CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1.Background to the study

Although fundamentalism has been a visible feature for the most part of the twentieth century, it is only in recent decades that it has occupied the front burner both in domestic and international politics. With the end of the Cold War and the thawing of hostility between the liberal democratic West and the Communist-oriented East, a new form of tension emerged, dominating both local and international politics. The emergent state of disorder has been primarily expressed in clashes between Arab and Western civilisations. For many observers of political Islam, these clashes are not recent occurrences; they are basically contemporary expression of the age-long interactions between Muslims and Christian Europe. For Tibi (1998), fundamentalism, particularly political Islam, is a product of the many centuries of the crusades against Islamic civilisation; the most fundamental outcome of which is the imposition of western norms and values on Arab civilisation, particularly the establishment of the modern state system.

While the West focused on the global promotion of its civilisation, Huntington (1993) recognised early the dangers inherent in suchattempts to universaliseWestern liberal democratic values, particularly problems associated with the dynamics of Islamic-Western tensions. Thus, while scholars such as Fukuyama (1992) predicted, following the termination of the Cold War, that Western liberal democracy was the unrivalled system of governance which the world would inevitably follow under the guidance of the West, they did not foresee any other force challenging the new world order. But as the world celebrated the end of the bipolar arrangement of international politics, fundamentalism began to resurface as political Islam emerged as a more formidable opponent to Western socio-political civilisation compared to Communism which the West had just defeated.

Recognising the new reality and the impact it could have on global peace, Huntington, in an expanded version of his original article, warned that evolving civilisations, particularly in China and the Arab world, would constitute more severe threats to Western civilisation than the erstwhile ideological conflict with Communism (1996). These warnings seemed prophetic: on September 11, 2001 a group of Islamic fundamentalists coordinated by

Osama Bin Laden hijacked four airplanes in the USflying them into various targets, including the World Trade Centre in New York, killing thousands of innocent people. The attack re-awakened global consciousness on the threat of political Islam while scholarly discourse on the nexus between religion and conflict gained greater global prominence.

Africa was not immediately seriously considered in the whole analysis of the threats of Islamic fundamentalism (though there had been isolated cases of religion-related violence such as the terrorist attacks against the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 7, 1998). Since the master minds of the 9/11 attacks were from the Middle East, the US with its allies devoted its resources in checkmating what was now widely viewed as Islamic fundamentalism or political Islam in the region (Albert, 2011).

Decades after the 9/11 attacks however, religious fundamentalism has become rooted in the African continent. In contemporary times, the continent is home to several Islamist organisationsincludingthe Islamic State (ISIS), Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), Ansarul, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and so on. These groups have established a foothold in the region, and have also been involved in several attacks from North Africa to West Africa. On April 9, 2017, ISIS attacked the Coptic Christians in the Mediterranean city of Alexandria and Tanta, north of Cairo Egypt leaving over 38 persons dead (*The Punch,* April 9, 2017).

Nigeria is not immune to religious fundamentalism or better still, religion-related violence. In Nigeria, religion plays a vital role. Religion has had a great influence on the Nigerian society right from the pre-colonial era. In fact, it is difficult to research on Nigeria without adequate reference to religion (Kukah, 1994; Suberu, 2009). Notwithstanding, it seems that religion has not contributed anything meaningful to the development of the country as narratives on religion in Nigeria have always tilted towards its negative contribution to the Nigerian state (Danjibo, 2009).

By far, Christianity and Islam constitute the two most prevalent religions in Nigeria, with the third being the African Traditional Religion (ATR) which also claims a substantial percentage of the population. It is believed that Nigeria has one of the world's largest Muslim populations and probably outdoing Egypt as the biggest in Africa (Ploch, 2013). However, portraying the two foreign religions (Islam and Christianity) as the most

intolerant in the Nigerian context can be partially true (Mazrui, 1990). In fact, the history of religion-relateddisputes in Nigeria dates back to *Ogun Folefole* (house-breaking war) of 1867 (Banjo, 2000). This was followed by the expulsion of Christian missionaries from Abeokuta in 1891, an incident which was masterminded by practitioners of African Traditional Religion (Ayandele, 1974). There was the gruesome murder of Mallam Bisiriyu Apalara in January 1953 by Oro Cult members (Quadri, 2013: 30). However, in contemporary times, cases of religious conflicts involving ATR could be said to be very minimal arguably because ATR is usually perceived as having no "jealous God". Mazrui (1990) argues that between Christianity, Islam and ATR, perhaps the most tolerant is the ATR. He argues further that because the two other faiths are universal in aspiration; they are inherently competitive, thus leading sometimes to conflict.

Even though inter-faith skirmishesin Nigeria, particularly between Islam and Christianity,date back to the colonial era (Ubah, 1987), they became more prominent in the post-independent period as identity politics and the struggle for power and resources, especially among the ethnic majority groups (Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo) dominated inter-group relations in Nigeria. The early post-independence era and the relative absence of major religious conflicts that characterised the first fifteen years (apart from the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970 which was arguably caused by ethnic and political difference), tended to give the impression that religious conflicts were not likely to be one of Nigeria's social and political concerns. However, the aborted but tragic Dimka coup of 13 February, 1976 left in its trail the impression of internal and external manipulation of religious sentiments. In addition to this was the Shari'a debate of 1977/78 at the Constituent Assembly. These events were soon to be followed by sectarian conflicts within Islam. Members of Izala, Qadiriya and Tijanniya brotherhoods clashed on several occasions. These events and clashes no doubt served as critical pointer to the presence of deep religious and sectarian divide in the Nigerian society (Loimeier, 1997).

The 1980s began with the *Maitatsine* sectarian violence in Kano. Arguably, *Maitatsine*was the first religious shock to the national psyche. Subsequent *Maitatsine* riots occurred in the Bullum-Kutu area of Borno State on 16 October, 1982. Jimeta and Yola also experienced *Maitatsine* disturbances in 1984. The Gombe riots of April 1985 and the Funtua bloody *Maitatsine* riots of January 1983 were all cases of the *Maitatsine*-induced sectarian

violence that threatened the security of Nigeria and engaged the material and human resources of security forces to the utmost. Apart from the *Maitatsine* disturbance of the 1980s, and as if to make up for its late arrival, religion has almost, in the last thirty years or so, outdone all the traditional causes of political instability by the frequency with which it has threatened the stability and security of the Nigerian nation (Ubah, 1987). During the Murtala-Obasanjo-led transition to the Second Republic, the Constituent Assembly could not reach an agreement on the Shari'a debate. The Shari'a controversy raged fiercely during the drafting of the 1979 Constitution. In April 1979, there were protestsinKaduna and Zaria with protesters displaying posters with inscriptions that read: "No Shari'a, No Peace, No Nigeria". Subsequently, conflict broke out between Muslims and Christians. The burning of Christian worship centres in Kano State in 1982 was the first overt inter-religious conflict between Christians and Muslims (Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate Religious Disturbances, 1982).

Early in 1986, Nigeria was reported to have joined the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and this generated a lot of controversies. With the OIC crises yet to abate, the *Cross Crisis* erupted in the University of Ibadan in 1986 (*New Nigerian*, 13 February, 1986). The Kafanchan/Kaduna crisis of 1987 started as religious conflict (Akpuru-Aja, 2007). Other cases of religious conflicts are the pro-Bali Christian Demonstrations of 1990 and the Kano, Katsina and Bauchi riots of 1991. Others were the Zagon-Kataf conflict of 1992; Akaluka crisis of 1994; Zaria riots of 1986; the Shari'a crisis of 2000 in both northern and eastern Nigeria and the numerous religious crises in Jos, Plateau State.

However, none of these religious crises attracted greater attention like the Boko Haram crisis. Boko Haram is viewed as a violent salafist movement (Thurston, 2016) in northern Nigeria which grew into a very deadly and ferocious group instigating attacks against the Nigerian state and its citizens. While the group is said to have emerged in 2001, going by the name "Yusufiyya", with more than 280,000 followers traversing northern Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, it is commonly identified today as Boko Haram,a name literally interpreted in Hausa to mean "Western education is forbidden" (Danjibo, 2009).

Records show that, in the bid to promote its brand of Islam, Boko Haramperpetrated a number of attacks against innocent Nigerians, including religious leaders and security personnel before 2009. Mohamed Yusuf and his followers were said to have made more

than one attempt on the life of the late Sheikh Jaafar Adam, who was his teacher at the Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri because he opposed his (Yusuf) views on Islam. They also attacked several communities, villages and security formations in Yobe and Borno States killing a number of people before the July 2009. In one of its attacks on Panshekara community, Kano, in April 2007, Boko Haram killed 13 policemen. This was after it had killed two officers of the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC) few days earlier (Adeniyi, 2011: 107-109).

In essence, though the group had a narrow scope of operations in its formative years, it nevertheless committed a lot of atrocities that attracted the response of security forces, including the July 2009 incidence that launched it into national prominence (Ogunsanwo, 2015). Boko Haram became more violent with widespread and far-reaching attacks in 2009 following the death of its leader, Mohamed Yusuf, as well as a considerable number of its followers during July 2009 confrontations with security operatives in different parts of the north. The group's attacks continued to have serious repercussions in terms of deaths and number of property destroyed.This occurred regularlyparticularly in north-eastern region of Nigeria (HRW, 2012). The primary focus of Boko Haram has been the state and federal targets such as security forces and their stations. Its targets have equally included public places such as markets, bars, recreational centres, churches, schools, etc.Media houses and communication masts have not been spared either. Boko Haram also masterminded assassination of Islamic religious leaders and politicians who appeared to have spoken out against their activities (Roelofs, 2014).

Since the Boko Haram crisis began, the government has adopted multiple conflict managementstrategies to address the challenges and restore stability. It established a Commission of Enquiry which has become a characteristic feature of government approach to managing the conflict. The government also used force through the declaration of state of emergency, Joint Task Force (JTF) comprising both military and Police, the 7[th]Mechanised Division, and the Multinational Joint Task Force. It has also pursued the dialogue option including negotiation and amnesty for the sect members in return for peace in the region. In addition, the government has also used the support of the civilian Joint Task Force and the Hunters' Guild. It is therefore against this backdrop that an academic assessment of these various multi-level conflict management strategies was carried out with

a view to analysing their effectiveness and how successful they have been in addressing the crisis.

1.2. Statement of the problem

Boko Haram has become a terrorist organisation of global concern. The group has been identified as one of the most lethal global terrorist organisations whose activities constitute grave threat to peace and security both local and beyond. The *Global Terrorism Index* (GTI 2014) placed Boko Haram 4th in terms of global terrorism-related atrocities; others are Taliban, ISIL and Al-Qaeda. *The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism* at the US Department of Homeland Security identified Boko Haram alongside Al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, Hamas, Armed Islamist Group among others as constituting threat to American national security. Because of its links to foreign terrorist organisations like al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda,and the threats it poses to American interests and international peace, the United States Department of States,in 2012, labelled the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau a *Specially Designated Global Terrorist* and thereafter on in June 2013 declared him a wanted man placing a bounty of 7 million Dollars on him (*Sahara Reporters,* June 3, 2013).

Locally, Boko Haram, along with the farmer-herder conflicts and Niger Delta militancy constitutes the single biggest source of insecurity in Nigeria. Despite government's efforts to address the issue, the group has continued to initiate successfully, devastating attacks against security formations and civilian populations, including children, women and civil servants in north-eastern Nigeria.It has also extended its terror activities to neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon thus creating a web of insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin and indeed, West Africa. In fact, it is on record that the month of June 2015 was one of the deadliest in terms of Boko Haram assaults in Nigeria, where over 600 people lost their lives (*Channels News*, 7 July, 2015).

Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2014) also observed that Boko Haram terrorism constitutes a major case of insecurity for Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, efforts to address the crisis have not produced the expected results. Corroborating the observation of HRW (2014), the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2014) reports that government's conflict management strategies have been poorly implemented, hence the seeming intractability of Boko Haram violence and extremism (ICG, 2014: 30-34).

Since Boko Haram terrorism began, government has employed various conflict management strategies ranging from the pronouncement of emergency rule to setting up of Joint Task Force, establishment of 7[th]Mechanised Division, use of Civilian Joint Task Force, formation of a multinational Joint Task Force as well as dialogue and negotiation with Boko Haram members. Nevertheless, questions have been raised about the application and effectiveness of the approaches utilised by the government in dealingwith the problem. A report by *Vanguard* (November 19, 2012) contended that it appeared the government has often wavered and has remained inconsistent in its choice of conflict management strategies. *Agence France-Presse* (November 18, 2012) and the *Daily Trust* (August 27, 2013) newspapers also reported several contradictory statements from the government especially on the dialogue option. At one time, the government would argue that they are dialoguing with members of the group; at another time, it would contradict the claim on dialogue (Jaiyeola, 2013).

Although literatures exist on Boko Haram terrorism, these studies have mainly focused on the evolution of the group, its ideology, motivations and operationsin Nigeria (Ploch, 2013; Roelofs, 2014; Abdullahi, 2015).Conflict management strategies adopted by the Nigerian government in addressing the conflict have not been critically investigated and documented in existing academic literatures. In view of this, this study examined the various conflict management strategies adopted by the government in addressing Boko Haram terrorism from 2009 to 2016.

1.3.Research questions
The following were the research questions:
    i.   What are the different conflict management strategies adopted by the Nigerian government in addressing Boko Haram terrorism?
    ii.   How effective are these strategies?
    iii.   What are the challenges confronting each strategy?

1.4.Aim and objectives of the study
The aim of this study was to examine the dynamics of Nigerian government conflict management strategies in addressing Boko Haram terrorism from 2009 to 2016. The specific objectives were to:
    i.   Examine the various conflict management strategies adopted by the Nigerian

government in addressing Boko Haram terrorism;

    ii.   Analyse the effectiveness of these strategies;

    iii.   Examine the challenges confronting each strategy.

1.5. Significance of the study

Boko Haram and its violent terror activities have been a major contributor to the declining security situation in Nigeria, especially in northern parts of Nigeria. The nature and dynamics of its attacks are also fuelling prevailing religious tensions in many parts of Nigeria and this could furtherstoke the embers of religious tensions and violence in Nigeria and even beyond. In addition, the sophisticated nature of the violence being perpetrated by the Islamist group and its reported ties with international terrorist groups have heightened concerns among Nigerians and the international community that Boko Haram can wreak havoc that could effectively destabilise not only the country, but also West Africa and the Lake Chad region and other overseas targets.

Yet efforts by the government to manage the challenges have not produced the anticipated outcome and this givesan impression that the government lacks a viable national strategy to prevent the terrorist group from carrying out further atrocities. Hence, the persistence of Boko Haram terrorism makes this study necessary as there is the need to re-examine the government's conflict management strategies with a view to identifying the challenges and improving on them for better result.

1.6. Scope of the study

This research examined the dynamics of Nigerian government's conflict management strategies in addressing the Boko Haram terrorism. The study is limited to Adamawa, Borno and Yobe in the northeast region of Nigeria. The choice of these states was influenced by the fact that they constitute the most active theatres of Boko Haram sectarian violence. The study spans 2009 to 2016. The year 2009 is chosen because it signifies the commencement of Boko Haram attacks, while 2016 is chosen because the crisis is viewed as an on-going one. The study will examine the dynamics of Boko Haram terror activitiesin the country. It will analyse the effectiveness of the various government conflict management strategies such as the pronouncement of emergency rule; the formation of the JTF; the establishment of the 7[th]Mechanised Division; the use of the civilian JTF; the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria; and the

option of dialogue and how far they have succeeded in addressing the conflict.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The emergence of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria, especially since July 2009 when it escalated both horizontally and vertically, opened up a new vista in the study of religious crises and the place of religion in governance in Nigeria. Resultingfrom the recurrent nature of the phenomenon, writers, especially academics, have beamed their searchlight on the movement and its activities as well as on the various efforts to manage the violence. While some writers have tried to establish how Boko Haram came about, its ideology, motivations and causes of its grievances and assaults on the state, others have focused on the impacts of the crisis and its implications for democracy and national security. A few have also attempted to highlight and analyse the various approaches that have so far been adopted in countering the sect's ferocious attacks against the state. This chapter examined the debate on Boko Haram terrorism and its management. It reviewed existing works on terrorism and its management and then provided a theoretical framework suitable for the study.

2.1. Literature review

This subheading is dedicated to a review of literatures relating to the research area. It covers studies on global terrorism and the management of global terrorism, as well as studies on Boko Haram terror activities in Nigeria and efforts by the Nigerian government to contain the sect's activities.

2.1.1. Terrorism

Terrorism is an old phenomenon although it has attracted greater attention in the last three decades. For decades, terrorist strategies, including indiscriminate use of force, have been deployed by violent groups against combatants and non-combatants,resulting in enormous devastation including deaths. A European Commission study(2008) observes that while the objectives and *modus operandi* of terrorist groups continue to change, there is little chance, at least, in the near future, that terrorism wouldbe defeated. This is predicated on the assumption that terrorism tactics are widely used by multiple, violent organisations and the number continues to increase. While it may be possible to curb or neutralise individual

organisations who utilise terrorist approaches to advance their political purposes or goals,it is more difficult to break the vicious cycle of terrorism. The general debate is that one of the most effective way of dealing with terrorism has to with demystifying and understanding its deep-rooted causes and triggers.

Furthermore, the Commission (2008: 4) defines terrorism as premeditated political violence against civilians with the objective of exploiting the publicitythat the actions garnerto further the group's "cause". Essentially, terrorist acts differ from others such as civil war and guerrilla warfare. This is because, unlike others whose focus are on the combatants and security forces, terrorist activities hardly differentiate civilian from military targets. In fact, it feeds on the media attention on its activities against soft targets. The atmosphere of fear and disillusionment it creates among the public is often geared towards raising the profile of the group's objective or cause.As argued by USIP (2011) terrorists' attention to propaganda far outweighs the action itself. In which case, more efforts are usually devoted to the planning and technical sides of the operations.

Furthermore, USIP defines terrorism as:

> The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate
> fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies
> in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or
> ideological (USIP, 2011: 3).

Terrorism constitutes a major source of insecurity across the world, and its primary targets are usually citizens and private properties. In the early post-Cold War period, the world began to witness unusual turbulence occasioned by terrorism and activities of militia bodies. The problem was further aggravated by the proliferation of arms and insurgencies as a consequence of the struggle for power. Apart from religious related conflicts, resource-based conflicts and self-determination also contribute to the acts of terrorism across the world. In the Niger Delta area of Nigeria, various activities of youths that culminated in militancy and agitations by different groups have been described as terrorism by some people.

Ashara (2013) in the study, *The Trauma of Nigeria's Terror Ordeals: Trends, Effects and Panacea,* posits that given that scholarship on religious terrorism tends to focus on one specific stimulus— millennial, apocalyptic or messianic terrorism, in which groups use

violence to "hasten the end of times and usher in an anticipated new world" (Ashara, 2011: 21) — the current wave of religiously motivated terrorism propagates acts of unrestrained, indiscriminate violence. Ashara further maintains that whether acts of terrorism are perpetrated by states or armed groups during violent conflicts, vulnerable groups are subjected to danger. The truth must be told that the secrecy associated with the planning and execution of attacks by non-state armed groups take people unawares, unlike states that target specific groups through security forces that have constitutional backing to enforce laws.

In Teichman's study, *How to Define Terrorism Philosophy* (1989), he defines terrorism as "the poor man's atom bomb, with the assertion that struggles of national liberation are struggles of the poor against the rich, and the weak against the strong; given that terrorist techniques are relatively inexpensive" (p. 515). While terrorism causes conflicts in affected areas (Toros, 2008), terrorist financing is responsible for the difficulties encountered in mitigating the activities of terror groups (Golwa, 2010; Kessler, 2011:202), to the point that they have adequate resources to plan suicide bombings (Brown, 2011), or suicide terrorism (Capell, 2007). For example, Boko Haram's catastrophic terrorism is responsible for threats to Nigeria's internal security (Bamidele, 2012). This is because terrorism represents a brand of violence (Baseren, 2008). In various parts of the world, there are ruthless terrorist organisations (Nwozor, 2012), and these organisations maim and take people hostage even if they are not bombed. The intensity of the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre and display of sophistication by the terrorists remain remarkable and will be evergreen in the history of international relations and security (Falaiye, 2008).

Various scholars are in agreement that terrorism is difficult to define in a specific way (Teichman, 1989; Awoniyi, 2002; Pogoson, 2013). And this problem of definition is addressed by their consideration that terror adopts violence as a strategy. This makes Teichman (1989) argue that it is crucial to reject attempts to arrive at a definition that is based on ordinary language, because the usage of the term terrorism is wide, and one must avoid describing it based on conversations, news or media reports or mere political statements. In the words of Coady (1989: 505), "The definitional question is essentially irresolvable by appeal to ordinary language alone since terrorism as a concept is not 'ordinary' in even the way intention, guilt and dishonesty are… its natural home is in

polemical, ideological and propagandist contexts. Significantly, Seyyad (2013) offers more insight thus: In conceptual terms, terrorism can be expressed through eight narratives: (i) as expression of religious constructions; (ii) as a protest and rallying symbol (ideological); (iii) as instrument of policy (political); (iv) as violent criminal behaviour (organised crime); (v) as a warfare implement (spatiotemporal swathe); (vi) as propaganda tool (visual warfare through media); (vii) as vengeance (norm); and (viii) as vigilantism (state functionalism) (p. 96). These show that terrorism has some elements of the deployment of violence or confrontation against a particular group.

Terrorism is the illegitimate use of violence or force against individuals or property to frighten or pressure a government, the civilian population or any other sector in furtherance of political objectives (Awoniyi, 2002). In terms of 'time in world history', it is crucial to assert that 200 years ago, the word terrorism meant a form of action carried out by governments; to the degree that the Oxford English Dictionary defines it as "government by intimidation as carried out by the party in power in France between 1789-1794" (Teichman, 1989:507). It is a transnational phenomenon that poses grave danger to the survival of humans, the stability of states, and international security; and some acts of terror are assassinations in the day or night at public places or residential areas, suicide bombing, and kidnapping (Imohe, 2010).

Terrorism, according to Article 1 of the European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, is "a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical integrity or liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents; an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage or serious unlawful detention; an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons" (Council of Europe, 1977). This shows that terrorism hardly manifests without the instrument of violence either by state governments or non-state armed groups. Over the years, terrorists have advanced to proving states wrong that they don't have the monopoly of force or violence.

Classifications of terrorist organisations are based on the ideologies they pursue, their motivation, location, size, and support. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism highlights the ideological classifications of terrorist organisations including: anarchist, anti-globalization, environmental, communist/socialist,

leftist, nationalist, separatist, racist, religious, and right-wing conservative. Although terrorists can be left-wing or right-wing, Teichman (1989) argues that only the most relativist usages ignore this, with the assertion that terrorism is systematic to some extent, unlike mob violence. But what we should note here in addition to the foregoing discourse is that terrorism is a violent action that is usually aimed at inflicting physical injury on the victims. There are four categories of terror based on location and perpetrators, namely: international, transnational, domestic and state terrorism (Oshanugor, 2004). This is because terrorism is not only associated with terror-producing behaviour, but it also transcends the national boundaries of countries, thereby having various aspects or dimensions. This is noticeable in the transnational and international categories of terrorism.

The trauma of terrorism has been underscored by scholars from various perspectives. Teichman (1989) refers to terrorism as that action that terrifies people due to its terror producing nature. It could be claimed for instance that the recent surge and provocation of Boko Haram has become an embarrassment to Nigeria, as the group continues to unleash terror on innocent Nigerians in the northern region of the country in a fashion that exposes the vulnerability of the state. It should be noted that the intensity of such attacks heightened since the 2010 Independence Day bombing that paved way for other bomb scares in manyother parts of Nigeria, including Lagos, Abuja, and Kaduna, among others.Osaghae (2013) sees terrorism as an unusual dimension of threat to national peace and stability. He notes that it was unbelievable in the past that terrorism could happen, as people saw suicide bombing as alien to indigenous culture. This marks a significant movement in the global discourse on acts of terrorism given the dynamics of terrorist financing and networks of terror. In fact, the factors that have sustained terrorism over the years in most parts of the world are notably funding and recruitment. In addition, it would have been very difficult for any group that perpetrates terrorism to survive various counter-terrorism operations if not for their modus operandi and leadership-followership patterns.

The scholar further explicates the two notable theoretical explorations that offer insight into the 'sources and origins' of terrorism in Nigeria. They include the diffusion effect theory, which is concerned with the set of writings that flowed from the global democratic revolution school which explained democratisation in the Global South in relation to the diffusion effect of the impulses generated in the Global North including the path – breaking

processes in Eastern Europe; and the global push argument which links the Arab Spring, for instance, to the proliferation of weapons and fundamentalism to various relatively peaceful countries in sub-Saharan Africa (ibid). The anarchy and instability associated with terrorism remains a challenge to the Middle East and Africa where the spate of bombing remains high.

Terrorists perpetrate their deadly operationsby deploying various strategies. Some of their strategies include driving bomb-loaded vehicles into public places, detonating explosives in religious houses, lancing attack on security installations, targeting motorists by planning ambush, gunning unsuspecting citizens down, attacking footballviewing centres, attacking markets, and abducting government officials and security operatives among others. Although terrorists pose grave threats to lives, they rarely see themselves as 'terrorists' but rather regard themselves as 'freedom fighters' interested in protecting their rights without fear.

The inability of security forces to tame the monster of terrorism has been observed by some scholars and practitioners. For instance, Adekunle (2013:360) argues that the inability of the police to grasp the rudiments of the method of countering terrorist attack causes security breach.

2.1.2. Religious/sectarian violence

Religion has become an aspect of every human endeavour globally. This is predicated on the idea that there is barely any group of people in communities that do not recognise any deity. Religious violence is a perennial challenge to various countries across the globe and a critical look at countries that witness religious violence brings to prominence the divisions that exist between different adherents of the religious groups. Most times, religious leaders are incapable of containing the violent activities of the adherents.

Dzurgba (2008: 10) maintains that "religion is a spiritual and social phenomenon which consists of sovereign power". Its spiritual constituent includesthe invisible, incorporeal or non-physical entities such as God, Satan, angels, demons, heaven and hell. The social elements on the other hand consist of the physical and material entities which include Holy Bible, hymns, pews, sacraments, church buildings, regalia, pulpit, organ, drums, tithes and

offerings" (p. 10).What this implies is that there is no religion that does not believe in the superiority or omnipresence of a deity over all that live on earth. The activities of man further make religion sustainable and relevant and that is why people give much importance to religion to the extent that they are ready to kill or make life difficult for others in the name of religious fanaticism with its attendant violence.

The existence of individual and group differences also shows how people take to different religious pathways (ICG, 2010). Unfortunately, this is why some groups see themselves as rival religious groups. When we talk about religious violence, it is critical to note that not all communities are prone to them. This is not because other forms of violent conflicts do not exist but because there are no rival religions in those areas. Similarly, communities where only Seventh Day Adventist Church or Islam exists, there would be a higher likelihood of the communities enjoying religious tolerance unlike a community where various Christian denominations and Muslims live side by side one another. Imbusch, Misse and Carrión (2011) argue that there is the necessity for some clarification of the definite sources and origin of violence and why some types of violence are prevalent in particular regions or countries. This is apt, considering the sources of violent conflicts that culminate in social disintegration in communities or countries. For instance, the killings by the Boko Haram Islamist sect in northern Nigeria made Christian leaders caution their Muslim counterparts that Christians were targeted by the group.

Religious violence has become one of the challenges of intergroup relations in several parts of the world due to the value placed on it in the society. In many African societies, religious violence, just like interethnic conflicts, usually takes various dimensions during intergroup hostilities which have linkages with competition for resources or power. Examples are the conflicts between the multi-ethnic groups in South Sudan, especially between the Lou Nuer and the Murle in Jonglei State (Oftedal, 2013). The problem remains that every religion sees its deity as the Supreme Being that must be honoured by all even as adherents perpetrate violence despite professing peace.

Meanwhile, religious conflicts could be sectarian in nature. Thephrase, "sectarian violence", typically denotes violent conflict that occurs primarily along the lines of religion. A typical example is the conflicts between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland (class-divisions couldalso be a cause). It could also be viewed as the general

ideological, political differencesbetween diverse schools of thought such as between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims. However, the use of sectarian conflict in this study shall be limited to violent conflict within a religious group with general ideology at the macro-level, for instance within the various denominations in Christianity or sects in Islam.

Sectarian violence is usually inspired by sectarianism, that is, among different factions of a specific philosophy or religion within a community or nation. Often, religious segregation plays a role in sectarian violence. According to SIPRI (2008: 40) "sectarian violence implies a symmetrical confrontation between two or more non-state actors representing different population groups." Some of the factors that enable or could trigger sectarian violence include power struggles, the nature of the political climate, the social climate as well as the prevailing economic conditions. Causes of the Boko Haram violence appear to fit into this analysis as many studies argue that the emergence of the Boko Haram sect was predicated on some of the factors highlighted above.

Furthermore, Brennan (2014) in a commentary on sectarian violence in Syria and Iraq observes that though it is basically a form of rivalry or conflict between two opposing sects, it often times spreads beyond the primary groups involved and begins to include other issues and targets in the conflict. He argues that in the example of Iran and Syria the increasing level of sectarian terrorism in both countries, though a product of the ancient Sunni-Shiite divide, has overwhelmed the Middle East, East Asia and beyond. Virtually all the extremist groups responsible for contemporary atrocities within the Middle East and beyond, including Hamas, Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), could be traced to these sectarian divisions within the Islamic religion.

Given the massive casualty and the identity of victims that are often affected during such violence, Bronner (2006) attempts to provide a broader definition of sectarian violence, arguing that the concept could be construed as conflict between and among groups with specific ethnicity or religion. The conflict might have several sources but the outcome is usually violence based on ethnic or religious dissimilarities. He goes further to assert that civil wars could be characterised by sectarian violence, but sectarian violence is more systematic and less sporadic. In other words, civil war is an on-going, widespread, often organised and rather relentless sectarian conflict.

2.1.3. Conflict management

The idea of conflict management emerged from the recognition first, that conflict is an inevitable and recurring phenomenon in any given society; and second, that not all conflicts can necessarily be resolved, hence the need to learn conflict management techniques and reduce the odds of "non-productive escalation" (Foundation Coalition, n. d.). Conflict management entails the acquisition of skills relatingto the resolution of conflict. It is also about self-awareness about conflict types and conflict communication skills and establishing a framework/mechanism for the management of conflict in any given environment.

Ifesinachi (2009: 51) defines conflict management as "the operationalization and response to the enforcement of the strategic provisions, goals and ideals of conflict resolution agenda". For Akpuru-Aja (2009: 40), "conflict management is basically the use of open and clear dialogue to assist opponents or parties not only to have agreements against hostile images or actions, but compliance to agreed resolutions and strategies". In other words, conflict management is a whole effort and process that spans the conflict phase such as preventing the outbreak of conflict in the first place, or its escalation; or aimed at restoring the confidence of the parties to conflict that their interests and goals are safe even when the conflict is considered under control.

Conflict management is a broad concept that goes beyond the full range of conflict resolution. Afzalur (2001) observes that the difference between conflict management and conflict resolution is more than just semantic. Conflict resolution implies a finality of conflict in which case the conflict parties are satisfied and their interests and goals realised. It assumes that the conflict is ended and totally resolved. Conflict resolution implies reduction, elimination and termination of conflict, whereas conflict management is a long term process or arrangement which involves institutionalised frameworks and procedures for dealing with conflict whenever it occurs.

Otite(2007)perceives conflict management as a wider concept that involves conflict resolution and transformation when necessitated. He states further that the concept is more of a long term arrangement involving institutionalised and regulative procedures for dealing with emergent conflicts. For Best (2009), "it is the process of reducing the negative

and destructive capacity of conflict through a number of measures by working with, and through the parties involved in the conflict" (p. 93). To be successful therefore, conflict management must occur in a polite atmosphere and context (although conflicts do not generally follow the demands of politeness (Otite, 2007)). However, adequate communication and perception checking, which in turn involves speaking out wholeheartedly, listening carefully, expressing strong feelings appropriately, remaining rational, asking questions, being disposed to making concessions and so on are key to effective conflict management.

Sometimes, conflict management is used synonymously with "conflict regulation" (Best, 2009: 93). Best further opines that the concept encompasses the entire gamut of positively dealing with conflict at the different stages, including those proactive processes put in place to ensure the prevention of conflict. It also incorporates conflict containment, limitation and litigation. For Bourton (1990), the expression can also be used to connote containment of conflicts through steps introduced to promote conditions in which collaborative and value relationships control the behaviours of conflict parties. Accordingly, Best (2009) observes that conflict management is perhaps an admission of the reality that conflict is inevitable, and also that not all conflicts can always be resolved; thus, what conflict experts could do is to manage and regulate them.

Schmidt (2000) observes that as a broad concept, conflict management has both short and long term objectives. The most realistic objective of conflict management in the short run is conflict settlementwhich means reducing or containing the escalation of crises and wars. Only after the short term goals have been realised that the search for a long term and more fundamental solution of the crisis can begin. This is also likely to be a much more drawn out process. The short term goal of crisis intervention may be a matter of days and weeks; while the long term objective of conflict resolution is likely to be realised in months, years or decades of patience and incremental prodding.

From the short to the long term process, conflict management may follow a particular pattern, possibly to:
- Reduce the level of violence and destruction;

- Prevent the vertical escalation towards the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);

- Prevent the horizontal expansion into other theatres;

- Transform the (potential or actual) violent clash into a less damaging form of interaction;

- Search for temporary solutions that can prevent (re)escalation and steer the parties in conflict towards a settlement of the conflicts, or at least termination of the killings, e.g. through a ceasefire; and

- Find a long term comprehensive and more fundamental solution to the conflict (see Schmidt, 2000: 22-25).

Black (1990) elaborates more on conflict management. He argues that to connote the term with peaceful resolution is fallacious. According to Black, conflict management goes beyond third part intervention in conflict and it may not necessarily be pacific mode of dispute settlement. He identifies conflict management as "the handling of grievances" and the social conditions of the conflict would determine how it would be handled (p. 43).

If the notion of conflict management is related to a country like Nigeria, conflict management becomes a very useful tool where there are several "non-resolvable" conflicts which can at best be managed. Undoubtedly, one of the greatest challenges facing Nigeria as a nation is preponderance of sectarian and other forms of conflicts arising from the nature of her plural society, and the seeming lack of effective approach to managing these conflicts. The pervasiveness and recurring nature of ethnic, religious, communal and ethno-religious conflicts in the country typified by Boko Haram terrorist activities indicate a failure or weakness in the conflict management approaches implemented by the Nigerian state in addressing the problem. There is therefore the need to advance a more effective and comprehensive framework for managing diverse conflicts in the country.

2.1.4. Conflict management strategies

Since conflict situations are unique and dynamic, it is difficult to recommend the best conflict management approaches. In other words, choice of approach depends on a number of factors including:

- The nature and relative importance of the conflict

- Time factor (pressure)
- Position of the conflicting parties and other stakeholders
- Relative emphasis on goals versus relationships

Jehn (1997) observes that in order to adopt effective management strategies, a thorough analysis of the conflict should be carried out. This will reveal the conflict dynamics and the best possible intervention strategy. The type of conflict will determine the conflict management approaches to be adopted. He states further that a conflict may either be "affective" or "substantive". Affective conflicts are those that might result in negative impacts on individual, groups or society; hence there is the need to reduce such conflicts. Conversely, substantive conflicts are those that may have positive effects on individuals, groups and the society. He argues that a moderate level of conflict is beneficial as it stimulates discussions and debates which can in turn help society attain higher levels of development, peace and stability (pp. 531-3). Such a society is able to enunciate strong policies or design effective management strategies for managing conflicts.

Several conflict management approaches have been highlighted by researchers (Verma, 1998; Macintosh and Stevens, 2008; Ojiji, 2009; Albert, 2010; Daly and Rasmi, 2010). Daly and Rasmi (2010) use conflict management approach inter-changeably to refer to conflict handling style which they describe as the different approaches used by individuals in dealing with others in potentially confrontational business or social situations. Verma (1998) refers to the same concept as conflict management styles.Conflict management approach would therefore relate to the strategies, styles, approaches or responses that people employ to deal with situations of conflictthat is considered detrimental or inimical to the realisation of a preferred goal. There are multiple ways that people, whether individuals or groups, including government, respond to conflict. From existing literatures, these approaches include avoidance, domination, compromise, collaboration, accommodation, confrontation and problem solving.

