the same vein, the local government council under whose jurisdiction falls primary education has a limited role in implementing basic education. SUBEB performs appointment of education secretaries for the LGEA, likewise the selection of teaching and non-teaching staff from grade level 06 and above. The LGEA can only appoint staff from grade 01 to 05 and submit its report to the board rather than the local government council. An ESSPIN report (2009a) observed that although the LGEA are supposed to manage basic education for LGs, they were placed under the administrative control of SUBEB, a state agency. By this

FIGURE 5.2: DIAGRAM OF UBEC, SUBEB AND LGEA ROLES



act, the Local government councils who technically own the primary schools do not exercise administrative control. Thus, the usurpation of their authority by the state government. As stated in the UBE Act (2004) and Lagos UBE law (2005), these provisions create a power/ resources imbalance between the commission and board and between the board and local government education authority. These imbalances Gray (1989) and Warner (2006) observed creates a low level of trust and weak commitment to the collaborative process. The following variable that affects the collaborative process under starting conditions is the incentive to participate. These incentives could range from financial gains to concrete, tangible policy outcomes resulting from the collaborative process. Again, examining the UBE Act and Lagos UBE law indicates a lack of incentive for the state and local governments to participate in the collaboration. This is because the power imbalances (UBEC and SUBEB) may affect their motivation to participate in the collaborative process (Imperial, 2005). For instance, the ESSPIN report (2009a) observed that the responsibility given to LGs to recruit staff from grade level one to six resulted in a disconnect between the state and LGs. In this case, the local governments' incentive to participate may be low as their role is limited. At the same time, the bulk of financial and administrative responsibilities for basic education lay with the state government.

Similarly, state governments' incentive to participate appears low, as observed in their inconsistency in providing their counterpart funding for basic education. Premiumtimes (2015) observed that out of the 36 states in the country, 32 had not accessed 56 billion naira of the counterpart funding from the Universal Basic Education Commission in eight years. The four states from the report that have accessed their basic education funds to date are Taraba, Sokoto, Katsina and Kano. Lagos state, which served as the case study for this research, was among the list of states that have not accessed their matching grants to date. Notwithstanding, these states make provision for primary education in their annual budgets. Several deductions could be made from this observation, one of which is that state governments would rather expend funds they have control over than that subject to external authority or regulation.

The final variable under the starting conditions is a prehistory of conflict or cooperation. Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, the country has witnessed quite several disagreements between the federal and state governments. Worthy of

mention is the withholding of local government allocation from the federation account meant for Lagos state. The federal government took the decision based on the insistence of the Lagos state government to go ahead with the creation of additional local government councils. The action by the federal government prompted the Lagos state government to file a suit at the Supreme Court, challenging the legality of the action (Alabi, 2006).

Similarly, there was also the issue of consultation between the President and Governors before introducing the UBE programme in 1999 (Elaigwu, 2013). The Governors assumed that since the programme depended on their operational support for successful implementation, they should have been consulted before the President announced its introduction. This was confined by the Supreme Court ruling of April 2002, nullifying the federal government's intention to deduct funds from statutory allocation of states and local government councils in financing primary education. According to Tahir (2008), the ruling changes the narratives as the powers of the federal government were reduced and thus gave the states more leverage in managing primary education at the expense of local government councils who are regarded as administrative appendages. This prehistory of conflict between the federal and state governments has a high probability of creating low levels of trust, leading to low levels of commitment. Evidence of this could be seen in the fulfilment of counterpart funding for basic education by state governments.

5.2.2: Facilitative Leadership

Leadership in the context of collaborative governance is essential as it ensures that stakeholders remain committed to the collaborative process. The leaders can achieve this by setting clear ground rules, building trust, facilitating dialogue, and seeking mutual gains. Ryan (2001) highlighted specific attributes of effective collaborative leadership: adequate management of the collaborative process, maintaining technical credibility, and empowering the collaboration to make credible and convincing decisions that are acceptable to all. An examination of the intergovernmental relations framework for implementing basic education shows that the commission is better positioned to provide effective leadership. The Act gives the commission the power to provide policy guidelines for implementation and coordinate in collaboration with non-governmental and multi-lateral agencies all implementation-related activities. By this provision, the commission basically provides leadership in coordinating and ensuring the implementation of basic education in the country.

However, available documented evidence indicates that though the commission sets these policy standards, it cannot ensure that the SUBEBs and LGEAs adhere to them. Freinkman (2007), in his analysis of education delivery in Nigeria, observed that agencies of the federal government lacked the capacity and legal instruments to monitor and coordinate state performance. Khemani (2001), commenting on the delivery of primary education in the country, observed that the reality on the ground is that there is no clear delineation of managerial and financial responsibilities. Rules enacted are often not understood, let alone followed. A similar observation was made in a Federal Ministry of Education report (2012), which observed that protocols guiding the relationships between the commission and boards were unnecessarily complicated and unclear while processes were often unknown and lacked accountability. This probably explains the lack of coordination observed in the implementation process. For instance, Adediran (2015) observed the lack of an adequate coordinating system of the activities of international donor agencies-DFID and USAID. Both agencies engaged in similar projects at the same time within the same geographical area. Clearly, this was a duplication of efforts and inefficient use of human and material resources.

Consequently, rather than provide leadership in the collaborative process towards achieving basic education goals, the commission has not been able to ensure coordination of the various activities of the boards, education authorities, and international donor agencies. A large number of parastatals, with some having overlapping mandates at the federal and state levels, may be responsible for the inability of the commission to provide effective leadership (Santcross *et al.*, 2010, FME, 2011). Thus, the commission may not build trust, facilitate dialogue and seek mutual gains for stakeholders in the collaborative process.

5.2.3: Institutional Design

This deals with the structure and processes put in place for the collaborative process. The effect of the institutional design on the collaborative process is that it determines who can participate and the extent of the participation in the collaborative process. This could affect the level of commitment of the various stakeholders (Reilly 1998, 2001). The intergovernmental relations framework is the institutional design for the implementation of basic education. The framework is hierarchical and attempts to incorporate as many participants as possible with varying degrees of participation. Therefore, there is an extensive set of institutions involved in providing basic

education, thereby creating a complex set of structures and processes. This intricate institutional design is arguably the reason for the non-attainment of basic education goals (Adamolekun, 2013; Arong and Ogbadu, 2010; World Bank, 2008). For instance, there is no clear definition of functions and powers between the three tiers of government and their agencies with no agency accountable for results (Good Planet Foundation, 2013). An example in this regard is the inspection of primary schools. The Federal Ministry of Education has an inspectorate unit overseeing the review of schools. The Universal Basic Education Commission also has a monitoring and evaluation department monitoring all aspects of primary education. At the state level, State Universal Basic Board has school services departments that inspect primary schools. The State Ministry of Education also has inspectorate units that carry out the same function. Finally, the Local Governments Education Authority also has school supervisors that visit schools and compile school reports. Consequently, the supervision of schools through the various inspectorate units shows incoherence and a lack of complementary vision (Orbach, 2004).