Avoidance: This is a conflict management style employed when one party in a potential conflict ignores the conflicting issues or denies the significance of the issues in their life. Avoidance is a method that has to do with not addressing the conflict or a tactical way of delaying the handling of conflict until conditions are favourable, if and when the time does

come. In this conflict handling style, the person is both unassertive and uncooperative. There is absence of an intention to pursue one's own needs or those of the other actor (Ojiji, 2009). Rahim (2002) observes that people who employ this style have less concern for themselves and the other and a lack of concern too for satisfaction. This style is associated by Daly and Rasmi (2010) with conflict prevention or ignoring possible or actual belligerent situations or simply postponing conflict situations.

As is often the case however, conflict is not resolved by ignoring the issues ignored or not attending to them. In other words, conflict avoidance is a dangerous way of managing conflict even if it guarantees some immediate calmness. In the long run, if the issues in the conflict are not addressed, there could be a worsening of relations between the conflict parties. Suffice it to say, however, that conflict avoidance could sometimes provide temporary reprieve from a potentially dangerous situation. It does not pay to confront a situation or attempt to negotiate when the conditions are unsafe.

Domination: This is a method of dealing with conflict when people's disposition in situations is to assert themselves. In this approach, there is little or no interest in the wellbeing or interest of the other party: it is all about the person and the person alone. In a given conflict then, one party that is assertive tries to totally over-shadow the other party. In a way, it is an attempt to deny the right of the other party. The primary motivation in domination as a conflict management style is the quest to win, and therefore make the other party lose. Thus the assertive party behaves in a manner to suppress the views of the other party by using strong arguments or emphasising his rank or economic status/position.

Thomas et al (2012) hold that people who employ this style have a high concern for self and low concern for others. The style is characterised by attempts to satisfy one's own interest/concerns at the expense of the other's concerns by finding a win-lose solution. It could be argued that this approach to handling conflict can hardly lead to a lasting resolution of the conflict. In fact, even if the assertive party "succeeds" in "winning" the dispute, there is a tendency that the "resolution" will leave behind "grudges" in the other party. Accordingly, whenever the opportunity arises, the party would express discontent, which would possibly lead to the "[re]-opening of an old wound. This management style is rooted in power relationships where one actorfeels that it has more power over the conflict issues than the other who is perceived to possess no ability to respond adequately to the

power being displayed by the dominant party.

Accommodation: This style of conflict management emanates from a cooperative disposition. Therefore, the person employing this style is not assertive nor is he involved in competition with the other party. Instead, in accommodation, there is a conscious attempt to sacrifice one's needs and focus on satisfying those of the other party. The underlying value of accommodation is that of self-esteem disorder (Ojiji, 2009). In such a situation, the person becomes meek and this enables him or her to readily accede to the demands of the other party. Other times, it may be a reflection of the desire to ensure personal and social harmony and to preserve relationships at one's cost.

Accommodation connotes high cooperation and low assertiveness (Foundation Coalition, n. d.). This style is appropriate to demonstrate moderation, improve productivity, establish goodwill, or keep peace (p. 2). Some people use accommodation when there is little importance attached to the conflict issue or outcome.It should be noted that accommodation as a conflict management style only has a short term benefit in the form of social stability. In the long-run, the other party (assertive) may assume greater power that can be detrimental to other persons. By having the less assertive person submitting to their desires, the assertive one learn to think that the situation will always be so with other persons and in other situations. When this expectation is not met, they can become aggressive. Secondly, if a conflict is not constructively handled, parties may not reap from the opportunities that conflict presents to them to improve their relationship and situations. Peace at any cost may be the reason behind this approach where parties emphasise areas of agreement and smooth over, or ignore disagreements.

Compromising: It involves negotiating, finding a middle ground, accessing values, and making concessions. It searches for, and negotiates for an outcome that is relatively satisfactory to all parties. This strategy, according to Verma (1998), provides definitive solution.Compromising as a conflict management style involves "finding an expedient, mutually acceptable solution, which partly satisfies both parties" (Ojiji, 2009: 123). In other words, parties split their differences and make concessions with the hope of resolving the conflict. In this situation, a party is partially cooperative and partially assertive.

Compromise becomes necessary in situations where the positions of the parties are so incompatible that the two cannot be reconciled without one of them losing something in the process. This is different from collaboration where the parties can be reconciled without any of them making loses. This is a win some, lose some situation.

Collaborating: This is a style of managing conflicts that relates to the disposition of being assertive and also cooperative. In this case, the actors do not avoid the conflict; they work with each other to find a solution that is satisfactory to both of them. It is about dialogue where all those involved listen actively and gain understanding of the other stakeholders as well as their own. That understanding enables them to develop a resolution that satiates the concerns of all involved. It is a situation where all parties win. Collaboration is more socially adaptive as it leads to a solution that is acceptable to the parties involved.

Most negotiations are of this nature, such that even though getting to find a solution can be quite tedious, when a solution is eventually found through negotiation, it tends to be obligatory on the stakeholders as they were part of the process. In other words, this style of handling conflict makes sure that the parties drive both the process and the outcome. This control, as theorised by Thibaut and Walker (1978), is vital in ensuring compliance, which in turn offers a guarantee of an enduring resolution of the conflict. As long as none of the parties is left with a grudge over the outcome of a given process, there will be tendency for the resolution to lead to lasting peace. Verma (1998) believes the long term solution that collaborating provides is because it incorporates multiple views and insights from differing perspectives which usually results to agreement and commitment from all parties involved.

Confrontation: Confrontation as a conflict management style happens when the actors in a conflict physically or emotionally "attack" each other. They could do this by threatening each other, insulting each other or generally engaging in violent acts such as hitting each other. There is a considerable degree of lack of understanding of each other's position as each one insists on his position and thus disagrees with the other party's point of view. It is therefore not surprising that this conflict management style is characterised by violence and results in a lose-lose-lose outcome. That is a situation where both parties are not able to attain their goals (Ojiji, 2009).

Although confrontation usually results in lose-lose outcome, in some instances the conflict

management approach could result in a win-lose outcome. That is where the stronger party asserts greater force on the other and wins. Confrontation approach connotes low cooperation and high assertiveness between conflict parties. Confrontation may be appropriate when there is the need for immediateresponse, when vital issues need to be handled or when the party needs to protect self-interest. However, this style cannot proffer sustainable solution to the problem as one of the parties will bear grudges in the end which would likely create the necessary incentives for the next round of conflict (Faleti, 2011).

Problem-Solving: This conflict handling style involves constructive listening by parties in the conflict. Parties show respect for each other's differences and searchfor peaceful meansof resolving the issues in conflict. This makes the parties avoid apportioning blames and instead seek to maximise the conflict situation. Both parties view the conflict as belonging to them, and therefore require collaboration as a way of solving it (Ojiji, 2009).Problem-solving approach usually leads to a win-win outcome because parties have high concern for self and for others and this makes the parties attempt to satisfy everyone's concerns fully by finding a win-win, mutually acceptable solution to the issues in conflict (Thomas et al, 2008). This style is characterised by behaviours such as open information sharing, alternatives seeking, and cooperation in order to maximise each party's outcomes (Rahim, 2002). If properly implemented, problem-solving approach usually leads to a long lasting solution of conflict.

In a detailed review of the new dimensions in the management of conflicts in Nigeria, Albert (2007) observes that conflicts are generally responded to in three possible ways in any society: by avoidance, confrontation and problem-solving. In other words, a conflict party may adopt a denial position in the conflict and allow the conflict to fester and escalate unreasonably rather than provide an avenue for dealing with it (Wilmot and Hocker, 1998). When avoidance is adopted and the conflict situation is allowed to fester, the conflict parties may become confrontational, verbally aggressive, issue threats, and resort to litigation or even physical violence (Albert, 2007). The result in this situation is usually a win-lose outcome.

The third approach is the problem solving approach which Albert refers to as a situation in which the conflict parties either by themselves or through the help of a third party find

solutions to their problems in a friendly environment. This process is a cooperative and highly participatory one as it promotes cooperation and harmonious relationship between feuding parties.Elsewhere, Albert (2010)argues in support of the problem-solving approach, pointing out that confrontation or the deployment of force in dispute settlement is adversarial and often times creates a situation where one actor wins while the other loses. Though necessary in certain instances, the approach often does not consider the point that the dispute parties would have to somehow continue their relationship at the end of the conflict in the same psycho-social space, where one cannot vacate the environment for the other. Accordingly, Albert advocates the problem-solving non-adversarial conflict management strategy where conflict parties work together to find lasting solution to their differences. This could occur through negotiation, mediation and to a limited extent, arbitration. The effective application of this approach will offer durable peace agreement.

Confrontation (especially physical violence) has been widely used in a lot of conflict situations in Nigeria by the conflict parties involved (see Otite and Albert, 2007). So too, successive governments in Nigerian have adopted some of the above mentioned conflict management styles, depending on the situation and issues involved. The various approaches that have been used by the Nigerian government in the management of conflicts (especially sectarian violence) will be subsequently discussed in details.

2.1.5. Global terrorism

Global terrorism simply implies terrorism that ensues all over the world. It is one of the worst forms of crime that ever existed. Terrorists and terrorism exist across different countries of the world. Terrorism not only leads to death, it also results in the destruction of properties, livelihoods and existing patterns of economic production. In fact, terrorism has implication for global civilisation and the civilised order that took centuries of years to develop. Terrorists can operate as individuals (usually referred to as lone wolves) but in most instances, they operate as part of one of the many global terrorist organisations.

Terrorism is widely considered a global phenomenon with victims of terrorism increasing alarmingly. A review of the report by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014) shows an increase of 61% in the number of deaths resulting from terrorist attacks in 2014 alone. It also shows that the number of terrorist-related assaults around the world have increased dramatically; while over 80% of terrorist activities occur in only five countries. These top

five nations include Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. Out of the 162 countries surveyed, Iraq emerged as the most impacted by terrorism with about 2,492 terrorist attacks in 2013 alone,killing about 6,362 people.Combined, these nations accounted for nearly 15, 000 fatalities. Since the year 2000, only five of the crimes were suicide attacks. In 2013 alone, 17, 958 died in terrorist attacks, a 61% increase more than the previous year. The four terrorist groups responsible for the most destructive acts are the Taliban, Boko Haram, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and al Qaeda. The GTI survey reportshows that extremist variants of Islam were the "key commonality for all the four groups". However, the GTI study did not factor in the recent attacks from the Islamic State (IS) since the research tapers off at the end of 2013.

Although terrorism is on the increase and a major concern compared to other forms of violence, the report suggested that it is relatively small when matched against the 437,000 deaths that resulted from homicides in 2013. The GTI states that in the US, a person is sixty-four times more likely to be a victim of a homicide than terrorism. The most common method of perpetrating attacks was through the use of explosives. It is estimated that since the year 2000, suicide attacks constituted only 5% of terrorist attacks.In addition, the report also lists what it termed "at risk countries", noting that more than 90%of all terrorist attacks occur in countries that have gross human rights violations. It identifies the following thirteen countries with high risk potential of terrorism activity: Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote D'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel, Mali, Mexico, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Uganda. These nations either have violent on-going conflicts or notable social and economic setbacks.

The report highlights the following as the main triggers of terrorism:
1. Greater social hostilities between different ethnic groups, and religious and linguistic groups; lack of inter-group cohesion, and high level of group grievances.
2. Presence of state sponsored violence such as extrajudicial killings, political terror, and gross human rights abuses.
3. Higher levels of other forms of violence, including deaths from organised conflict, likelihood of violent demonstrations, levels of violent crimes and perceptions of criminality.

Seyyad (2013) asserts that it is almost impossible to track down terrorists because they keep such a low profile that no one can easily single them out from the regular public. There have been countries that have harboured terrorism worldwide, particularly in the Middle East, and there have been numerous events that have led to disasters and ultimately, war. Arguably, a greater number of terrorist groups are fundamentalists and radicalised extremists who carry out terror in the name of their religion. What makes then so dangerous is that they are unpredictable and willing to die for their religion.Kessler (2011) opines that terrorism is the single biggest threat facing the United States. The US has suffered great losses due to terrorism, and especially in its interests in other countries. The US greatest enemies are Islamic terrorists. The extremists consider all those who are not adherents of Islam across the world as infidels who must be killed. While their ideology may not be totally rooted in Islam, they think it is and try to make non-Muslims believe the same. Their beliefs are so powerfulthat a lot of their members are willing to commit suicide in a bid to maximise casualties. These are usually referred to as suicide bombers.

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism outlines some terrorist organisations across the globe. They are Al-Qaeda, Anarchist Faction, Armed Islamic Group, Army of God, April 19 Movement, Anti-Capitalist Attack Nuclei, Anti-Zionist Movement, Anti-State Action, Autonomous Cells of Rebel Action, Black Star, May 98, May 15, Ku Klux Klan (KKK), Kurdistan Workers' Party, Leftist Nucleus, Irish National Liberation Army, Irish Republican Army, Amal, Hezbollah, Black Friday, Black Hand, Free Aceh Movement, Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front, and Hamas, among others. These terror-operating organisations have different diverse aims but a similar thing that unites them is the instrument of violence that they usually adopt. Richmond (2003) brings to the fore, what is referred to as "old forms of terrorism" which confronted the political and territorial hegemony, even as "new forms of terror" consistently challenge the very value systems of the liberal international system (p. 292).

Furthermore, recent incidents globally show that suicide bombing has increasingly become a major strategy usually adopted by terrorists and militia groups to inflict sorrow on people, especially those that gather in public places. From Africa to America, Asia to Europe, terrorist groups have succeeded in launching attacks that do not only destabilise affected regions, but also record high numbers of public violent deaths. The attacks on religious

institutions, markets, restaurants, malls and football viewing centres have become a defining moment in the history of terrorism.On September 22, 2013, a church in Peshawar in the north-western region of Pakistan was attacked by terrorists in one of the most fatal suicide bombings in the country years after a suicide bomber killed seventy-eight people and wounded over a hundred others.

The Conflict Monitoring Centre's report that a 40% rise in terrorism was reported with 284 people becoming victims of terrorist violence (Romaniuk, 2014). Similarly, various attacks on Christians and Muslims in Nigeria show that terrorism requires timely response by policymakers, given the number of violent deaths and also, taking into consideration the point that hardly does a week pass bye without casualties being recorded in the north-eastern and north-central states.

In Pakistan, it is argued that political authorities have failed to obtain the political capacities necessary to address the state's endemic corruption, poverty, and poor education programs above and beyond a lack of willingness to relinquish hold on privileged government positions. This explains why the security forces remain underfunded, ill-equipped, and poorly trained, while a faulty judicial system has smoothed the planning and execution of terrorist activities by militants operating within Pakistan's borders and in the regions adjacent (Romaniuk, 2014). This is not different from various scenarios in Africa where some states are already referred to as failing states or failed states, even though they have existing governments. This description is based on the inability of leaders in such countries to contain terrorism and insurgencies that contribute to the number of public violent deaths. The death toll further increases state fragility in such countries.

Terrorist organisations have gained more influence through intelligence gathering on targets to the detriment of constituted authorities. For instance, Goita (2011) has this to say about the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb:

> Previous AQIM attacks largely consisted of opportunistic kidnappings of tourists and NGO workers in the Sahel. Recent attacks, however, have demonstrated a greater degree of sophistication and intelligence-gathering capability (p. 1).

The statement above shows that intelligence and fundraising constitute some of the weapons used by terrorist groups to furthertheir activities with the aim of advancing their

ideology. Various scholars have demonstrated with facts that not only non-state armed groups are involved in acts of terrorism. Some governments, according to Ashara (2013), use assassinations, massacres and other methods of cruelty to sustain power or gain territory. The management of terror has not been an easy task globally; while some citizens blame the government for the poor management, some scholars attribute the spate of bombings and ability of terrorist organisations to gain more recognition and sympathisers for the continuous terrorist activities. For example, Adekunle (2013) attributes the porous and volatile nature of internal security in Nigeria to the deficiency of the police in crime prevention and detection.

It is argued that just like in most countries in Europe and Africa, terrorism has touched every aspect of national life in Pakistan to the level that the entire range of attacks has escalated both in in intensity and spread and touching virtually every rung of the society.These attacks have also been well calibrated, calculated and carried out in an efficient manner (Seyyad, 2013). Its effects manifest in casualties or fatalities, which is why this study identifies with Ashara's(2013)claim that terrorism creates tension in every polity, with the capacity to shake institutions and structures of the state. There is scarcely any terror incident that does not create instability or pandemonium in different forms. Most people even abandon their places of worship, businesses, offices and schools in search of safety, leaving only security operatives at the scenes and neighbourhoods to investigate and arrest masterminds.

It has been observed that the issue of Nigeria's collaboration with Israel and other countries did not start now, as a lot of meetings have been held on terrorism. For example, Nigerian and Israeli authorities have held a series of meetings since the Chibok girls were abducted by Boko Haram (Scannews, 11 May, 2014). It has to be noted that analysts warned that Kenya would suffer major terror attacks from the Somali Islamists believed to have connections with al-Qaeda, the global terror group that had previously attacked Kenya, thereby making it difficult for the country to escape the fury of the jihadist al-Shabaab (Kagwanja, 2012). Although terrorism began to gain global attention after the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September, 2011, the September 2014 terrorist attack on a mall in Nairobi, Kenya was a defining moment in global anti-terrorism campaign. This was not only occasioned by the planning and execution of the attack, but also by the casualties

recorded after the attack by al-Shabaab. Consequently, most world leaders realised that if the fight against terrorism was not given the required attention or policy response, the world would be a dangerous place for all, irrespective of race, ethnicity, status or gender. The condemnations were as a result of the view that terrorism cuts lives short.

According to Goita (2011: 51) "the deepening roots in local communities and the regional economy, AQIM is developing enhanced resilience against counter-terror efforts" Acquiescence to demands for ransoms and the release of detained AQIM operators did not only strain regional ties, but also complicated the anti-terrorism war in Africa. Mauritania, in 2010, in protest against Mali's release of four AQIM detainees of Mauritanian descent, recalled its envoy in Bamako for a period of eight months (Goita, 2011). This approach was adopted by the Boko Haram group who demanded the release of its members by the Nigerian government before it would release the more than 200 secondary school girls kidnapped in April 2014.

Containing terror requires the involvement of youth leaders, community leaders and women at all levels to make it realistic (Ashara, 2013). Lang (2010) argues that the international community needs to take steps and initiate a wider discussion about both sentencing standards and the crime of terrorism. Curbing terrorism requires the criminalization and punishment of culprits for deterrence in the society. This is so because the war on terror cannot be won without policy intervention at various levels of governance.

2.1.6.Terrorism in the Sahel

The Sahel is a large territorial space around the Sahara desert. Countries in the Sahel region includeNiger, Mali, Chad, and Mauritania. This region is increasingly being referred to by security scholars as "the new front in the war on terrorism" (ICG, 2005). Over the years the Sahel appears to have become one of the hotbeds of terrorist activities. Alexander (2013) argues that one cannot fully understand the impact of rising terrorism in the region without referring to past threatening signs of terrorism in the years before especially the terrorist acts of January 2013 in Algeria and Mali. In the views of the ICG (2005), the Sahel was a breeding ground for terrorist activities. It therefore warned the West that "a misconceived and heavy handed approach could tip the scale the wrong way; serious, balanced and long

term engagement with the Sahelian countries should keep the region peaceful. An effective counter-terrorism policy there needs to address the threats in the broadest terms, with more development than military aid and greater US-EU cooperation (ICG, 2005: 4)".

In January 2013 al-Qaeda-linked extremists and their associates in northern Mali tried to seize the country's capital, Bamako, spurring a timely French military involvement that hadthe backing of the international community. This in turn, triggered a lethal response that involved hostage taking at a natural gas facility in nearby Algeria. The showdown eventually led to the death of 37 foreigners, including four Americans. Shortly after this incidence, the emergent threat of terrorism in the Sahel and North Africa which in earnest began since 11 September, 2001 intensified. As Alexander (2013) observed, what had been widely considered as a regional problemhad metamorphosed into a global problem with far-reaching consequences.

The threats of terrorism in the Sahel assume a greater concern when it is analysed against the backdrop of the threats of terrorist alliances at the global level as seen in the relationship ofal-Qaeda and its local associates and affiliates in Africa and other regions. Three major terrorist groups are particularly significant: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram. AQIM had issued a publication on September 18, 2012, appealing to Muslims in North Africa and the Sahel to emulate the Benghazi assault and to attack US diplomatic targets in their countries. For this reason, there is a growing security concern that these regional movements have expanded their reach and recruiting to other militants associationsin the Sahel, Maghreband particularly in places such asSomalia, north-eastern Mali, southern Algeria,Northern Nigeria and Niger (Serge, 2012).

In December 2012, the respected Centre for Naval Analyses (CNA)released a strategic report which showed that there was "evidence that AQIM has infiltrated the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, as well as indications that Sahrawi from the camps have joined terrorist groups based in Mali." Similarly, Alexander (2013) observed that al-Qaeda, alongside its affiliates including AQIM, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Dine had seized control, in northern Mali, of a large swath of territory larger than the territories of France and Texas combined andabout the size of Afghanistan.These terrorist organisations almost effectively consolidated their control in

the area, creating a terrorist enclave that attracted "new jihadist recruits from Sudan and other countries across the region, including the Polisario-run Tindouf camps in Algeria, and from Western countries" (Alexander, 2013: 15).

In the areas controlled by the terrorists such as Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal, extreme version of the Sharia law was administered on the population until they were liberated in early 2013 by the French military intervention that liberated the three cities. But the al-Qaeda-linked militants simply retreated without much of a fight to desert and mountain hideouts from where they still infiltrate much of northern Mali and court terrorist-trafficking networks that reach across the Sahel. More specifically, the threats of al-Qaeda's new regional hub in the northern region of Mali and from its associates constitute both tactical and strategic challenges. They have helped to reinforce other forms of criminalities in the area. For instance, in financing their operations, these terrorists primarily depend on kidnapping, piracy, illicit trafficking in humans, drugs, vehicles and other banned items emanating, sometimes, from Latin America and bound for Africa and Europe.Corroborating the point that terrorist organisations also involve in trafficking business, the Associated Press (2012) claimed that confessions of captured terrorists and other intelligence reports showed that there exists a strong link between AQIM and cartels in Latin America who deal in drugs and arms. Some of these are smuggled into western countries through terrorist-trafficking networks existing in the Sahel region. Furthermore, the various terrorist movements are further emboldened in their activities by the emergent international migration crisis. An increase in the movement of refugees, some, economic migrants, has helped also in the flow of weapons and combatants through the many porous and unsecured national and international borders in the Sahel.These contradictions have further boosted the ability of the various terrorist movements to increase their new attacks and carry out their criminal actions with impunity.

Clearly, these terrorist threats emanating from the Sahel and the Maghreb in some ways, added to the "flames" that busted with the emergence of the Arab uprisings, widely referred to as the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring, revolutionary in so many ways, originated from Tunisia and latter consumed many other Arab countries in Africa and beyond including Egypt, Libya,Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and elsewhere. The key question then is, to what extent are al-Qaeda and other Salafi jihadist groups in the Sahel, Maghreb and

neighbouring African countries already capitalizing on political instabilities in the Arab world and elsewhere tofurther destabilise the regions?

For experts in the area of terrorism studies across the globe, it is clear that an "Arc of Instability" is emerging across Africa's Sahel which has created an in-route for terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda to further extend their influence from places such as Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan and to create new safe havens from which they can successfully plan and execute terrorist attacks in Africa, Europe and also in the US. Thus, Alexander's 2013 report on terrorism urges the US, Europe and other members of the international community to engage the region more effectively to prevent the brewing security challenges from becoming a more global crisis. Specifically, Alexander (2013) called for greater collaboration and engagement between the United States and Sahelian countries as a way of defeating terrorism and promoting peace in the troubled region.

Wright (2012) argues that the Sahel region faces serious challenges: a firm foothold by al-Qaeda in the Sahara; inconsistent economic growth; a growing, restive young population;and multiple regional crisis that impact negatively on security and economic cooperation.Particularly, the emergent Boko Haram and the transnational nature of its activities has continued to wreak havoc in Nigeria and across the region, including Chad and Cameroon.In Mali, the threat of terrorism became manifest at the beginning of 2012 when the returning Tuareg rebels, who had fought as mercenary combatants forLibya's Moamar Gaddafi formed an alliance with indigenous rebel groups to exploit political instability in the country. Taking advantage of the lacuna in government that emerged following an earlier coup, these groups (Tuareg fighters and Ansar Dine) captured several towns in northern Mali, including the famous city of Timbuktu following which they declared an independent state of Azawan. As expected, the crisis in Mali and the security threats it portended, triggered a response from neighbouring countries especially Niger and Algeria as well as from sub-regional, regional and global organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union (AU) and the United Nations UN.

According to Alexander (2013), two specific threats are particularly significant with regard to Mali. First, is the threat of a neighbourhood and mirror effect of the rebellion as it could

stimulate insurrection in neighbouring countries with large Tuareg populations. Second, there was the likelihood that terrorist groups inspired by al-Qaeda's vision and supported by regional affiliates will expand their operations across Africa and beyond. These dangers have become even more alarming considering that by summer 2012, northern Mali had fallen and was effectively administered by the various Salafi jihadist organisations, including AQIM, its affiliate, El Moulethemine Brigade, Ansar Dine and MUJAO. Ansar al-Sharia, the Libyan terrorist group, would later join others in controlling parts of northern Mali. It has been reported that extremist groups in the region receive significant amount of training, funding, weapons and other logistic support from AQIM thus attracting an inflow of recruits from the region and from elsewhere including from Western countries.

In fact, terrorism "from above," an appellation used in describing the harsh application of Sharia law by terrorist groups who controlled the north of Mali,was already gaining traction even before the intervention of French forces. Civilians have been publicly punished for their "crimes," such as smoking or playing music. Also, those caught stealing would have their arms and legs amputated while there were several reports of extrajudicial executions. Cultural artifacts and heritage sites were equally not spared. More than half of Timbuktu's 16 antique cultural mausoleums were already destroyed by early 2013 in a pattern similar to that of the Talibans of Afghanistan.

The socio-economic and political disruptions in Mali also had devastating humanitarian consequences internally displacing about 200,000 persons and producing 150,000 refugees, most of whom moved to Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, and other African countries. It took the intervention of the international community,especiallythe United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in collaboration with France, the United States, Europe, the AU and other like minds to dislodge the terrorist groups and other criminal networks in the region and in the process, restoring Mali's territorial integrity.

Besides Nigeria and Mali, Mauritania is another country in the Sahel region confronted with security threats posed by affiliates of AQIM, Boko Haram, Polisario and from ex-combatants of the Libyan conflict. These challenges in Mauritania are further worsened by local race conflicts between its black and Arab populations,human trafficking and slavery as well as unemployment and corruption. Externally, there is also the strained relations

between Mauritania and Senegal arising from dispute over the exploitation of the Senegal River, a border landmark for both countries, and thus another reason for conflict and violence. Although the number of terrorist incidents, such as kidnapping, was lower in 2012 compared to preceding years, security issues were still on the government's agenda. For example, in July, Mauritania's cabinet considered monitoring the Internet to counter extremism. Towards the end of 2012, the Mauritania government significantly enlarged its defense budget to energise its security forces counterterrorism operations against AQIM and other rebel organisations. Mauritania had also called for the settlement of the Mali crisis in order to preserve its cultural heritage sites (Alexander, 2013).

Chad is also at the receiving end of terrorist threats from AQIM and Boko Haram. The insurgency in Nigeria has driven many people to flee into Chad in search of safety. Ever since Chad was affected by such insurgent threats as well as increased confrontations with neighboring countries, the president of Chad called for the creation of a regional force to confront the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups. As part of the Lake Chad countries, Chad has contributed troops to Boko Haram fighters. The country also supported the engagement of Islamist groups in Mali.

In Niger, besides the presence of Boko Haram, other terrorist organisations have also createda foothold. Particularly, AQIM maintains its affiliates who have successfully operated orchestrating attacks against locals and foreigners alike. Due to this threat, international development organisations, specifically the Peace Corps, have suspended their humanitarian activities in the country (Alexander (2013). Furthermore, there is the belief that a faction of Tuareg militants with ties to AQIM continues to operate considerably in the north of Niger. Like Chad, Niger also joined in the international effort against terrorism, particularly in the fight against Boko Haram and AQIM.

2.1.7. Managing global terrorism

Managing global terrorism, also viewed as counter-terrorism measures, involves a broad range of approaches which usually incorporate military tactics, non-military tactics, or a combination of both. The type of strategy adopted would be determined by the nature of the threat of terrorism. In other words, while countering one aspect of the threat of terrorism may involve the need to use military might to severely degrade the capability of

the terrorist organisation, another aspect of the threat may require broad coalition to contain or cut off supplies such as the sources of finance to the extremist organisation.

Nevertheless, countering the scourge of terrorism, an interest of all nations, has remained a key part of the international agenda for decades. A historic milestone was however reached in 2006 when, unprecedentedly, all the member-countries of the UN signed on to a global strategy to coordinate the counter-terrorism efforts of member-states. The strategy for combating global terrorism comprises concrete recommendations in four key areas:

- Tackling the conditions conducive to spread of terrorism
- Preventing and combating terrorism
- Building countries' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard, and
- Ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law while countering terrorism.

Alexander (2013) observes that globally the counter-terrorism strategy of the state against terrorist groups can come in three different dimensions:

➢ Hard power approach
➢ Soft power approach, and
➢ The hybrid approach

The first, which involves the use of "hard power" in combating terrorist groups, is done with the belief that terror organisations are enemies of the state that must be crushed by waging war against them. A typical example of this strategy is the post 9/11 posture of the United States in its efforts at combating terrorism. President George Bush, in outlining America's strategy against al-Qaeda, which he termed "War on Terror", was quoted to have said:

> …the U.S will use every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every weapon of war until every terrorist groups of global reach has been stopped (cited in Dyson, 2008: 56).

Fundamentally, the idea behind the use of "hard power" which usually entails military counter-terrorism (COT) effort implies that taking the fight to the "enemies" is a defence

strategy and a show of force to pass the message that the threatened state has all the capacities to curtail its enemies' excesses. This idea about terrorism has become a justification for military involvement in states like Pakistan widely considered as a haven for terrorist groups. It was also the main stated justification for the US invasion of Afghanistan. It was also a justification for the second Russian invasion of Chechnya (Byman, 2010).

It is believed that the hard power approach, especially military intervention, has not always been successful in stopping or preventing future terrorism, like the Malaysian Emergency, the Mau Mau Uprising, and a significant part of the campaigns against the IRA during the Irish Civil War (Segel, 2012). According to Christia and Semple (2009), although military option can disrupt a terrorist group's operations temporarily, it sometimes does not end the threat completely. Thus, repression by the military in itself (particularly if it is not accompanied by other measures) usually leads to only short term victories, tending to be ineffective in the long run as described by Trinquier (1961) in the book, *Modern War,* about French's doctrine deployed in Algeria and Indochina.

The other approach involves the use of "soft power". It is also referred to as the non-military or non-decapitative approach. The strategy basically targets the insurgent groups and the local communities or societies where they operate. It involves the use of pacification to lull or transform the groups and their activities and win the hearts and minds of the local population. According to White (2014), the application of this method is also contingent on the ineffectiveness of the "hard power" strategy or the intention of the state to not only ease civilian suffering that may erupt due to contestation between the state security apparatuses and the armed groups, but to further win them to its side.

The soft power approach appears to fall within the human security model which also aims to address intractable and deep-rooted inequalities that fuel terrorist activities. In other words, underlying sources of the conflict need to be identified and appropriate measures instituted to bring about equity in the distribution or allocation of resources in a sustainable manner. Such actions empower citizens, providing "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" (White, 2014: 62). This human security dimension can take many forms, such as investment in food security, education, water supply, vaccination programmes, shelter, and

protection from violence, military or otherwise. Arguably, successful human security campaigns would have to be characterised by the participation of various groups of actors, including government, non-governmental organisations and citizens.

The third dimension which is the hybrid approach involves a combination of both the soft and hard power approaches, or put differently, the balancing of both military and non-military approaches. The hybrid approach has been described in some literatures and commentaries also as "carrot and stick" approach. The underlying assumption or even theory behind this approach is that to achieve success, the counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency strategy of the state in managing terrorism must comprise both political and military engagement.

Arguably, the take-off of extensive research into the hybrid approach as a more effective counter-terrorism strategy could be linked to President Bush's declaration of "War on Terrorism" after the September 11, 2001 Al-Qaeda's terrorist attack against US's World Trade Centre and Pentagon (See Segel, 2012; Alexander, 2013; and White, 2014). In their separate studies, these writers appear to reach similar conclusions that military might alone cannot achieve maximum victory in combating terrorism. In other words, they argue that reconciliatory policies, rather than the singular use of hard power, reduces terrorism and insurgency.

Nevertheless, while these literatures unanimously suggest that a balancing of soft power approach and hard power approach is needed to effectively combat terrorism, in reality, there are instances where the hybrid approach has been applied but it appears not to be enough to properly address the issue, whether religious terrorism, militancy or other types of rebellious activities. For example, a combination of both strategies appears not to have fully succeeded in the Niger Delta and north-east regions of Nigeria. Rather, in respect to the former, the application of the hybrid approach appears to have ended in transient tranquillity of the insurgent group whereas the underlying issues in the conflict remain. Meanwhile, in the latter, it appears not to have worked at all as Boko Haram has continued to threaten the legitimacy of the state.

2.1.8. Boko Haram terror activities in Nigeria

It may be difficult to fully appreciate Boko Haram terror activities without a deeper insight into its emergence. Marchal (2012) believes that Boko Haram sectarian violence is the first forceful attempt to impose some form of religious agenda in Nigeria. He argues though, that it has its root and also draws inspiration from a rich experience of earlier intra and inter-religious violence that plagued parts of northern Nigeria. Nevertheless, what makes Boko Haram unique as a novel but epochal occurrence in Nigeria's history is neither its well-orchestrated killings nor car bombings against official buildings, but a sustained campaign of terror attacks over several years.

Over the last three decades, one may quote several precedents. Some of the major incidents of violence that occurred in northern Nigeria include the Maitatsine revolts between 1960 and 1980, the Muslim-Christian conflict (Kano, 1982), the Bulumkutu violence (Maiduguri 1982), the Jimeta-YolaMaitatsine disturbances (1984), the GombeMaitatsine disturbances (1985), the Kafanchan crisis (Kaduna State, 1987), the Zuru sectarian conflict (Zuru, 1987), the second Muslim-Christian conflict (Kano,1991), the Katsina religious uprisings (Katsina 1991-1992), the ZangonKataf uprising (Kaduna State, 1992), the Kalakato religious disturbances (Funtua, Katsina State, 1993), the SabonGari market disturbances (Kano, 1995), the second Kafanchan crisis (Kaduna, 1999) and the anti-Shari'a violence episodes 1 and 2 (Kaduna State, 2000) (see Wakili, 2005: 484-503).

Boko Haram has different meanings. The BBC African Service (2010) referred to it as Nigeria's militant group. The group started with an unidentified structure and chain of command. Its official name is *Jama'atuAhlisSunnahLidda'awatiwal-Jihad,* which in Arabic means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". Boko Haram is literarily translated as the "Association of Sunnis for the propagation of Islam and Holy War" (Fayeye, 2012; *Newswatch*, 2012). According to a leader of the sect, Umaru, the concept of Boko Haram actually, does not imply that "Western Education is sin", but that "Western Civilization is forbidden" (Fayeye, 2012: 40). In other words, Boko Haram is not averse to formal education coming from the West, but affirms the belief in the superiority of Islamic culture (not education) because culture is broader and encompasses education, however, the type not based on Western education. For this reason, Onuoha (2012) opines that the sect frowns at the media's description of it

as Boko Haram; hence it prefers to be addressed by the name, Jama'aAhlulSunnaWalJama'aal Jihad.

Although the sect's appellation has undergone changes over time, it is believed that its ideological mission is relatively clear: thedefeat of the Nigerian state and establishment of an Islamic one guided strictly by Shari'a law. The group's members are largely convinced in their belief that Nigeria is a corrupt, infidel state mired in social vices. Thus, it is obligatory on pious Muslims to do away with the morally bankrupt country of Nigeria and join forces with Islam progressivesto establish, in a secluded place, the ideal Islamic nation free of all the trappings of a "morally bankrupt" state like Nigeria. According to Danjibo (2009), the ideology promoted by Boko Haram is about the establishment of *Shari'a*law in the society.

Hence the reason why security formations,public institutions and properties were among the first major casualties of the sect's violence. To buttress this point, Danjibo (2009) quotes Alhaji Ali Dandume, former minority leader in Nigeria's House of Representatives who said that Boko Haram is an assemblage of youths—both out-of-school and college graduates—without gainful employment and roaming the streets with the belief that their misfortuneis caused by the government that imposed Western education and failed to appropriately utilise the resources of the country to the benefit of all.

Ideologically, any member who fights and dies for the cause of an Islamic/Shari'a state by destroying modern state formation and government establishment automatically has the promise of "Aljanna" (heaven or paradise).Tell Magazine has this to say about Boko Haram:

> The mission of the sect was to establish an Islamic state where 'orthodox Islam' is practiced. Orthodox Islam according to him (Mohammed Yusuf, leader of the sect) frowns at Western education and working in the civil service because it is sinful. Hence, for their aim to be achieved, all institutions represented by government, including security agencies like police, military and other uniformed personnel, should be crushed (*Tell*, 10 August, 2009, p. 34).

Onuoha (2012) in his studyattempts to examine Boko Haram emergence. According to

Onuoha, it remains a debate as to when Boko Haram first emerged. The years 1995, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 have been freely ascribed to it by different writers. However, it is widely stated in the media (local and foreign)that Boko Haram emerged in 2002 with Yusuf Mohammed as the group's leader. However, Nigerian security forces date the origin of the sect back to 1995, when AbubakarLawan established the Ahlulsunnawaljama'aalhijra sect at the University of Maiduguri, Borno State. In those days, the group thrived as a non-violent association until sometime in 2002 when Yusuf became the leader of the sect following Lawan's decision to travel to Saudi Arabia in pursuit of further Islamic knowledge. Ever since, the group has transformed under various names like the Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah, Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram and Jama'atuAhlisSunnahLidda'awatiwal-Jihad (Onuoha, 2012).

In Ajayi's (2012) view, Boko Haram is the offspring of Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation, a group that evolved in 1995 and progressively developed into what was not referred to as Boko Haram by year 2000. This position has been reinforced by a report in the *Tribune* of 12 February, 2012 which stated that information at the disposal of the different security agencies suggested that Boko Haram has existed since 1995 in contrast to popular view that the sect emerged in 2003. It probably assumed a low profile between 1995 and 1999 when the responsibility to lead was handed over to Jon Mustapha Modu. For Copeland (2013), Boko Haram began as a small resistance groupprimarily made up of a congregation of youths led by Abubakar Lawan who began their religious activities in the mid-1990s. However, a coherent group identity did not emerge until the charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf took control of the group and rapidly endeared the group to the local population, especially the youths in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State.

On the other hand, some studies have argued that Boko Haram evolved from the ruins of the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s and developed as a replacement for the Maitatsine movement whose goal, like that of Boko Haram had to do with the sanitisation and entrenchment of true Islamic religion (Adesoji, 2011). Danjibo (2009) also corroborates this view, opining that MuhammedMarwa(leader of Maitatsine) believed that Islam had been corrupted by modernization (Westernization) and the establishment of the modern state. Marwa was very abusive, radical and provocative with his preaching and teachings.His abuses were particularly directed at revered traditional/religious institutions

such as the emirs. The political elites were also not spared by the teachings.Provoked by Marwa's brand of Islamic preaching, AlhajiSanusiLamido,the then Emir of Kano, banished him from Kano. He would later return to Kano to continue his religious activities.

Danjibo (2009) claimed that Marwa, on several occasions due to his offensive preaching and a reputation for disobeying the laws of the state was imprisoned between 1972 and 1979. After several confrontations with the police in the 1980s, the group was subdued by the security force. However, a number of its members also went underground to form extremist cells in some secluded areas in the north. They would reappear two decades later, in the year 2000 to form what was then known as the Nigerian Taliban—a loosely organised but radical religious organisation. Their major preoccupation was the advocacy for the establishment of Sharia rule in northern Nigeria which they argued had already been infiltrated and poisoned by western secular culture (David, 2011). The Nigerian Taliban was almost completely destroyed by Nigerian military forces in 2004, but Mohammed Yusuf took up the radical Islamic cause. In 2002, Yusuf established a radical Islamic education centre which attracted pupils from several villages and towns in northern Nigeria. These pupils along with surviving adherents of the Nigerian Taliban constituted the foundation members of Boko Haram (David, 2011).

Danjibo (2009) sheds light on the formative years of Mohammed Yusuf. He opines that Yusuf developed his radical Islamic ideas from his explorative study of the Qur'an in Niger and Chad. These religious views were largely anti-Westernization and anti-modernization. Muhammed Yusuf later returned to Nigeria where he settled and established a fundamentalist sect in Maiduguri in 2002 with the name*Yusufiyya*, most likely after his name. The sectarian group attracted a significant number of followers from northern parts of Nigeria, Niger and Chad. With a following of over 280,000, Yusuf became one of the most radical Islamic preachers who, on a regular basis, rolled out provocative sermons that targeted other Islamic scholars, traditional, religious and political institutions (2009).

Adesoji (2011) averred that Boko Haram, like many other extremist religious sects, propagated an Islamic doctrine that was against Western civilization including science. For the group, the ultimate goal was the recognition and practice of Shari'a law as the one and only law by which individual and group conducts must be guided across the length and

breadth of Nigeria. Boko Haram membership had a mixture of the both rich and poor, educated and illiterate including drug addicts and members of criminal groups.

The tie that bound these disparate people together, according to Stewart (2012) was the aspiration to overthrow the secular state. Furthermore, its mode of operations at its formative stage basically involved the use of elementary or crude armsthat were easily accessible on the streets and villages.By 2004, the sect had begun to gain greater public attention for its brand of Islam. Many in the north became worried about the actions of the sect and the rate at which it was gaining converts, especially among the youths. Boko Haram's appeal was so strong that students of tertiary institutions in states like Borno and Yobe easily became members and were so motivated to the extent that they decided to withdraw from their institutions of learning to join Boko Haram for Qur'anic lessons. Graduates among them were noted to have torn their certificate as a sign of ejection of western education (*Tell*, 10 August, 2009, cited in Danjibo, 2009).

According to Onuoha (2012), the exact number of its current members isunknown, though it it is believed that Boko Haram has followers with various degree of conviction drawn from virtually all of the 19 states of northern Nigeria and beyond including from other African countries, particularly Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Sudan. Its members are primarily individuals who are disenchanted with the political and socioeconomic situation of Nigeria, particularly the unemployed youths and former*Almajiris*. *Almajiri,*generally referred toas street children, is a phenomenon that developed from ancient cultural practice in the North where parents would send their children to live and learn Islamic education under the tutelage of prominent Islamic teachers in various towns and cities in the northern part of Nigeria. These *Almajiris* live and study in very awful conditions, thereby making them vulnerable to recruitment into extremist sects like the Boko Haram, largely through indoctrination.

As of 2010, Nigeria hosted about 9.5 million *Almajiris*, with over 80 per cent concentrated in northern Nigeria (Semere, 2015: 4). Besides *Almajiris* that form the bulk of its foot soldiers, the sect also has as members some well-educated, wealthy and influential people such as businessmen, politicians, university lecturers and even high profile traditional and

religious leaders who mainly provide financial, logistic and even spiritual support to the group. However, in a bizarre fashion, Boko Haram appeared to have included bank robbery as a means of generating funds besides hostage taking and kidnapping. Onuoha (2012) is of the view that apart from using the funds to prosecute its jihad, Boko Haram also use stolen funds to help the group fund other "important" responsibilities such as alms-giving (zakat) and assisting the under-privileged including widows.

Marchal (2012) and Akanji (2013) observed that other factors also contributed to the emergence and rise of Boko Haram. They argued that the political component is the constituency that has attracted staunch criticisms and aided the rise of the sect, especially against the elites and their corrupt behaviour. Despite the adoption of Shari'ain northern states, inequalities have increased and the corruption of the elites has not diminished. Boko Haram's appeal therefore is based on the necessity to address these failures and assassinate politicians perceived by the lay population as corrupted. He argues further that the defeat of General Buhari, who stood for a different moral order (at least in the youth's minds), in the 2011presidential election only fuelled this fierce dissent as Buhari built his popular support on a call for Islamic modesty (and therefore honesty) and a need for Muslims to be fairly represented, coupled with the fact that elections were perceived to have been manipulated and rigged to favour his opponent, who incidentally is a Christian from southern Nigeria.

Consequently, Boko Haram has evolved over the years as an Islamic fundamentalist group that preaches complete obedience to the laws of Islam. It has backed up this ideology with attacks on government institutions and facilities and against any other group who opposes its course, including international bodies. It is believed that the first violent encounter between the group and the government security forces occurred in December 2003 when its members clashed with the Police over what was described as a communal dispute relating to fishing rights. Subsequent events are unclear; it was either the sectcarried out an attack on local police stations or the army used excessive force on the group members including executing a siege on the group's mosque. Either way, most of the group's followers were reported to have died as a result of the conflict, including the leader. In 2004 the survivors returned to Maiduguri and re-joined the youth group originating from the AlhajiMuhammaduNidimi Mosque, now led by Mohammed Yusuf under the appellation of Boko Haram (Oftedal, 2013).

Boko Haram's descent into violence and its terrorist activitiesin Nigeria can be divided into two phases. Roughly, the first phase lasted from the sect's formation until the death of Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009, during which time the group went underground and was relatively peaceful. The second phase began in September 2010 till date and is characterised by radicalization and increasing violence.During the first phase, the main preoccupation of Boko Haram was withdrawing its members from society into a secluded place untainted by secularism. Mohammed Yusuf, the charismatic speaker of the group, was in 2002 selected by a body of shaykhs to head the group. However, Yusuf would turn against the shaykhs who appointed him as he accused them of being corrupt and as a result, unable to preach the "true Islam". Probably also an ideology that informed the group's name, Yusuf was very vocal in denouncing Western culture, education including science—a conviction that made him to reject conventional wisdom of a spherical world and that rain is induced by water vapours.

In contrast, Yusuf advocatedand admonished his followers to observe a moderate and ascetic way of life. Members of his sect were enjoined to reject the secular and "very immoral" life of the Nigerian society, including Muslims, which did not adhere to the true teachings of Islamic. Justifying his aversion against those he labelled as corrupt and immoral Nigerian Muslims, Yusuf argued that even in the 12 northern states where the Shariá law (that came into existence in year 2000) was binding, these were not being strictly implemented (Murray, 2011). He therefore advocated for the institutionalization of a true Islamic way of life in society. He built the IbnTamiyyahMasjid Mosque in Maiduguri from where he disseminated his brand of Islamic theology to his followers.By the life of seclusion which Mohammed Yusuf advocated which led his followers to dissociate themselves from the larger society, the seed of a violent brand of jihad had been sown. Gradually, as Walker (2012: 3) observed, "a state within a state" was established, with a cabinet, its own religious police and a large agricultural farm to feed their people.

As the new leader of the sect, Muhammad Yusufassumed the title of*Amir ul-Aam* (Commander in Chief) aided by two *Na'ib Amir ul-Aam* (deputies). An *Amir,* that is, a commander, was appointed to head each of the states where Boko Haram existed.Below the state *Amirs* were the local *Amirs* to administer the various local government areas. And lastly, the followers who, in a somewhat impressive order of organisation, had their own

roles and responsibilities including those who played the role of police and soldiers, among others (Onuoha, 2012). Under Yusuf's leadership, the sect violently attacked some public buildings including two local police stations in Kanamma and Geidam, Yobe State on December 24, 2003. This was followed by a lull in the group's activism as it focused on gaining more followers and other important resources (Oftedal: 2013).

Occasional attacks and clashes between the Police and the sect known as *al-amr bi-l-ma`rufwa-l-nahy `an al-munkar*(enjoining the good and forbidding the evil) occurred. However, these attacks did not assume a very dangerous dimension of armed conflict as the group were intermittently repressed by the security forces (Bøås, 2012).In 2004,Boko Haram set up a base in Kanamma community in Yobe State which it named "Afghanistan". From that period, its activities became overly provocative, constituting considerable concern to local communities. This was especially so because its followers in various institutions of learning (especially in Yobe and Borno States) pulled out of school to join the sect while publicly destroying their certificates in a symbolic move. Like in Yobe, its members, on 21 September, 2004 attacked police stations in Gworza and Bama carting away arms and ammunition and killing several police officers (Onuoha, 2012). There were low-intensity confrontations between Boko Haram and security agencies with the group also organising sporadic guerrilla-style attacks on police and military formations in some areas of Yobe and Borno States until it finally succeeded in triggering a major revolt in July 2009.

In 2009, the sect clashed with the authorities in a manner reminiscent of the 2003 confrontations. The group's members, on their way to a funeral, were stopped by the police for not wearing motorcycle helmets (Walker, 2012). The argument that ensued resulted in gunshots being fired with several people injured. In retaliation, Boko Haram members attacked police stations, mosques, churches and some government buildings in Bauchi and Yobe, killing several policemen. The claseswhich began on July 26 continued until30 July, 2009 and spread to five states in northern Nigeria: Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Kano and Katsina. Over 800 people died after five days of violence which eventually ended following the response of the military (Oftedal, 2013).

The fighting ended on 30 July, 2009 when the group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was

finally captured in his residence by the military but died mysteriously a few hours later in police custody in what was widely perceived as an extrajudicial killing. However, a ranking police officer, Assistant Inspector-General Moses Anegbode insisted that Yusuf died in a shootout while trying to escape from the security forces (*BBC News*, 2012, accessed October 30, 2013). However, officials working for Human Rights Watch in Nigeria rejected the claim by the police and demanded that Yusuf's death be immediately investigated, labelling it "extrajudicial" and "illegal" (ibid).

Over a thousand lives were lost during the revolt particularly those of the sect's members and with many others arrested and detained for formal trial (Onuoha, 2012). At the same time, the Police sustained its clampdown and search for other sect members and sympathisers who had gone underground. Further arrests were made while the properties of those who had fled were confiscated. According to Oftedal (2013), what appeared to be police brutality and excessiveuse of force led to the disappearance of number of individualssuspected to be supporters of Boko Haram, yet the Police denied any involvement. Other members of the group went underground with very little known about their hideout between September 2009 and the end of 2010. Although, there were speculations and suggestions by security sources in Nigeria that some of Boko Haram members had migrated toterrorist training bases in Algeria within the period. Other sources point to Mali, Somalia and Cameroon. At the time, Boko Haram was widely believed to be extinct, but this was not the case as the group would emerge more determined and better prepared.

The extra-judicial killing of Yusuf and some leaders and followers marked the end of the first, relatively calm period of Boko Haram's evolution but angered its surviving members, who unsurprisingly, were increasingly using martyrdom videos of the July 2009 uprising as inspiration and to radicalise its members. Leaflets, audio and video tapes with very radical contents were disseminated by the group members to media outlets indicating their intention to confront the secular authorities. The period that followed saw Boko Haram emerge from being a weak and poorly organised local rebellion sect to one with greater sophistication who had mastered the art of guerrilla warfare, including the technical knowhow to make and deploy improvised explosive devices in perpetrating its violent operations against the Nigerian state.

The post-Yusuf era constitutes the second phase of Boko Haram's violent campaignin Nigeria characterised by violent radicalization and sophisticated and far-reaching attacks. Contrasting the poorly organised hit-and-run assaults it carried out in the past, its violent operations were nowmore sophisticated and better coordinated under the guidance of the Shura Council headed by Abubakar Shekau who became the new spiritual leader of the sect. By mid-2010, Boko Haram reappeared in Nigeria under a new leader, believed to be Abubakar Mohammad Shekau, Yusuf's former second-in-command. He announced his control over the group in a video released in April 2010. Five months later, about 50 Boko Haram gunmen launched a massive jailbreak in Bauchi, freeing over 700 inmates, including roughly 150 Boko Haram followers and killing four, two of whom were civilians (Oftedal, 2013). This attack marked the beginning of a fresh and progressively violent period in Boko Haram's evolution, in which the sect's deadly activities became frequent and advanced. From initiating a few attackseach year using crude weapons such as knives, sticks, cutlasses before 2009, in the second phase, Boko Haram startedorganising attacks almost every week using explosives and, from 2011, suicide attacks.

A few months after the prison attack, around Christmas, Boko Haram killed at least 107 people in attacks in Maiduguri and a series of four bombings in Jos. Two attacks in Maiduguri by armed Boko Haram members killed a policeman and a retired police officer and wounded three civilians while attacks on Maiduguri churches with petrol bombs killed six people. Two bombs exploded near a large market in Jos on the day before Christmas, a third bomb hit a mainly Christian area of Jos, and the fourth explosion was a roadside bomb. The group claimed responsibility for the attacks, and threatened new attacks, stating on the group's website that, "We will continue with our attacks on disbelievers and their allies and all those who help them" (*Guardian*, April 10, 2010).

Between December 2010 and January 2011, Boko Haram assassinated several prominent individuals including AlhajiModuFannamiGubio, a governorship aspirant of the defunct All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP). In addition, Boko Haram assassins shot, killed and wounded several security officers including Sergeant Isa Omale and a Corporal of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC). Boko Haram never hid the fact that it was behind these attacks. Continuing its pattern of attacking, especially during holidays, Boko Haram bombed a military barracks on New Year's Eve (Ogebe, 2012).Boko Haram

attacks continued thereafter but the group next received widespread attention with its May 2011 raid on a police station during the night in which there was a gun battle for about an hour. Earlier that week, Boko Haram attacks had claimed the lives of two civilians and one police officer.

On May 27, 2011, about 70 gunmen, in a simultaneous attack on a bank, a police barracks and a police station in Damboa, Borno State, slaughtered eight personsamong whom were four policemen. Authorities suspected Boko Haram. Just days later on May 29, (claimed by Boko Haram) a series of bombings were launched by Boko Haram. The first was at a bar in a military barracks in Bauchi. Over ten individuals died,and about 35 were injured. Another bomb detonated at a relaxation spot in Zuba, Abuja, killing two persons and injuring about 11. The third bomb blasted a bar in Zaria just hours after Nigeria's presidential inauguration in Abuja. The following day, two youths were wounded after treading on explosives in Zaria. And in the northeast city of Maiduguri, a bomb targeted an army patrol vehicle, although there were no casualties (Ogebe, 2012). Many other attacks have since followed.

Boko Haram assaults mainly targeted state security forces—police, soldiers, NSCDC, and prison officials amongst others—andalso centres of worship, markets, football viewing centres, community and religious leaders, politicians, and other civilians who they consider as "enemies" (Onuoha, 2012: 4). Some of the high profile attacks carried out by Boko Haram included the 2011 bombattacks on the police headquarters and the UN compound in Abuja, and the coordinated January 2012 bombings in Kano. The suicide attack on the police headquarters signalled a change of tactics as the sect had graduated to the use of car bombs. So too, the violence on the UN building at Nigeria's capital city, Abuja, on 26 August 2011 marked a departure from Boko Haram's traditional target set of government facilities and indeed signpost the possibility of a change in target selection in the future. The 16 June, 2011 attack involved an enormous car bomb which was fortuitously prevented just before it could hit its main target of killing most of the service's highest-ranking officers at the police national headquarters. Arguably, the attack was the most shocking of an almost daily series of bombings, random murders and targeted assassinations carried out by the largely Borno State-based Boko Haram movement.

The incident happened when what looked like a police official vehicle was inadvertently allowed to follow behind a convoy that was conveying the then Inspector General of Police, Hafiz AbubakarRingim, and some other ranking police officers to the police headquarters in Abuja. Both the driver and passenger in the vehicle loaded with explosives were allegedly carrying fake police identity cards. However, an intuitive traffic officer within the compound directed the car to park in a secondary lot, thus averting an explosion very close to the main building and in the process preventing the loss of life on a larger scale. As it were, the explosion slew the terrorists and four other men including the traffic policeman who had diverted the car. In addition, about 40 vehicles were burnt in the blast while more than 50 others were severely damaged. The powerful blast broke windows and upended equipment throughout the seven-storey building (Militant Leadership Monitor, 2012).

Between July 2009 and January 2012, Boko Haram killed nationals of over nine countries: Kenya, Norway, Nigeria, Italy, Germany, China, Cameroon, United Kingdom and Mali; while nationals of India and the United States have survived attacks by the sect (Ogebe, 2012). In the same period, the group conducted roughly 160 separate attacks, resulting in the death of over 1000 people and internal displacement of hundred others (Onuoha, 2012). Boko Haram claim many other violent attacks that resulted in the death of hundreds of people since the start of 2012 mainly in its epicentre of Maiduguri, Borno State. Besides Borno, many of its deadly attacks also occurred in states like Gombe, Bauchi, Jigawa, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, Niger, Yobe and Nigeria's capital, Abuja. While its attacks mainly concentrated in states in the northern parts of Nigeria, the sect has demonstrated its intention to extend same to the predominantly Christian South. In January 2012, the group issued a warning to non-Muslims and Southerners to exit the North within three days or face attacks. While it did rattle many Christians residing in the North and beyond who feared ethno-religious killings, it was unable to have the effect of causing mass movement of Christians and Southerners away from the North.

Particularly worrisome about Boko Haram terror activities is the addition of suicide bombing in its violent tactics. Since its successful deployment of the first suicide bomb attack at the police headquarters in Abuja, on 16 June, 2011, Boko Haram has further carried out several other suicide bombings in Adamawa, Yobe, Borno, Gombe, Kano and

Abuja among others, with huge death toll and destruction of property resulting from these attacks. It controls a large swath of territories in the north-east region of Nigeria and has repeatedly launched attacks against both civilian and security formations in the north-east. The terrorist activities of the Islamist sect compelled a delay in the general elections in 2015 initially scheduled for February 14 and 28, 2015.

Furthermore, the sect threatened to derail the country's elections. On February 18, 2015, it released a video on Twitter where its leader Abubakar Shekau was seen vowing that "This election will not be held even if we are dead...." (*The Punch,* 18 February, 2015). Boko Haram has proved resilient to government counter-terrorism measures and it is believed that the first six years of the sect's insurgency has resulted in the death of over 13,000 people (Abubakar, 2015).

2.1.9.Perspectives on themanagement of Boko Haram terrorism

ICG (2015) provided some explanation regarding how the Nigerian government has managed Boko Haram crisis. According to the ICG, the government has largely managed the Boko Haram terrorism through military deployments to the affected zone. The study also concluded that one major reason why the group would continue to destabilise communities in the North East rests with contractions in government's political will to do more and frontally confront the group's terrorist activities. A further argument by the study is that the escalation of Boko Haram terror activities sort of caught the Nigerian government unaware with the government also believing that the crisis will eventually peter out or die a natural death. Former President Goodluck Jonathan's statement in December 2011 arguably supported the submissions of the ICG. Jonathan had argued then that "the bombing is a burden we must live with. It will not last forever; I believe that it will surely be over" (Vanguard, 26 December 2011). Further comment supporting government's assumption that the crisis will naturally end was made a month later by the then Chief of Defence Staff Air Vice Marshal Oluseyi Petinrin who equally noted that Boko Haram terrorists would soon run out of "idiots" willing to executeits suicide bombings (Punch, 24 January 2012).

Onuoha and Ugweze's (2014) study aligns with the conclusions of the ICG (2015) in the area that Nigeria's leadership (and indeed, the international community) was largely unprepared for Boko Haram's violence and bombing campaigns. In their view, like the

international community, the government largely considered Boko Haram a local rebellion with little or no consequence to warrant decisive response. Only after the group became more vexatious attacking both local and international targets and with concrete threats of expansion beyond Nigeria's territory that they were now taken very serious. Boko Haram's ability to make good their threat compelled the government to increase military deployment to combat the group's activities in the North East. Additionally, Onuoha and Ugweze (2014) showed that beyond deployment of military capability, the Nigerian government equally sought international assistance in addressing the problem. However, they argue in line with other scholars' position that involving the international community in the counterterrorism operations against Boko Haram (especially the United States) may hamper prompt success against the problem of terrorism in Nigeria. However, the study did not elaborate on how such international involvement could hamper the campaign against the terrorist group.

Adibe (2014) examined government anti-Boko Haram activities from a different perspective. Although he listed pronouncement of state of emergency, efforts to negotiate with the sect, military confrontation and external support for Nigeria in the field of security and surveillance, he argued that government's response to the group's terrorism has remained ineffective because these efforts do not address the longer-term and deeply held grievances that underpin the crisis. These grievances, he argued, are born out of poverty, neglect and dire socio-economic conditions of the region. Adibeargued also that the North is home to some of the poorest communities in Nigeria. Within the North itself, the North East—the most impacted by Boko Haram—has arguably, the biggest concentrations of people which fall within what Fanon (2001 edition) categorised as the "Wretched of the Earth." Many of these people are illiterate, either unemployed or underemployed, and therefore suffer from various forms of what Gurr (1970) would call "relative deprivation."

Adibe (2014) equally ascribed the dire poverty situation in the North to "bad governance" caused by selfish political leaders both in the state and at the federal level who are accused of embezzling or misappropriating the funds that should have been channelled to the development of the states. Thus he linked the management of Boko Haram terrorism to the general issue of nation-building. He therefore argued that long-term management of the problem has to be tied to resolving the crisis of Nigeria nation building. Nigeria faces a

crisis in its nation-building process as nearly every segment of Nigeria claims it is "marginalised." The struggle in nation-building is tied to the issues of inequality, poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria which has inexorably created an existential crisis for a lot of Nigerians where it also seems that everyone has one type of discontent or another against the state.

Accordingly, the study concluded that a long-term solution for containing Boko Haram terrorism along with other emergent insurgency groups in Nigeria, is to resolve the issues of nation-building and indeed, state building. Terrorism will end when the idea of oneness and national unity becomes ingratiated in the mind-set of the citizens and when they ultimately develop, in the view of Anderson (1983), the "imagined community." For Anderson, that imagined community is a nation, a collective, socially constructed by individuals who inherently see themselves as members of the collective. For him, a nation "is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (1983: 224).

In response to the terrorist activities of Boko Haram, Nigerian government, through the former National Security Adviser, Col. Sambo Dasuki, announced on March 23, 2014, the establishment of Counter Terrorism Center (CTC), under the office of the NSA. This represented a new counterterrorism approach to Boko Haram. The CTC comprises of two departments, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Branch (JTAB) and the behavioural Analysis and Strategic Communication Unit (BASCU). The CTC also initiated a robust and all-inclusive National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), after consulting widely with relevant stakeholders in the security community both local and international. The new strategy appeared to depict, in addition to military operations, a carrot approach to fighting terrorism. This approach was premised on rehabilitation of apprehended terrorists; providing needed infrastructure in the North; employment opportunities; etc. There was also the aspect of the approach that sort to foster close cooperation between Nigeria, Chad, Benin, Cameroon and Niger including in the area of intelligence sharing and joint border patrol.

Analysing Nigeria's counterterrorism approach, Ibegbu (2014) argued that Nigeria had left it too late in terms of strategising against terrorism. He argued in his article that the

trajectory and indications were there, and security analysts had warned of the emerging threat that Nigeria will face as a hub for terrorist. Yet, no discernable action was taken by the government. For Ibegbu, one aspect where Nigeria lost ground in the anti-Boko Haram fight was the unusual and somewhat questionable method that it deployed in selecting the leadership of those tasked with the counterterrorism war. In his view, those selected to lead the campaign had little or no knowledge, experience, education and/or desired acquired interest in Boko Haram and terrorism as a whole. By the time Nigeria started paying attention to terrorism after the Nigerian Police Force Headquarters and the UN office in Abuja had been attacked, Boko Haram had already established its network and recruitment through its propaganda and its effective use of religion to manipulate and gain followers.

Besides these challenges, Ibegbu listed corruption and lack of commitment to address the non-military aspect of the Boko Haram issue as the downside of government's efforts in addressing Boko Haram extremism. He therefore advocated that counterterrorism measures should be enacted by the government to effectively tackle the surge of religious extremist movementslike Boko Haram that has taken roots in Nigeria. In particular, he recommended that experts on terrorism should head government's counterterrorism units, while corruption also should be aggressively addressed since without that, any fight against other areas will become ineffective.

2.2. Theoretical framework

The importance of a theory is in its capacity to provide facts which people believe to be true about events or issues. It loses its values if it fails to provide rational and meaningful understanding about the given subject. A theory must explain or suggest ways of explaining why a particular object or issue possesses certain features. Meaning that, a theory is predictive, explanatory and problem solving; and that is why Cohen (1968) observes that the "goal of any theory is to explain something which has occurred with a view to dealing with problems that arose or may arise" (p. 2). Accordingly, this study considers a theory that is appropriate in understanding the management of religion-related violence. Within this framework, conflict transformation theory would be employed.

2.2.1. Conflict transformation theory

Lederach(1995), widely regarded as the foremost theorist of conflict transformation, believes that dealing with contemporary conflicts goes beyond reframing or altering of

positions and projectinga win-win outcome as conflict resolution and conflict management suggest. Rather, conflict transformation theory supposes that conflict emerges as a consequence of inherent problems of injustice and inequality expressed by competing socio-economic, cultural and political structures; hence, solving the conflict would involve altering or changing these structures and frameworks that often breed inequality and injustice.

For Miall(1999), the character of the conflict parties and the structure of their relationships may be rooted in a form of conflictual interactions that extends beyond the specific location of conflict. Therefore, he views conflict transformation as "a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict" (1999: 32). This suggests that conflict transformation involves a comprehensive and all-encompassing approach which is geared towards a gradual removal of the structural causes of conflict that are embedded in the society. Removing these structures of inequality and injustices is the most effective way to guarantee sustainable peace.

The process of transformation may affect several entities, including the actors, issues, rules, goals, and structures. Actor transformation involves a major internal change within the stakeholders in the conflict. This might be a re-orientation of their perceptions and views about the conflict situation. It could also involve a re-emergence of new actors in the conflict. Issue transformation involves modification of the nature of the conflict; this may involve downplaying the significance of the original conflict issues and emphasising shared concerns for new issues which may create an entry point into solving the conflict. Rule transformation targets redefining the norms guiding the conflict parties during negotiation to bringthe conflict toa conclusion. Such transformation would reflect in their attitudinal disposition and behaviour that could help to yield a more conducive environment for negotiation.

Goal transformation involves changing or altering the original goals or objectives of the conflict parties. These goals are usually embedded ininterests and positions. Goals transformation involves drawing the attention of conflict parties to the realization of new and mutually benefiting objectives/goals that could be pursued in the conflict. Lastly,

structure transformation is critical to the entire process of transforming a conflict. This involves a profound reframing of some or the entire structures of the conflict. This is, changing the institutions, resources, stakeholders and other factors that feed and sustain the conflict. Such change would result in new opportunities for lasting peace in the society.

Conflict transformation theory is relevant to this study as it may provide solution to the seemingly intractable value-based conflicts such as the Boko Haram sectarian violence, which in part has been fed by systemic failures such as supposed marginalization and injustices and under-development in parts of northern Nigeria. This, however, must go beyond a short term solution of providing the necessary satisfiers to meet the primary needs of the parties in conflict; it should involve a long term process that addresses structural inequalities and injustices. This will also include changing the dynamics of the conflict parties' relationship and the underpinning circumstances that create the conflict.Dealing with these key issues can help to de-escalate the violent situation and bring relative peace to communities impacted by Boko Haram terrorism.

CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

3.1. Research design: A research design guides a researcher on data collection and analysis. It is a framework that contains the structure and strategy for conducting a research (Aworh et al, 2006). A case studyresearch design was adopted in the study. It enabled the researcher conduct an in-depth and critical analysis of the subject matter in the study locations and also to contribute to increased understanding on Boko Haram terrorism and government's conflict management strategies in addressing the issue. It was utilised to collect data useful for interrogating the various strategies adopted by the Nigerian government in addressing Boko Haram terrorism from 2009 to 2016; the effectiveness of the various strategies and the challenges that confronted each strategy. The study selected the capital cities of Borno (Maiduguri), Yobe (Damaturu) and Adamawa (Yola) as the study locations as they are widely referred to as the "epicentre" states of Boko Haram insurgency in the North East.

In selecting the target audience, the study population was delineated into different sub-groups each representing various segments of the population. The security agencies were grouped into one category as they are largely responsible for prosecuting the counterterrorism war on Boko Haram. The traditional rulers, religious and community leaders were categorised mainly as resident respondents and they have deep understanding of the study locations. The Civilian Joint Task Force members were equally identified as target audience since they have engaged from different perspective in the war on Boko Haram. The qualitative method of data collection was adopted for the study. Fuller descriptions of where and how the data were collected and from whom, as well as the instruments utilised in collecting the data are presented below.

3.2. Study locations: Three cities located in three different north eastern states constituted the location of the study. They are Maiduguri (Borno), Damaturu (Yobe), and Yola (Adamawa) respectively. As explained earlier, the three states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe are largely considered the epicentre of Boko Haram terrorism. They also received the

greatest attention in term of government response to the set's activities.

3.3. Study population: The population of study comprised adult population in the selected cities of Maiduguri, Damaturu and Yola. However, the target population included security agencies, religious and traditional institutions, community leaders, members of the Civilian JTF,and other relevant government officials which were identified in the field.

Table 3.1: Population estimates of the three selected cities for the study

City		Populationestimate (2006 census)
Maiduguri		1,197,497
Yola		336, 648
Damaturu		88,014
Total		**1,622,159**

3.4. Sampling andsampling procedure: Purposive and snowballing sampling techniques were employed in selecting respondents for in-depth interview. A sample size of thirty three respondents were purposively selected from the study population cutting across security agencies, traditional and religious leaders, relevant government agencies, the National Assembly, international organisations, volunteer groups in the study area amongst others. The justification for this method inheres in the fact that the purposively selected respondents were people who could provide inside and authoritative information on the subject matter because of their affiliations in the society and the nature of information they providedfor the study. They also represented various segments of the study population.

3.5. Methods of data collection: Data for the research was derived qualitatively through primary and secondary methods.

Primary method: Primary method was through granting of in-depth interviews. The researcher purposively conducted 33 in-depth interviews (IDIs)

Secondary method: Secondary data was derived from reports of Human Rights Watch,

Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group.Additional data was got from books and government official records.

3.6. Instruments of data collection: In-depth interview guide was employed for data collection. The respondents were group into different categories for which specific IDI guide was developed accordingly. The purpose was to ensure that the right questions were directed to the appropriate category of respondents. This approach ensured that interviewees were only asked questions within their areas of influence which on the other hand rubbed-off positively in terms of appropriateness of the responses provided. Furthermore, a total of 33 in-depth interviews were conducted with respondents drawn from the following groups as shown in the table below:

Table 3.2: Distribution of number of IDIs conducted

Category of respondents	Number of IDIsconducted
Theatre Commander, Operation Lafiya Dole	1
Nigerian Army	1
Nigerian Air Force	1
Multinational Joint Task Force	1
Nigeria Police Force	1
Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA)	1
National Defence College	1
Traditional rulers	3
Religious leaders	15
Civilian Joint Task Force	1

Chairman, House Committee on Interior (Federal House of Representatives)	1
National Human Rights Commission	1
Federal Ministry of Justice	1
Nigeria Immigration Services	1
Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps	1
National Orientation Agency	1
Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR)	1
Total	**33**

3.7. Method of data analysis

Data retrieved from in-depth interviews was content analysed using descriptive and narrative styles.

3.8. Limitation of the study

It was difficult obtaining data on the number of Boko Haram suspects under prosecution by the Federal Ministry of Justice or those that had been convicted under the Terrorism Prevention Act (2011 and 2013). Such information which were not readily available would have helped to better measure the effectiveness of the terrorism legislations of the government. Also, some of the respondents with the MNJTF and the National Assembly scheduled for interview could not be reached despite efforts to do so. However, those respondents that the researcher was able to interview provided adequate and robust information which ensured that the quality and validity of the findings of the study was not negatively affected.

CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

4.1. Conflict management strategies adopted by the Nigerian Government in addressing Boko Haram terrorism

Studies on conflict management generally identify five key strategies of conflict management. These strategies are collaboration, competition, avoidance, compromise and accommodation (Akpuru-Aja, 2007). In military strategy, they are broadly divided into three categories: hard power strategy, soft power strategy and the hybrid strategy (Wright, 2007; Gray, 2011; Wagner, 2014). The hybrid strategy is a combination of the other two and in more recent times, commonly referred to as smart power. Smart power, especially, is a term that is widely used in foreign policy circles and associated with Hilary Clinton, former United States Secretary of States. While *hard power* advocates the use of coercive means, soft power relates to the capacity to realise preferred outcome through attraction. The smart power (also referred to as hybrid or carrot-and-stick approach) seeks to combine the tools of both soft and hard power (Nye, 2009).

Dealing with the Boko Haram sect, especially since 2009, has turned out to be a monumental challenge to the Nigerian government. Boko Haram emerged as a relatively unknown sectarian group and became more visible in 2009 from where it transmuted into a radical and very extremist Islamic group by virtue of its ideology and conduct. On a general note, the Nigerian government at various times adopted different strategies to address Boko Haram activities that could be classified holistically, under three layers of strategy—*soft, hard* and *smart power*. Nevertheless, there was no coherent sequence in terms of how the government responded using soft, hard and smart power in addressing Boko Haram terrorism. The difficulty of government to evolve a coherent strategy to contain Boko Haram activities largely rested on the fluidity and adaptability of Boko Haram in the different phases of the conflict.