Apart from the unclear definitions of functions and powers among these institutions, the role of the local government council appears restricted. The Constitution of Nigeria and UBE Act gives the local governments the mandate of providing primary education through their respective Local Government Education Authorities. However, the LGEA is under the administrative control of SUBEB, and the local governments have minimal or no input in the operations of the education authority (ESSPIN, 2009a). The education secretary who heads the organization is an appointee of the board and not the local government council. Decisions guiding its operation are made at the state level (SUBEB) without consultation with the local government council. Figure 4 below outlines the roles of the LGC, LGEA and SUBEB in primary education delivery. The institutional design for the actualization of the UBE goals is characterised by unclear roles and lack of coordination.


5.2.4: The Collaborative Process

Ansell and Gash (2008) categorise the collaborative process into; Face-to-Face dialogue, trust-building, commitment to the process, shared understanding and intermediate outcomes.

(i). Face-to-Face Dialogue

Communication or face-to-face dialogue could serve as a means to build trust, mutual respect, shared understanding and commitment to the process (Gillian *et al.* 2002, Warner, 2006). In the absence of face-to-face dialogue, there is a tendency for

FIGURE 5.3: DIAGRAM OF THE ROLES OF SUBEB, LGC AND LGEA



lack of trust and commitment to the process. The hierarchical nature of the intergovernmental relations framework for basic education makes communication between UBEC, SUBEB and LGEA more like instructions to follow than consultation or negotiations. For instance, Freinkman (2007:7) observed an antagonistic relationship between federal parastatals and state government officials, which is a similar pattern between UBEC and SUBEB. Consultation is insufficient, and project selection does not reflect local priorities, which contradict a genuine desire to involve local officials in implementation and monitoring. Thus, the commission prescribes a procedure for doing things that the SUBEBs must adhere to without consultation.

This observation was also collaborated by an ESSPIN (2009b) report which observed that conditions attached to expenditure issued by UBEC to SUBEB were done without considering the specific needs of states in the provision of basic education. An example in this respect is mandating states to build additional classrooms which for Lagos state is not feasible due to limited land space. This trend was also observed between the SUBEB and LGEA as communication between them is mainly instructional (ESSPIN, 2009a). Furthermore, it was observed that consultation among these agencies was weak. These observations indicate a low level of consultation in the collaborative process and could hamper the commitment of stakeholders.

(ii). Trust Building

Building trust between all the stakeholders involved in the collaborative process is also essential, particularly when there is a prehistory of conflict. The duplication of roles and responsibilities in the intergovernmental arrangement for basic education suggest a lack of trust among the stakeholders. For instance, in a bid to solve the shortage of teachers, some local governments in Kwara state started a scheme to recruit teachers. The project involves the recruitment of NCE graduates, who were placed on a monthly allowance of 5000 naira. After seven months, these teachers are examined, and those that pass are placed on a new monthly stipend of 7000 naira. The intention was to absorb them into the main stream teaching service subsequently. However, the State Universal Basic Education Board disapproves of this scheme and sees it as a usurpation of their function. These kinds of actions are reasons given for the lack of decentralization in the country and show a lack of trust between the levels of government (ESSPIN, 2009a).

(iii). Commitment to the Process

Stakeholders' level of commitment will go a long way in determining the success or failure of the collaborative process. This can be achieved through trust and 'ownership' of the process. Stakeholders must see themselves as owners of the process and not critics of other stakeholders who may hold opposing views (El Ansari, 2003; Geoghegan and Renard, 2002). Furthermore, Ansell and Gash (2008) observed that where collaboration is mandated because of a weak incentive to participate, there is a likely probability that this can disguise a lack of real commitment by stakeholders.

Available evidence suggests that some state government's commitment to the actualization of the UBE programme appears weak. This is particularly evident in the inconsistency observed in the fulfilment of counterpart

TABLE 5.2.4.1: SUMMARY OF MATCHING GRANTS DISBURSEMENT FROM MAY, 2011 TO MAY,**2013**

SN	STATE	2011	2012	2013	TOTAL
1	ABIA	1,218,131,826.68	0.00	0.00	1,218,131,826.68
2	ADAMAWA	654,395,480.02	0.00	852,936,713.92	1,507,332,193.94
3	AKWA IBOM	2,962,202,654.54	0.00	0.00	2,962,202,654.54
4	ANAMBRA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
5	BAUCHI	1,495,309,271.64	852,936,683.92	360,000.00	2,348,605,955.56
6	BAYELSA	0.00	1,300,000,000.00	1,300,000,000.00	2,600,000,000.00
7	BENUE	2,120,000,000.00	0.00	0.00	2,120,000,000.00
8	BORNO	436,263,653.35	436,263,653.35	436,263,653.34	1,308,790,960.04
9	C/RIVER	0.00	622,781,965.64	0.00	622,781,965.64
10	DELTA	1,362,011,659.27	872,527,306.70	852,936,713.92	3,087,475,679.89
11	EBONYI	832,432,432.00	300,000,000.00	213,121,621.64	1,345,554,053.64
12	EDO	759,381,557.07	436,263,653.35	0.00	1,195,645,210.42
13	EKITI	622,781,965.64	872,000,000.00	0.00	1,494,781,965.64
14	ENUGU	0.00	1,800,000,000.00	0.00	1,800,000,000.00
15	GOMBE	759,441,557.79	436,263,653.35	0.00	1,195,705,211.14
16	IMO	0.00	0.00	2,643,045,986.22	2,643,045,986.22
17	JIGAWA	759,441,554.79	654,395,482.74	0.00	1,413,837,037.53
18	KADUNA	323,340,030.45	436,263,653.35	436,263,653.35	1,195,867,337.15
19	KANO	2,858,863,325.96	852,936,713.92	0.00	3,711,800,039.88
20	KATSINA	436,263,653.35	1,268,696,083.35	233,738,462.39	1,938,698,199.09
21	KEBBI	323,176,901.44	872,527,306.70	852,936,713.92	2,048,640,922.06
22	KOGI	310,781,965.64	872,000,000.00	0.00	1,182,781,965.64
23	KWARA	760,167,240.62	436,263,653.35	426,468,356.96	1,622,899,250.93
24	LAGOS	0.00	1,195,705,225.70	852,936,713.92	2,048,641,939.62
25	NASARAWA	1,363,554,054.06	0.00	672,781,965.64	1,986,336,019.70
26	NIGER	460,490,389.24	867,527,306.70	0.00	1,328,017,695.94
27	OGUN	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
28	ONDO	436,263,653.35	436,263,653.35	0.00	872,527,306.70
29	OSUN	622,781,965.64	0.00	863,000,000.00	1,485,781,965.64
30	OYO	622,781,965.64	0.00	872,527,306.70	1,495,309,272.34
31	PLATEAU	531,121,621.62	0.00	0.00	531,121,621.62
32	RIVERS	673,172,392.26	872,527,306.70	852,936,713.92	2,398,636,412.88
33	SOKOTO	1,153,903,587.26	0.00	1,152,892,170.70	2,306,795,757.96
34	TARABA	173,375,869.32	872,527,306.70	852,936,713.92	1,898,839,889.94
35	YOBE	759,441,554.79	436,263,653.35	426,468,356.96	1,622,173,565.10
36	ZAMFARA	0.00	1,526,809,747.95	0.00	1,526,809,747.95
37	F.C.T ABUJA	323,177,901.44	436,263,653.35	1,000,000,000.00	1,759,441,554.79
	TOTAL	26,114,451,684.87	19,966,007,663.52	15,744,551,817.42	61,825,011,165.81