Government's initial strategy in terms of response to the group's activities at that early stage could be classified as avoidance or denial. That, is, not paying the right attention, or not taking proper action to resolve the conflict. It amounted to not dealing with underlying causes of the conflict and hoping that the issue would resolve itself. Arguably, this line of thought probably influenced the government to take a police action primarily involving

response from the police and other policing agencies. As the group transformed into a more extremely formidable, destructive force, committing all sorts of heinous crimes, including killing and waging war against the state, the government also recalibrated its strategic response into a more formidable (contain and defeat) military option. Government also employed soft power strategies in addressing the conflict.

Table 4.1: Classification of conflict management strategies adopted by the Nigeria Government in addressing the Boko Haram terrorism

Avoidance (sometimes involving minimal force)	Hard Power (Force/Militarised)	Soft Power (Non-militarised alternatives)
❖ Dealing with the early state of Boko Haram ❖ Police action	❖ Declaration of State of Emergency ❖ JTF (Op Restore Order) ❖ Military Ops: Boyona; Zaman Lafiya; Lafiya Dole→Op Crackdown; MNJTF→ including Op Gama Aiki ***Civilian JTF (later accepted as a component of COIN)	❖ Legislations: Aspects of the EFCC Act (Section 15, on terrorism financing); Terrorism Prevention Act (2011, 2013 Amendment); NACTEST (2014, reviewed in 2016) ❖ Addressing systemic problems in the region: poverty, illiteracy, etc. ❖ Dialogue option/amnesty proposal ❖ Building bridges through inter-religious dialogue ❖ Media and propaganda infrastructure and de-radicalization programmes ❖ Victim Support Fund (VSF) ❖ Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE) ❖ North East

			Development Commission (NEDC) ❖ North East Regional Initiative (NERI)

Source: Compiled by the author

For analysis, this research classifies the various conflict management approaches utilised by the Nigeria government in addressing the Boko Haram terrorism into avoidance, hard power and soft power strategies are reflected in the table above. Nevertheless, the various strategies adopted by the government are discussed as a continuous approach in a thematic form that relatively provides some form of logical sequence in analysis.

4.1.1. Strategies adopted for addressing Boko Haram's early rebellion

Studies such as Onuoha (2012); Oftedal (2013) and Abdullahi (2015) have detailed how the crisis began in July 2009 pitting the members of the sect against the police. Broadly speaking, government's strategic response against the sect in 2009 was more or less avoiding the conflict. Brigadier General Rabe Abubakar aptly captured how the government viewed the group and its activities when it first began its open rebellion in that year, noting that, "this thing (Boko Haram) came up as an amateur group; a group that was not known before it metamorphosed into what it is today" (Interview, Abuja, 13 August, 2016). The initial response was to consider the group as an outlaw, a malfeasance, an Islamic sect with no authentic religious inclination whose rebellious behaviour needed to be dealt with through some sort of law enforcement action.

Being the principal organisation mandated to maintain local law and order and the lead agency in terms of the country's response to internal security challenges, the police was deployed to deal with the group's uprising in July 2009. The government continued to rely onthedeployment of the police in the bid to contain and curtail the group's activities. In the process, the Nigeria Policeended up utilising what could be termed as some level of high handedness including the introduction of wide-ranging roadblocks, mass detentions and disruption of the group's activities with the aim of curbing and containingtheir excesses.

According to Umar (2013), government adopted this strategy because it viewed the rebellion as short-term issue that would dissipate as was the case with similar experiences in the past in other part of Nigeria. However, as the crisis continued and spreading from the epicenter in Maiduguri to other parts of the North East and beyond, the military was drafted

in to assist in line with the constitutional obligation to assist the civil authority and the police in maintaining law and order. This is consistent with the claim by a respondent that the escalation of the crisis, the killings, attacks on churches, mosques and other public facilities, and the inability of the police (whose stations and personnel had also become casualties) to stop attacks compelled the intervention of the military (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Noting that the Boko Haramterror group had developed into a significant menace to security and public peace and had also, considerably,successfullyundermined the authority of the nation's leadership, the government sanctioned a more robust military intervention against the sect coordinated by the 3rd Amour Division, Jos which controls the entire North East and North Central. In the process, Mohammed Yusuf, the founder and leader of Boko Haram, was captured by the military but later died in police custody under questionable circumstances. Even after his death, security forces continued to haunt fleeing members and supporters of the group, arresting and detaining them and summarily executing others.

Security forces were said to have been involved in widespread revenge killings of suspected members and apologists of the Boko Haram sect, some in the presence of their family members; others were brutally beaten, arrested and detained; while properties, including cars, shops and houses were burned by the security forces. Additionally, Human Rights Watch (2012) accused the security agents of equally engaging in financial theft while searching the homes of suspected community members; and at least in one instance, raping a woman. One respondent who witnessed the ordeal recounted: "the beatings, the killings, everything there was shocking. It was not a hidden thing" (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016), evidently alluding to the unselective and brutal methodin which the security agencies abused, manhandled and murdered the sect members and perceived sympathisers.

While the strategy succeeded in driving members of the sect underground for a while, they did re-emerge in the fall of 2010. Their re-emergence manifested in the several attacks carried out by the sect. On7 September, 2010,a group of armed Boko Haram men brazenly invaded a Bauchi prison freeingmore than 700 prisoners,withsome 100 sect members included.The attack left four persons(two community members, a policeman and a soldier) dead. The attack of 7th September was followed by series of attacks between December 24

and 27 in Maiduguri and Jos where not less than 86 people were murdered. Furthermore,eight persons were killed in Maiduguri on the 29th of December 2010 by violent Boko Haram members. Amongst the dead wasagubernatorial aspirant of the then ruling party in Borno State—the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) (IRIN, 2013).

These attacks continued in 2011 and even became more significant in terms of range and impact. In fact, Boko Haram attacks in 2011 were worse than anything experienced in previousyears. Eyituoyo (2013) noted that in 2011, over 35 major Boko Haram attacks occurred, leaving more than 260 people—mostly civilians, dead. The sect took their attack to the next level by orchestrating suicide bombingsat the Police Headquarters in Abuja on June 16, 2011. Barely two month later, it would signal its intention to internationalise by attacking the United Nations building in Abuja on August 26, 2011, killing at least 25 people. Despite security forces on their trail, Boko Haram attacks continued unabated leaving several persons dead and property destroyed.

The increasing lethality of Boko Haram attacks, especially in Nigeria's north-east region, inspired a reassessment of Nigerian government's conflict management strategy leading to the creation of a Joint Task Force, dubbed *JTF Operation Restore Order* (JTF-ORO) in 2011. ORO I (as it was called) lasted between June 2011 and May 2013 comprising about 4000 troops contributed by the Nigerian military, the Department of State Security, the police,Nigeria Immigration Service,Nigerian Customs Service and Defence Intelligence Agency. The headquarters of the new body was domiciled in Borno State capital, Maiduguri. The JTF had a mandate to restore law and order to the troubled region of the north east and in particular, to Borno State. The operation underwent a little calibration in December 2011 extending ORO III into Yobe State with 2000 troops drawn from thethree services making up the Military (Nigerian Army, Air Force and Navy), with critical support from the DSS, the Nigeria Police, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS). ORO III performed the same function as ORO I. However, while ORO I was directly supervised by the Defence Headquarters, ORO III was under the authority of the Army Headquarters.

At the beginning, the joint mission collected intelligence about the characteristics and activities of the Boko Haram camp. The JTF had a mandate to subdue and ultimately defeat and eradicate Boko Haram through a forceful crackdown on its members and their

activities. Itsactivities were predominantlytargeted at constrictingor reducing Boko Haram's operational terrain, degrading its capacity to cause more violence and killing ordetaining the group's members and followers. To realise its objective of limit, contain and destroy, the JTF utilised a number ofmethods which included military-relatedtacticssuch ascodon and search, mounting of checkpoints and roadblocks and arrests of suspected members. The methods also entailedraids, surveillance and providing security protection for high-profile Boko Haram targets—humans and properties among others.

Yet, overwhelmed by the Boko Haram continued violent campaign whichrelentlessly threatened the authority and legitimacy of the political leadership and also increased fears of insecurity across the entire country, the administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan, on December 31, 2011, declared a state of emergency, informing the nation that it had become necessary to address the continued Boko Haram attacks, especially as thegroup had threatened the collective security of Nigerians and shaken the foundations of the nation's corporate existence. The parts of the country affected by the declaration included fourteen local government areas (LGA) all in four northern states namely,

➤ Borno State: Maiduguri Metropolitan, BankiBama, GamboruNgala,Jere and Biu LGAs respectively
➤ Yobe State: Damaturu, Potiskum, Gasua-Bade, Geidamand Buniyadi-Gujba LGAs respectively
➤ Plateau State: Jos South, Jos North, Riyom and Barkin-Ladi LGAs
➤ Niger State: Suleja LGA

The declaration however, did not affect the political leadership in the affected states and local government areas. Rather, they were requested to give maximum cooperation to securityinstitutionsthat were mobilised to restore stability and control to those areas.

> I therefore urge the political leadership in the affected states and Local Government Areas togive maximum cooperation to the law enforcement agencies deployed to their respective communities to ensure that the situation is brought under control within the shortest possible time (President Jonathan, December 31, 2011).

In addition, the defence and police chiefs were directed to institute and implementadequate actions with a view to ensuring that lives and properties were well protected in the affected

states. Furthermore, the President, in the declaration, directed the Chief of Defence Staff, in cooperation with other service chiefs, to establish a special force unit made up essentially of the Military, with a primary task of counterterrorism. While as part of a more comprehensiveanti-Boko Haram strategy to end the group's terror threats in the area, adjoining borderlands in the affected local government areas were to be shut downwith the aim of controlling or addressingthe increasing spate of cross-border terrorist activities as Boko Haram and other illegal groups were deemed to have exploited the porosity of the contiguous borders to perpetrate atrocities in Nigeria and easily found safe haven in neighbouring countries and areas which the country's security forces had no legal authority or jurisdiction to enter (Interview, Abuja, 18 August, 2016).

Accordingly, the presence of security operatives in the areas was boosted so as to effectively combat the Boko Haram insurgents. As they did in the past in similar circumstances, they employed several tactics including search and cordon operations based on intelligence report, as well as mounting of roadblocks. A number of these roadblocks and checkpoints especially on the main roads were mounted to frustrate and disrupt the movement of members of the Boko Haram who frequently utilised the roads as access routes to get to their targets (Interview, Abuja, 18 August, 2016). According to respondents, another major function of the troops at the various checkpoints was to flag suspicious vehicles and individuals who were subjected to different types of search. Also, passengers in public vehicles were equally required to disembark from such vehicles and walk through the checkpoint while they were physically screened by the security personnel at the checkpoints.

The tactical response seemed not to work but only continued to cause disruption of daily activities of the people and infringement on their rights to carry out their daily activities unencumbered and in peace. The hassles and abuses encountered by the people not only frustrated, incensed and disenchanted them, it resulted in a feeling of estrangement and abandonment by the government.Added to this was the poor management and inadequate staffing of the various checkpoints which equally lacked the vital screening facilities. Consequently, it failed to effectively prevent operatives of Boko Haram who continued to perpetrate series of attacks both within and outside the areas said to be under emergency rule. The ineffectiveness of these anti-Boko Haram measures would lead to the President's

dismissal of the then Minister of Defence, Bello Haliru Mohammed and the then National Security Adviser, OwoyeAzazi on June22 2012. Their sack followed the dead of over 150 persons in a space ofone week when three churches were targeted by suicide car bombs in Kaduna and there were subsequent riot and revenge attacks (*BBC News*, 2012). Even with 20% of the 2012 national budget allotted to defense and security, Boko Haram continued to perpetrate violent attacks, thus increasing the level of insecurity in the country (Copeland, 2013).

4.1.2. Disbandment of the JTF and introduction of exclusive military internal security operation

Violence remained unabated as Boko Haram intensified its attacks while also expanding its range of targets including attacks of market places, schools, military and police formations and foreign targets.Additionally, a splinter group had emerged with the name *Ansaru*(*Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Lands*). The new group, Ansaru,was reported to have been established in the first month of 2012 and seemingly projecteda more transnational or global outlook than Boko Haramalthough it also operatedin northern Nigeria, especially Borno and Kano States (Combating Terrorism, 2013). The splinter group claimed responsibility for an attack on January 12 on a Nigerian detachment enrouteto Mali to support the counterterrorism campaign against jihadist organisations in the northern parts of that country. It also masterminded the prison break at the Special Anti-Robbery Squad command centre in Nigeria's capital, Abuja in November of the same year. The group was equally responsible for the kidnap of foreign hostages with the most prominent being the abduction of 7 foreigners in Bauchi State in February 2013 (*Vanguard*, November 19, 2013).

These incidences and many others involving high level of violenceclearly embarrassed the Nigerian government, giving the impression of a government struggling with legitimacy issues in some areas of the country. The increasing rate of Boko Haram violence and series of embarrassing events that followed thereafter in terms of how the government security forces responded led to another change in strategy to combat the menace posed by the sect. On April 19, 2013, the Nigerian military launched a large-scale assault on Boko Haram bases in Baga, Borno State. About 187 persons were reportedly killed, including a significant number of civilians. The massacre, as the International Crisis Group (2013)

called it, spurred public outcry against the increasingly impulsive and repulsive hard tactics deployed against Boko Haram.

Following the local and international backlash that followed the Baga incident, former President Goodluck Jonathan ordered an investigation into the killings as well as a review of the whole operation against Boko Haram. However, the military issued a statementindicating that most of the dead in the Baga attack were Boko Haram members. On April 3, 2013, Lieutenant General Azubuike Ihejirika, the then Chief of Army Staff, admitted that Boko Haram had become more dangerous in its operations, owing to support from international terrorist groups (ICG, 2013). As if to confirm what the Chief of Army Staff said, Boko Haram, in a coordinated attack in the north east on 7 May, 2013, killed about 55 persons. The group also freed about 150 prisoners in a raid in Bama, Borno State and burnt security service men and government buildings. Six days later, Shekau,the group's leader, posted a video purportedly showing hostages in the custody of Boko Haram.

Following an assessment of the government's counter-insurgency responses to address the protracted Boko Haram violence, a number of measure were adopted by the government to increase the success of its operations against Boko Haram. The first measure taken was to declare another state of emergency, this time, primarily covering the states which the government considered as the main theatres of the conflict. Accordingly, former President Jonathan on 14 May, 2013 invoked Section 305, Sub section 1 of the nation's 1999 Constitution thus pronouncing emergency rule in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States, noting that Boko Haram's activitieshad been unacceptable, instilling fear among the citizenrywhilealso causing a near-collapse of law and order especially in the North:

> The activities of insurgents and terrorists have been reprehensible, causing fear among our citizens and a near-breakdown of law and order in parts of the country, especially the North...It would appear that there is a systematic effort by insurgents and terrorists to destabilise the Nigerian state and our collective resolve. Already, some northern parts of Borno state have been taken over by groups whose allegiance is to different flags and ideologies... Following recent developments in affected states, I hereby declare a State of Emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States (*Vanguard*, 14 May, 2013, p. 4).

However, the latest round of the emergency rule issued by the government threw up a debate about the usefulness of such a strategy at that particular time, or what the real intentions behind it were. While the government had argued that declaring a state of emergency was needed to limit the operability of the insurgent groups and also provide the security forces more powers and space to effectively rein in the activities of the sect, some respondents argued that the decision, especially in states like Adamawa was more or less motivated by political considerations. In Adamawa, respondents argued that at the time the state of emergency was declared, there was little or no significant danger to the state emanating from the actions of Boko Haram in the North East. They further argued that the declaration of state of emergency in Adamawa was a contrived political decision triggered by political disagreements involving the then governor of the state, Murtala Nyako, ruling and opposition parties in the state and some influential politicians in the presidency. One of the respondents said:

> At that material time, there was no threat of Boko Haram in Adamawa. The whole thing was political. There was crisis in the Nyako administration. There was this issue of bringing another group to come and take over the political institution from him. We were reliably informed that Adamawa State was added at the last minute because some politicians were thinking that the President will appoint them as administrators to run the affairs of the state just like Obasanjo did. If you look at it critically, when this state of emergency was declared, no single local government, including Madagali, was under attack by Boko Haram. In fact, Boko Haram at that time did not even occupy Gwoza, not to talk of coming to Mankara, Madagali and all those places. That was why we were suspicious of the declaration of state of emergency in Adamawa (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

Nevertheless, justifying the declaration, former President Goodluck Jonathan noted that the move was not targeted at the political authorities in the affected states but aimed at creating the right environment for security agencies to defeat Boko Haram. Thus, like the December 31, 2011 declaration, the new declaration did not strip political office holders of their authority. They were to remain in office and cooperate fully with the security forces to achieve the objective of restoring peace to the troubled areas. According to the president: "…the governors and other political office holders in the affected states will continue to discharge their constitutional responsibilities…I urge the political leadership in Borno,

Yobe and Adamawa States to co-operate maximally with the Armed Forces and the Police to ensure that the exercise succeeds" (*Vanguard*, 14 May, 2013:4).

Further justifying the declaration, the President noted that the ultimate aim of the group is secession and the creation of a separate Islamic state. According to the president,

> What we are facing is not just militancy or criminality, but a rebellion and insurgency by terrorist groups which pose a very serious threat to national unity and territorial integrity. These terrorists and insurgents seem determined to establish control and authority over parts of our beloved nation and to progressively overwhelm the rest of the country. In many places, they have destroyed the Nigerian flag and other symbols of state authority and in their place, hoisted strange flags suggesting the exercise of alternative sovereignty (*Vanguard*, 14 May, 2013, p. 4)

Consequently, the President ordered the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Ola Ibrahim, to ensure that more security personnel were immediately deployed to the three states to boost the ongoing internal security operations in those states. To further energise the troops, the President directed that all necessary measures should be taken by the troop to the extent permitted by their rules of engagement, to defeat the terrorists and end the scale of violence and impunity perpetrated by them. "All necessary measures" here involved "the authority to arrest and detain suspects, the taking of possession and control of any building or structure used for terrorist purposes, the lock-down of any area of terrorist operation, the conduct of searches, and the apprehension of persons in illegal possession of weapons" (*Vanguard*, 14 May, 2013, p. 4).

The May 2013 declaration of state of emergency was a precursor to the disbandment of the *JTF ORO* and the establishment of a full-fledged military combat force against the terrorist group in the North-East. Nevertheless, the JTF continued to engage with the sect members within the last three months before its mandate expired. In line with the declaration of state of emergency, more troops were moved into the three states to bombard the militants' hideouts. The government imposed a curfew in Maiduguri, a move that enabled the military to conduct massive and brutal air bombardments on several Boko Haram hideouts in the contested areas. A blockade was instituted on Boko Haram's stronghold of Maiduguri as the military sought to re-establish control over territories that had fallen under the group's authority.

By May end, the military had successfully recaptured and secured some areas in the contested zones such as Hausari, New Marte,Krenoa, ChikunNgulalo and Wulgo withall the terrorist camps in the locations destroyed (ICG, 2013). Several other Boko Haram camps were destroyed by government troops with many of Boko Haram members either killed or fleeing from government forces' attacks. Government security forces claimed further successes in the operation. The JTF announced on July 15 that "it had substantially achieved" its aim of destroying Islamist bases in the three states and killing over 90 suspected Boko Haram members, and capturing other members and leaders of the sect. The military also claimed that Shekau, the sect leader, was wounded in a firefight that took place in the Sambisa forest on 30 June and that he likely died afterwardsin Cameroon where he had been covertly smuggled to for medical treatment. However, on 11 August, 2013, Shekau, in a video, denied his death and replacement.

Boko Haram continued its attacks against personnel of the JTF and many other civilian targets. In July2013, Boko Haram leader, Shekau, hadmasterminded attack against public schools. The sect launched multiple attacks against schools in Damaturu and Maiduguri. In addition, about 43 people were killed in Kaga and Kukuwa villages of Borno State in reprisal attacks against civilian JTF, while the group also carried out multiple bombings in Kano on 29 July, 2013 (ICG, 2013). Shekau vowed to continue the war against the government. Violence continued and at least 35 persons were killed in clashes between Boko Haram and security forces in Borno State. According to the ICG (2013), throughout the month of August, Boko Haram targeted members of the JTF with many of them reportedly killed, including 24 security personnel killed in an ambush near Monguno, Borno State.

Following the lingering insurgency and the increasing capacity of Boko Haram to continue to stage deadly attacks, the Defence Headquarters announced On 18 August, 2013that it had disbanded the JTF on counterterrorism in the North-East and announced the establishment of a new Army Division (7Mechanised Division)codenamed "Operation BOYONA" (an acronym that captures the three concerned states – Borno, Yobe and Adamawa) that would take charge of the federal government's drive against Boko Haram effective from 19 August, 2013. It is not exactly clear why the Joint Task Force was dissolved and substituted with the new Army Division. On the one hand, there is the

argument that the establishment of the 7 Mechanised Division was not as a result of fundamental failures on the part of the JTF. Rather, it was borne out of an internal competition among senior military officials who were angling to become the Chief of Army Staff. As it were, Operation BOYONA arguably failed to perform better than its predecessor. On the other, it was also argued that the establishment of the 7 Mechanised Division was informed by the high casualty suffered by the JTF and other local security formationsas a result of unrelenting attacks by the sect. Thus, it was driven by the necessity to rejig the counter-terrorism strategy so as to decisively contain the threat of Boko Haram (Nigeria Army, 2017).

Unlike the JTFwhich comprised military, paramilitary and police personnel, the new outfit was solely under the control of the Nigerian Army signalling the beginning of a full military strategy against the sect members. According to Brigadier General Chris Olukolade, the former Director of Defence Information, the counterterrorism operations against Boko Haram would experience a new approach particularly with the Army Headquarters taking over command of the operations Chris Olukolade further noted,

> A General Officer Commanding (GOC), in the rank of Major General is …to command the new Division which will have its headquarters in Maiduguri. He is…to take over Command and the assets of the headquarters of the Joint Task Force. The new Division is to continue with the conduct of counter-terrorists operations in the Northeast which comes under its Area of Responsibility (Odunsi, 2013: 2).

With the expected changes, the Army assumed total control of the new phase of the counterinsurgency engagement, even though the defence headquarters provided and performed supervisory role. According to General Olukolade the new strategy was part of the overall framework or arrangement developed for the actualisation of the operation to fulfil the directive as elaborated in the May declaration of state of emergency by former president Jonathan. The new outfit began its operations the following day. Operation Boyona had about 10,000 troops drawn mainly from the military forces. On 10 September, 2013, it launched airstrikes on Boko Haram bases in Mada, Borno State. But in retaliation, Boko Haram also attacked the security forces and the local vigilante groups who supported the operations. In the same month, the sect attacked Gajiram village, Borno killing approximately 20 people and between September 25 and 26, the sect killed 27 persons in

separate assaults on communities in Borno State. Two days later, the group attacked a college in Yobe State killing 47 students (ICG, 2013).

Operation BOYONA was succeeded by Operation Zaman Lafiya in August 2013 comprising 10,000 troops largely drawn from the 7 Mechanised Division. Zaman Lafiya was so code-named in Hausa language meaning peaceful coexistence. Its area of responsibility equally covered Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States with its headquarters located in Maiduguri. It operated until 2015 when the counterinsurgency operation in the North East underwent a major shakeup following the assumption of the President Muhammadu Buhari to office. Though the military operation continued in the North East, Boko Haram continued to gain more grounds, attacking civilians and security personnel alike, while capturing large swaths of territories in the region. Of significant note was the April 14, 2014 kidnap of 276 school girls from Government Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State.

The brazen attack and kidnap of the female students including what some analysts considered slow or inaction on the part of government security forces, attracted stern criticisms against the Nigerian government both locally and internationally. Despite the setback against military operations in the region, Former President Jonathan stated during the Paris Summit for Security in Nigeria in May 2014, that not less than 20,000 troops had been deployed for counterterrorism operations in the north-eastern part of the country. In contrast, Amnesty International (2015: 22) was of the view that the actual number of troops was lower than those put forward by the President. Meanwhile, Boko Haram continued violent activities, capturing and controlling about 80,000 square miles of territory (including Sambisa forest) thus creating what could be described as an Islamic enclave for itself.

Table 4.2: Major operations in the North East 2011-2015

Operation	Dates	Area	Forces	Commander	Oversight
Operation Restore Order I (ORO I)	12June 2011– 15 May	Bornos tate, Headq uarters in	Joint Task Force:NigerianAr my,Navy and Airforce, the NigeriaPolice	Brigadier General Jack Okechukwu Nwaogbo (July 2011 - January	Defence Headqua rters

			Force (NPF), Department of StateSecurity(DSS), Nigerian Immigration Service(NIS)and the Defence Intelligence Agency(DIA). Troops included those from1 Division, 81 Battalion,174 battalion, 82 Battalion (4,000 troops)	2012) Major GeneralEwansiha (12 January2012 – May 2013)	
	2013	Maiduguri			
Operation Restore Order III (ORO III)	13 December 2011 – 15 May 2013	Yobe state	Joint Task Force: NigerianArmy, Navy and Airforce, theNigeria Police Force (NPF), Department of StateSecurity (DSS), Nigerian Immigration Service(NIS)and the DefenceIntelligence Agency (DIA). (2,000 troops)		Army Headquarters
Operation BOYONA	May 2013– August 2013	Borno, Yobe Adamawa states, HQ in	Joint Task Force: NigerianArmy, Navy and Airforce, theNigeria Police Force (NPF), Department ofStateSecurity(D	May 2013 – August2013: Major GeneralEwansiha	Defence Headquarters

		Maidu guri	SS), Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS)and the DefenceIntelligence Agency (DIA). (10,000 troops)		
Operation Zaman Lafiya	August 2013– to July 2015	Borno, Yobe Adamawa states, HQ in Maiduguri	Newly established ArmyDivision 7 (10,000 troops)	Major General Ethan(August 2013- January 2014) Major GeneralBindawa (January – February 2014) Major GeneralMohammed (February – May2014) Brigadier GeneralIbrahim (May 2014-19 January 2015) Major GeneralLamidi Adeosun (19January 2015– July 2015)	Army Headquarters

Gleaned from *Amnesty International* (2015: 21) with little modification by the author

Government military strategy against Boko Haram remained largely inconsistent in terms of the management of the Boko Haram sectarian violence. For Falade (2013), it has remained difficult to fully understand why several approaches to conflict management are

going into effect in a controversial and uncoordinated manner. For example, while declaring an emergency rule in the three critical states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, the president also stated that the civilian political authorities will remain. It was unclear the extent to which the armed forces would be able to operate and continue a military assault against Boko Haram without inhibitions from the civilian political authorities in the affected states.

4.1.3. Emergence of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and their acceptance as a component of the counterterrorism strategy

The Civilian Joint Task Force in communities of the North East could be viewed as a child of necessity. Their involvement in the anti-Boko Haram campaign and the subsequent acknowledgement and acceptance by the military and other government officials was not initially part of government's strategy to combat the sect's activities. However, as the counterinsurgency operation progressed, the CJTF increasingly became part and parcel of government's overall strategy to identify, contain and defeat Boko Haram. It started in Maiduguri, Borno State. It is not exactly clear when the group earnestly began its activities. However, it is believed that it emerged in 2013 after emergency rule had been declared. The group was initially known as the Volunteer Young Vigilance Group (VYVG) but their name later changed to Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). As their name implied, they were viewed as constituting the civilian version of the JTF of cooperating security agencies comprising the military, police, DSS and others. However, the official name of the group in Borno State is Borno Youth for Peace and Justice. This is reflected in the statement of a respondent:

> When we came out, people decided to call us Civilian JTF because at that time, we had military joint security agents task force including army, police, customs…they use to call them joint task force. But when we came out, people decided to give us the name Civilian Joint Task. But we have our official name we registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission which is Borno Youth for Peace and Justice. This is our official name (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

The CJTF whose members include hunters, farmers, village jesters, wood carvers, graduates and even princes and religious leaders emerged out of the difficult security situation they found their community and the need to assist and liberate the various villages

and towns from the fangs of Boko Haram. The group members had gauged the efforts of the Nigerian military and other security forces in dealing with Boko Haram and came to the conclusion that the efforts were inadequate and that the soldiers especially, were more or less unfamiliar with the people and the localities and evidently were incapable of easily identifying the rebels and terrorists hiding within the communities. The local peoplehad observed, helplessly, how Boko Haram butchered, killed and maimed their family members and loved ones and how persistent assaults by the terror group and highhandedness of the law enforcements conspired to suppress, emasculate and vanquish families, friends, peers, colleagues and associates. The community members had endured long periods of destruction, devastation and elimination of the local people and had witnessed their lands falling under the control of the terror group.

According to some respondents, their communities were not only under attack from Boko Haram, they also suffered in the hands of government security force. The presence of the security forces and their perceived excessiveness in terms of harassment and profiling of community members constituted source of frustration and grievances for the local population. Though the community members knew who the Boko Haram members were, it was difficult initially, to pass such information to the security forces as what they considered to be a patriotic endeavour inadvertently, always came back to haunt community members. A respondent stated:

> What really happened is that after the 2009 violence, community members identified Boko Haram members and gave information to the police. But if they are arrested by the police, within one, two or three weeks, they are released. The next thing, Boko Haram members will come and accuse you of passing the information to the police. You will be killed. Their members will openly go from house to house identifying informants and killing them and their relatives. It got to a point that you will be in a keke maruwa and people will be discussing Boko Haram and you are afraid to talk because the driver or even passengers could be a member of Boko Haram. If you say anything bad about them, that night they will come to your house and openly kill you and your family members and destroy your house. We know them; the military are strangers but we cannot point them out because of fear. So the military felt that the people were not cooperating. Hence, when an attack occurs, the military will not differentiate between Boko Haram and non-Boko Haram members. They will waste everybody (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Provoked by the experience, the peoplepurposed to confront the terror sect and voluntarilyjoinedthe anti-Boko Haramfight to save themselves and the local towns and villages. "The people said enough was enough; we know them (Boko Haram), they are our brothers, we are living in the same neighbourhood. You know who is in and who is not in. Then we started grabbing them again and bringing them directly to the authorities; we transfer them to the military. This was how the civilian JTF emerged (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016). The State Coordinator of the CJTF in Borno State, Abba-Aji Kalli further provided a brief background on how the group decided to take their destiny in their hands and defend their communities and how members were enlisted into the group,

> We were not safe in the hands of Boko Haram; we were not safe in the hands of the security forces. There were attacks and bomb blasts by Boko Haram. Again, if the military came here, they will arrest everybody, they will kill… That was how we said enough is enough. So we came out to assist the people. We decided to gather all the leaders, Chief Imams, the ward leaders and elders, including the youths. Anybody that wanted to volunteer will join; then we will decide who will be their leader (at the ward level). We will administer oath because we cannot control large crowd without guidelines. First, you will swear that you will not implicate any innocent person due to grudges between you and him. Second, even if it is a family member, father or your relations whatsoever, if he is involved (with Boko Haram), you will bring him out to the authority. Then thirdly, you will not use this avenue to extort or take somebody's property. If you are a Muslim, you will swear by the Quran, if you are a Christian, by the Bible because Christians and Muslims are together in this movement (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

The initial reaction of the security agencies, especially the military, was hostile and unpleasant. On several occasions, the military denounced the vigilantes and their activities noting that it as capable of defeating the sect members without the assistance of such locals. Arguably, it was a matter of the military being suspicious of the real intentions of members of the group and the likelihood that Boko Haram may have infiltrated their ranks. In one of such instances, when Boko Haram attacked Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri, the CJTF volunteers decided to mobilise and render assistance to the army. Ibekwe (2016) noted that the presence of the CJTF at Giwa Barracks, the location where the attack occurred demonstrated the fear and suspicion of the military against the vigilantes as an

organised group. It was observed that the encounter was brutal as soldiers held members of the group with mistrust and as apologists of the Boko Haram belligerents who attacked them. They were asked to lie down and roll of the ground before given to the opportunity to explain their mission.

A top military commander attested to the frosty relations that existed between the military and the civilian JTF at the early stage when he said:

> During the time of the Joint task Force, there was a lot of misunderstanding between the military and the civil populace. Civil-military relation then was absolutely at its lowest ebb; and then the populace and even some of the organised groups did not feel comfortable with the military approach in solving the problem. That created some form of schism between the military and the people…then the military felt that every other person, because of the pronouncement (state of emergency) at the time, that anybody you see along the street is likely a Boko Haram member. It was until they themselves rose up to be distinguished. They formed themselves into a vigilante to support the military to identify those who are the problem. That actually was a game changer (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Indeed, it was a game changer. Their successes and acts of bravery, including in the area of intelligence gathering and grounded understanding of the local terrain equally launched them as a potential ally of the military in the counterterrorism warfare. The military had accepted them as a strong ally for geo-recognisance duty, intelligence and information gathering and in the area of winning the support of local people which according to Brigadier General Rabe Abubakar, constituted "very vital components in fighting insurgency or terrorism the world over" (Interview, Abuja,13 August, 2016). There were equally, several reports of the civilian JTF repelling Boko Haram attacks across several communities in Borno State, mounting roadblocks, engaging in stop and search operations and liberating territories under Boko Haram control. The positive contribution of the group made the Borno State government to officially recognise them and assisting them with the vital logistic and financial backing.

Accordingly, the concept of the Civilian JTF proliferated and was adopted by many other communities in several parts of the North East and with similar effect. Ibekwe (2016) observed that their task appears to have known no restriction. They performed a number of

security roles as manning checkpoints, provided informant duties to agents of the state helping them to identify Boko Haram Terrorists hiding in the communities. They equally helped in exposing the hideouts of the sect members, while also participating actively in field battlesagainst the insurgents alongside soldiers. The CJTF also helped in rescue operation and liberation of locals and communities seized by Boko Haram. Abba-Aji Kalli, stated that: "we are proud to say ...we secured the city of Maiduguri first; we pushed them (Boko Haram) out. Even, there are places that the military cannot move in but our men are moving in (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016). Similarly, another respondent observed that "there would have been total collapse of law and order. The vigilante and their security helped in stabilizing the situation in the remote area" (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

4.1.4. Metamorphosis of Boko Haram and the recalibration of government's conflict management strategy

Arguably, Boko Haram, at inception, was not officially considered a terrorist organisation either by the Nigerian government or by the international community. It was more or less viewed as a sectarian group with radical, militant or insurgent tendencies. As observed by Falode (2016), Boko Haram, before 2010, had no clear-cutstrategy or plan on how to accomplish its goals in the north-eastern. Consequently, it employed, intermittently, irregular, bush-fighting approach widely known as guerrilla tactics where it perpetrated hit-and-run attacks on the local populations in Borno and environs. The types of weapons that were utilised by the sect at the time were essentially elementary and unsophisticated involving machetes, knives,swords, clubs,Dane guns and Molotov cocktails. Members of the sect carried out sporadic shootings from motorcycles which were aimed at both security personnel and civilian targets before retreating into their hideouts (Human Rights Watch 2012).

However, the group's re-emergence in the last quarter of 2010 saw a change in tactics and weaponry as it began to employ more lethal weapons such as bombs and IEDs (improvised explosive devices) on carefully selected strategic targets. Boko Haram later included the deployment of suicide bombers in its tactics which manifested in its vehicle-mounted suicide attack on the UN building in Abuja in 2011. Walker (2012) claimed that that

particular incident launched Boko Haram as an international terrorist organisation considering the weapons used and the finesse with which the attack was conducted.

Boko Haram now has in its arsenal very sophisticated weapons which it has used to wreak havoc in the North-East. Falode (2016) identifies some of these weapons to include surface-to air- missiles, rocket propelled grenades, vehicle-mounted machine guns, automatic rifles, semtex (high quality explosives) and the now regular grenades and AK-47 rifles amongst others. In addition, the groups tactics became more refined and technologically advanced, both in terms of its reaction to increased counterterrorism efforts by the military and in abid to stimulate or stoke religious crisis. From sporadic shootings in late 2009, Boko Haram began using IEDs which feature prominently, particularly during the period just before the 2011 elections (Crisis Group, 2014: 16). Subsequently, Boko Haram included vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) in its arsenal. According to Falode (2016), these vehicles were usually filled with huge numbers of explosive-laden cylinders with an impressive blast radius. It also began to get financial, training and other logistical support from international terrorist organisations and sympathisers such as Al Qaeda and Al-Shabaab (Onuoha, 2014).

In addition, Boko Haram included effective utilisation of the internet in its strategy for effective propagation of its ideology and also in order to reach a wider audience with its messages. YouTube, in particular, became an effective tool in showcasing its exploits and confrontations with the Nigerian government and security force. By and large, Boko Haram had effectively metamorphosed from a mere local insurgent group to a national and even transnational terrorist organisation adopting terrorist strategies that includedsuicide-bombings, beheadings, kidnappings and a number of other criminal activities like bank robbery while developing, arguably, a very impressive internet-based propaganda, recruitment and terrorist financing strategies.