SOURCE: ONOCHA, 2013

matching grants by state governments. Table 5.1.4.1 shows the payment of matching by states from 2011 to 2013.

The above table indicates that out of the 36 states with FCT, only 13 states fulfilled their counter funding for the years under review. The remaining 24 states missed one or two years of fulfilling their counter funding. While this data may not be a reasonable means to ascertain the level of commitment of these states to the UBE programme, it could be extrapolated that priority is not giving to accessing the matching, which may invariably affect the implementation process. Similarly, it was observed that the state governments had paid insufficient attention to the implementation of the UBE programme (Ajayi, 2007; Edho, 2009; Egonmwan, 2002; Omokhodion, 2008; UNESCO, 2009). According to Freinkman (2007), leadership at the state level exercises a high level of independence, as shown in their reluctance to share information and participate in joint projects. Furthermore, Joel (2015) observed that payment of counter funds by state governments was based to a large extent on the disposition of the leadership.

(iv) Shared Understanding

This involves a clear understanding among stakeholders of the problem (agreement on a definition of the problem) or the requisite knowledge needed for solving the problem. This is to facilitate a clear understanding among stakeholders of what their collective action will achieve.

Again it is doubtful whether the various agencies implementing basic education share the same understanding of the issues and solutions. For instance, reports of the various monitoring agencies- primarily UBEC and SUBEB- are submitted to their respective supervisory ministry or political executives. There is little evidence to suggest that there is the harmonization of these reports. According to Joel (2015), the various reports emanating from the multiple monitoring bodies suggest that harmonization and coordination are lacking in the implementation process. This complicates issues for SUBEB as they are uncertain of the reports and recommendations. This finding by Joel is an indication that there could be a different perceptions of the issues facing basic education and suggestions on how to resolve them. The likely implication is for the individual agencies to tailor their operations according to their perception of the issues facing basic education and not on a shared understanding of these issues. For example, the UBEC quality assurance report (2014) stated that the Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board should improve by

providing more classrooms. However, an ESSPIN report (2009b) observed that the instruction to LSUBEB to build more schools is not achievable as the state does not have the luxury of land to build. There are different perceptions between UBEC and LSUBEB on how to solve the issue of a large number of out-of-school children in the state.

(v). Intermediate Outcomes

Collaborative efforts must anticipate “small wins” for the stakeholders involved. These “small wins” may be critical outcomes that could be achieved in the shortest possible time and encourage a credible cycle of trust-building and commitment (Vangen and Huxham, 2003).

Areas, where this small wins could be seen, are enrollment, retention of pupils, learning outcomes and number of qualified teachers, among other indices. Although the Universal Basic Education programme was introduced in 1999, the Act establishing it did not come into effect until 2004. Likewise, the Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board was not established until 2005 after the state assembly enacted the basic education law. Before this time, the number of pupils enrolling in public primary schools in Lagos state was experiencing a decline (See Table 3.4.2). However, with the introduction of UBE, the total enrollment into public primary schools in Lagos state from 2009 to 2014 showed a fluctuation rather than a steady increase. Total enrollment for 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 were 399,740; 366,792; 419,551; 393,768; 502,347; and 400,277 respectively. A similar trend was observed for enrollment into primary one from 2011 to 2014. Enrollment into primary one for 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 are 62,545; 54,010; 91,146 and 56,302 respectively¹. Comparing these enrollment figures with enrollment figures pre-2005 does not indicate sufficient mutual gains to generate a strong commitment from the Lagos state government to the UBE programme.

The above analysis describes the character of the intergovernmental relations framework for implementing basic education under which is subsumed primary education. Documented evidence of this framework have established a lack of coordination and overlapping of roles in its operations. Similarly, there is a lack of definition of the roles of certain government agencies. Consequently, the deduction that can be made from this analysis is that there appears to be a low level of trust and

¹ Compiled from: www.ubec.gov.ng/data/

commitment to the collaboration on the part of the various stakeholders, thus, making the framework ineffective in actualizing the goals of National policy on primary education. The observed character of the intergovernmental relations framework for the implementation of national policy on primary education in Lagos state appears ineffective in enhancing collaboration between officials of the Universal Basic Education Commission, Abuja and Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board. This claim is based on available documented evidence on the implementation of basic education and the outcome generated since the commencement of the programme. The character highlighted here refers to the attitude and disposition of each tier of government towards the collaborative process. These attitudes and dispositions were shaped by the structure and operations of the intergovernmental relations framework.

5.3: THE ISSUES AND CHALLENGES OBSERVED IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING THE NATIONAL POLICY ON PRIMARY EDUCATION.

In the discourse on intergovernmental relations in Nigeria, two aspects are usually analysed. These are the allocation of jurisdictional powers and fiscal relations. These two aspects are discussed in detail below.