Consequently, the Nigerian government decided to recalibrate its anti-Boko Haram strategy to meet the new reality. The government decided to enact legislations that directly address issues of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria. Although the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011 (TPA) is viewed as the first major legislation to deal with issues of terrorism in Nigeria, a particular provision of the 2004 Economic and Financial Crimes and other related matter Commission (EFCC) Act had been relied upon by the government in trying

terrorism-related cases. Specifically, Section 15 of the EFCC Act penalises anyone who renders support to terrorism whether financial or any other support. Kabiru Sokoto, the mastermind of 2011 Christmas Day suicide car bombing of St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla, Niger State, which left about 44 people dead, was tried and convicted by an Abuja High Court under that particular section of the EFCC Act. Section 15 (20 of the EFCC Act (2004) states that "Any person who commits or attempts to commit a terrorist act or participates in or facilitates the commission of a terrorist act, commits an offence under this Act and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life."

Nevertheless, the TPA, 2011 is the first major piece of legislation that directly addresses terrorism in Nigeria. The Act was enacted by the National Assembly on June3, 2011. Section 1(2) of the act defines "act of terrorism" to mean "an act which is deliberately done with malice,aforethought and which:

a) May seriously harm or damage a country or an international organisation;
b) Is intended or can reasonably be regarded as having been intended to—
  i. Unduly compel a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act;
  ii. Seriously intimidate a population;
  iii. Seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation; or
  iv. Otherwise influence such government or international organisation by intimidation or coercion; and

c) Involves or causes, as the case may be—
  i. An attack upon a person's life which may cause serious bodily harm or death;
  ii. Kidnapping of a person;
  iii. Destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property, likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; etc.

d) An act or omission in or outside Nigeria which constitutes an office within the scope of acounter terrorism protocols and conventions duly ratified by Nigeria.

The Act in Section 2 also barred organisations where individuals associate for the purpose of or where the group involvesin—(a) participatingor collaborating in an act of terrorism; (b) promoting, encouraging or exhorting others to commit an act of terrorism; or(c) setting up or pursuing acts of terrorism.Section 2 sub-section 3(i) states that "a person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation commits an offenceunder this Act and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of 20 years". The Act makes provision for punishment for anyone who belongs to a terrorist organisation; supports terrorism; harbours terrorists; provides training for terrorists' withholds information about acts of terrorism or obstructs terrorism investigation amongst other crimes of terrorism. Penalties for acts of terrorism are contained in Section 33 of the Act which stipulates that:

(1) Subject to subsection (3) of this section a person who commits penalties,an offence under this Act is liable on conviction—
(a) In the case of an offence under sections 1 and 10 of this Act, to life imprisonment or to afine of not less than 150 million Naira or both;
(b) In the case of an offence under sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12 and 14 to an imprisonment for aterm of not less than 3 years and not exceeding 20 years;
(c) In the case of an offence under sections 6 and 7, to an imprisonment for a term of not lessthan 2 years and not exceeding 15 years;
(d) In the case of an offence under sections 25 and 29 to a fine not exceeding N1,000,000.00 oran imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or both; and
(e) Where death results from any terrorist act, the penalty shall be life imprisonment.
(2) The court before which a person is convicted of an offence under this Act may, in addition toany penalty imposed by the court, order the forfeiture of.

The 2011 Terrorism Prevention Act did not have the desired effect as expected. According to a respondent "the Act did not make certain stringent provision that will take care of the menace of terrorism because as at the time the National Assembly passed the 2011 Act, I'm sure they themselves—members of the National Assembly—and indeed Nigerians, did not really appreciate the gravity of the threats being posed by terrorists and terrorism, particularly, the activities of Boko Haram" (Interview, Abuja, 16 August, 2016). Thus, to give a more robust legal support and proper organisation of anti-terrorism efforts, the

government reviewed the 2011 Act, made adjustments and improvements which were reflected in the enactment of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2013, Amendment. The 2013 Amendment Act provides for a more comprehensive and far-reaching application of the 2011 Act and toughens the penalties against offenses deemed as constituting terrorist financing.

While Sections 1, 12, 14, 15, 22, 32, 36, 37-38 and 40 of the 2011 Act were amended, substitutions were made for Sections 3-8, 10, 13, 25, 26-29 and 33. Sections 11, 16 and17, 31 and 34 were deleted from the Act.The TPA, 2013 provides for the Principal Act that "all acts of terrorism and financing of terrorism are hereby prohibited, and a person or body corporate who knowingly in or outside Nigeria directly or indirectly willingly

(a) does, attempts or threatens any act of terrorism,

(b) commits an act preparatory to or in furtherance of an act of terrorism,

(c) omits to do anything that is reasonably necessary to prevent an act of terrorism,

(d) assists or facilitates the activities of persons engaged in an act of terrorism or is anaccessory to any offence under this Act,

(e) participates as an accomplice in or contributes to the commission of any act of terrorism or offences under this Act,

(f) assists, facilitates, organises or directs the activities of persons or organisations engaged in any act of terrorism,

(g) is an accessory to any act of terrorism, or

(h) incites, promises or induces any other person by any means whatsoever to commit any act of terrorism or any of the offences referred to in this Act, commits an offence under this Act and is liable on conviction to maximum of death sentence.

The 2013 Terrorism Prevention Act recommends the death penalty for insurgents and terrorists. Among its other provisions is the stipulation that suspected terrorist hideouts, enclaves and other properties associated with such should be destroyed. The Amendment Act provides for a far-reaching and more stringent punishment for acts of terrorism in Nigeria while also providing better coordination of the counterterrorism activities of the government domiciled in the office of the National Security Adviser.

The Terrorism Prevention Act was immediately followed by the development of a National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) in 2014 which was later revised in 2016. NACTEST was developed in view of the devastating causes and effects of terrorism. As stated in the foreword of NACTEST (2016), game-changing terrorist incidences such as the June 2011 police headquarter bombing and August 28, 2011 attack on the UN building; the 25 February 2014 Buni Yadi killings and the 14 April 2014 Chibok girls abduction necessitated the need for a well-articulated policy approach to terrorism. NACTEST was largely viewed as major policy plank in terms of Nigeria's strategic approach to threats posed by Boko Haram. The policy document focuses on a comprehensive engagement on how to dislocate, dismantle and defeat terrorism in general in Nigeria.

In terms of response to terrorism, the National Counterterrorism Strategy NACTEST) is structured on five major pillars (work streams) with each having critical goals and indicators for success. These five work streams are:

a. Forestall: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism

b. Secure; strengthen protection capacity against terrorist attacks

c. Identify: preemption through detection, early warning and ensuring that terrorist acts are properly investigated

d. Prepare: to mitigate the impact of terrorist attacks by building resilience and redundancies to ensure continuity of business

e. Implement: a framework for the mobilisation of coordinated cross government efforts.

The NACTEST policy framework highlights the priorities of the government in terms of the focus on protecting and providing security for the citizens as well as denying terrorists and those who sponsor them favourable conditions or a breeding ground to plan their terrorist agenda. Furthermore, the implementation of the policy also imposes tasks on the security agencies, government and non-governmental organisations and all other relevant stakeholders. The policy was aimed at achieving an effective, proportionate, transparent, collaborative, proactive and flexible response to terrorism in Nigeria.

4.1.5. Regional arrangements and other international cooperation on countering Boko Haram Terrorism

The transnational nature of Boko Haram extremism necessitated the need for a regional and international security arrangement to contain the operations of the insurgents. The group had not only demonstrated that it had become one of the biggest security problems facing Nigeria, its activities had spread and also impacted neighbouring countries especially those around the Lake Chad basin including Cameroon, Chad and Niger. In 2015, it was declared the most dangerous terrorist organisation ahead of ISIS and al Qaeda and responsible for a total of 6,664 deaths ahead of ISIS' 6,073 (*The New York Times,* November 18, 2015). Boko Haram transnational reach could be explained from the Boko Haram's expansion in terms of recruitment, training, equipment and financing from beyond Nigeria as well as its targeted cross-border/transnational attacks. Onuoha (2014) provided rich details on the above areas of Boko Haram internationalism; how the group recruit and train followers from countries of the Lake Chad, Sahel and North African regions; its robust association with FTOs (foreign terrorist organisations) like Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) winning for Boko Haram special trainings in weapons and tactical and so on.

Beyond these, countries around the Lake Chad felt the vicious impact of Boko Haram. A *NewswatchReport* (June2014: 18) claimed that the group ran atransnational recruitment network, training and indoctrination sites in places like the Ridina and Zango districts of Ndjamena, Chad; Garoua and Maroua areas of Cameroon; Maina Soro, Maradi and Diffa in Niger Republic and other cells in Central African Republic. Boko Haram organised direct attacks in Cameroon, Chad and Niger kidnapping foreigners for ransom and killing locals and foreigners alike. It increased its attacks against these countries and foreign nationals living there when the countries appeared to counter its activities in their territories and international interests. Countries in the Lake Chadarea also served as some of the main stages of planning cross-border attacks against Nigeria and constituted a safe haven for Boko Haram members fleeing military onslaught in Nigeria. Boko Haram cross-border attacks and other activities revealed that while the insurgency was initially Nigeria-based, it hadspread into the neighbouring countries also becoming a source of insecurity in those countries. The upsetting development therefore requiredthe initiation of a swift and effective strategy to curtail and manage the group's transnational activities (Interview, Abuja, 13August, 2016).

Thus, considering Boko Haram's threat to its interests in Central and West Africa, made very public by the abduction of a French family in the northern parts of Cameroon, France organised the Paris Summit on security where African leaders including leaders of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger were invited. Representatives of the United Kingdom and United States Governments and those of the European Union were equally present. Strategies to deal with terror and terrorist organisations in Central and West Africa, particularly Boko Haram, were discussed. Among the decisions taken at the Paris Summitwas the needfor improved bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation especially in the area of intelligence sharing and coordination ofanti-Boko Haram actions.They also agreed on a plan for proper monitoringof shared borders. Another aspect of the various initiatives agreed upon to contain the activities of Boko Haram and similar terror groups involved mobilisingfinancial aid to assist victims of terror activities in the affected communities especially womenand girls (Onuoha, 2014).

The Nigerian government had during the Paris Summit and beyond emphasised on the view that international cooperation and collective action would be needed to combat Boko Haram if the threat it poses to Nigeria, the Lake Chad region and beyond would be effectively dealt with. Not long after, the call metamorphosed into regional commitment to cooperate in ending the scourge of Boko Haram. At a special meeting of the member states of Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)and Benin on October 7, 2014 which took place in Niamey, Niger, the leaders agreed to establish a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) as a primarily militaryforce to confront and defeat Boko Haram and other similar groups that have caused instability and sufferingin the Lake Chad area due to their terrorist activities. The agreement and the full activation of the MNJTF received the approval of the Peace and Security Council (PSC)of the African Union on November 25, 2014. However, the first deployment of the MNJTF took place on January 29, 2015 following authorisation by the PSC. It lasted for a period of 12-months until the mandate of the force was renewed on January 14, 2016 which authorised it to operate for another 12 months.

N'Djamena, Chad's capital was chosen to serve as the MNJTF operational headquarters with the force personnel comprising of troops contributedmy member countries. The headquarters served as the command and control center of the force from where the military actions of the troop-contributing nations were coordinated. Furthermore, though

the MNJTF was an initiative of the LCBC comprising six member states, only four of the member countries—Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger, joined by cooperating/non-binding partner, Benin Republic made up the MNJTF. Thus, Assanvo; Abatanand Sawadogo (2016) describe the MNJTF as an alliance of nations that was created to oppose a mutual menace.

The MNJTF has a broad mandate that covers both military and humanitarian roles. Militarily, it has a mandate to conduct military offensive against Boko Haram with the objective of preventing the group's expansion to new territories, assisting to shrink its operating areas, curtailing or limiting their free movement and eradicating and tightening their access to weapons and logistics across shared borders. The MNJTF also has the humanitarian task to assist in the search for, and rescue of all those adducted by Boko Haram including the Chibok secondary school girls who were kidnapped in 2014. It was equally encouraged to perform certain psychological activities that would encourage split and defections within the ranks of Boko Haram (African Union Report, 2015). The MNJTF plays specific media, information, intelligence, propaganda and human rights support roles.

The force functions in such a way that allows each contributing nation to deploy her own troops, as a matter of priority, within her territorial boundaries that potentially or have been infested by Boko Haram terror activities.However, these operations are carried out in an organised manner within the identifiable sectors delineated by the leadership of the force. Four of such sectors exist: sector 1, with the command located in Mora (Cameroon); sector 2, located in the town of Baga-Sola (Chad); sector 3, based in Baga (Nigeria); and sector 4, based in the town of Diffa (south-east Niger) (Assanvo; Abatan and Sawadogo, 2016: 3). While it is the case that each nation's troop operates within the country's borders as area of priority, it is not illegal or unusual for such national contingent to venture into border areas of a neighbouring country so long as the operation is carried out in line with established rules and regulations guiding such extra-territorial actions particularly the one that stipulates that such engagement must occur within a perimeter not exceeding 25km. According to Brigadier General Rabe Abubakar,

> We call it freedom of operation and action by each of these
> countries. For instance, a Chadian can come to the Nigerian
> territory, operate by fighting Boko Haram and go back. So also,
> Nigerians can go to Cameroon, fight Boko Haram, pursue them
> there and relocate back. They operate to keep a holistic, or

contribute in giving a formidable defence to the entire region against Boko Haram (Interview, Abuja, 13August, 2016).

Nevertheless, the right of hot pursuit, as it is called, appears to have operated within the region by the MNJTF more or less on a on a bilateral ground between member countries rather than what contains in the legal documents establishing the body which grants freedom of hot pursuit not exceeding 25km into the territory of a neighbouring state (Interview, Maiduguri, December 28, 2016). Since January 2015, the Multinational force has been actively engaged in the counterterrorism activitiesto defeat Boko Haram from a regional perspective and helping to ensure that the sect does not find safe haven in or around any of the countries in the Lake Chad area. However, in January 2015, shortly after inception, themultinational force headquarters in Baga, Nigeria, came under heavy attack and was overrun by Boko Haram whose members went ahead to massacre innocent civilians in Baga and destroyed the town. It is noted that this particular incident moved the LCBC leadership to embark on sweeping changes in the MNJTF, leading to the relocation of the headquarters from Baga, Nigeria, to Ndjamena in Chad. The decision including that to increase the number of troops led to improvement in the activities of the body (Kodjo, 2015). The effectiveness and level of success of the MNJTF would be discussed subsequently.

In line with the outcome of the Paris Summit, the United Kingdom and United States equally provided some form of assistance/cooperation to the Nigerian government in terms of intelligence gathering. Both countries alongside France contributed considerably to the effectiveness of the External Intelligence Response Unit (EIRU) on terrorism that was formed in June 2014 between Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad as component of the Paris Summit agreements. The EIRU has served as a comprehensive hub of information and for harmonising and smooth sharing of intelligence gathered by the various cooperating countries. According to Onuoha (2014), the EIRU has the potential of enabling countries involved to formulate or develop efficient security response to the menace of Boko Haram. The Western countries also contributed other forms of military and non-military assistance to the counterterrorism war on Boko Haram. They provided support in the search and rescue operations for the kidnapped Chibok school girls, while also assisting with training on counterterrorism operations for the Nigerian security force.

4.1.6. Addressing systemic problems in the North East region

The Nigerian government appeared to recognise that the focus on military and other coercive actions will not address Boko Haram terrorism, and that sometimes, the deployment of coercive apparatuses of the state could only help to exacerbate the situation and further alienate the people and even turn them against the political leadership.Accordingly, the government made efforts to address some of the systemic and structural problems that either gave rise to Boko Haram insurgency or that stoked the embers of the crisis. Government put in place measures to address some of the shortcomings in education, healthcare, economic opportunities, and other vital social infrastructure that are present in the North East.

The government of former President Goodluck Jonathan identified lack/poor education as one of the major causes for the security breach in the North. In the North East, and indeed, many other parts of Northern Nigeria, street kids, several of whom are 'almajiri'[1], constitute portion of an enormous mass of illiterates and poor that populate the region. Many of the local kids, some teenagers and adults, largely depend onalms begging, providing casual labour or engaging in petty crime for survival. Most of these children and youths are illiterate with few learning opportunitieswhich would have helped them to mingle and function productively in a developedsociety. Hansen (2016) argued that the under-privileged and pathetic economic situation that these children and young people have found themselves make them easy targets for extremist, fundamentalist and criminal groups like Boko Haram to be able to recruit, brainwash and deploy them for criminal and terrorist acts. He further argued that the underclass of chronically emasculated, poor, famished, illiterate and underdeveloped social stratum that produces these local kids and young adults is the direct result of the failure of a parasitic, predatory political leadership to deliver good governance and sustainable development to the people.

However, field investigation showed that Boko Haram members and sympathisers not only emerged from the down-trodden and poor, but also from amongst the wealthy and elite class. Children from rich families are equally foot soldiers and financiers of the sect. Some of them had been caught in the past without remorse and puncturing the claim that extreme socio-economic condition is a push factor in terrorism recruitment. The case of

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[1]*almajiri*are mainly boys, some as young as four or five years, from economically impoverished homes. Some of them are also from very rich families. These children are sent by their parents as apprentice to Islamic teachers in urban areas.

Abdulmutallab Farouk who tried to detonate a bomb on a United States-bound airplane on December 25, 2009 comes to mind. Farouk was one of the children of Umaru Mutallab, a former chairman of First Bank of Nigeria and one of Nigeria's wealthiest men. Ibrahim Uwais, the son of Mohammed Uwais, former Chief Justice of Nigeria, was also alleged to have left his family to join the Islamic State in Syria. Furthermore, on October 4 2013, Ismaila Gambo, 21 years old supporter of Boko Haram and his 17 years old sister Khadija from a wealthy family in Maiduguri were arrested by security forces before they could carry out their planned terrorist attacks. Many more children of wealthy and influential Nigerians have been implicated in Boko Haram terrorism (see for example, *Premium Times,* July 4, 2015).

Nevertheless, a study on youth radicalization in the northern Nigeria conducted by CLEEN Foundation (2014) equally concluded that economic and social issues were the main factors that trigger radicalization mostly among youths. Five of their main conclusions included:

i. Ignorance of *true* religious teachings (most important);

ii. Unemployment and poverty (very important);

iii. Poor parental upbringing (important);

iv. High levels of illiteracy (important);

v. The *alleged* excesses of the security agencies are NOT important as contributory factor to radicalization among youths.

According to Umar (2013), the government's recognition of the problem of illiteracy (especially in relation to almajiri) asan important factor in the emergence of the Boko Haram terrorismled it to establish learning centres to eliminate the "almajiri" challenge and cutBoko Haramaccess to easy preys and recruits. This research argues that Umar's position is questionable as evidence-based researches are yet to conclude on exactly the specific role that Almajiris have played in Boko Haram terrorism; although Umar suggested that financial inducement and indoctrination have converted some of these Almajiris into Boko Haram suicide bombers and foot soldiers in its conflict against the Nigerian state.

Yet, the government considered and initiated a formal education programme in parts of the north. It planned to establish almajiri learning centres in different areas in the 19 states of the North to provide a combination of western and Koranic, Islamic education to the Almajiris estimated to be around nine million in the country. The idea emanated from

variety of symposia, conferences and seminars held on finding effective and enduring solutions to the "almajiri" syndrome. At the various events, researchers and analysts identified the threat it posed and also made suggestions on possible solutions to the issue (Umar, 2013). Although this initiative was laudable, it did not take into deep consideration what would be the fate of the Almajiris after they might have been educated or trained. There were no specific provisions for employment or economic empowerment that would have meant that they were properly economically or productively engaged and effectively taken out of the streets which the programme intended to achieve.

Government's conviction was that the "almajiri" school project would help not only to remove Almajiris from the street, but also help to combat the problem of poor education of youths in the north, which it believed was a foremost source of insecurity in the North East.The novel school programme initiated by the Jonathan governmenthad the objective of incorporating the almajiri children into the formal education system hoping to help them acquire the necessary skills and education that will lead to their all-round economic, social and political development. Furthermore, the proposed schools were designed to be furnished with all the necessary leaning facilities including provisions to have boarding facilities. One of the pilot centres was formally commissioned by the government in Sokoto State, an area many kilometres away from the main theatres of conflict in the North East, somewhat making a mockery of the whole plan (Kura and Mohammed, 2012). According to Abubakar (2013), the government planned to build over 125 almajiri schools in the country, 80 of which were already completed.

The administration of President Buhari appeared to have bought into the idea of combating illiteracy in the North East. As noted by Nigeria's Vice President, Yemi Osinbajo, poverty, illiteracy, disease and other of such infirmities are both triggers and exacerbating factors of the Boko Haram crisis. These constitute some of the challenges that the government intended to combat through the interventions of PINE, Victim Support Group and other initiatives (cited in Abdullahi, 2015: 164).

From the above reference, it shows that besides the setting up almajiri schools to cater for problems of illiteracy, Nigerian government also instituted a number of other measures to address socio-economic and development challenges in the North East considered as key drivers of radicalisation and insurgency. The Victim Support Fund (VSF) was launched in

2014 by former President Goodluck Jonathan to support victims of the destruction and carnage caused by Boko Haram actions in the North East and help in addressing some socio-economic problems of the region. In launching the programme, the Federal Government set aside 30 million dollars to endow the fund while it called on private individuals and organisations to support the fund. The VSF has among other mandates:

- Economic empowerment for victims of terrorism, especially women
- Educational support for terror-affected and displaced children
- Psychological support for people affected by terrorism
- Facilitation of foster programming for children orphaned by terrorism
- Critical assessment of state of insurgency in Nigeria, and,
- Socio-economic analysis of the impact of insurgency on the victims

The VSF could be considered as part of a comprehensive strategy by the government to ensure that people affected by Boko Haram terrorism are not only assisted on humanitarian grounds, but to see that the disenchanted ones within them do not become target for recruitment by the sect. One respondent referred to this initiative as part of the *smart power* tactics; a form of psychological operation or winning hearts and mind (Interview, Abuja, 18 August, 2016).

Similar to the Victim Support Fund, the North East Regional Initiative (NERI) and the Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE) were also inaugurated by the government. Particularly, PINE was established in 2015 as a comprehensive initiative on post-conflict peacebuilding in the region. Sometimes referred to as *The Buhari Plan,* PINE is considered an encompassing framework that serves as the overarching policy strategy to coordinate and supervise all humanitarian initiatives, peacebuilding and other developmental efforts at rebuilding destroyed communities and restoring normalcy to the North East. Besides providing immediate support to victims of Boko Haram terrorism, these bodies were also designed to address structural and systemic challenges in the area including infrastructural improvement, revitalization of the agricultural and health sectors, educational transformation and engendering and delivering good governance. Others include safety and security enhancement, promotion of entrepreneurship and job creation for youth and women empowerment.

In October 2016, President Buhari established the Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI) headed by Theophilus Danjuma to serve as the highest coordinating agency for the various reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes in the zone—both the interventions sponsored by the government and private sectors including those of local and foreign development bodies in the rebuilding of the region. The PCNI was to operate within a period of three years following which its mandate would be subsumed under a long-term regional development framework or entity in the form of the North East Development Commission.

However, field investigation showed that these development intervention bodies hardly carried out any meaningful form of reconstruction projects in the North East. Mainly, what these bodies were able to do was to distribute food, medical items and other emergency relief supplies to victims of the terrorism and insurgency largely through the instrumentality of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the state versions known as State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA)[2]. Major rebuilding exercises were yet to actually commence in the North East. According to a respondent, internally displaced victims of Boko Haram terrorism were yet to actually go back to the hinterlands which were severely ravaged by the sect. He stated that,

> If we are even talking of rebuilding, it is not possible because people have not gone back to those places out of that fear that the areas are still not free of Boko Haram attacks. Where you have a situation where people have not moved back, how can you be talking of rebuilding those places? And people are not even thinking of going back to those places because the fear is still there that Boko Haram will come back (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

The few areas where rebuilding works were carried were largely in places closer to metropolitan areas such as Hong and Gombi in Adamawa State. These were places that were very close to Yola, the capital city. Largely, there remained a palpable fear that many communities and villages thought to have been recovered by the Nigerian military were not totally safe yet for reconstruction work as some of them were again being lost to the Boko Haram terrorists. This assertion is further corroborated by the statement of a prominent politician in North, Buba Galadima who argued that at least, seven out of the 27 LGAs in

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[2]Adamawa, it is known as Adamawa State Emergency Agency (ADSEMA), In Yobe, it is called Yobe State Emergency Agency (YOSEMA) while it is known as BOSEMA in Borno State.

Borno State were not functioning as they were still being controlled by the terrorist group (cited in Premium Times, 22 September, 2017).

Nevertheless, it was in line with the goal of addressing systemic problems and developing the North East region that a bill for establishing the North East Development Commission (NEDC) was passed by the National Assembly in October 2016 (Interview, Abuja, 16 August, 2016).The government considered economic reconstruction a critical and urgent issue in the region. The economic (re)development of the NorthEasts was viewed as one of the key issues that the Nigerian governmentconsidered crucial not just to achieve better balanced growth and development of the region, but aimed at reducing the likelihood of future insurgencies and terrorism.The NEDC was set up mainly to drive socio-economic development in the region including promotingthe economic growth and wellbeing of the local population, security,infrastructure, education and agriculture. The NEDC appears to have issues with taking off and is yet to properly kick-off any form of socio-economic development intervention in the North East.

4.1.7. The dialogue option and amnesty proposal

While pursuing the confrontational conflict management approaches, the Nigerian government, at the same time, made an offer to engage in a strategic dialogue with Boko Haram. Overtures towards dialogue between the government and the Boko Haram group first emanated from within Boko Haram. In early 2011 a member of the group claiming to be a spokesman called the BBC (Hausa service). He said that if the government was to give back the group's mosques in Maiduguri and Bauchi and allow its members to worship in peace, the group would give up its arms. However, shortly afterward, the BBC Hausa Servicecontacted one "Abu Dujana", a member of the sect countered that the drive for reconciliation did not emanate from the core of the group but perhaps from the more moderate members of the sect. Abu Dujana later stated that there had been an internal purge of the group and that "internal divisions have been eliminated" most likely, meaning that the dissenting voices had been killed or eliminated (Walker, 2012: 11).

Similarly, in September 2011, former President OlusegunObasanjo, with the assistance of Senator ShehuSani, attempted to facilitate dialogue and reconciliation between Boko Haram members and the Federal Government through Mohammed Yusuf's brother-in-law, Babakura Alhaji Fugu.Soon after Obasanjo met with Yusuf's brother, gunmen

invadedFugu's house and shot him dead. It was suspected that uncompromising members of the sect killed him even though Boko Haram denied the killing. Again, in January 2012 a group claiming to be a moderate breakaway faction of Boko Haram sent a recording to the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), saying it was ready to negotiate. Four days later,a number people were publicly beheaded in Maiduguri by suspected members of Boko Haram. Walker also considers these two events to be linked: "When Boko Haram kills their own, they behead them, and reports of beheadings seem to go up when there are talks of negotiation" (2012: 12).

However, there were feelers that the possibility of dialoguing with Boko Haram existed. Consequently, the government, in January 2012, announced it was initiating peace talks with "representatives" of the group through political "back channels" and Datti Ahmad was appointed as Chief Mediator (Copeland, 2013: 6). Two months later, Ahmad announced that he was resigning his role, a decision that negatively impacted the proposed dialogue. But the government was given a green light again about the possibility of the group submitting for negotiation when in November 2012 a spokesperson for Boko Haram, Abu Mohammed IbnAbdulaziz, extended an offer for peace talks during a phone interview with journalists in Maiduguri. Abdulaziz provided five conditions for the talks: negotiations must be held in Saudi Arabia; MuhammaduBuhari, Nigeria's former military ruler must arbitrate discussions; Ali Modu Sheriff, the former governor of Borno who was responsible for the fatal enforcement of the motorcycle helmet law in 2009 must be arrested; members of Boko Haram must receive compensation for the death of family members and facilities, including mosques, destroyed by the state must be rebuilt; finally, jailed sect members must be released.Elaborating on the sect's goals, Abdulaziz said,

> We are not actually challenging the state, as people are saying, but the security (forces) who are killing our members, children and wives…We want to engage in dialogue but government must show sincerity in its handling of the situation (cited in Copeland, 2013: 7).

In response to the purported offering, former President Jonathan stated, "If what the proposed ceasefire is intended to achieve are the objectives of peace and security, then it is a welcome development" (Copeland, 2013: 7). Nevertheless, there were uncertainty about Boko Haram'sorganisation and whether Abdulaziz had the authority to speakfor Shekau

and the sect's leadership even though he claimed to have replaced the group's previous spokesperson, Abu Qaqa, who was killed by security forces in September 2012. Although government was opened to negotiating with the sect, before it could react to Abdulaziz' conditions for negotiation, Buhari rejected the offer to serve as mediator, seeking to distance himself from the group's Islamic radicalism.This cast serious doubts on whether a peace process was possible.

Meanwhile, a number of Nigerians equally called on the Federal Government not just to initiate dialogue with the group but to seriously consider granting Boko Haram amnesty similar to what obtained in the Niger Delta in 2009. They believed that amnesty for the group's members could serve the same effect as the one granted to the Niger Delta militants. Of particular note was the call by the Sultan of Sokoto,Alhaji Muhammad Abubakar III, in March 2013, that the Federal Government should grant total amnesty to the Boko Haram group, stating that,considering the effect of the 2009 Presidential Amnesty deal for militants in Nigeria's oil belt of the Niger Delta, granting the sect presidential pardon would guarantee peace and encourage the sect to lay down their arms.Prominent Christian leaders such as Cardinal John Onaiyekan, Bishop Mathew Kukah, and Pastor Paul Unongo also backed the call (Mudashir, 2013).

The Niger Delta militants were up-in-arms against oil infrastructure in the region which they saw as an instrument of exploitation by the Federal Government that gave very little back to the people. After a prolonged war in the creeks between the militants and the security agencies, with its attendant debilitating effect on the nation's economy, President Yar'Adua intervened with the amnesty offer to the militants. The idea was for them to lay down their arms in return for a pardon as well as human and infrastructural development of the Niger Delta.The amnesty programme was viewed as a game-changer which allowed militants and other agitators in the region to come out of their shells to state their grievances against the Nigerian state and what needed to be done to placate those grievances in return for peace in the region.

However, the government initially rejected calls for amnesty forBoko Haram members, arguing that Boko Haram had no face and its leaders were "ghosts" whose demands were not actually known. Nevertheless, in consideration of the success of the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta and the willingness to do whatever it would take to ensure

peace in the North East, former President Jonathan decided to set up the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North East to explore the possibility of granting amnesty to members of Boko Haram (Interview, Abuja, 7 October 2016). The PresidentialCommitteecomprised senior political, religious and military representatives tasked with considering the feasibility of granting amnesty to Boko Haram members and recommending modalities for implementing such a step. The group was inaugurated in April, 2013 and had a 90-day period to come up with its recommendations. The period was extended by two months to enable the committee do a thorough job.

The move by the government to grant amnesty to Boko Haram members became one of the most controversial issues in the country. Though it got the backing of influential political and religious personalities, it was also met with a barrage of condemnation from Nigerians. For example, the leader of pan-Yoruba socio-cultural group, Afenifere, Reuben Fasoranti, described the call for amnesty to Boko Haram as unfortunate and highly outrageous. He argued that the position in Afenifere is that the Boko Haram members are evil. They should be identified and severely dealt with according to the laws of the land (Jaiyeola, 2013). Similarly, arespondent, Akin Folarin told*This Day* newspaper that:

> Boko Haram members are faceless terrorists and should be treated as such. The federal government should do everything possible to wipe them out by bringing those behind the terror acts against the state to book. The issue of granting them amnesty must not arise in the interest of peace among Nigerians (cited in Jaiyeola, 2013: 3).

The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) also rejected the amnesty deal for Boko Haram members, stating that it was akin to wasting tax payer money. According to CAN former president, Pastor Oritsejafor, "…amnesty plan is to divert the attention of reasonable Nigerians and the world from the cruelty of Boko Haram to Christians" (*Nigeria Monitor*, 2013: 6).While it is true that Christians were targeted by the sect, especially at the early period of the crisis, field investigation showed that Muslims and sacred Islamic places such as Mosques, palaces, business and homes of Muslim religious leaders were equally not spared by Boko Haram attackers. In his assessment of Boko Haram violence in the North-East, Abdullahi (2015) also agreed that even the sacred spaces such as Mosques were not spared. Accordingly, CAN could have argued against amnesty for the sect

members because of its mass atrocities against innocent Nigerians rather than focusing on Christians alone as victims.

Meanwhile, Boko Haram steadfastly rebuffed the dialogue offer. The leader of the sect, AbubakarShekau, in an audio recording, rejected the proposed amnesty, saying that the group had done nothing to warrant it. Instead, he argued, it was the government that needed to be pardoned (Mudashir, 2013). Whatever the case, the Presidential Committee continued to explore the possibility of reaching amnesty agreement with key Boko Haram members. It tried to do this by dialoguing with some Boko Haram members who are currently in custody of security agencies. The committee submitted its report to the government on 5 November, 2013 recommending, among other things, the setting up of advisory committee that will continue on dialogue. It also recommended the setting up of a Victim Support Fund for victims of the crisis to be administered by a new agency established specifically to assist the victims. However, the president ruled out compensation, saying that government would find a way to assist the thousands of victims of the insurgency.

Dialoguing with Boko Haram remained an option for the government. Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari noted that the government had not ruled out the dialogue option but there was the need to identify the right leadership of the group. According to Buhari, "the government…is prepared to talk to bonafide leaders of Boko Haram. If they do not want to talk to us directly, let them pick an internationally recognised Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO)…then Nigeria will be prepared to discuss…" (*Point Blank News*, August 28, 2016). The President equally noted that ""the split in the insurgent group is not helping matters. Government had reached out, ready to negotiate, but it became difficult to identify credible leaders" (*Savid News*, September 22, 2016).

In line with government's strategy of dialogue and strategic appeasement, the Nigerian army in 2016 extended an olive branch to members of Boko Haram requesting them to surrender in return for pardon and rehabilitation. In response, over 800 Boko Haram fighters voluntarily surrendered in exchange for pardon (Interview, Abuja, 13 August, 2016). A considerable number of them equally surrendered to the Multinational Joint Task Force in Diffa, Niger Republic. The army established a rehabilitation camp for the former Boko Haram militants in Gombe State where they will be properly rehabilitated before being reintegrated into the society. This approach was initiated to go with what the former

Theatre Commander of Operation *Lafiya Dole* Major General Lucky Irabor referred to *smart power* or the *carrot and stick* approach. While Boko Haram insurgents who willingly surrendered will be granted pardon, others who remained recalcitrant will be dealt with using military force (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December 2016).

4.1.8. Media and propaganda strategies

In the context of insurgency and terrorism, insurgents and terrorists generally use propaganda and the media a lot in trying to mobilise support for their dastardly activities. Margaret Thatcher, former British Prime Minister, once cautioned in the 1980s that "democratic nations must try to find ways to starve terrorists and other hijackers of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend" (Apple, 1985, not paged). Terrorists, the world over strive on information. In the same vein, Boko Haram effectively utilised the media and other forms of propaganda in propagating its ideology, recruitment, propagandizing its successes against the Nigerian security forces and spreading fear and perceived inability of the government to protect its citizens. Thus, the government, apart from using the military and other response strategies, also had to organise its media and propaganda infrastructure and counter-radicalization strategies to provide a counter-narrative on Boko Haram ideology and terrorism.

The effectiveness of Boko Haram media strategy including the mix-messaging resulting from uncoordinated views given by different persons and agencies concerned with government's antiterrorism efforts led to the establishment of the National Information Centre (NIC) in 2014. NIC became necessary as a result of contrasting and often embarrassing information on the war against Boko Haram emanating, especially, from the military, the police, the DSS and from the information unit of the Presidency. According to the focal person on counterterrorism strategy at the National Orientation Agency (NOA), concerning government antiterrorism information,

> …where the military will give a version that will seem somewhat different from what the Police will give. At a point in the early days of Boko Haram, a top military officer will tell you that "we went there and blasted the whole thing and only four casualties on the Army side and sixty on the other side". Meanwhile, the reverse is the case. The police will come and give a different account on the same story; the Navy will come, a different story. These are the things this platform is trying to address now" (Interview, Abuja, 18

August, 2016).