A: ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTIONAL POWERS:

Jurisdictional conflict arises due to the encroachment of one level of government mainly the Federal government in the constitutionally assigned powers of the other level of government, which could be the State or Local governments. In Nigeria, causes of jurisdictional conflict could be traced to the skewed provisions of the 1999 constitution in favour of the Federal government. Specific conditions like Section 4, sub-section 2 are open-ended and could be used by the Federal government to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the State government. Similarly, the exclusive list for the Federal government has more items than the concurrent list that is legislated upon by the Federal and State government (Akinsanya 2005). This has given rise to numerous litigation between the Federal and State governments under the fourth republic.

The framework put in place to implement the Universal Basic Education programme by the UBE Act follows a similar trend of empowering the federal government more than the state governments. The consequence has been the attempt by some state governments to resist the superior stance of the federal government

agency by challenging the legality of such actions in court or outright disregard for directives issued by this agency. For instance, before enacting the UBE Act in 2004, the federal government wanted to evade the state governments by directly funding primary education through the local governments. The action led to a lawsuit at the Supreme Court which ruled that it was illegal for the federal government to bypass the state government in the funding of primary education (FME, 2003).

B: FISCAL RELATIONS ISSUES:

In the area of fiscal relations, again, the Federal government is dominant over the state and local governments. The formula for sharing the revenue accruing into the Federation account gives a higher percentage to the Federal government than the State and Local governments. Similarly, taxes that appear to be elastic and buoyant are given to the Federal government to administer. In contrast, those that are less elastic and buoyant are given to the State and Local governments to administer (Elaigwu, 2007). This has led to clamour, particularly from oil-producing states, for the control of their natural resources for them to discharge their responsibilities to their people effectively. Similarly, there has been disagreement between the federal and state governments over managing the revenue accruing into the federation account. For instance, in 2002, President Olusegun Obasanjo, by an executive order, increased the federal government share of the federation account from 48.5% to 56% (Sagay, 2003). This action was viewed as been unconstitutional as it was only the National Assembly based on the recommendation of the Revenue Allocation Mobilization and Fiscal Commission that could make that decision. Subsequently, a suit was initiated by some state governments at the Supreme Court challenging the legality of this decision.

While these two areas, allocation of jurisdictional powers and fiscal relations, are the two broad areas where issues of conflict between the Federal and State governments may arise, its manifestations could be multi-dimensional. The research identified the factor described below as the conflictual issue and a challenge to the intergovernmental relations framework for the implementation of National Primary Education Policy in Lagos State;

5.3.1 LOW LEVEL OF TRUST

In conducting the interviews, the following areas were covered, namely; the recruitment of teachers, provision of infrastructures and funding of primary education. In recruiting teachers, the Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board (LSUBEB) is

solely in charge. They will advertise, shortlist, interview and recruit teachers for the various primary schools in Lagos state. The reasons adduced for this action are that the law (As stated in the Compulsory Free Universal Basic Education Law of Lagos state, 2005) and the Education Secretaries at the Local Government Education Authority (LGEA) may abuse it the power to recruit. According to interviewee SN 10

If you give them the opportunity, they can be abused. Why? Because they are political officeholders. They belong to a party, and in recruitment, they may want to follow the party dictation, and other people are there. They are very closer to the people and the people that need job today are more than the vacancy. I could remember some years ago they were given opportunity to recruit non-teaching staff. Do you know that they abused that privileged in the sense that in each school, the number of non-teaching staff doubled that of the teaching staff and created problem for the government

The opinion expressed by this official indicates a low level of trust in the capacity of the Education Secretaries to do a proper job. While the Education Secretaries can recommend it, they do not determine the outcome of the recruitment process. The Governor based on a written submission from the Board is the primary determinant of the recruitment of teachers. However, the salary of primary school teachers is deducted from the allocation to the Local Government from the federation account. According to interviewee SN 6

.....the salary is usually in the Local Government allocation. Once the Local Government allocation comes from the federal, they will deduct the salaries of primary school teachers. The state will deduct because it is the state that is paying the salaries of school teachers

This shows that the LGEA, who should have direct administrative control over primary schools, are denied such powers. Yet, the funding for teachers' salaries recruited by the State government comes from the Local government allocation. The Education Secretaries by this arrangement may not be willing participants in the collaboration to implement the policy. Their support may be more passive than active efforts. Although the reason given for the recruitment of teachers by the Board and not the Education Secretaries is lack of capacity, there was no mention of capacity building at this level to enable them to perform the function.

Interviewee SN 13 expressed displeasure at this arrangement, stating that:

Those are the things that are bad that we are talking about. As state is taking over Local government authority, so also the SUBEB is taking over the functions of the LGEAs. They are separate, they have separate functions. The LGEA is supposed to be responsible to the Local government council based on the constitution of Nigeria

Similarly, interviewee SN 12 expressed the view that in terms of recruitment of teachers:

.....the best agency is Local government. When you are in control of a thing, it becomes your liability. You will determine what you can accommodate; you determine standards because the education of primary school is a grassroots thing

The observation made from these opinions is that while SUBEB officials hold the view that LGEA officials cannot recruit, those at the LGEA have the view that this is a usurpation of the authority of the Local government council. The deduction made from these comments is that evidence of trust between the Board, and LGEA is low, thereby limiting the active commitment of the latter to the collaborative process.

In terms of the provision of infrastructures, the Board is the primary determinant. Infrastructures like renovation, building of classrooms, toilets and other capital projects are done by the Board. In the work plan submitted to the Commission, provisions are made for capital projects to be executed by the Board. Fifty per cent of the matching grant is allocated to the provision of infrastructures. It is assumed that the Local government council under whose jurisdiction is the primary schools where these capital projects will be sited is duly consulted. However, the responses from the interviewee indicate that the Local government officials are informed and do not form part of the decision-making process. According to interviewee SN 6:

The planning, research and statistics and project department of the Board are in charge of that because the two departments plan for the educational needs of primary schools. They take data, collect data. From this data, they will be able to identify schools that needs classrooms, schools that needs furniture, schools that need toilet, schools that need more teachers. Based on this, they advise the Board, these are the things the schools needs..... Another process is that anytime His Excellency go for this town hall meeting and the community demand something from him, he will ask the chairman or commissioner of education to note it

Similarly, interviewee SN 6, when asked the question of consultation with relevant stakeholders like LGEA, State Ministry of Education and UBEC on the provision of infrastructure, stated that:

When we talk about consultation, we don't consult them. It is only when we have problem with area boys who are disturbing the execution of the project in any of the LGAs. Once they are at the grassroots, we have to get them involved on how we can assist the contractor to resolve it. And whenever, we are giving out contract, we use to copy them, that so, so project is going to take place in one of the schools under them. So they too will be aware and be doing oversight functions

The above comments indicate that the administrative function of provision of infrastructure lies mainly with the Board while the Local governments are informed. This is not likely to facilitate the active involvement of the Local government councils in the provision of infrastructure.