In a way, the National Information Centre was a consequence of another strategic policy move initiated by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) which in December 2013 created a Presidential Communication, Command and Control Centre (PC4). The PC4 was more or less a control point for crisis management that would enable the president/government to effectively respond to disaster and other security challenges in the country. Besides providing the president with real-time communication by audio and video data communication between and within stakeholders, the PC4 equally incorporated and trained security agencies and other relevant stakeholders on roles and responsibilities, strategic policy and direction, dealing with dilemmas, and strategic level decision making in crisis management.

The drive for effective and efficient information management equally led to the establishment of the National Information Centre, a platform made up of representatives of the military, the Police, DSS, Ministries of Information and Foreign Affairs, NOA and the Public Affairs unit of the Presidency. It was coordinated by the NOA under the supervision of the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). The main task of the centre was to ensure proper coordination and dissemination of information on the fight against Boko Haram. Basically, it was a strategic information platform where information on government's efforts on Boko Haram would be received and processed before being projected to the public. The focal person on counterterrorism strategy at the National Orientation Agency (NOA) added in respect to the reason for establishing the NIC and the need for an effective government response to Boko Haram media and propaganda activities,

> If Boko Haram media strategy was not strong enough, there wouldn't have been any need to set up a counter-strategy. Boko Haram still possesses a strong media unit through which they release videos, their narratives and so on. And government needed to effectively respond with a strong information strategy (Interview, Abuja, 18 August, 2016).

The work of the NIC was not only to counter Boko Haram video releases and news, but also to effectively counter their narrative too. Respondents observed that Boko Haram story lines were totally different and misleading and equally effective on the targeted audience. Hence, there was the need for government's media strategy to counter Boko Haram's

psychological operation. The NIC played a critical role in matters of communication, creation of new narratives, informing citizens verbally and helping to change public attitudes and perception towards government efforts in combating Boko Haram terrorism.

The National Information Centre was ultimately incorporated as an aspect of government's media strategy in a more comprehensive framework for de-radicalization and countering violent extremism (CVE) instituted by the government under the Office of the National Security Adviser. The National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST, 2016) elaborates more on the new framework for government's counterterrorism and de-radicalization programmes. The strategy envisaged a multi-stakeholder response to terrorism involving security agencies, government ministries, departments and agencies and also the media, traditional and religious leaders amongst others.

Government's grand approach on de-radicalization encompasses dealing with both the non-violent and violent phase of radicalization. The former involved harnessing national resources in addressing structural problems of poverty, unemployment and other socio-economic challenges that are intricately linked with radicalisation. The strategy also involved countering contentious narratives or malevolent ideological preaching of religious leaders, monitoring the teachings of radical ideologues as well as predicting and dealing with areas of possible fusions in terms of cultural affiliations which were considered as gateways or entry points to radicalization. It also involved monitoring of border communities for incoming radical ideologies and dealing with such ideologies. Dealing with the violent phase involved counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, possible amnesty for die-hard and non-die-hard that are willing to surrender non-violently, addressing issues of human rights and elimination or incapacitation of violent and unrepentant extremists.

Government initiated programmes to reinforce peacebuilding and conflict transformation. These efforts covered training of youths, women, traditional leaders and religious rulers. It was also within this framework that government enlisted the support of religious leaders in the North East to change radical ideological narratives, especially, those of Islam. It should be noted however, that even before official collaboration with the government, traditional and religious leaders in the theatres of conflict made remarkable efforts at building bridges and dousing tensions between people of various faiths through inter-religious committees

advocacy and sensitization campaigns.

When Boko Haram insurgency began, the overwhelming perception was that it was a religious conflict with Christians constituting the primary target. This was largely because of the way the conflict manifested at the early stage. Besides targeting security personnel, it was common occurrence that churches and Christians were roundly attacked by members of the sect. Boko Haram attacks gave the impression that it was a religious fight between Muslims and Christians. Cases were regularly cited on how public transport vehicles were stopped on the way and Muslims separated from Christians. While the former were spared, the latter were killed (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Nevertheless, Muslims leaders were equally among the first set of people to rise up to repudiate and denounce the activities of the sect as non-representative of the Islamic faith. This is reflected in the submission by the CAN Chairman, Borno State, Bishop Naga William Mohammed who stated that:

> …but later on, we discovered that there were some elements who were just trying to ferment trouble between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. So the Muslims were the first people to begin to agitate that this is not Islam. They now sold the idea to us and we discovered that they were saying the truth and now, we come together to fight our common course (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

The above assertion is consistent with the observation of CAN and Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN) Chairman in Adamawa State, Bishop Mike Moses, who stated also that:

> Initially, we thought it was just these normal religious clashes between Muslims and Christians. But after one or two years, we discovered that Boko Haram is a terrorist organisation. And you know, terrorists, they don't look at who is a Muslim and who is a Christian. They have burnt churches and mosques; killed Christians and Muslims.no matter how they tried to depict it, it still boils to the fact that they are terrorists (Interview, Yola, December 26, 2016).

It was with this mutual understanding of what Boko Haram represents that religious leaders from divide decided to set up and utilise inter-religious committees to sensitise their members on the need for peaceful coexistence between Christians and Muslims. The medium equally became very useful in preventing reprisal attacks against members of the other religion. In Adamawa, the state chapter of Nigeria Inter-religious Council (NIREC)

played this crucial role in ensuring that individuals and communities did not turn against each other in the form of accusations and counter accusations. With respect to the efforts of NIREC, the CAN/PFN Chairman of Adamawa added,

> NIREC is not only about awareness campaign; we also solved issue that could have even gone to court. You know this Boko Haram thing. We have solved issues that could have marred the peace; because if you stop at the level of awareness, NIREC wouldn't have been effective. That is why we also had to work out modalities to reconcile, especially, those communities that the people accused themselves after the attack. It was common to hear one say we saw him killing this person, and the others will say we saw them, they are the ones. That was the time we now came in (Interview, Yola, December 26, 2016).

The government keyed into the activities of the various inter-faith committees/councils to pursue the strategy of countering the narratives of Boko Haram ideology and other malevolent ideological narratives. Members of various Presidential committees on the North East including security agencies such as the military, police and the DSS regularly interfaced with religious leaders on preventing inter-religious clashes, monitoring and regulating the activities of radical preachers/teachers. According to Sheik Goni Mohammad Sa'adu Ngamdu, the North East Coordinator of Jama'atuNasir Islam (JNI), the government sought the help of religious leaders in addressing the problem of radical preaching by Muslim preachers. According to the Sheik,

> We have developed sermons that have to do with peacebuilding. For the Muslims, they are used by our Islamic preachers during pre-Juma'at. That is, before the Imam will come out, the preachers will preach that sermon. The sermon contains tolerance, honesty, cooperation among Muslims and good neighbourliness with non-Muslims. The idea is to imbibe these values in our followers. We also established the Peace Corps in our Islamiyya schools in order to catch the children and youths at the early stage. We successfully developed a book on sermon to help the young to understand the negative narratives of Boko Haram. With the help of our sermons, we have helped in countering those negative narratives (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Messages drawn from verses of the Quran were often used to preach peace, non-violence and respect for human rights. Efforts were also made to provide proper interpretations to the Quran so as not to justify the activities of Boko Haram. Examples included portions of Quran 5: 32 which states that "If anyone slays a person – *unless it be for murder or for*

spreading mischief in the land – it would be as if he slew all people. And if anyone saves a life, it would be as if he saved the life of all people (Emphasis mine). Muslim clerics and leaders made commendable efforts towards providing counter narratives to Boko Haram use of the highlighted portion of the text in their argument that Allah permits the killing of non-Muslims and infidels especially for "corruption in the earth/land" (See 5: 33). According to Sheik Goni, through these sermons, Muslim clerics emphasised the message that it was Allah's universal proclamation that all human life is highly valuable and that the murder of one person would be as terrible a crime as the murder of all humankind (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

While the government also focused on countering violent extremism and de-radicalization programmes, especially at the non-violent stage, it was observed in the study locations that most of the efforts in this regard were either sponsored by international development organisations and non-governmental organisations, and the various state governments. Organisations such as the National Reconciliation and Stabilisation programme (NRSP), Department for International Development (DFID) and International Civil Society Action Network (ICSAN) played crucial peacebuilding and de-radicalization role in Borno State. One of the main objectives was to prevent the young ones from being influenced by radical preachers into adoption of extreme religious views.

In particular, a shortwave radio network known as Dandal Kura Radio International played important role in peacebuilding activities in the North East and entire Lake Chad area. It was a Kanuri-language radio station which broadcasted from Maiduguri. Dandal Kura means "meeting place" in Kanuri. The station not only provided reliable information and promoted counter-radicalization, but also, interesting programmes that encouraged dialogue between individuals and groups. The station usually invited counsellors, including Muslim, Christian and traditional leaders to talk victims through their trauma, and sued for reconciliation between opposing parties including former Boko Haram members who had cut ties with the sect. It also ran popular radio programmes and dramas, written and acted out by local people, sometimes featuring former members of Boko Haram and their relatives (such as *Yaro K3jiwo*) which was used to promote morality, non-violence and peaceful coexistence.

Dandal Kura's programmes and drama series had become one of the most listened to in the

area while a significant number of the local population thought favourably of its peacebuilding programmes. According to a commentator, hearing these real life stories, including stories of reconciliation, and nonviolent ways to resolve disputes, had a positive impact. "Perhaps even more importantly, people who listen to Dandal Kura tend to be less likely to believe that violence is a means to an end in North Eastern Nigeria, than those who don't listen to Dandal Kura" (Magistad, 2017: not paged).

It was a general view that ignorance of the right teachings of Islamic religion constituted a factor that influencedacceptance of extreme religious views by young people across various communities in Borno State. In fact, the state governor, Kashim Shettima, alluded to this when he averred that,

> Distorted translation of the Holy Book by the insurgents landed us in this mess. If we have had good understanding of Islam, we would have been in a better place. There is no room for extremism in Islam. We need to go back to Islam as practised by Prophet Muhammad,when Islam encouraged Muslims, Jews, and Christians to live in peace with one another (cited in Omonobiand Marama, 2014).

One practical way in which Muslims and Christians promoted peaceful coexistence – a story that resonated across the various responses from the field – was the solidarity, support and the coming together of Muslims and Christians to protect each other and build their communities. Especially, during the height of the crisis, it was common to see Christians being protected in a Muslim-dominated community and vice versa. In places like Maiduguri and Yola, in outright defiance against Boko Haram ideology, Muslim leaders and followers attended Sunday church services as a show of faith and tolerance and provided protection for the worshipers. Also in Christian dominated areas often known as "Jerusalem", some respondents recounted how Christians shielded Muslims from any possible attack during the weekly Friday congregational prayers in the mosques (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

In Adamawa, Christian and Muslims leaders came together to establish the Adamawa Peace Council through which they agreed to jointly build community peace and harmony. To actualise this, they embarked on joint projects including public forums to encourage dialogue and douse religious tensions in the society, literacy and enlightenment programmes in the community, inter-faith, social and economic programmes, and

community scholarships for indigenous students. The activities of the Adamawa Peace Council was said to have contributed to keeping the peace in various communities in Adamawa State (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

4.1.9. Buhari administration and the reinvigoration of the military operation against Boko Haram

The inauguration of the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari provided a fillip to the counterterrorism war on Boko Haram, especially the military operation. The President had, during his inaugural speech on May 29, 2015, ordered the Nigerian military authority to move its Command and Control Centre to Maiduguri, Borno State and to remain there until Boko Haram was completely subdued:

> Insecurity, pervasive corruption, the hitherto unending and seemingly impossible fuel and power shortages are the immediate concerns…The most immediate is Boko Haram's insurgency. Progress has been made in recent weeks by our security forces but victory cannot be achieved by basing the Command and Control Centre in Abuja. The command centre will be relocated to Maiduguri and remain until Boko Haram is completely subdued (*Vanguard,* 29 May, 2015).

The idea was that victory against the sect cannot be achieved by basing the command and control of the military in Abuja, Nigeria's capital. Accordingly, the Service Chiefs held a meeting with the President where the commitment was renewed to ensure Boko Haram was defeated. President Buhari had promised that the military and other security agencies would be provided with the necessary assistance to ensure that the war on Boko Haram was successful.

Furthermore, the president, in the first few months of the administration in 2015, made strategic diplomatic visit to Niger (June 3), Chad (June 4), Cameroon (July 29) and Benin Republic (August 1)—all members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. The shuttle diplomacy to the various LCBC countries was to discuss ways of forging stronger regional offensive against Boko Haram terrorists whose activities resulted to massive security challenges in the Lake Chad region. The President also visited Germany on June 6 to attend the G-7 meeting, while also paying state visits to the United States (July 19) and France (September 4) among other things to discuss the threat of Boko Haram and how to tackle the insurgency.

With regard to the MNJTF, President Buhari pledged that Nigeria would provide $100 million to boost the operations of the regional fighting force against Boko Haram. The sum of $21 million was provided in June to the MNJTF in addition to about $80 million provided in servicing the operations of the multinational force (Interview, Abuja, 13 August, 2016). Changes were equally made in the structure of the organisation. President Buhari successfully argued during a meeting with the LCBC countries that Nigeria should be allowed to control the force throughout the period of the war on Boko Haram. He equally argued that the six months duration for change of the command and control structure of the MNJTF should be jettisoned. The argument was that "military operations that are subjected to a rapid turnover of command and control structures…do not augur well for effectiveness and efficiency" (Ehikioya, 2015). Furthermore, it was argued that such a process will undermine, even if it not intended, the military capacity to sustain the push against the insurgents, who also have the uncanny ability to adapt and rejig their operational strategies.

Accordingly, members of the MNJTF had agreed to increase troop contributions as well as greater cooperation and coordination of collaboration efforts in the fight against Boko Haram. In essence, the outcome of the meeting was an arrangement where the other members decided to contribute more troops while Nigeria provided funds for the operation.

In line with President Buhari's directive, the military, on June 8, 2015, announced the establishment of Military Command and Control Centre (MCCC) in Maiduguri from where Operation Zaman Lafiya against Boko Haram terrorism, which began in August 2013, will be monitored, coordinated and controlled. The MCCC was to serve as the forward command base of the Chief of Army Staff and other Service Chiefs. The military authorities also announced that an alternate command centres will be set up in Yola and Damaturu, the capital cities of Adamawa and Yobe States also considered as part of the main theatre of Boko Haram terrorism.

A lot of misconception had followed the "relocation" of the military high command to the North-East. It should be noted that the movement of MCCC to the theatre of the Boko Haram conflict did not imply that the command structure of the military changed or that the Chief of Defence Staff and other Service Chiefs had to move their offices to Maiduguri to partake in the on-going operation. The directive was more or less to ensure that the military

leadership had greater presence in the North-East to ensure adequate attention was given to the operation. The implication was that, it became easier for the military leadership to acquire first-hand information about the challenges of the troops and what needed to be done to meet the military objective. In the words of Group Captain Ayodele Famuyiwa, Director of Public Relations and Information of the Nigerian Air Force,

> The Command structure has not changed. The recent directive was not ensure that the leadership was more present in the North East. From time to you find the Chief of the Air Staff going to the North-East and looking out for what is it that we need, what is the next phase of the operation, how have we succeeded in this and all that. But it does not mean that the Nigerian Air Force, as you have it, have moved in to the North-East. No! It's just getting the attention of top leadership so that at every point in time you…have a feeler of what is happening. You know what the challenges of the troops are, you know what to do. It is about not just sitting down in one's comfort zone and then you expect that something is going to be happening there. You are part and parcel of what is happening there, and it helps to give effect to the operation (Interview, Abuja, 18 August, 2016).

Subsequently, after the movement of the military high command to Maiduguri, Operation Zaman Lafiya was replaced with *Operation Lafiya Dole* on July 19, 2015 by the new Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai. *Lafiya Dole,* derived from Hausa language which translates to "peace by force" was launched to reflect the new impetus and determination of the military under the Buhari administration to fast-track the war on Boko Haram. Excerpts from Buratai's speech at the announcement of the new operation in Konduga, Borno State summarises this impetus:

> It is the wish of the Federal Government to end this terrorism quickly in this part of the country…Operation Lafiya Dole is derived from the belief that we must end this insecurity. We must restore peace to all parts of the North-East... We are going to carry this as a war…"As the insurgents have refused to understand and come to the right way we must force them to make sure that peace return…(*The Pointer,* (online news) July 19, 2015).

Operation Lafiya Dole is headed by a Theatre Commander with the rank of Major General in charge of the Theatre Command Headquarters in Maimalari, Maiduguri, Borno State. The Theatre Command is the military command and control centre for the comprehensive military operation against Boko Haram. The Commander superintends over all the

components responsible for Operation Lafiya Dole comprising land, air and sea components. The land component comprised the 3rd, 7th and 8th Army Divisions while the air components were the 103 Strike Group and the 105 Composite Group (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Operation Lafiya Dole could be described as a military offensive involving the full deployment of force to contain and defeat the Boko Haram terrorists. As the name implied, it amounted to total war against Boko Haram where the military took the fight to the terrorists in their safe havens and territories under their control. Within months, the military had killed a considerable number of Boko Haram terrorists, captured many others and reclaimed several territories in the North East which were hitherto under the control of Boko Haram. Many villages, communities and towns were liberated, while several civilians who were abducted were equally rescued during the operation. Between June 2015 and July 2016, the military reported rescued over 10,000 persons trapped or kidnapped by Boko Haram terrorists (Interview, Abuja, 13 August, 2016).

The military strategy had successfully decimated the terrorist causing them to retreat into their stronghold of Sambisa forest and environs. Seeing that Boko Haram was already haemorrhaging, the military decided to wave the olive branch to those who would willingly surrender. As stated earlier, a number of Boko Haram members surrendered in return for pardon and rehabilitation. In May 2016, the military launched "Operation Crackdown." This was more or less an operation within Operation Lafiya Dole. Operation Crackdown was a mop up operation against Boko Haram terrorists who had fled into Sambisa forest. The operation was to ensure that what remained of Boko Haram was completely incapacitated and degraded since the terrorists did not heed the voice of wisdom to come out in return for pardon (Interview, Abuja, 13 August, 2016). The Nigerian Armed Forces deployed both ground and aerial personnel in what was termed a "final onslaught" against Boko Haram to clear the remnants of the terrorists' enclave as well as rescue hostages still under the control of the group including the Chibok girls whose abduction led to an international outrage and condemnation against Boko Haram.

Meanwhile, the commitment extracted from cooperating countries of the MNJTF had started paying off. The other countries increased strict monitoring of their borders so that Boko Haram did not have the opportunity of spilling over into their countries. In essence,

the Multinational Joint Task Force helped in securing key borders to prevent Boko Haram from gaining access to those countries. This strategy pushed the terrorists back into Nigerian territories where the Nigerian forces were conducting an operation against them.

Similarly, it was within this context that the Multinational Joint Task Force launched Operation Gama Aiki (operation complete the job) in June 2016 as a follow up to Operation Crackdown with the aim of taking out Boko Haram terrorists in northern Borno around the troubled areas that bordered Chad and Niger Republic. The effectiveness of Operation Crackdown had resulted in massive movement of Boko Haram Terrorists escaping from Sambisa forest towards northern Borno State border with Niger and Lake Chad Islands. According to a respondent,Operation Gama Aiki was a concerted effort by the Multinational Joint Task Force to clear all remnants of Boko Haram Terrorists in its general Area of Responsibility (AOR). He further claimed that the operation was aimed at ensuring that the terrorists are prevented from establishing another sanctuaries and hideouts in the Lake Chad region (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016). OperationGama Aiki involved not only the MNJTF troops, but also the national air and ground forces from member countries of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republics.

Accordingly, the Air components of Operation Lafiya Dole as well as the Nigerian Air Force intensified air operations against Boko Haram terrorists. Between June and December 2016, the Air Forced released several video footages showing Boko Haram members fleeing areas of the Sambisa forests as a result of the military offensive. The Nigerian Air Force had noted that there was the need to block the insurgents in northern parts of Borno while the military close in on them from the south encasing them within the area for final assault.

Considerable number of operational success was recorded by Operation Gama Aiki. According to the Chief Military Public Information Officer of MNJTF, Col. Muhammad Dole, villages and communities such as Doran Nairi, Faide-Jimba, Yebi-Tasugia, Yebi-Jemi, Alli Kanori, Yebi Tumanba, Alagarno and Doron-Naira in Sector 3 (Nigeria) were cleared of the terrorists. While, areas including Littri, Madayi and some villages on the Lake Chad Island along Sector 2 axis (Chad) initially considered as Boko Haram strongholds were successfully cleared too (cited in Metro Watch, June 22, 2016). During the operation, the MNJTF troops were also able to capture 31 terrorists, while large

quantity of equipment and cache of arms and ammunition belonging to the terrorists were either captured or destroyed. Among the equipment captured by the MNJTFwere 1 x Hilux mounted with Shilka gun with 97 rounds of 21mm (AA), 14 x AK 47 rifles, 4 x RPG Bombs, 6 x Mortar Bombs, 2 x GPMG rifles, 1 x HK 24 MG, 1 x AKM MG and 8 x Bandoliers (Ibid).

Table 4.3: Timeline of some military successes recorded against Boko Haram

Date	Operation	Location	Outcome
19 November, 2014	Zaman Lafiya (Op No Mercy)	Adamawa	Military recaptured Gombi, Pelia and Hong communities. Boko Haram terrorists captured, many others killed, weapons and equipment recovered
3 February, 2015	Zaman Lafiya	Adamawa	Coordinator of National Information Centre, Mike Omeri announces that military has recaptured ten towns including Hong, Mubi North, Mubi South, Michika, Shuwa, Wuro Gyambi, Gombi, Vimtim, Uba and Bazza in Adamawa State.
10 March, 2015	Zaman Lafiya	Borno	Military recaptured Bama town
March 2015	Zaman Lafiya	Yobe	Two key LGAs (Gujba and Gulani) retaken from Boko Haram. Goniri, the last major stronghold of the group recaptured on March 16.
24 September, 2015	Lafiya Dole	Borno	Troops captured Banki town; destroyed 7 Boko Haram camps; several Boko Haram terrorist killed while others were captured alive between Banki Junction and Ngorosoye.
24 February, 2016	Troops of 7 Division/Cameroonian forces	Banki-Kumshe border towns	23 Boko Haram terrorists killed; 150 hostages (mainly children) rescued; 4 AK 47 rifles destroyed; a gun truck mounted with an Anti-Aircraft Gun (AA Gun), 2 AK 47 rifles, a 60mm mortar and a Dane gun captured.
12 March, 2016	Lafiya Dole (113 Battalion)	Borno	40 Boko Haram terrorists killed; the group's Alajeri camp in Guzamala LGA destroyed; 1 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), 1 Rocket Propelled Grenade 7 (RPG 7), 6 AK-47 rifles, 2 Fabrique Nationale rifles, 10 magazines, 188 rounds

			of 7.62mm (NATO) ammunition, 64 rounds of 7.62mm (Special) ammunition, 3 mobile phones, 6 copies of Holy Quran and 20 Motorcycles were captured.
March 2016	Lafiya Dole in conjunction with Cameroonian forces	Nigeria-Cameroon border town of Kumshe, Borno	Kumshe was liberated; 24 armed terrorists killed, one truck mounted with an anti-aircraft gun, two AK47 rifles as well as 60 mm mortars were recovered.
23 March, 2016	Lafiya Dole (Troops of 22 Brigade in conjunction with the Armed Forces Special Forces (AFSF) battalion and Army Headquarters Strike Group (AHQ SG))	Borno	Kala-Balge Local Government Area liberated
18-28 March, 2016	Lafiya Dole (Troop of 3 and 7 Divisions, Air component of NAF)	Borno	Boko Haram spiritual headquarters, Alargano Forest, captured; villages in the fringes of the forest: Yajiwa, Joba, Mosa, Ariwuzumari, Missene, Sansan and Kagalmari also cleared of the terrorists.
4 April, 2016	Troops of 22 Brigade Garrison, Army Headquarters Strike Group (AHQ SG) accompanied by some Civilian JTF	Boboshe, Garna, Kyare, Kadawu, Gineba and Ajiri, Borno State	15 Boko Haram terrorists killed, 6 captured and 275 hostages rescued.
4 June, 2016	Lafiya Dole (troops of 22 Brigade Garrison, and 153 Task Force Battalion of 7 Division and 8 Task Force Division, Nigeria Air Force Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) and some Civilian JTF)	Muskari, Gilam, Hausari and Chukungu du, Borno State.	Troops killed 19 Boko Haram terrorists including an Ameer, Abubakar Gana. IEDs making factory destroyed while 2 Anti-Aircraft Guns, 1 AK-47 Rifle, a Pistol, 1 Rocket Propelled Gun (RPG) Bomb, 1 AK-47 Magazine, 267 rounds of 7.62mm (NATO) metal links ammunition, 23 rounds of 12.7mm belt ammunition, a Canter truck, 1 Gun truck, 1 Land Rover vehicle and a Toyota Hilux vehicle were recovered.
28 July, 2016	Troop of Sector 4, MNJTF (located in Diffa, Niger)	Damasak, Borno State	Damasak is liberated from Boko Haram; surrounding villages including Sure equally cleared of the terrorists.

		(border town between Nigeria and Niger)	
6 November, 2016	Lafiya Dole (3 Battalion of 22 Brigade)	Borno	Troops rescued 85 Boko Haram captives (mostly women and children) in Chukungudu; wiped out the terrorists' camps in Geram, Bulankassa and Chukungudu; neutralised five Boko Haram terrorist fighters; recovered four rounds of Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) bombs, one double barrel gun, 349 packets containing various rounds of ammunition, three magazines, a link belt of machine gun ammunition and one AK-47 rifle magazine; recovered an IED making factory at Geram, three vehicles and several motorcycles.
23 December, 2016	Lafiya Dole	Sambisa Forest, Borno	Nigerian army captures Boko Haram's "last enclave" in Sambisa forest
14 March, 2017	Lafiya Dole (112 Task Force Battalion, 22 Task Force Brigade)	Borno State	Troops liberated 455 persons held hostage by Boko Haram during clearance operation to clear remaining suspected Boko Haram hideouts in Artano, Saduguma, Duve, Bordo, Kala, Bok, Magan, Misherde, Ahisari, Gilgil, Mika, Hiwa, Kutila and Shirawa settlements in Kala-Balge Local Government Area. Bok, Misherde, Mika and Kutila in Kala Balge were also cleared.
31 August, 2017	Nigerian Army/Air Force (possibly under Op. Lafiya Dole)	North East (not specific)	Top Boko Haram commanders (Abu Dujana, Man Tahiru (Deputy to Boko Haram terrorist group Hisba leader), Man Chari, Malam Abdullahi Abu Sa'ad and Goni Bamanga) and many of their foot soldiers were killed.

Source: Compiled by the author from multiple sources

On December 24, President Buhari announced that the military operation succeeded in crushing Boko Haram terrorists in their last enclave in Sambisa Forest. The military equally issued a statement that a large number of Boko Haram members including their leader, Abubakar Shekau had fled to Kala-Balge, an area near Cameroon. Further

statements were issued noting that the insurgents were fleeing to other parts of the country while a number of them had regrouped around Lake Chad in an area covered with dense vegetation making aerial detection and ground operations dangerous. Nevertheless, Operation Lafiya Dole continued to clear the terrorists from what the military called "obscure locations" and "convenient sanctuaries" (cited in Punch, December 30, 2016). Troops of Operation Lafiya Dole still conduct outright offensive against Boko Haram hideouts, mount roadblocks, stop and search operations and patrols in the North East.

4.2. Effectiveness of the conflict management strategies

There is little understanding, or put differently, a continuous debate on what effectiveness (success) means in irregular warfare that will assist analysts in interpreting the effectiveness of a counterinsurgency/counterterrorism strategy. In wading into this debate, Clancy and Crossett (2007: 88) observed that "we do not yet possess a framework withinwhich we might interpret success or failure against insurgency or terrorism operations. Nor do we have a solid set of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) withwhich to frame an understanding of the raw data." In other word, an audience of analysts, counterinsurgency/counterterrorism specialists, soldiers, and policy-makers may hear the same briefing, see the same collection of graphs and data,and come to diverse and conflicting opinions as to how effective the strategies deployed are in achieving set goals.

Some trends and indicators of effectiveness of a strategy (especially military strategy) are often highlighted in conventional warfare. Clausewitzians such as Beck (2005) and Reveron (2010)pinpoint the gaining and control of territory as a key indicator of success of a strategy. Another traditional metric of effectiveness is reducing the size and capability of the opponent to a fraction of the original. Additionally, Clancy and Crossett (2007) see winning as the ultimate determinant of effectiveness or success of a strategy. This implies having more left than the opponent at the end of the hostility. Though these metrics are useful, they remain insufficient in predicting effectiveness or success of a strategy when dealing with irregular-style warfare such as that used by terrorists or insurgents.

The absence of a generally agreed set of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) in irregular warfare compels Clancy and Crossett (2007) to conclude that the context of the specific situation and the nature of the warfare in which one is engaged could be utilised to tailor measures consistent with analytic objectives. Thus, data retrieved from the operations can

then be interpreted in the context of the probable effectiveness or predictions made via models, simulations and estimates (2007: 96). Nevertheless, Jones (2006) provides a useful framework for assessing the effectiveness or success of a counterinsurgency strategy. According to Jones, a measure of effectives of a strategy must contain the following characteristics: the strategy must be meaningful; must be linked to the strategic end state; must have a strong identifiable relationship between cause and effect, it must be observable; precise and must be correlated to changes in the environment to attain timeliness as the operations progresses. Thus, the effectiveness of the various strategies utilised by the Nigerian government in addressing the Boko Haram terrorism is discussed within the above framework.

4.2.1. Effectiveness of the strategies adopted for addressing Boko Haram's early rebellion

It could be argued that government's initial poor handling of Boko Haram uprising became the harbinger to the emergence of a more lethal and destructive terrorist organisation which Boko Haram turned out to be. Nevertheless, government's response was effective to the extent that it successfully contained the uprising in 2009 and suppressed the activities of the group for about a year. Yet, it failed significantly in many other ways. Particularly, the indiscriminate arrest and extra-judicial execution that accompanied the early efforts to contain the sect was totally flawed. As argued by a respondent, in fairness to the government, the original intentions of the police action deployed was not to use maximum force. Indeed, the use of minimum force was needed to compel compliance from the militant Boko Haram members. However, the police and later the military bungled the response and became too high-handed or excessive in the application of force in containing the July 2009 Boko Haram uprising (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Consequently, the massive arrests and killing of Boko Haram members led to escalation of the crisis both in intensity and spread. The action of the security force, rather than douse tensions, inadvertently triggered massive uprising in Borno State and across other northern states such as Bauchi, Yobe, Adamawa and Kano where Boko Haram members ran haywire and in the process attacking security force and their formations. In Bauchi State, about 700 Boko Haram members attacked a police station with grenades and guns in retaliation for the arrest of several of their group leaders and the injuring of some of their

members. Similarly, during the height of the July uprising, members of the group attacked police stations and government buildings in Maiduguri, Borno State resulting in counterattack from the police and soldiers, with the violence quickly spreading to Potiskum in Yobe State and Wudil in Kano State.

A 2009 Country Report on Human Rights Practices by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour (2010) showed that between July 26 and 29, 2009, violent clashes between police and militant members of Boko Haram in four northern states resulted in more than 700 deaths and 4,000 displacements. There is possibility that the number of deaths was much higher than reported as security forces ensured that quick burials in mass graves precluded an accurate accounting of the dead according to the Bureau's report. Summary executions, use of excessive force, and widespread arrests of suspected extremists (many based on little or no evidence) meant that the lull (or containment) that government response succeeded in achieving was temporary.

In particular, the little level of success of the government'sconflict management strategywas significantly diminished with the unlawful killing of Boko Haram leader, Mohamed Yusuf. Although Falode (2016) is of the view that this proposition is yet to be proven, it has been widely argued for in literature as well. Besides the many other "atrocities" committed by the Nigerian security forces, the death of Yusuf pushed the Boko Haram group to embrace the more combative approach in its dealing with Nigeria. This is consistent with Hill's (2012: 2) argument that the killing of Yusuf by the Nigerianpolice irredeemably motivated the group to significantly expand and intensify its armed campaign. Added to this is the fact that the action of the Nigeriansecurity forces against the group equally outraged popular sentiments in the north to such an extent as to ensure that Boko Haram had an almost unfettered stream of volunteers and sympathisers (Interview, Damaturu, 26 December, 2016).

Furthermore, respondents argued that government's initial strategy to contain Boko Haram was less successful because it only focused on addressing the actions of the group without paying attention to the philosophy of Boko Haram and other social problems, including poverty and lack of education, that they said triggered the violence. This assertion also corroborates Umar's (2013) observation that government's conflict management strategy in addressing Boko Haram at the early stage reflected the symptom approach solution in

counterterrorism. The major argument against the approach is that its limited effectiveness often stemmed from its failure to address the underlying issues that push people to join radical or terrorist organisations.

In the case of the Boko Haram therefore, this strategywas considered ineffective as it did not prevent the crisis from remerging later on. However, if Jones' (2006) indicator of what constitutes effectiveness of a strategy relates to achieving the strategic end state, then government's response achieved considerable success as it was able to contain the sect's violent uprising at that material time. However, when considered from the viewpoint of sustainability of success recorded, the strategy could not be said to have been successful especially when it is considered that Boko Haram was able to remerge afterwards and with greater threat posed to the Nigerian state. Thus, though Boko Haram appeared initially suppressed, the seed of insurgency, and later terrorism, had already been sown through Yusuf's radical ideological teachings; nurtured by the level of unemployment,poverty, and economic destitution of its followers as well as the excessiveness of the security forces. Accordingly, government's clampdown in 2009 only succeeded in containing the sect's actions but failed to prevent a regeneration of Boko Haram militants who later surfaced in late 2010 with more vigor and sophistication in their activities prompting further government's responses.

4.2.2. Effectiveness of the militarised conflict management strategies

The hard power strategies as discussed under objective one began with the declaration of state of emergency leading to the establishment of JTF ORO and the subsequent deployment of full military operations under various codenames. It also covered the regional arrangement through the platform of the MNJTF and its activities within the Lake Chad area. Although not a military operation per se, the introduction of the C-JTF and their contribution to the counterinsurgency operation was also discussed as part of the hard power strategies.

The effectiveness of the state of emergency, or the extent to which it was successful remains controversial. While some respondents argued that the declaration achieved modest success, others were of the view that not only was it ineffective, it had, as part of its unintended consequences, an unfortunate role of contributing to the deterioration of the security situation in the North East. What was generally accepted despite the opposing

debate was that there was an undisputed position that something "urgent" needed to be done to reclaim security, legitimacy and sovereignty of the country which had been affected by the Boko Haram crisis.

A considerable number of respondents argued that the state of emergency was a failure as it did not in any way prevent further attacks and advancement of Boko Haram. It was argued that not only did the emergency rule sound very "political," it was poorly initiated and executed by the security forces. High points of the ineffectiveness was the series of attacks suffered by security forces whose barracks and security formations were constant targets for Boko Haram. Other series of embarrassing incidents of security personnel running away from Boko Haram offensive characterised the failure of the state of emergency. One respondent in Yola recalled how ineffective the emergency rule was in Adamawa State,

> Personally, I didn't see the purpose of the state of emergency. Those guys who were supposed to be protecting lives and property were watching people run away. They were even shouting to the people 'please run o, they (Boko Haram) are coming'. You see soldiers with their uniform fighting to board the pickup van with civilians, pushing them, throwing away their uniform and their guns. In this situation, if the soldier runs away from danger what will the civilians do? That border there around Gwoza where there is a police training school, one person, well trained and armed came to them, only for them to run away and leave everything there for Boko Haram to come and take over. Then, the people have no hope again. I thought that a soldier was supposed to die fighting rather than running away but that was not the case. At first, people looked down on the police as nothing, gradually; people came to look down on the soldiers as nothing. And they are yet to regain or redeem their image. It will take time for people in that zone to begin to respect a soldier (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

The perception of many respondents in Adamawa was that the declaration of state of emergency helped in attracting Boko Haram into Adamawa State. In their opinion, the primary focus of Boko Haram was Borno State. Communities and local government areas in Adamawa were not necessarily under any immediate danger of attack by Boko Haram. Thus, when the emergency rule was declared, it not only failed to prevent Boko Haram from advancing into Adamawa and almost capturing Yola, it also could not stop the terrorists from carrying out their activities in their captured territories. Another respondent

averred,

> As a matter of fact, the people of Madagali are pointing accusing fingers against the government till date. The presence of security forces attracted Boko Haram to their community. After the curfew was declared, people were at home thinking that everything was okay, not knowing that Boko Haram has come and all the soldiers and other security personnel have left town. Still, Boko Haram continued to hit Adamawa; they came up to Gombi despite the declaration of state of emergency. It served no purpose, no real purpose; that's the truth. It was after the declaration that Boko Haram came and captured Madagali, Guyuk, Michika, Mubi and these other towns (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

Furthermore, it was observed that security forces, in implementing the emergency rule, not only resorted to physical and sexual harassment of civilians; they equally turned the emergency rule into a money–making venture by forcefully extorting money from members of the public who came in contact with them at the various roadblocks and checkpoints. In the words of Dr Salihu Ateegu, Secretary to the Centre for Islamic Thoughts (CIT),

> To worsen the situation, some of the checkpoints are there; the soldiers are busy collecting N20 from road users. Something that was seen as very impossible when I was in secondary school, or even during my early days in the university. But today we see it happening. You see a soldier aiming a gun at you saying: I will shoot o! I will damage your leg! Because of N50. It's emergency. Also, people were prevented from going to Mosque; you don't even go to Mosque, let alone pray. It was capable of bringing ill-wind between the populace and soldiers. To cut it short, actually, the state of emergency ended up making the people suffer. It made them stop farming. For more than three years now, people in Madagali, Michika could not plant a seed. They are hungry and dying of hunger (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

The State of Emergency also brought a lot of untold hardship to motorists and travellers and undignified treatment of innocent Nigerians by security forces. However, despite the argument against the effectiveness of the emergency rule that was declared by the Federal government in the three north eastern states, others argued that the emergency rule achieved some level of success against Boko Haram. Technically speaking, the declaration of emergency rule by former President Jonathan was not intended to, in itself, defeat the Boko Haram group. In a way, it was targeted at creating the enabling environment for security agencies, especially the military, to operate in the area of responsibility. According

to respondents, the situation on ground between 2011 and 2013 in the North East largely called for some emergency type response. Boko Haram had control over territories in northern parts of Borno and was fast advancing to Maiduguri. It had significant influence in Bama, Konduga and even within Maiduguri. Furthermore, the Governors of the three affected states were largely incapacitated in terms of the capability and capacity to confront the terrorist organisation. Put differently, it was an open secret that the Governors of these states had become effeminate and feeble in discharging their responsibility as Chief Security Officers.