The last aspect covered in the interview is funding. This can be classified into capital and recurrent expenditure. The capital aspect funds the provision of infrastructures while recurrent aspects handle training of teachers and salaries of teachers. The counterpart fund provided by UBEC is used mainly to finance the provision of infrastructures and the training of teachers. The significant issues observed here are the provisions guiding the utilization of these funds. It is around these provisions that disagreement between the Board and Commission usually occurs. For instance, interviewee SN 1 stated that:

There are certain things you can let go, they don't have any financial implication. You know stick and carrot approach. But there are certain issues we will not let go. For example, if we all agree there is a training programme for teachers and we have support fund for training them, we will ensure that when they send in their action plan, that programme is reflected. If not, we will not release money to them for training

In contrast to this, interviewee SN 6 noted that:

At times, UBEC used to be rigid on the action plan where as terrain may differ. So this has been causing disagreement. Along the line, by the time the states try to convince them that their own terrain is different from another state. So you cannot be saying that what is operating in Sokoto should be operating here

This shows that while the Commission is particular about uniformity in the utilization of funds across the states, the board believes that there should be flexibility as terrain differs. Citing an example along this line, interviewee SN 6 stated when the Commission asked the Board to procure plastic chairs for the pupils instead of wooden chairs. They responded that the plastic chairs were not durable and would take up more space which they do not have. The Board suggested wooden chairs, which were dual seats, as the best for their schools. Although quarterly meetings are held to resolve these disagreements when they occur, it is not certain that resolutions were reached at these meetings. This is based on the reoccurrence of suspicion on the part of the Commission on the activities of the Board, whether they have diverted the funds meant for specific purposes to other things. Citing an instance of suspicion, interviewee SN 11 stated an allegation of mismanagement of funds made by the Commission against the Board. It took the investigation carried out by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to clear the Board of any wrong doing. That the Commission has this perception of the activities of the Board is based on experiences they had with some State Boards. In the first instance, the state government ensured that the major administrative responsibilities in respect of basic education lay with the state agency. The initial attempt by the federal government to have direct administrative control of basic education was challenged at the Supreme Court in 2003. The Court ruled in favour of the states (Interviewee SN 3). This has incapacitated the ability of the Commission to mandate compliance from the state agency. Therefore, the only avenue left to the Commission to enforce adherence to guidelines for implementing the policy is through funding. Although, the UBE Act (2004) stipulate the procedure for assessing and utilizing the matching grants, the application of this rule as resulted in conflict between the Commission and Board. The second instance is that the manifestation of this conflict is expressed through the informal processes of intergovernmental relations. While the anticipated behavioural responses that should be exhibited by officials across the levels of government should be high level of trust and mutual respect, low level of trust and suspicion sometimes occur. This could have negative consequences for implementing the basic education programme under which is subsumed primary education.

Interviewee SN 3 stated that:

Whenever there is mutual understanding, mutual respect, dedication to duty, everybody knowing its responsibilities and is doing it well, it is going to positively affect delivery of basic education. But in situations where there are conflicts and these conflicts do sometimes arise. It could be on a technical basis. UBEC has a guideline on how or which area to apply the funds. If there are breaches by the state, definitely conflict will arise between UBEC and SUBEB. And sometimes, if there are not carefully and timely managed, it could negatively affect the delivery of basic education service

Consequently, the formal procedure of interaction as generated negative informal elements thereby hindering the actualization of basic education goals. Furthermore, the low level of trust observed among the participants in the collaborative process was attested to by Interviewee SN 10 who stated that:

When you are not informed, you are deformed. Information is power. When there is information, then all of them can flow and there can be collaboration. So as I said, information is power. So when such things are to be done, if SUBEB is the one that is in charge, SUBEB should be duly consulted as well as the local government area. So that when information flows from one person to the other automatically there is going to be accomplishment

The above comments indicate a tendency for the Commission and Board to be restrictive or limited to what the officials perceive is necessary for the collaborative process. However, this may, in the long term, reduce the level of trust between these officials. This finding indicates that the informal processes that have elements of trust and commitment play a key role in actualising the objectives of primary education in the country.

5.4. THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS FRAMEWORK IN ENSURING EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL POLICY ON PRIMARY EDUCATION IN LAGOS STATE

The sufficiency of the intergovernmental relations framework is based on the ability of the structures and processes established to achieve the policy's objectives. In other words, this ensures that the outcome of the collaborative process is in line with the goals of the National policy on primary education. Part of the objectives of primary education is to ensure permanent literacy, numerical and communicative skills in pupils (NERDC, 2013). To achieve this, the National Policy on primary education stipulated that education at the primary level is free, mandatory, universal

and qualitative. In addition, the policy specified a teacher-pupil ratio of 1:35 for effective teaching and learning. Thus, pupils enrolled in these public primary schools should, on completion of primary education, demonstrate these skills. Similarly, the pupils should not exceed 35 in a class. Therefore, the attainment of these objectives serves as the basis of the assessment of the intergovernmental relations framework.

The sufficiency of the intergovernmental relations framework in ensuring cooperation and collaboration between the various government agencies implementing the National Policy on primary education appears weak and ineffective. Data on outcomes generated in several states do not indicate significant improvement in specific indices of primary education. As discussed in the previous section, the low level of trust between the commission and board on the utilisation of funds poses a challenge to attaining policy objectives. The SUBEB and LGEA are in a better position to understand the needs of the primary schools. However, restricting their discretion on the utilisation of these funds may reduce their commitment to the programme and prompt them to engage in unilateral decisions. This is further compounded by the structural and procedural issues observed in this study which may not facilitate effective collaboration between the various agencies. For instance, there was a decline in enrollment of pupils (25,783 pupils) between 2010/11 and 2011/12 academic sessions in Lagos state (see table 5.3.1). While it could be argued that the decline resulted from migration of these pupils to low-fee registered and unregistered private schools, it still shows the parents' preference for these private primary schools (Harma, 2011). Their choice could be based on a perceived low standard of these public schools.