Moreover, the irregular warfare-type tactics that Boko Haram adopted presented serious challenge to the security forces. In many areas, including the cities, Boko Haram was able to easily hit its targets (mostly at night) and retreat to hiding within the civilian populace, making it difficult for military and other security agencies to identify them. The security forces could not effectively respond to these peculiar challenges. Accordingly, the emergency rule provided the military with more powers to effectively arrest the situation. Though it did not totally stop it, the imposition of curfew considerably limited the free movement of the insurgents while the power to conduct stop and search aided the military's efforts to access local communities in search of Boko Haram militants and arrest them without much legal resistance. This is reflected in the assertion of Sheik Goni Mohammed, the North East Coordinator of Jama'atuNasir Islam:

> The emergency rule helped a lot, because it provided the opportunity for the security agencies to operate peacefully and comfortably. It was that state of emergency that gave the opportunity to the security agencies to close the roads and other things and also to have access to most places like house-to-house checking that they have conducted in Maiduguri. It was the state of emergency that empowered them to conduct arrest without any intimidation from the community or any law of the land. Without the state of emergency, the security operatives wouldn't have been able to operate peacefully. This was the essence of the state of emergency and we appreciate that (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

In supporting the view above, Brigadier General Abubakar argued that the declaration of emergency rule had the positive effect of stabilising the situation in the North East and providing the necessary confidence that the sovereignty of the country and legitimacy of the government was still intact. Thus, he argued: "when the emergency rule was placed,

what was the situation on ground? I believe we succeeded in mitigating some of the crisis that could have been catastrophic if such emergency was not declared. It was a temporary rule to subdue the prevailing difficult circumstances or security-threatening situation" (Interview, Abuja, 13 August, 2016).

Fatile (2014) provides support to Abubakar's argument that the declaration of state of emergency was an effective strategy. According to Fatile,before the declaration of state of emergency, the situation in the affected states was really bad. Besides, there was anxiety even beyond the affected parts of the north about the possibility and ability of the Boko Haram to launch an Islamic state in the entire north and to progressively overwhelm a significant portion of the rest of the country. Indeed, Boko Haram terrorists posed serious threat to thesovereignty of Nigeria; they hoisted their flags and were carving out enclaves. Thus, the declaration of state of emergency, though it did not stop their activities, had the effect of reducing the potency of the terrorists in the North East.

Arguing in support of the success of the state of emergency, Bishop Moses, the CAN/PFN Chairman in Adamawa, noted that the declaration of state of emergency by former President Jonathan's administration was very useful. If not, it was only a matter of time before Boko Haram would have captured some other places including the capital city, Yola.

> The declaration of state of emergency curtailed so many things. With that, the beef up of security was enormous and you discovered that even when they (Boko Haram) wanted to change their tactics, they were apprehended because almost all the security agencies were on ground to manage and curtail their excesses. If you look at the way they were coming into Gombi, which was very close to here (Yola); if they had taken Gombi, definitely they would have been in this place. But we thank God that the security agencies were on ground to curtail their movement (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

Thus, it can be argued that despite the shortcomings, the state of emergency achieved modest success. While it did not solve the problem of Boko Haram or yielded the desired outcome, as a means, it helped as an impediment to the insurgent group. It provided a veritable platform for the various military operations against the sect to commence. As noted by Onuoha (2014: 4), the aggressive military campaigns that followed the declaration of state of emergency resulted to a reduction of geographical scope of Boko Haram and

many other successes against the group.

Meanwhile, the disbandment of the Joint Task Force comprising the Nigerian Army, Navy and Airforce, the Nigeria Police Force, Department of State Security, Nigerian Immigration Service and the Defence Intelligence Agencythat preceded full military operation attracted certain criticisms against the Nigerian government. Despite its shortcomings, it has been argued that the JTF framework represented some form of interagency collaboration in combating the menace of Boko Haram. Specifically, it is argued that the disbandment actually robbed the counterinsurgency operation of its intelligence gathering and other deliverables which the other security agencies brought to the table. As a conglomeration of forces comprising the military and other security force, it was envisaged that it would make the fight against Boko Haram easier and more effective.

Furthermore, besides the argument that the disbandment of the JTF was politically motivated, it could also be viewed that dissolving the Task Force was a tactical and strategic move after careful reappraisal of the whole operation in the North East. The operation had fulfilled its objective and needed to be done away with and replaced with a more effective strategy to meet the new reality on ground. This proposition can also be gleaned from the claim of former Theatre Commander of Operation Lafiya Dole, Major General Irabor,

> There is what we call conflict transformation. When a problem occurs, you weigh different options; you carry out what we call "estimate process" in the military. This involves threat analysis or some form of check mapping. You look at what the threat is and what your strength and weakness are as a force. Depending on what you are doing, you either change the tactics, or the procedure, or the techniques. Or you could also dissolve whatever arrangement in place and fashion something new. This was the kind of process that we went through. Yes, as at the time the JTF was established, it played its part. But given the nature of the threat, it was felt that the JTF arrangement was not actually giving the bite that was required, and so the operation transformed into a different one. The realities and dynamics of the operation gave rise to those changes. If the JTF arrangement at the time was effective, there wouldn't be need for them to be changed. The wisdom in having to change the arrangement was because there were shortcomings that came up with the arrangement of the Joint Task Force (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

From the above assertion, it can be concluded that the Joint Task Force was viewed as no longer capable of confronting the new reality of threat posed by Boko Haram and needed to be disbanded and replaced with a more forceful fighting force. Additionally, the argument that its dissolution equally robbed the anti-Boko Haram operation of intelligence was countered by respondents who observed that the subsequent forces that replaced the JTF had a level of cooperation between the military and other security agencies that was mandatory or required. For example, Operation Lafiya Dole which later subsumed the 7th and 8th Divisions and other components of the military operations was technically a joint operation involving different military components and representatives of other security bodies including the Police, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, the DSS and others. The operation equally had an arrangement (intelligence fusions) that allowed for information and intelligence sharing between security agencies and other stakeholders including local government officials.

On the effectiveness of military operations against Boko Haram, the general perception was that military operation yielded considerable level of success before. There was a level of dynamism in the application of the military strategy. It seems that to ensure effectiveness, the military was able to review and alter its strategy to suit the mutating nature of Boko Haram threats. It appeared to have followed recommendations of military strategists like Wright (2007) who argued that as the character of war changes, the requirement for winning it also changes. Thus, aggressive military campaign that commenced in 2013 actually led to a decline of the geographical scope of Boko Haram assaults pushing them back towards the main contested zones in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. There was equally a reduction in the number of attacks against security formations such as police stations and military barracks while the rate of suicide bombing also reduced. However, Boko Haram increasing resorted to irregular warfare tactics of planning ambush and hit and run. It shifted focus to attacking soft civilian targets, launching violent attacks and overrunning villages, communities, towns and schools where security was weak or non-existent.

However, the decision of the militaryto blend both conventional and unconventional countermeasures against Boko Haram paid off in terms of withstanding the latter's guerrilla tactics. Between 2013 and early 2015, Nigeria's military strategy against the sect largely involved kinetic operations comparable to how conventional warfare is fought between

state actors; including mass deployment of infantry and observance of the rule of engagement. Though it worked earlier on, it cost the country dearly latter on. In response, the government, though it denied it vehemently (Tukur, 2015), employed the services of a South African private security firm known as Special Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP) to assist the counterinsurgency operation against Boko Haram. According to Falode (2016), STTEPmercenaries, who were veterans of bush warfare in South Africa, trained Nigerian elite forces on counterterrorism and helped in conducting sortie against the Boko Haram.Using a policy of 'relentless pursuit', an unconventionalmilitary mobile warfare tactic developed by STTEP, the state was able to evolve an effective counteroffensive against the Boko Haram where the Nigerian security forces were able to match Boko Haram's hit-and-run tactics.

Nevertheless, the general opinion of respondents was that, though the Nigerian security forces and STTEP had succeeded in putting Boko Haram on the back foot, it was not until strategic military changes were introduced by the administration of Muhammadu Buhari in 2015 that Nigeria's military offensive against Boko Haram yielded desired results. The movement of the military command and control to Maiduguri, reinvigoration of the MNJTF and provision of the right equipment and leadership motivation meant that by late 2015 Boko Haram had been significantly decimated (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016). In December 2015, President Buhari declared that Boko Haram had been "technically defeated" (BBC News, December 24, 2015). The security forces had been able to recover most of the contested zones that were previously occupied by Boko Haram, in the process, dismantling the sect's administrative and political centres that were established in territories in Borno and Yobe States.

The effectiveness of the military strategy cannot be discussed without mentioning the contributions of the Multinational Joint Task Force. The MNJTF played a crucial part in the successes of the military operation against Boko Haram. In fairness, the military operation was successful because of Nigeria's engagement of troops from neighbouring countries such as Chad, Niger and Cameroon. The coming of the Multinational Joint Task Force to the aid of Nigeria especially, from late 2015, was useful in putting the Boko Haram on the back foot and effectively denying the sect any safe haven in the neighbouring countries. Troops from Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin, under the aegis of MNJTF

played crucial roles in the counteroffensives. In some instances, they had to enter into territories in the contested zones to dislodge the insurgents as in the case of Chad and Nigerien troops routing Boko Haram militants in Damasak, Gashinga, Jabulami and Malam-Fatori in 2015 (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016). Commenting on the impact of the MNJTF, Major General Lucky Irabor observed that "the reinvigoration of the MNJTF brought a new vigour to the fight against Boko Haram terrorism. It saw a greater boost to the fight and since then, it has been a win-win arrangement for the Lake Chad Basin Commission Countries (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Accordingly, Boko Haram did not only loose territories, its stronghold in Sambisa forest, Borno State fell in December 2015 prompting President Buhari to note in January 2016 that Boko Haram "is now on fall-back" (Nwabughiogu, 2016).With these successes, it became almost impossible for Boko Haram to launch conventional attacks against security forces in the contested zones. BokoHaram is said not to hold a single territory in Nigeria today and largely operating piecemeal and coordinating occasional suicide attacks from around Sambisa forest, Kala Balge forest and other areasalong the Lake Chad. Hence, as noted by Falode (2016), "technically defeated" and "fall-back" are two appropriate terminologies that broadly explain the effectiveness of the military operations against Boko Haram.

4.2.3.Contributions of the Civilian JTF

Respondents in the study locations generally agreed that the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was of value in complementing the efforts of the military and other security forces in containing Boko Haram. There are four key areas where the Civilian JTF contributed to the fight against Boko Haram. The Civilian JTF, especially in Borno State was very useful in acting as local guide to the military in certain operations. Albert (2017) in a university lecture on "Beyond Nigeria's Sambisa: Forests, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Africa" succinctly explained the deep understanding that insurgents and terrorists have on forests and other local terrains which makes it very difficult for Nigerian, and indeed, African militaries to effectively combat such insurgencies.

Flowing from the above, the Civilian JTF, also being members of the local communities have firsthand knowledge of the local geography. Thus, their deep understanding of the local environment became very useful in guiding the Nigerian troops through difficult terrains in the forest regions of the North East. According to a member of the CJTF, "our

civilian JTF had taken part in almost all the operations going on in Sambisa forest." Also, "they are always the first to sight Boko Haram suspects during checks in the state capital" (cited in Punch, 30 July, 2017). The importance of the CJTF understanding of the area was acknowledged by a very senior military officer who averred that "their understanding and ability of leading the troops to certain locations gave a lot of strength to the forces and they did a very good job" (Interview, Abuja, 13 August, 2016). Further confirming the importance of the CJTF in this area, Reverend Father Yilar Apagu, CAN Secretary, Yobe State, added:

> Another aspect where the Civilian JTF has helped is their knowledge of the terrain as compared to the military which is just deployed to the region and is not familiar with the area. So, they lead them to inner places that the military do not know (Interview, Damaturu, 26 December, 2016)

Additionally, the Civilian JTF were equally effective in providing sound intelligence and information on Boko Haram hideouts, impending attacks as well as identifying members of the sect who were hiding within the local communities. The impact of the CJTF in this area probably necessitated a respondent to claim that "inMaiduguri where the Civilian JTF started, if not for them, the military wouldn't have been able to achieve what they achieved because these Boko Haram members would not have been fished out by the militarybecause they did not know them" (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016). That the members of the CJTF lived in the communities with Boko Haram militants before the coming of the military gave them huge advantage in terms of having different types of intelligence on Boko members, their movements and activities. Being able to identify and expose who Boko Haram members were, was vital to the military successes recorded.

Furthermore, the impact of the CJTF activities was visibly felt in the area of repelling Boko Haram attacks and assisting to liberate or recapture some areas that came under Boko Haram attacks. As a matter of fact, and though the military authorities had clearly rejected this claim, it was widely acknowledged by local community respondents that the Civilian JTF usually comes to mind when discussing how the city of Maiduguri was prevented from falling into the hands of Boko Haram. The general view is that, the security forces had become disenchanted with the guerrilla tactics adopted by Boko Haram which instilled fear on them. This led many to abandon their post, while others quickly sought transfer out of

the city to other locations. A few others simply absconded and went absent without official leave (AWOL) becoming deserters. So when Boko Haram repeatedly attacked, the Civilian JTF inadvertently became the first line of defence against the terrorists. The feat recorded by the CJTF is captured in the words of the group's Borno State Coordinator whoargued that it was the CJTF that eventually repelled Boko Haram invaders and secured the city of Maiduguri.

> We are proud to say this, we secured the city of Maiduguri and pushed them (Boko Haram) out. Even, there are places that the military cannot move in but our men are moving in. Again, in 2013/2014 or so, there was an attack around Malam Balari, about 47 people were killed. We moved in, we repelled them and killed six of them while others ran away (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Junril Gunda, Legal Adviser and a member of the Civilian JTF further observed that,

> Boko Haram members are not afraid of the military, they are afraid of the civilian JTF; they believe if a civilian JTF kills any of them, they will go to hell. Many of them have said this during their testimonies (cited in Punch, 30 June, 2017).

According to another respondent in Damaturu,

> The Civilian JTF worked seriously; they brought peace to many communities. Places that were considered Boko Haram stronghold that no one could go, such that if the military is asked to go, they will not. If the Police is asked to go, they will not. The Civilian JTF dared the insurgents by entering those places. Even if one is killed, another will go in; another is killed, another one will go until they are able to get the insurgents and hand them over to the military (Interview, Damaturu, 27 December, 2016).

The above claims find support in the response of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) Chairman in Borno State. According to Bishop Naga Mohammed, "if not because of this Civilian JTF, Maiduguri, I think, would have been ashes by now because the insurgents were ready. It has brought some sort of calm to the state" (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016). Nevertheless, the extent to which the above proposition is true remains a debate. However, what is not in dispute is that the Civilian JTF played a crucial role in the counteroffensive against Boko Haram in the North East region.

Like in Borno State, the CJTF is also recorded to have been effective in countering Boko

Haram activities in Adamawa. It is also claimed that the group was instrumental in repelling attacks and driving away Boko Haram from several communities in the state. This assertion is contained in the response provided by interviewees in Adamawa. According to a member of the Muslim Council of Adamawa, the Civilian JTF played important role in liberating communities such as Mubi, Maiha, Gombi and even Madagali.

> Boko Haram had ransacked Mubi, overtaken Gombi. What remains of Yola was just a matter of time. It was then the vigilante now came in. It was the vigilantes who helped in clearing Boko Haram in Maiha. Then they went to Mubi and cleared Boko Haram out also. It was then the Federal Government was now saying nobody asked the vigilante to come in. This statement was issued by the army headquarters, that they have capacity when people were being ransacked. Which capacity? (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

Lastly, beyond providing intelligence and acting as local guide to the military and helping to repel and liberate Boko Haram attacks, the Civilian JTF on some occasions also acted as local security for communities that were deserted by Nigerian security forces including soldiers. According to respondents, due to the intensity of Boko Haram activities, most police stations were closed down while military checkpoints were abandoned. The police were transferred to major towns while the villages and communities were left without security. "So in the villages, there was no security. The Civilian JTF had to mobilise to provide security. If not because of the vigilante, only God knows what would have happened in those places. There would have been total breakdown of law and order" (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

It was observed that the reason why the CJTF became so effectivein complementing the efforts of the security forces against Boko Haram, besides their local knowledge, and the courage and determination showed by the group members, was the reliance on local charms and other forms of "supernatural powers" which worked for the group. According to one respondent,

> They don't have sophisticated weapons, but they have supernatural powers. In Gombi, Boko Haram members were captured without any gunshot. Also, when they came to Mubi, all these Boko Haram members with guns did not have the strength to even aim and shoot. They were dragging their legs as if they were zombies or like they were drunk or slumbering. That is how they left the place

without shooting a gun (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

There is no way to empirically prove the above assertion on the reliance on and effectiveness of charms and spiritual powers. But as Owumi and Ajayi (2013) and Anderson (2014) have shown, traditional medicine, charms and other indigenous resources are commonly used for crime control across African societies and their efficacy is not in doubt. But proving them remains an area of mystery for science and technology.

Civilian JTF was effective in complementing the role of the institutional security forces. It still plays the role of local vigilantes. Wielding local charms, swords, bow and arrow and locally made guns, members mount road blocks, conduct stop and search and local community patrols. It appeared that they have become the most important part of local community policing across several communities in the North East. This was easily verified by the researcher through observation method during field investigation. Their presence was visibly felt every few kilometres on the road across the study location. They equally worked side-by-side with soldiers and police on various checkpoints.

4.2.4. Effectiveness of the non-militarised conflict management strategies

Unlike hard power strategies, the effectiveness of soft power approaches is more difficult to measure especially on the short term. In assessing effectiveness, time is an important factor. It can be argued that while the effects of hard power strategies require much less time to become visible, in contrast, the effects of soft power strategies often take longer time to develop and become manifest. In other words, while military operations for example, tend to produce immediate or short term outcomes, de-radicalization or addressing systemic problems of poverty, illiteracy and underdevelopment (attraction, incentivisation and persuasion) have the potential for long term change. It is for this reason that Gallarotti (2011) argued that soft power solutions tend to also last longer than hard power solutions. In other words, the deployment of instruments of soft power has the potential to achieve sustainable security in the long run.

A number of soft power or non-military strategies employed by the government in countering Boko Haram terrorism had been discussed in objective one of the study, including legislative and prosecutorial efforts that ban terrorists acts and organisations and also aim to cut terrorist financing. Others have included developing an aggressive media and propaganda campaign, addressing systemic problems such as poverty, illiteracy and

underdevelopment in the North East and the dialogue efforts among others.

Existing legal frameworks have helped in arresting and trying suspected Boko Haram members. The arrests of suspected Boko Haram supporters/financiers have equally generated intelligence that led authorities to other suspected financial supporters. For example, the arrest of Mohammed Zakaria, a notorious arms dealer, provided intelligence that led to the subsequent killing of Alhaji Salisu Damaturu, a Boko Haram sponsor in February 2011. The same strategy equally exposed Ali Ndume (a senator from Borno State) and Saidu Pindar (former ambassador to Sao Tome and Principe) as alleged financial supporters of Boko Haram. Ali Ndume was arrested in November 2011 and charged with financing Boko Haram under the terrorism TPA. In 2012, a Boko Haram spokesperson was arrested and alleged that former Kano State Governor Ibrahim Shekaru and Bauchi State Governor Isa Yuguda were financiers of Boko Haram fighters (Agbiboa, 2013). As noted earlier, Kabiru Sokoto was tried and convicted under Section 15 of the EFCC Act as well as under the provisions of the TPA.

Commenting on the effectiveness of the legislations on terrorism, Emmanuel Kaswe, Principal State Counsel in the Department of Public Prosecution of the Ministry of Justice averred that although the legislation on terrorism are still being tested, in the shot period that they have existed, they have yielded positive results. "We have secured about ten or so convictions with respect to terrorism cases prosecuted under the new laws. The convictions go a long way to show that the legislation is effective in countering acts of insurgency. In the case of Mustapha Umar, *This Day* Bomber, everything was decided in six months and judgment was secured" (Interview, Abuja, 16 August, 2016).

Besides the convictions, Nigeria's terrorism legislations also allow the country to legally freeze financial assets of terrorists in the country. However, there is no evidence pointing to the fact that the government ever seized Boko Haram financial assets within Nigerian financial institutions. Two factors are generally adduced to for lack of success in this area especially when it relates to the inability of government to identify and seize Boko Haram monetary assets within Nigerian banks. The first is that fear of possible repercussions from the sect may have foreclosed any intention of most Nigerian banks to file suspicious transaction reports (STRs) that would help identify possible Boko Haram funds. The second, and perhaps, more plausible factor, is what Rock (2016) described as the

possibility that leaders and members of the sect do not appear to depend on the formal financial sector. It has been argued that Boko Haram largely uses couriers to transport cash and other valuable items throughout the areas where it operates. In a discussion with the BBC, Sowore had equally observed that "Boko Haram commanders and its leaders do not travel with passports, they travel on the ground in hijacked vehicles; they do not have any formal assets that anyone can point to—it is not a formal organisation" (BBC, May 2014). Also, what they rather do is to attack banks and cart away cash.

However, it is not only the Nigerian government that has difficulty tracking and cutting Boko Haram finances, even the United States government have also had difficulties countering Boko Haram's funding streams mainly because of the sect's financial operating procedures which make counter-finance measures inadequate to have an effect on its funding. As observed by Rock (2016: 17), "freezing the financial assets of Boko Haram seems to be the least effective measure for countering its financial support. Having the legal framework in place to freeze bank accounts and to designate individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) seems to be more of a symbolic gesture than a measure that has any true effect since Boko Haram does not appear to be operating within a regulated financial sector." The ineffectiveness of the legislations in terms of freezing or cutting Boko Haram terrorist financing also made Stewart and Wroughton (2014) to conclude that the tools and techniques used for freezing monetary assets of violent extremist organisations (VEOs) since 9/11 (which has been reasonably successful globally) seem to be useless when dealing with Boko Haram.

Furthermore, it remains a debate whether to consider Nigerian government's PR campaign against Boko Haram as a success or failure. Indeed, changes had been made in terms of media information and propaganda strategy by the military and in the political circle in the wake of the huge battering the government suffered in the hands of Boko Haram as well as in the local and international media. Specifically, the death of Mohammed Yusuf and the attendant human rights abuses that followed, the kidnap of Chibok girls, the Baga incidence and many others that were poorly managed constituted a propaganda failure for the government. Although the reorganisation of government's media and propaganda infrastructure was deemed as a step in the right direction, its effectiveness remained debatable. While the coordination of information dissemination on the Boko Haram crisis

by the NIC, the Defence Information Unit and the media unit of the Presidency did contribute somewhat to improving the image of the Nigerian government, it did not succeed in changing broad public opinion that Boko Haram propaganda strategy was largely more effective than that of the government (Interview, Adamawa, 26 December 2016).

Besides the fact that government and the military no longer spoke from several uncoordinated and unauthorised sources, it could still be argued that what emerged from the government's propaganda campaignwas a bit confusing and sometimes, incoherent. On some occasions, the messages emanating from the Defence Headquarters and the NIC rarely reflected therealities on the ground, whether it is the reputation or status of the army or simply the resultsof military operations. For example, under the Jonathan administration, while government's propaganda evoked the great successes of Nigeria's military operations, what was regularly reported in the media were on the defection, mutiny of troops and soldiers being accused of firing at their commanding officer and the logistic and material problems of the army.

Furthermore, and unfortunately, even with a better organised information outlet, military statements often raised more questions thanprovided answers, even when the news was good for example, when hostages are freed or Boko Haram members killed. There were alsonumerous retractions that hindered the credibility of government or military propaganda especially the ones relating to the death of Boko Haram leader, Shekau. On multiple occasions, even under the Buhari administration, the military had claimed that Shekau had been killed only for him to release another video clips confirming his survival and denouncing government propaganda. While a top military officer interviewed during field investigation still insisted that Shekau was dead, the Mansur Dan-Ali, Nigeria's Minister of Defence, acknowledged that Shekau was still alive and "possibly" hiding in Sambisa forest (*Daily Post*, March 28, 2017).

Again, the Nigerian government'soft repeated claim that the group was on the runand that its demise was a matter of weeks or months were often countered by powerful Shekau imagery and more Boko Haramattacks, hitting hard on government's credibility. In 2013, former President Jonathan declared that Boko Haram would be defeated within sixmonths (Saldika, 2015). So too, in February 2015, thegovernment claimed Boko Haram was on the

run.But Boko Haram responded by pledging allegiance to ISIS and went on a terror spree between June and July 2015 that sent a clear signal to the new administration of President Muhammadu Buhari that the group was still very active. President Buhari had similarly set a deadline for the Nigerian Army in July 2015, giving it three months to defeatBoko Haram. It backfired as the group remained very active. Although the government recorded impressive military victories afterwards and weakening the group, Boko Haram devastating attacks on Maiduguri in the second quarter of 2017 proved the terrorists were stillable to strike at will, thereby countering the government's narrative.

Considering the above therefore, the study aligns with St-Pierrre's (2015) submission that despite the few successes, the media and propaganda strategy of the government and the army – even after Buhari took office in May 2015 could best be described as "trial and error", lacking coherence and cohesion. In any propaganda war, controlling the narrative is crucial and Boko Haram appeared to have impressively managed to do that since 2009 mainly through the violence of its actions, the mystic surrounding its leader Abubakar Shekau, as well as exploiting the Nigerian population's distrust for governmental institutions.

The debate continues as to whether government's media and propaganda campaign against Boko Haram was effective or whether it ended up undermining government's credibility and reinforcing that of the enemy. But government's effort at building bridges of peaceful coexistence and counter-radicalisation through the activities of interfaith groups was deemed successful with long term benefits. The efforts of religious leaders helped in dousing religious tensions in many communities in the North East; assisted in monitoring and countering radical preaching and the activities of radical preachers (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016). As observed also, by Charle Nworji, NOA's focal person for counterterrorism and strategies, the benefits of the strategy are likely to manifest long-term in terms of de-radicalization of individuals in northern Nigeria and hindering terrorist recruitment through significant impact of the image of Boko Haram as non-representative of Islam (Interview, Abuja, 18 August, 2016).

Also in the non-military sphere, efforts aimed at addressing systemic problems (some considered as part of the root causes of Boko Haram insurgency), were viewed as effective means of countering violent extremism. The Victims Support Fund, Presidential Initiative

on the North East and other programmes aimed at developing infrastructure, building schools, mosque and other social amenities were equally viewed as important in helping government regain credibility and support of the local population. The Buhari administration followed up on efforts of the Jonathan government by setting up a reconstruction anddevelopment programmes to carryout infrastructural and social development in the NorthEast.

In practice however, not much had been achieved through these programmes besides providing mere palliatives such as food stuff, household utensils, and occasional medical check-ups and so on. The real issue of reconstructing the devastated communities, provision of security that would allow the people who are mainly farmers to go back to the farms and providing them with seedlings, fertilisers and other support needed to revamp their agricultural practices were yet to be adequately attended to by the various government initiatives.

While the establishment of camps and setting aside funds to cater for the over 2 million internally displaced persons (IDP) fromthe conflict in the NorthEast could produce short term relief, respondents generally agreed that the work of the NEDC and other associated government institutions like those of agriculture would require long term commitments to have any meaningful impact on the anti-Boko Haram campaign. According to a respondent, addressing the issues of poverty, underdevelopment and the plight of the IDP is part of a more comprehensive plan of government on counterterrorism. "This is part of the various platforms that the government has set up to counter Boko Haram efforts; it is a holistic approach to the issue which will have an effect on the enemy now (Boko Haram) and in the future" (Interview, Abuja, 16 August, 2016).

The Nigerian government's decision to dialogue with Boko Haram attracted a debate whether the strategy is effective in managing the sect's terrorist activities. In counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations, it is often recommended that governments pursue a multidimensional approach involving military and non-military strategies including direct or indirect engagement with the terrorists and insurgents (Nwankpa, 2014). According to Miller (2007), flexibility and adaptability is crucial in counterterrorism. The decision to engage terrorists in dialogue must be borne out of the willingness of the group to also commit to the process. In which case, negotiation for

example, will not be recommended in dealing with terrorist organisations or insurgents who are not open or amenable to dialogue. That is why Rineheart (2010) argued that the variation in dynamics, history, composition and organisation of different terrorist groups often determine the counter-terrorist models that could be applied in solving them. For example, direct engagement appears to be the most effective option to resolving the conflict with Hamas (Palestine) and Hezbollah (Jordan) as America's attempts to isolate and degrade both groups have only made them more resilient. On the contrary, it can be argued that al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) cannot be approached with direct engagements.

With regards to Boko Haram, the dialogue option was viewed as a useful tool for mitigating the group's terrorism. Also, Boko Haram had in the past shown to be open to engagement, mediation and negotiations. In spite of various denials and rebuttals, the group did go as far as presenting intermediaries and representatives to deliberate with the Nigerian government notably in 2013. As noted by Taminu Turaki, the former Minister of Special Duties who headed the Presidential Committee on Dialogue, though the committee never met Boko Haram leader Shekau, the sect sent representatives to meet with the committee. However, the dialogue strategy failed to make meaningful impact under the Jonathan administration. No meaningful outcome was reached between the Jonathan government and Boko Haram leaders. In line with what obtained in the literature, a number of respondents noted that the ineffectiveness of the dialogue approach flowed from the inability of the dialogue committee to engage the right members of the sect even though the Chairman of the dialogue committee argued otherwise. It was also suggested that on more than one occasion, negotiations with Boko Haram was foiled largely becauseof government's inability to keep details of the process away from the media which incensed members of the group that government could not be trusted.

Although the dialogue option was ineffective in containing or reducing Boko Haram terrorism, it did result to a positive outcome under the Buhari administration in terms of negotiating the release of the Chibok girls kidnapped by the sect in 2014. Boko Haram, in August 2016, released a video which suggested that it was open to a prisoner swap of the abducted Chibok girls for detained BokoHaram members. Secret negotiations that followed led to the release of twentyone of the girls on 13 October 2016.While the

governmentinsistedthat it was an unconditional release and not a swap, it was widely believed that a huge amount of ransom was paid by the government and possibly also involving release of a number of the sect members. Unlike in the past, the process involved tactical negotiations and some form of mediation by third partiesthat allowedfor confidence building on both sides.

Flowing from the confidence and trust that was established as a result of the successful release of the 21 girls, eighty two Chibok girls were further released in May 2017 by Boko Haram after a series of intense negotiation between the terrorists and the Nigerian government, facilitated by third parties such as Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In return, a number of Boko Haram commanders who were in government custody were released to the group as part of the agreement.

As noted already, while the dialogue approach resulted in the release of a number of abducted Chibok girls, it failed to end hostilities between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram. To put it differently, when argued from the viewpoint that non-violent engagement with terrorists or insurgents is supposed to result to some form of ceasefire agreement or a reduction in hostilities/violence between the conflict parties, then it can be said that the dialogue option was not effective in managing Boko Haram terrorism. Besides, the proposal of amnesty for sect members in return for cessation of violence as construed by the dialogue committee was a failure as it never saw the light of day. However, the success recorded by the release of the Chibok girls and the willingness of both the Nigerian government and Boko Haram to engage in negotiation show that the strategy could be effective in terms of achieving a higher level of success if properly implemented.

4.3. Challenges confronting the conflict management strategies

Before attempting to discuss the specific challenges that confronted the conflict management strategies adopted by the government in addressing Boko Haram terrorism, it is apposite to first discuss what a substantial number of respondents considered as a general challenge that affected government's response to the Boko Haram problem. This has to do with ethno-religious and political underpinnings as well as the disposition, or the commitment of the government to contain the sect's activities both at the initial stage and all through the period of the insurgency.

Arguably, the Nigerian government's anti-Boko Haram response was hampered by insincerity of the political class. It is not in doubt that Nigeria is a profoundly heterogeneous society both along religious and cultural lines which its leaders have tried to manage over the years. The death of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua on May 5, 2010, set in motion the geopolitical tussles that hampered government's response to Boko Haram violence. Political power was supposed to rotate between the North and the South as part of the political arrangement that was put in place by leaders of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) to help check ethno-religious political bickering following the return to democracy in 1999. President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian and Southerner, had successfully served two terms of eight years and was succeeded by Yar'Adua, a Muslim and Northerner, in 2007. But Yar'Adua died in office, leaving his Southern Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan to complete the rest of his term.

The decision of former President Jonathan to run for the office again in 2011 after completing the remainder of Yar'Adua's 4-year term, contrary to expectations, especially of the Muslims and Northerners, split the party, resulting in a number of dissatisfied Northern elites including Governorsto threaten to make the country "ungovernable" (Aziken, 2013). The violent upsurge of Boko Haram's insurgency coincided with this period leading to the accusations by those in Jonathan's camp that Boko Haram was a proxy of Northern elites, who instrumentalised the insurgency to embarrass and undermine a Presidency that they viewed as illegitimate. The highpoint of this accusation occurred in January 2012 whenformer President Jonathan announced that members, sponsors and sympathisers of Boko Haram had infiltrated the government (including the executive, legislative and judicial arm).This suspicion extended to the government also doubting at the initial stage, the veracity of the Chibok girls' abduction this making it difficult to muster effective response against the group.

Yet, Aziken's (2013) opinion could be faulted on the ground that if truly the Muslin Northerners, especially the Governors and other influential political elites were to make governance difficult for former President Jonathan, they would not target the North for destruction. While it is true that the President's decision to contest in 2011 did not go down well with many Muslims and Northerners, the PDP won a considerable number of votes in the North which contradicts the claim that the North had set out to make the country

ungovernable under former President Jonathan.

Conversely, many politicians in the North concluded that the Presidency deliberately declined to contain Boko Haram as part of the plan to emasculate electorates and decrease their political influence. Thus, governors of states like Borno (who belonged to the opposition party) initially denied the threat of Boko Haram because they did not want the Federal Government to declare a state of emergency in their state (Interview, Abuja, 18 August, 2016). This insincerity of the political class also affected government response to the threat.

Supporting the argument that there may be elements of truth in both narratives above, Bello-Osagie (2015) averred that Boko Haram, at its formative stage, could be viewed as a state sponsored militia group which enjoyed the support of prominent politicians and government figures. Yet the benefactors could not be said to have included former President Jonathan as Boko Haram rebellion started under former President Yar'Adua. Former President Goodluck Jonathan only inherited Boko Haram. However, it could be strongly argued that the Jonathan administration nurtured Boko Haram for political reasons as earlier explained. The multiple scandals that confronted the administration in relation to the counter-terrorism war on Boko Haram support the accusation.

One particular instance occurred in September 2014 when a private jet belonging to former head of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor was caught in South Africa with undeclared $9.3 million allegedly meant to purchase arms for the Nigerian government to prosecute the anti-Boko Haram military campaign. Although the Federal Government defended the seized cash that it was meant for counter-terrorism purpose, not many Nigerians could be said to have been convinced by the government's explanation. The popular opinion was that the seized cash was money budgeted to aid the security operations in the North East which was being embezzled and laundered by government officials and their political and military accomplices.