Similarly, the diversity of agencies and duplication of efforts demonstrates a low level of trust among the various agencies. Otherwise, each agency would have been assigned a specific role to perform, which the other agencies will depend upon. However, the framework is complex, with certain agencies not having a clearly defined role. (Arong and Ogbadu, 2010; Adamolekun, 2013; World Bank, 2008; Orbach, 2014 and Freinkman, 2007). The World Bank report (2008) observed that the complex institutional structures associated with the UBEC and SUBEBs have led to confusion over roles and jurisdiction across institutions, leading to institutional rivalry rather than cooperation and collaboration. The overlapping of functions by the various agencies is, to a large extent, responsible for the inability to reduce the number of out-of-school children (Aransola, Bamiwuye, Akinyemi and Ikuteyiyo, 2009). Ejere

(2011), in his assessment of UBEC, noted that the agency did not demonstrate enough capacity to coordinate and ensure adherence of the various implementing agencies to the rules guiding implementation. Thus, the complex nature of the intergovernmental relations framework has made it difficult for UBEC to coordinate the activities of the various agencies effectively. The above arguments from the literature and those from the interviews justify the conclusion in this research that the intergovernmental relations framework established for implementing the national policy on primary education does not appear sufficient.

TABLE 5.4.1: ENROLMENT FIGURES FOR THE YEARS 2010/2011 AND 2011/2012

CLASS	2010/2011		2011/2012	
	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE
PRY 1	30330	32215	27071	26939
PRY 2	33880	36291	29354	29964
PRY 3	36992	39511	32954	34518
PRY 4	30509	32424	35384	36609
PRY 5	34054	36506	35939	37181
PRY 6	37132	39707	32936	34919
TOTAL	202897	216654	193638	200130
SUM TOTAL	419551		393768	

Source: www.ubec.gov.ng/data/ .

In terms of commitment, the state governments appear to have a low commitment to the UBE programme. Bolaji, Gray and Campbell-Evans (2015), in their study of the implementation of basic education in Nigeria, observed that the success of any policy depends to a large extent on the commitment and will from the political class. According to the authors, the lack of political will has resulted in multiple actors pursuing their interests at the detriment of collective interest. This limited the effectiveness of the UBE programme. For instance, Schiffer, Mustapha and Mustapha (2013) conducted a study on non-salary funding in Kano state and observed that the political interest of the State Governor was the primary determinant of education spending and considered it to be also pivotal in accessing UBEC funding. These were the same findings of Joel (2015), who observed that political will and SUBEB leadership were strong factors determining states' payment of counterpart funds. This shows that once the political class is not committed to the programme, nothing much can be achieved in terms of funding. The probability of lack of trust and low level of commitment to the UBE programme by the Lagos state government is high. The state had been under the control of the opposition political party from 1999 to 2015.

Consequently, the state government may be reluctant in implementing a national policy that gives credit to the federal government controlled by a different political party. Although no empirical evidence was found for this assumption, findings in other policy areas indicate this pattern of behaviour (Aiyede *et al.*, 2015). In the same vein, the local government councils may also show little commitment to the UBE programme since most of the functions are performed by the LGEA, which is under the administrative control of the board.

In summary, the available documented evidence does not indicate that the intergovernmental relations framework for implementing the National Policy on primary education is sufficient to achieve the policy objectives. Although Lagos state witnessed improvement in certain areas of primary education such as transition rate, learning outcomes in English and Mathematics, number of qualified teachers and infrastructural development, there are still many out-of-school children, overcrowding of classrooms and poor infrastructure in some LGAs.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

6.1 Preamble

This chapter reviews the research work by providing a comprehensive summary of the various chapters. Similarly, it highlights the significant findings of this study and includes a recommendation that could facilitate cooperative relations among officials of government involved in the implementation of the National Primary Education Policy.

6.2: SUMMARY

This research investigated the effect of intergovernmental relations on the implementation of National Primary Education Policy, which is subsumed under the Universal Basic Education (UBE) program. The aim is to ascertain the extent to which Intergovernmental relations (considered here as the independent variable) affect the implementation (dependent variable) of the National Primary Education Policy. To adequately achieve this objective, the research work was divided into six chapters.

Chapter one of this research laid the background to the study, statement of the problem, research questions and objectives, theoretical framework, definition of term and limitations encountered during the study. The statement of problem identified effective collaboration among implementing officials as one of the challenges confronting the implementation of National policy on primary education. Therefore, the study sought to ascertain the factors responsible for this lack of collaboration and engender it.

Chapter two provided an extensive review of existing literature on intergovernmental relations and policy implementation, emphasising Nigeria. It reviewed the literature on structure and processes for intergovernmental relations and the outcomes they are likely to generate. Similarly, the literature revealed that fiscal and jurisdictional issues were the main conflicting factors affecting intergovernmental relations in Nigeria. Likewise, implementation of public policy is hindered by several factors such as disposition of implementers, lack of administrative control, complex

nature of the public policy, shortage of resources and intergovernmental and inter-organizational relations.

Chapter three outlined the methodology adopted for the study and the site of the study which is Lagos state. It also examined the state of primary education in Lagos; the Pre-1999 era and the Post-1999 era. This was done to ascertain the state of primary education in the state before the commencement of the Universal Basic Education program and the achievement recorded so far since the program started. It was observed based on secondary data that the state had recorded significant improvement in certain areas of primary education in the state. However, a lot still needs to be done to reduce the number of out-of-school children in the state.

Chapter four focused on the implementation framework and the performance of the National policy on primary education. This chapter enumerated the performance indices of the National policy on primary education and observed that challenges still exist in specific areas such as funding, enrolment, teaching and learning and quality of teachers.

Chapter five presented the findings from the data collected through interviews of officials of the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) and Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board (LSUBEB). The data from the interviews were complemented with data from secondary sources to analyse if there had been an effective collaboration between the various stakeholders from the federal, state and local governments level in implementing the National policy on primary education. The analysis showed that there had not been an effective collaboration between the various stakeholders based on secondary data evidence. Similarly, evidence from the interviews indicate that low trust between the various government agencies is a significant factor hindering effective collaboration for the implementation of the National policy on primary education in Lagos state.

6.3 CONCLUSION

Radin (2007) thought that the discussions on intergovernmental relations could not be devoid of conflict irrespective of the metaphor used to describe. Therefore, the emphasis should be on how to prevent unnecessary conflict and manage those that may affect productive ends. The designers of the Universal Basic Education programme assumed that the three tiers of government would as a necessity follow the provisions of the Act and cooperate to achieve the stated objectives. They

fail to realize that cooperation is not a given that will just occur based on legislative requirements. On the contrary, cooperation will be better facilitated by the administrative procedure put in place.

Achieving effective collaboration among the tiers of government in the implementation process is complex and challenging. However, specific processes, when put in place, could facilitate better coordination of their activities and enhance cooperation. Agranoff (1986 cited by Radin 2007) highlighted recent developments in intergovernmental relations that emphasize the perspective that the independent and distinct character of various participants is accepted, need for an interface between political and career actors, the superior-subordinate relationship should be avoided, and consensus to adhere to tasks and goals. This perspective suggests a need for public officials across the various tiers of government to work on ensuring a high level of trust in the implementation process. Lundin (2007) identifies trust as one crucial variable that could bring about cooperation in implementing public policies in a multi-level system of government. Lack of trust was one of the factors identified in this research as hindering effective collaboration among the officials of UBEC and SUBEB. According to Scharpf (1997), who used the concept of weak trust, trust is when the preferences expressed by an actor are honest and not misleading and that the actor will stay committed to an agreement as long as the conditions under which it was made does not change drastically. Consequently, there is a need for UBEC and SUBEB in conjunction with other stakeholders to constantly work on building trust among them.

In conclusion, trust is a vital component of facilitating collaboration among tiers of government. It is essential that these tiers of government evaluate on periodic bases their relationship to address issues that breed distrust. The finding of this research confirms the argument in the literature that collaborative relationship among the tiers of government plays a prominent role in the policy implementation process. It identifies how lack of trust has hindered the full attainment of the objectives of the National policy on primary education in Lagos state. The output generated in terms of enrollment and transition rate plus learning achievements could have been better if the mechanism for collaboration was more effective. Furthermore, the weak Intergovernmental relations framework for policy implementation identified in previous studies is attributed to a lack of trust among the implementing agencies. The

finding from this research has helped bridge the gap in knowledge on Intergovernmental relations and policy implementation in Nigeria.

6.4: RECOMMENDATION

The structures established for the coordination of the activities of each tier of governments towards the implementation of the National policy on primary education subsumed under the Universal Basic Education programme could not be considered adequate. The issues most times revolve around the processes or instruments used to ensure that the lower levels of government comply with the rules and regulations of the policy. These are the areas that issues usually arise, and, most times, it manifests through informal elements of trust and commitment. For instance, applying sanctions like withholding subsequent matching grants may not be effective in getting states to adhere to instructions guarding utilization of funds. Although this practice might be an attempt to ensure accountability of the state governments to the funds they receive, there is the tendency for it to reduce the level of trust between government officials and lead to the stagnation of the implementation process. This is because the state governments may perceive the federal government as infringing into its sphere of jurisdiction and restricting its discretion on how best to utilize these funds on public primary schools which are under their control.

The essence of the intergovernmental relations framework was to have structures and processes that would facilitate collaborative effort between the levels of government. The framework designers assumed a hierarchical, top-down management approach will facilitate the implementation of basic education. The emphasis was more on organizational structures and processes (how the various organizations are to work together) than on the informal aspect (Behavioural responses arising from the formal part). Thus, the UBE Act specified the structures and processes needed and paid less attention to behavioural responses from officials that will facilitate effective collaboration.

The character of relations between the various levels of government before the full commencement of the UBE programme exhibited tendencies of antagonism and conflict. The conditions under which the programme was to be implemented were based on low trust and weak commitment. There was a need to put processes in place to reduce the antagonism and build confidence with this background. Another recommendation of this research is for consultation and negotiation between the

federal, state and local governments. The decisions reached through these negotiations should not be subject to final approval by the political executives.

On the contrary, it should be seen by all stakeholders as the last forum of decision making for the collaborative process. If need be, the negotiations can occur at different layers with a particular layer for the political class to commit to the decisions reached. However, the collaborative forum should serve as the final stage for a consensus decision binding on all stakeholders. This collaborative forum, when properly established, could build trust among the various stakeholders. Although the National Education Research and Development Council brings together officials from multiple levels of government, its role is more of policy development and curriculum. The collaborative forum will identify issues that come up and how to resolve them. In the same vein, state governments have to assimilate the local government councils into the collaborative process.

The law establishing local government education authority must be reviewed to allow for more active participation by the local government councils in their operations. The present practice of recruitment of teachers by SUBEB should be reviewed to accommodate more active involvement of the LGCs. The UBEC should play the role of facilitative leader in the collaborative process. This implies that as much as possible, the commission continues to dialogue with the SUBEBs and other relevant stakeholders involved in implementing basic education in an atmosphere of co-equals rather than superior-subordinate. It should aim to ensure the buy-in of the SUBEBs and, more importantly, the state political executives such that it is perceived as their 'own' programme and not that of UBEC. This is crucial as the commitment to accessing counterpart funds is determined primarily by the state political executives.

Finally, building trust and commitment between all the stakeholders takes time to develop. The commission should continue to address issues that breed a low level of trust and loyalty. The conditions attached to accessing the UBE intervention fund are worthy of mention. Although it seeks to ensure accountability and transparency in utilising these funds, it should be balanced with building trust and commitment. Otherwise, a state may continue not to access their matching grants fully, thereby negating the actualization of the objectives of National Policy on primary education.

6.5 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

This study has contributed to the existing knowledge on intergovernmental relations in National policy implementation in Nigeria. Previous studies had identified ineffective intergovernmental structures and processes as one of the factors responsible for poor policy implementation. This claim was examined using the Administrative federalism and Contingency model of Collaborative governance as the theoretical framework. The theories stated certain factors necessary for achieving better coordination and cooperation between implementing agencies from multiple levels of government. The presence of these factors, as argued, should advertently achieve expected policy outcomes.

Evidence of the presence of these factors was not seen in the framework of the Intergovernmental relations for implementing the National policy on primary education. The outcomes generated did not reflect the significant improvement in primary education in Lagos State. The study discovered that the ineffectiveness of the framework of the Intergovernmental relations for implementing the National policy on primary education was due to the low level of trust between implementing agencies at the Federal, State and Local governments level. Thus, this study has provided a new understanding of the role of Intergovernmental relations in National policy implementation in Nigeria.

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APPENDIX

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Interviewee Information

Gender:

Grade Level:

Rank:

Purpose of the Study

The main purpose of the research is to examine the nature of the relationship among levels of government in the implementation of National Policy on Primary Education subsumed under Universal Basic Education (UBE).

Questionnaire for SUBEB officials

1. What are your views about recruitment of primary school teachers through the recommendation of Education Secretaries?
2. What do you think are the reasons behind the law stating that the Educational secretaries should recommend to the Board and not appoint teachers directly?
3. What are your views on the Counter-part funding for Basic Education under which is subsumed primary education?
4. Do you think based on the provision of the UBE Act on counter-part funding; the Federal Government through UBEC is exercising undue influence over Basic Education cum Primary Education?
5. What is the process of providing Infrastructure i.e classrooms, office space, playgrounds and toilets in public primary schools?
6. What are your views on the management of the implementation of basic education programme by UBEC?
7. As a Board, have you been able to effectively handle the recruitment of teachers across the six educational districts of the state?
8. What are your views on the clause that UBEC can withhold counter-part funds for states that diverted previous funds to other purposes?
9. In the provision of Infrastructures in public primary schools, has it been done based on needs or to achieve equal spread?
10. In the recruitment of teachers are all relevant stakeholders i.e LGC, NUT, PTA, CBMC involved?
11. In the submission of work plan upon which counter-funds will be spent, are all relevant stakeholders like State Ministry of Education and LGEA consulted?
12. Are there regular consultations with relevant stakeholders like LGEA, State Ministry of Education and UBEC on solution to the likely challenges encountered in the recruitment of teachers?
13. Are there regular consultations with relevant stakeholders like LGEA, State Ministry of Education and UBEC on solution to the likely challenges encountered in the provision of infrastructure?
14. How can collaboration among the Board, UBEC and LGEA be improved upon?
15. Some primary schools have a higher pupil – teacher ratio, what do think is responsible for this?
16. How can this problem be resolved?
17. What has been the noticeable achievement with respect to primary education in terms of teachers, funding and provision of infrastructure since the commencement of the UBE programme?

18. Are these achievements based on joint efforts between the Board, UBEC and LGEA or a major effort of the Board?

Interviewee Information

Gender:

Grade Level:

Rank:

Purpose of the Study

The main purpose of the research is to examine the nature of the relationship among levels of government in the implementation of National Policy on Primary Education subsumed under Universal Basic Education (UBE).

Questionnaire for Education Secretaries

1. What are your views about recruitment of primary school teachers through the recommendation of Education Secretaries?
2. What do you think are the reasons behind the law stating that the Educational secretaries should recommend to the Board and not appoint teachers directly?
3. What are your views on the Counter-part funding for Basic Education under which is subsumed primary education?
4. Do you think based on the provision of the UBE Act on counter-part funding; the Federal Government through UBEC is exercising undue influence over Basic Education cum Primary Education?
5. What is the process of providing Infrastructure i.e classrooms, office space, playgrounds and toilets in public primary schools?
6. What are your views on the management of the implementation of basic education programme by UBEC?
7. Do you think the Board, has been able to effectively handle the recruitment of teachers across the six educational districts of the state?
8. What are your views on the clause that UBEC can withhold counter-part funds for states that diverted previous funds to other purposes?
9. In the provision of Infrastructures in public primary schools, has it been done based on needs or to achieve equal spread?
10. In the recruitment of teachers are all relevant stakeholders i.e LGC, NUT, PTA, CBMC involved?
11. In the submission of work plan upon which counter-funds will be spent, are all relevant stakeholders like State Ministry of Education and LGEA consulted?

12. Are there regular consultations with relevant stakeholders like LGEA, State Ministry of Education and UBEC on solution to the likely challenges encountered in the recruitment of teachers?
13. Are there regular consultations with relevant stakeholders like LGEA, State Ministry of Education and UBEC on solution to the likely challenges encountered in the provision of Infrastructure?
14. How can collaboration among the Board, UBEC and LGEA be improved upon?
15. Some primary schools have a higher pupil – teacher ratio, what do think is responsible for this?
16. How can this problem be resolved?
17. What has been the noticeable achievement with respect to primary education in terms of teachers, funding and provision of infrastructure since the commencement of the UBE programme?
18. Are these achievements based on joint efforts between the Board, UBEC and LGEA or a major effort of the Board?

Interviewee Information

Gender:

Grade Level:

Rank:

Purpose of the Study

The main purpose of the research is to examine the nature of the relationship between levels of government in the implementation of National Policy on Primary Education subsumed under Universal Basic Education (UBE).

Questionnaire for Public Primary School Teachers

1. Are you aware of the objectives of the National Policy on Primary Education?
2. What are the challenges you have observed in the running of Public Primary Schools in Lagos state?
3. Which agency of government (UBEC, LSUBEB or LGEA) is in a better position to resolve the observed challenges?
4. What is your view on the recruitment of Primary school teachers?
5. Who do you think should handle the recruitment of teachers and why?
6. Who do you think should be responsible for payment of primary school teachers' salary?

7. What is your view about the standard of primary education in the state – is it falling or rising?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR UBEC OFFICIALS

1. Do you think your relationship with other tiers of government like the State and Local government could affect the implementation of the National policy on primary education?

2. Are there areas of disagreement between you and officials of the State and Local government?

3. If yes to Question 2, what do you think are the factors responsible for these disagreements?

4. What mechanism or procedures are put in place to address or resolve areas of disagreement between officials of UBEC and SUBEB?

5. Are there mechanism or procedure put in place to facilitate cooperation between officials of UBEC and SUBEB?

6. How effective are the structures and processes established for the implementation of the National Primary Education Policy?



LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT

LSUBEB/PL/2006/16/74/IV/84

19th December, 2018

Mr Adebayo Olumide Adedeji
Department of Political Science & Public Administration,
Redeemer University,
Osun State.

APPROVAL

RE: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL POLICY ON PRIMARY EDUCATION IN LAGOS STATE 1999-2015

Reference to your letter dated 10th December, 2018 on the above subject, I am directed to notify you that the Board had approved your request to conduct research on "Intergovernmental Relations and the Implementation of National Policy on Primary Education in Lagos State 1999-2015" in Lagos State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB), 6 Local Government Education Authority within the State, namely Agege Local Government Education Authority (LGEA), Ifako Ijaiye LGEA, Kosofe LGEA, Oshodi-Isolo LGEA, Ikeja LGEA, Eti-Osa LGEA and selected Public Primary Schools within the aforementioned LGEAs.

2. Please ensure that the report of the research is forwarded to the Board via this E-mail (basiceducation.subeb@gmail.com or lasubebbasic@yahoo.com) for perusal and necessary action.
3. Also, you should note that the confidentiality ethics of Research Study should be strictly adhere to in order to avoid unnecessary embarrassment to the State Government.
4. Moreover, You should liaise with the Education Secretary of the relevant Local Government Education Authority to facilitate easy access to the selected Schools.
5. Thank you.

Disu, T.O.
Director (Planning Research & Statistics)

STATE UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION BOARD (SUBEB)

Maryland Schools Complex, Maryland P.M.B. 21676, Ikeja Tel: 08150680907
E-mail: basiceducation@lagossubeb.gov.ng, basiceducation.subeb@gmail.com, lasubebbasic@yahoo.com Website: www.lagossubeb.gov.ng