Notwithstanding, viewing the challenges from the above lens only, ignores the *takfiri*[3] element of Boko Haram ideology, which distinguishes them as a unique and unadulterated force encircled by a Northern elite who had allowed themselves to be corrupted by secular influences. Their consistent targeting of key Islamic figures in the North evinces the sharp rupture between them and conventional authorities within the region (P. 13). Yet, it would not be preposterous to view former President Jonathan's response to the insurgency as deeply politicised which was a major challenge that confronted anti-Boko Haram efforts.

Beyond that, former President Jonathan equally projected uncertainty on how to deal with the group which reflected in the somewhat inconsistent response that flirted between heavy military response and appeasement. The lack of consistency, or not having a clear direction in terms of what counterinsurgency policy to adopt reflected in the series of embarrassing setbacks for the campaign to contain and defeat Boko Haram.

4.3.1. Contending issues regarding the declaration of emergency rule

When the state of emergency was declared in the three North Eastern States of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, the issue of political correctness became a factor that militated against the security operations that followed. According to a respondent, the debate over the real intensions of the Federal Government in declaring the emergency rule made it not to enjoy maximum support from the political leadership of the affected states who harboured fear of being the target in terms of their political influence being undermined (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016). Their fears were not unfounded considering the antecedents of emergency rule declaration under Nigeria's Fourth Republic. When former President Obasanjo declared emergency rule in Plateau (May 2004) and Ekiti (October 2006) States, the leadership of the states were removed and replaced by sole administrators. In the two examples above, the emergency rule and removal of the leadership was considered political as the President's way of dealing with recalcitrant state governors or politicians who were not in his good books.

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[3] A *takfiri* represents a Muslim who accuses or pronounces another Muslim or adherents of another faith as an apostate or infidel. *Takfir* is the accusation or pronouncement itself which could be used to sanction violence against leaders deemed impure or corrupted. It is a major cause of sectarianism.

To douse the apprehension of the governors of the affected North Eastern States, as well as to garner support for the decision, former President Jonathan in his declaration, decided that established political authority in the states would remain and continue to perform the function of governance. However, that particular decision raised other debates about the legality or probity of retaining the state governors. Examining this in the mirror of the Constitution, there is no place in the Constitution that provides for the removal of a sitting Governor when a state of emergency is proclaimed in a state. Rather, the Constitution as amended, in Section 305 (4) empowers the governor to request the president to issue a proclamation of a state of emergency in his state when the situations stipulated under subsection 3(1), (d) and (e) occur. In other words, President Obasanjo's removal of the Governors of Ekiti and Plateau Stateswhena state of emergency was declared could be said to have been borne out of autocratic propensity as it was unconstitutional and inappropriate.

Another major challenge that confronted the emergency rule had to do with the consequences of the declaration on the citizens' enjoyment and enforcement of fundamental rights. Respondents contended that the execution of emergency rule impacted the fundamental rights of the local population. Two key areas were identified: impact on the freedom of movement as well as violation of their rights by the security forces including unfair profiling, arbitrary arrest and detention without due process, torture, extortion and other forms of ill-treatments (Interview, Yola, 28 December, 2016). Yet, a counter-argument was provided that, while security agencies do not necessarily set out to violate human and peoples' rights during emergency rule, the fact is that in a state of emergency certain fundamental rights could be derogated and watered down for the purpose of attaining public safety and national security (Interview, Abuja, 16 Agust, 2016).

Furthermore, a little erosion of rights is covered by the Constitution in section 45 (1) and (2) which states that core human rights can be restricted for public interest, safety, and defence. As one respondent observed, citizens' rights can only thrive, flourish, and be protected in a harmonious, peaceful and safe climate in a state. Where a state is in the throes of violence and insecurity, such rights lose its flavour (Interview, Damaturu, 27 December, 2016). Flowing therefrom is the argument that emergency powers are exercised to protect a state from the problems of insecurity making it reasonable that certain rights

are curtailed (for example through imposition of curfew) for the aim of the rule to be achieved. Thus, the end of emergency rule is the restoration of a peaceful environment where the local population can fully enjoy their rights.

In addition, the alleged politicisation of government response was said to have adversely affected the funding and provision of necessary equipment to the operations of the JTF that was deployed under emergency rule.During the state of emergency, several soldiers and personnel of other security agencies complained of a dearth of usable equipment, despite the fact that the security budget had increased every year since 2009 (Liman, 2015). The effect was the widespread speculation that the President and other senior party figures including top security officials were siphoning funds away from the counterterrorism effort. A respondent observed that the various government responses to Boko Haram terrorism under the Jonathan administration largely suffered from theft of funds meant for arms and other requirements needed to prosecute the fight against Boko Haram (Interview, Abuja, 18 August, 2016).

4.3.2.Challenges of the military operations

Much of the challenges that confronted the military operation against Boko Haram had little to do with the military strategy of containment and defeat. Rather, it was more or less a matter of tactics or put differently, how the strategy was executed. Obviously, the first major challenge that confronted the military was its inexperience in dealing with unconventional warfare. Apart from participating in regional and international peacekeeping operations, Nigeria's military had not been involved in a major war since 1970. Largely, the Nigerian military was trained to confront conventional warfare and had little or no operational experience or ability to fend off guerrilla fighters, particularly those who are deeply embedded in the local population. Thus, when it was first deployed into the conflict theatre, it faced the challenge of dealing with an irregular warfare.

The military had the problem of adopting a flexible strategy that directly countered that of Boko Haram. The decision to confront Boko Haram using largely conventional military strategy had its setback. The military's approach and training revolved around conventional warfare. But it became clear that fighting Boko Haram insurgency and terrorism also required adopting unconventional strategies of asymmetric combat. The Boko Haram crisis

was a war that the military did not really know who the enemies were and where they were. Clearly, the enemies were very difficult to identify. Consequently, the military had to recalibrate its strategy to adopted unconventional methods or what Falode (2016) referred to as bush war. Alluding to the changes made and the effect, Brigadier General Rabe Abubakar stated that,

> Because of the changes we have done from conventional training to unconventional training to accommodate the asymmetric nature (of Boko Haram terrorism); to accommodate the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism factors, that's what led to the tremendous success recorded by the military (Interview, Abuja, 13 August, 2016).

Beyond that, it has been argued that political encumbrances constituted a limitation to the military strategy. However, there is little concrete evidence to suggest that military operation was deliberately sabotaged by the political class. Nevertheless, there was the debate that some of the military decisions that were taken regarding the fight against Boko Haram were not a product of recommendations by the military leadership but the handiwork of the political elites who had vested interests in the political situation in the North East. The first one that comes to mind is the declaration of emergency rule which propelled further military involvement in the North East. Whether positive or negative, the decision to declare state of emergency and the terms and references of the declaration, it was argued, had little input from the military authorities (Interview, Adamawa, 26 December, 2016).

Although the military authorities refuted the above suggestion, it could be gleaned from some of the responses of the military respondents that political interference constituted a challenge to the operations in the North East. Excerpt from an interviewee's response states,

> The military is a creation of the state. It is not a creation of regimes. Political regimes have lifespan, but states do not. The military as a creation of the state must be made to sustain the state. Where you disintegrate the fabrics upon which the military foundation and ethics are built, then of course you are also building a crack in the foundation of the state. We must do everything possible to educate our populace so that they understand where politicians delve into the realm of deceit, where they have delve into misinforming the public, then the public will be discerning

enough to understand that the military involvement in this matter has nothing to do with politics. And where politicians are also delving into issues that are purely military and operational matters, then of course the populace can know what to do to be able to stop the politicians from interfering in such matters. That's…perhaps the best answer I can offer (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

In the same vein, another respondent averred,

"Hot" decisions were required at that particular time to ensure that we kept moving as a nation. However, the issue of security has been politicised lately...even with that, militarily, we achieved some level of success against Boko Haram despite some acts which are unprofessional (Interview, Abuja, 13 August, 2016).

Flowing therefrom, is the argument that military operation against Boko Haram was perhaps, deliberately or inadvertently sabotaged by alleged conspiratorial arrangements between government officials, politicians and top military officers who became conflict entrepreneurs in the North East. It is argued that this corrupt fraternization robbed the military of the necessary funding, equipment and other requirements that were critical to effectively prosecute the counterterrorism operations against Boko Haram. Despite the upward movement in terms of defence budget on a yearly basis, it did not directly translate into significant improvement in terms of military victories in the theatre of conflict. Rather than military winning the war, Boko Haram rapidly expanded its territorial control across the North East and beyond.

The challenge of military operation was further compounded by allegations of theft of funds meant for the military operation. Confirming this, Nigeria's Vice President, Yemi Osinbajo lamented that investigation into alleged theft of defense money revealed that 15 billion dollars of defense fund was unaccounted for (cited in *Vanguard,* 30 June, 2017). Inadequate funding had dire consequences on military effectiveness against Boko Haram terrorism. As noted by a respondent, the military strategy was good, but the means to prosecute the strategy was lacking:

For you to be able to achieve the strategy there must be ways and means. It is one thing to enunciate the strategy; it is another thing to be able to apply the appropriate ways and means to be able to achieve the end. The strategy is great, but more importantly, there are other elements that must be put in place for it to be able to

translate into the end which is containment and defeat (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

The means were not available to prosecute the war against Boko Haram according to Nigeria's Minster of Information, Lai Mohammed. According to Mohammed, government officials, politicians, businessmen and military officers connived to rob the Nigerian military of its prowess. Weapons were either not bought, or where they were, substandard or faulty ones were bought. He argued that the troops lacked the much-needed morale and operational vehicles and other equipment which they needed for an effective prosecution of the war. The weapons, munitions and equipment allegedly bought by the Jonathan administration were merely refurbished and lacked the basic components and spare parts. Additionally, the ammunition bought for both high calibre and small weapons had mostly expired, were incompatible with weapons and were grossly inadequate "That explains why troops remained largely static and were unable to effectively deploy to completely rout the Boko Haram terrorists in all their known enclaves" (Mohammed, 2016).

Supporting this view, a respondent claimed that ordinary military items such as boots, uniforms and food were in short supply to troops in the conflict theatres. Sleeping conditions in the field were terrible. Allowances meant for the soldiers were either not paid on time, in full, or not paid at all. Added to this was that Boko Haram terrorists were better armed, better motivated and better prepared than the Nigerian soldiers (Interview, Damaturu, 27 December, 2016). These challenges affected the morale of the Nigerian troops who were in constant fear of Boko Haram attack. And when the sect did attack, arms, ammunition and armoured vehicles belonging to the military were either captured or stolen by the sect.

Generally outgunned and outnumbered by the terrorists in some areas, no bullet-proof vests, poor allowance and bad food, the low morale of troops soon turned into frustration leading to rebellion against their commanding officers. In 2014, frustrated and angry soldiers in Maiduguri fired directly at the vehicle conveying a Commanding Officer, Major General Ahmadu Mohammed, Commander of Army's 7 Division, although he was not hit. The challenge confronting the military in the North East was such that Kashim Shettima, the Governor of Borno State—the worst hit in the region—contended also that Boko Haram was better armed and better motivated than "our own troops." He concluded that

"given the present state of affairs, it is absolutely impossible for us to defeat Boko Haram" (Shettima, cited in Aljazeera, 17 February, 2014).

While Governor Shettima may have made a point about Boko Haram being well prepared to battle the Nigerian security forces, questions remained as to whether the group was actually better armed than the Nigerian military. While concrete evidence as to where Boko Haram gets its weapons from remains scare, there are credible reasons to suggest that most of the weapons it deploys are stolen from Nigerian military sources. Besides the theft and sale of arms to Boko Haram by corrupt military officers (*Associated Press*, September 4, 2016) and weapons likely smuggled in from foreign countries such as Libya, Chad and Niger, Boko Haram has repeatedly attacked military bases particularly in Borno and Yobe States, including the attacks on military bases on Arege, near Lake Chad, Buni Yadi, Baga, Logomani, near Gamboru. In these attacks, the group has successfully carted away valuable military hardware, including anti-craft gun trucks, Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, MOWAG vehicles, technical pick-up trucks with mounted guns and armored personnel carriers. The group has displayed several propaganda videos showing tanks and armored vehicles captured during many of its raids on the Nigerian military. In fact, it had in its arsenal, the very sophisticated Panhard ERC-90 Sagaie—a wheeled armored battle vehicle of French origin—likely stolen from the Nigerian military armory, until it was retaken by the Nigerian military (Campbell, 2014).

Nonetheless, Boko Haram appeared to have the upper hand during many of its confrontations with the Nigerian security forces. With the good equipment the soldiers had frequently captured by the opponent, and the absence of basic equipment ranging from boots to tanks, the soldiers were left to contend with not only Boko Haram, but also, the general poor state of weapons and equipment. Many of the remaining armored vehicles and tanks earlier purchased by previous administrations had broken down or were in a state of disrepair. One of the soldiers complained of "tanks only firing twice, armored personnel carrier running for 10-15 minutes before overheating, machine guns jamming, and mortar shells failing to detonate" (*The Defence Post,* January 25, 2019). These challenges probably convinced Governor Shettima and many others, including soldiers, that Boko Haram was better equipped than the Nigerian military.

The operational capacity of the military improved following the inception of the Buhari administration. Some of the challenges that were experienced earlier were mitigated following improvement in funding of the military operation. New and second-hand hardware were acquired for all three branches of the military to enhance its battles against Boko Haram. These weapons included armoured vehicles such as BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, RM-70 122 mm self-propelled multiple rocket launchers and T-72M1 tanks, small arms, combat aircraft and large and small naval vessels. In 2017, the Nigerian government ordered$593 million worth of military equipment from the United States (*Quartz Africa,* August 29, 2017). These weapons included 12 Super Tucano A-29 surveillance and attack planes with capacity to perform reconnaissance and surveillance missions, as well as providing close air support to ground troops. The Super Tucano A-29 crafts are considered game changers in counterinsurgency operations. However, the order's delivery date of 2024 has been condemned by many as too far considering the dire need of the military for immediate, tangible result against the terrorists.The military also improved on its domestically manufactured and assembled small arms and armoured vehicles while refurbishing and upgrading aircraft with foreign assistance.

Furthermore, the military strategy encountered topographical or geographical challenges, especially in Borno State. Besides the vastness of Sambisa forest estimated to be about 60,000 sqm, the weather conditions usually presented some form of challenges to the military which slowed down its operations against the group in the region. Weather conditions usually affected the operation as the terrain is not a friendly terrain especially during the rainy season. Inclement weather often stalled some aspect of the military operation thus affecting momentum of the troops against the terrorists. For example, mine resistance vehicles which are crucial to clear the mines before ground troops can move in with other vehicles cannot operate because of the marsh nature of the terrain. The military had not acquired the necessary platforms that could be deployed under such weather conditions.

With regards to air operation, it was observed that though the Air Force's platforms and visibility had improved, poor weather conditions equally slowed down the deployment of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and attack aircrafts. According to Group Captain Famuyiwa, "even though our platforms have increased, we still cannot say

we have all the aircrafts in terms of capability; like the ability of some of those platforms to operate all weather. If you have the capability to operate all weather—day and night, that means that at any time, you are sure that you can conduct your operation. That becomes an advantage (Interview, Abuja, 18 August, 2016).

There was the problem of military high-handedness and human rights violations. Criticism came from both local and international human rights organisations, who accused the military of human rights violations including extra-judicial executions. The government was equally attacked for failure to respond to such accusations of extra-judicial executions. Amnesty International (AI) contended that security operations against Boko Haram in North East by the Nigerian military forces led to extra-judicial execution of more than 1,200 people. They also reported that the security forces had arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 people, mostly young men and boys; committed innumerable acts of torture; while hundreds, if not thousands, of Nigerians had become victims of enforced disappearance. Additionally, about 7,000 people have died in military detention as a result of starvation, extreme overcrowding and denial of medical assistance (2015: 40).

Amnesty International's report finds support in the response of those interviewed in the field by the researcher. According to a respondent:

> The problem of women being raped, men being flogged and other human rights violations are hardly ever reported.So when Amnesty International is saying this is what happened here, it is true. At a point we were taking pictures of those who are...(incomplete statement by respondent) because when people die in army cell, they carry them to the mortuary here (Yola). People were put in the cell and were starved to death, and they packed them to the FMC (Federal medical Centre). It is not a hidden thing. We started documenting it, but at a point we felt there was no need. Abuse was very common as they were not prepared for the mission. The way they went about handling it was wrong and unprofessional (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

Nigerian military authorities on the other hand often launched a staunch rebuke of Amnesty International denying claims of human rights violation against the local population in the North East. While acknowledging the existence of exceptional case of such violations, it is argued that the Military had always recognised human rights issues as fundamental and

protected by laws both local and international. In response to AI, Major General Lucky Irabor noted that:

> Individual organisations and groups have perceptions. Where your rights stop is where mine begin. So when in someone else's contestation that my military engagement falls short of the demands of international human rights law, another person may view it from another perspective. Otherwise, you may also ask why I am here. I came here because issues that bother on the rights of Nigerians have been trampled upon by a group that has decided to take the law into their hands. So if I come as an arbiter and I am now being accused that I am doing what is wrong, then it stands to reason that...perhaps, somebody is trying to put logic on his head. On what grounds will I be accused that I am violating human rights? Whereas, those who have been at the core of the destruction of lives and properties have not been accused of such (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Indeed, the military acknowledges that there are cases of human rights violations committed by its personnel but not in the magnitude being brandished by international human rights organisations.

> The Nigerian military is not a creation from space. Isolated case, yes of course…that is why we have our laws that help to regulate the actions and inactions of those who are members of the military. I can be sanctioned for any misdemeanour which if taken to the realm of the civil law I will be freed. You don't measure the organisation base on selected persons who are deviants. There are criminals and armed robbers in Nigeria, does that make you one? You go to US and you find 419 people or those who are rapists and homosexual, does that make you one? You look at the aggregate assessment, If you report it what actions have they taken? Did they take any action? If they took action then of course that should absorb it. But where there is acquiescence, institutional acquiescence that's where you begin to see that institution as not being responsible (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Nevertheless, human rights activists argue that the military authorities and the Nigerian government have not done enough to address the issues of human rights abuses in the North East. The contention is that despite ample evidences on the violations committed by Nigerian security forces, the military and civilian authorities consistently failed to take meaningful action to stop them and to bring the perpetrators to justice. Executions, torture, and other widely reported abuses largely remained uninvestigated and when they were, outcome was unpunished.

For example, the Galtimari Report of 2012 on the Security Challenges in the North-East Zone of Nigeria recommended, among other things, the establishment of a judicial commission of inquiry to investigate allegations of crimes by security forces. The Jonathan's government noted that it had initiated steps through the Defence Headquarters to investigate the allegations and deal with it appropriately (PCSC-NEZ 2012). However, the specific steps taken by the investigating committee or the outcome of the investigation were never publicised. Amnesty International (2015: 102) therefore concluded that none of the military officers who were in command of units, barracks and operations in the north-east at the time when war crimes were committed by the military ever faced any disciplinary action or penalty, let alone investigation or prosecution. In fact, it was argued that some of the military commanders were instead, promoted to senior ranks and positions in the army.

A number of respondents contended that the implication of such military actionswas that they actually compromised government efforts to win the support of the local population. Human rights abuses perpetrated by the military and other security agencies made them unpopular to the local community. In addition, it equally became a factor that contributed to easy recruitment of members of the community by Boko Haram. Members of the Muslim Council of Adamawa had argued that in some communities, Boko Haram actually promised protection to the people in return for their support and loyalty (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016). Abuse of human rights equally made it difficult for the military to win hearts and minds of the local population with extended consequences on information and intelligence which the people would have easily provided to the security agencies.

The military operations in the North East also suffered the challenge of having to do with emergent threat of improvised explosive device (IED). The use of IEDs continues to pose quite a lot of challenges to the military operation. Intelligence gathering on this threat, though it has improved remains problematic. Arguably, sweeping intelligence is no intelligence. Specific or pinpoint intelligence on these threats which is crucial remains difficult to come by. The use of improvised explosive devices remains one of the most potent weapons in the hands of the Boko Haram terrorists.

4.3.3. Impediments against the MNJTF

Although the Multinational Joint Task Force recorded notable achievements against Boko Haram terrorists, it also encountered a number of challenges. The first challenge had to do with appreciating the idea behind the MNJTF. The MNJTF was supposed to be a regional defence organisation to confront a "common regional" threat—Boko Haram. However, it could not be said that the response of the MNJTF constituted a "regional response". For all the members, the philosophy of a regional response was often preceded by national response. Thus, while Nigeria's military offensive was geared towards recapturing territories under Boko Haram control and defeating the terrorists, the other three key members, excluding Benin, sought to prevent or contain Boko Haram's expansionist drive. Hence, Assanvo, Abatan and Sawadogo (2016) argued that faced with an identical phenomenon, the cooperating countries either adopted an offensive or defensive position.

Assanvo, Abatan and Sawadogo(2016) further suggest thatthese different postures restricted the regionalcooperation needed andcould be interpreted as the absence of true solidarity among the LCBCCs as each of themonly seemed willing to defend their own interests and to react to the threat depending on how it affected their own territory. However, it could be argued that these differences did not have substantial impact on the operational effectiveness of the member countries of the Multinational Joint Task Force as the urgency of the common threat, added to the geographical expansion of Boko Haram, had the effect of forcing the cooperating countries into joint action.

There was also the challenge of mutual suspicion and distrust, especially between Nigeria on the one hand, and Cameroon, Chad and Niger on the other. These countries perceived the lack of commitment by the Nigerian government to do more to foster effective response being the epicenter of the Boko Haram conflict. Particularly, they felt the attitude and lack of political will under the Jonathan administration constituted an impediment to any real progress in terms of regional response to the problem. Even within Nigeria, the President had received relentless criticisms for perceived weakness in terms of leadershipand lack of political will toeffectively combat Boko Haram.Under his mandate, cooperation with his neighbours left a lot to be desired (Assanvo, Abatan and Sawadogo, 2016).

On the other hand, the Jonathan government viewed the other members with the suspicion of supporting or being sympathetic with Boko Haram for fear of being attacked by the sect. At inception, the Buhari government did enough to reassure these other countries on the

need to strengthen regional cooperation. The outcome of President Buhari's diplomatic visits to the concerned countries reflected on the effectiveness of the MNJTF between 2015 and 2016 in the fight against Boko Haram. Yet, relations between the four main contributing countries remain tense. Evidence of this includes the persistence of uncoordinated actions by member countries and claims of victory against Boko Haram by individual countries during joint operations.

The vast and largely porous border around the Lake Chad region creates another impediment to the efforts of the MNJTF. This also relates to inadequacy of troops to effectively man these areas. The implication is that, not only is the activity of the Multinational Joint Task Force limited in scope, policing the entire border areas or even consolidating reverses made against Boko Haram by the cooperating countries remains difficult. Put differently, the number of troops available to the MNJTF is viewed as insufficient for it to effectively combat Boko Haram in the vast Lake Chad region.

The MNJTF faced financial difficulties which hindered its effectiveness. In fact, financial constraint initially delayed the deployment or operationalization of the regional force after it was established. Contributions from Nigeria and major external financiers such as the United Kingdom, the European Union and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) failed to cover the initial budget estimates of US$700 million. Again, already burdened by substantial financial cost of human and material resources deployed against Boko Haram, funding the MNJTF therefore, constituted another layer of financial burden on the troop-contributing countries. The situation was further complicated by the economic downturn in Nigeria and Chad, the two biggest military contributors to the MNJTF, triggered bythe drop in crude oil prices.

The MNJTF was faced with repeated failure of member countries to give tangible effect to their financial pledges to the body. Even after President Buhari, in 2015, promised to increase Nigeria's funding to the body, financial difficulties continued to act as a constraint to the operations of the MNJTF. Due to the financial crisis, Chad, in June 2017 threatened to withdraw some of its soldiers attached to the Multinational Joint Task Force. It complained of lack of financial support to the country who has invested huge financial and human resources into the regional offensive against Boko Haram. Chad's withdrawal would have serious consequences for the fight against Boko Haram as the area between

Chad and Nigeria is one of the most porous which would give Boko Haram terrorist a fresh impetus to dominate the area.

Lastly, language and cultural issues presented some levels of constraints to the operation of the Multinational Joint Task Force. With respect to language barrier, a respondent observed that "I had a small problem as I don't understand English very well, so I did not properly understand the brief on how the Nigerian Army operates" (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016). The large number ofactorsfromdifferentcountrieswithdifferencesinlanguage, ethnicity, religion, even military culture and superiority contest madecooperationand coordination betweenandamongmembers achallenge. These issues also reflected in the attitudes of the cooperating countrieswhich tended to focus more on their own interests rather than onthe regional approach.

4.3.4. Limitations of the C-JTF

The initial challenge that confronted members of the Civilian Joint Task Force at inception was that of acceptance by the security agencies, especially the Nigerian military. For the military, this may have been a matter of pride and the need to project an image that the military had the ability and capacity to defeat Boko Haram. However, this challenge was dealt with following official recognition of the group by the Borno State government and their acceptance by the local population as a result of their exploits against Boko Haram. It also became clear that the local knowledge of the environment which the group possessed was a potential asset that the military could utilise in its efforts against the sect. Acceptance of the group led to greater level of cooperation between them and the military to the extent that the military trained a number of Civilian JTF members on the use of arms so enable them better prepared when moving along with the military in the frontline during operations.

There was also the problem of identification and coordination of the activities of the CJTF. The CJTF, it could be argued, was a child of necessity. When the group began and started confronting Boko Haram militants, it had no official identification or recognition prompting fears that Boko Haram militants could pose as members of the group to perpetrate crime. This was also one of the reasons why the security forces, particularly, the military were reluctant to publicly associate with the Civilian JTF as it was not clear who

were actual members of the body. Dealing with this challenge and in order to gain proper official acceptance, the CJTF in Borno State decided to register with the Corporate Affairs Commission with an official name of Borno Youth for Peace and Justice. Members were equally issued identification cards and properly trained in the act of vigilantism, community policing and low level combats by the military and other security agencies. Also, the military provided the CJTF with pump action and AK-47 rifles whenever they were to embark on an operation (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Another challenge that affected the contributions of the Civilian JTF and the commendations it received both from the local populations and the government was the overbearing attitude of members of the group, abuse and extortion of members of the public. The Civilian JTF began with members who worked whole-heartedly, with full commitment and respect for the civil populace and the oath of integrity and honesty that they swore to uphold. Part of the requirement to become a member as stated earlier, was a pledge not to cheat, hurt, defraud or abuse the rights of innocent members of the local population. Over time, members of the CJTF lost touch with this solemn pledge and had become corrupted. They not only violated the rights of the locals through physical abuse, they also extorted members of the public at roadblocks and stole from the local population. Sheikh Goni, a respondent in Maiduguri claimed that even Boko Haram members successfully infiltrated the group through which they wreaked havoc in Borno State. Members of the CJTF had equally connived with security personnel to cheat and commit acts of human rights violations against the public. According to Sheikh Goni,

> Initially, they (CJTF) worked with full commitment. If you put money in their pocket, they won't collect it. But later, corruption infiltrated them. It was later discovered that members of the Boko Haram had joined the Civilian Joint Task Force. It was also discovered that members of the security agencies such as the Police and others connived with the Civilian Joint Task Force to defraud innocent people: those with farmlands, those with cattle and a whole lot of terrible things happened. To be sincere, they have been contaminated. The group has been infiltrated with a lot of useless people—thieves, drug addicts, drunkards—all manner of useless people are now part of the Civilian JTF (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

These negative acts affected the commendations and praise that the CJTF had won from the local population. It affected the trust and respect that members of the public had on them prompting a number of people to argue that some members of the Civilian JTF were no different from Boko Haram militants and the soldiers who had no regard for the dignity and safety of innocent civilians. Nevertheless, the Civilian JTF was still widely regarded as a success. Sheikh Goni added that they were instrumental to bringing peace to Maiduguri and a lot of them continued to be useful in the fight against Boko Haram. However, there was the need for the group to be "cleansed" in such a manner that the bad ones are separated from those members with good intentions who were still committed to the cause of defeating the Boko Haram terrorists.

The gallantry of the Civilian JTF also came at a cost in terms of loss of members of the group to Boko Haram terrorism. According to Gunda, between 2012 and June 2017, a total number of 680 members of the Civilian Joint Task Force was said to have died in Borno State alone while trying to repel Boko Haram terrorist attacks (cited in Punch, 30 June, 2017). Added to the loss of lives is the lack of funding, poor logistics and inadequate equipment required for the group to be more effective. The Coordinator of the CJTF in Borno State noted that the group was poorly funded or supported, particularly, by the Federal Government. Much of the support they received came from the Governor of the State who provided them with about eighty operational vehicles, free medical care for members of the CJTF and irregular allowance of fifteen thousand naira monthly. The best the group got from the Federal Government was when about thirty of its members were absorbed into service by the Department of State Services (DSS). Also, the Army, under the leadership of General Tukur Buratai employed about two hundred and fifty members of the group (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

A major challenge that confronted the contributions of the Civilian JTF was the frequent breakdown of relationship between the CJTF and security agencies, particularly, the military. What the group considered as frequent and undue arrest of its members, especially those at its leadership cadre, was a major stumbling block in terms of effective synergy between the CJTF and the military. The military had accused some members of the CJTF of either being Boko Haram members or sympathisers, a claim that the group rejected. On several occasions, this boiled over prompting the CJTF to threaten to either down tools or

stop collaborating with the military. In the words of Abba-Aji Kalli, State Coordinator of the CJTF, Borno State:

> The biggest challenge we are now facing is that we are at loggerheads with the military. We don't have good relationship right now. As I am talking to you right now, our members have decided not to collaborate with any security outfit. They arrested our Sector 2 Commander linking him with cow rustling. It's all mere allegations. Our Sector 10 Commander was also arrested because they were looking for his driver. Somebody's crime should not be your crime. We agreed that henceforth, we will not collaborate with them until the Federal Government tells us what kind of protection they have for our members and their families. Somebody came and videoed our meeting and took it to the military intelligence and others. Then they came and picked up the two leaders of our intelligence unit. They were detained (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Members of the Civilian JTF accused some military top commanders of deliberately sabotaging the anti-Boko Haram operation for pecuniary gains by creating problems with members of the Civilian JTF. The military intelligence Commander in Borno was specifically accused of destabilising the cordial relationship they had with the military by labeling their members as Boko Haram. The fractious relationship got to a boiling point in the last quarter of 2016 when a very senior leader of the CJTF was arrested by the military:

> My Commander General was also arrested, handcuffed and taken away. We called a meeting of all the local governments, about 1000 members attended and were ready to go and drop our vehicles at the Shehu's Palace to give to the Governor that we will not work again. Because of this, most of our boys were ready to leave the job. They (the military) told us, we heard them; that they will pick us one by one. If this man (military intelligence Commander) remains here, things will not go well. We have committed ourselves to help out country and it has now become a crime to do so (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Although the Borno State Government intervened and reconciled members of the CJTF with the military, lack of trust remained one of the biggest issues between the military and the Civilian JTF. It hampered smooth relationship and collaboration between the two parties. While it may not be out of place that Boko Haram members might have infiltrated the ranks of the CJTF, unrelenting suspicion, arrest and detention of the members by the military without coordination with the leadership of the CJTF continued to fuel discord. This in turn affected the willingness of the group to effortlessly provide the military with

necessary intelligence and other forms of assistance which would have been very useful in the counterterrorism operation against Boko Haram.

4.3.5.Legal impediments and the challenge of prosecuting terrorism-related cases

Although Nigeria recorded successful prosecution of Boko Haram terrorism-related cases by relying on the relevant laws, prosecuting terrorism-related cases in Nigeria remains a daunting task owing to a number of factors. These include inexperience of the judiciary in handling terrorism-related cases, the lack of cooperation with those who should furnish government prosecutors with relevant information, problem of transparency in the investigation process, issues that have to do with the competency of the counsel, perceived incorrigibility of trial judges, and lacunas in the law which defense counsels often exploited using underhand tactics. There is also the difficulty of prosecuting "the Nigerian big man" and the problem of funding and high cost of investigation and prosecution. As at 2014, over 350 suspected Boko Haram terrorists had been recommended by the Nigerian military for trial at a federal high court for terrorist activities in the North East (Ejiofor, 2015) with little success due to various limitations.

One of the earliest challenges encountered in prosecuting terrorism-related cases had to do with the prohibition of retroactive criminal laws. The principle of non-retroactivity in the application of criminal law posed some impediments in the application of the TPA. Thus, a number of alleged Boko Haram members, sponsors and sympathisers who were held in various detention centres and prisons on terrorism-related charges before the TPA came into force could not be prosecuted under the terrorism act. Hence, as stated earlier, the successful prosecution of Kabiru Sokoto was only possible as the government prosecutors relied mainly on the Section 15 of the 2004 EFCC Act that criminalises the form of financial or related support for acts of terrorism. Under the EFCC Act, such offender is liable, on conviction, to life imprisonment.Nonetheless, adherence to the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law was important as non-adherence could not have been justified under international law. As stated in article 15 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR,1966), "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.""Nor shall a heavier penalty be

imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed."

One fallout of the principle of non-retroactive criminal law was that government officials inadvertently held on to many of the alleged Boko Haram members for years without prosecuting them in a competent court of law. This amounted to a violation of their rights as Nigerians and as human beings. Closely related to this was the condition of their detainment. Many detainees were cramped up in detention centres that were unkempt, overcrowded and literarily unfit for human habitation. These issues, according to the Muslim Council of Adamawa, constituted some of the allegations of human rights violations that there levied against the Nigerian security forces (Interview, Yola, 26 December, 2016).

Furthermore, it was argued that legal practitioners contributed to the ineffectiveness of the prosecution of terrorism-related cases, especially the defense lawyers of suspects, through the filing of fictitious and frivolous applications in the form of motion ex parte, adjournments, appeals and so on. It was observed that these delay tactics were often deployed especially when a counsel knows that the evidence against his client was overwhelming and that to defend such may be difficult. Hence they adopted such tactics to frustrate the administration of justice. Emmanuel Kaswe, a respondent claimed that defense counsels for alleged terrorists or supporters of terrorism often resorted to all sorts of legal trickery and stratagems to either frustrate the trial or weaken the evidence presented against their clients so as to make it look manifestly unsupportable. According to Kaswe,

> The problem we were having was that defense counsels capitalised on some provisions in the law to drag matters. They raise preliminary objection which the Court has to hear...The Court gives its ruling; they appeal to the Appellate Court. The moment they are going for that appeal they file a stay of proceeding at the Trial Court. Before that matter will be heard and dispensed with in the Court of Appeal, minimum 1-2 years. When the Appeal Court gives its ruling, they file further appeal to the Supreme Court. As they are going, they file another stay of proceedings. At the end of the day, on appeal alone, they can spend nine years. By the time they come back, after the Court says the Trial Court has jurisdiction, they file bail application before arraignment. The Court gives its ruling one. Of course no Court will close its eye to say that it wants to grant bail to a defendant in a terrorism-related

trial, especially when he can observe from the proof of evidence that there's overwhelming evidence against the defendant. So the moment they file that kind of bail application, the Court rules against them. They go again on another appeal. That is the strategy that was being employed before the birth of Administration of Criminal Justice Act (Interview, Abuja, 16 August, 2016).

Even with the coming into force of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, (ACJA, 2015) which prohibits staying of proceedings, defense lawyers still found a way to slow down or frustrate trials through incessant interlocutory appeals on virtually every issue which could conveniently have be taken holistically on appeal. This remains a major obstacle to prosecution of terrorism cases. The encumbrances are even more daunting when the issue has to do with the super-rich and very influential sympathisers and backers of Boko Haram. These elites include legislators, businessmen, (ex)governors, ministers, civil servants and occupants of different types of political positions. They are often perceived by Nigerians as being "above the law" who could never be brought to account for their wrongs. They could easily afford to engage the services of the best of lawyers and Senior Advocates.

The calibre of persons involved in these high profile cases are persons that can influence anybody, including the bosses of the prosecutorial officers rendering them ineffective.Thus, despite the elaborate procedure laid down in Section 396 subsections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the ACJA, 2015 to quicken the hearing and determination of criminal cases, these influential individuals have been able to employ underhand tactics including through their defense Counsel to frustrate its application.

In addition to the above was the problem of funding investigation and prosecution of cases. With regard to this challenge, the respondent added,

> Funding is the principal challenge. Members of the public have a civic responsibility to the state; one of which is to come and give evidence where they are listed as witnesses. Now if you cannot fund the transportation cost of such potential prosecution witnesses you don't expect them to come to court. It is good enough and kind enough for them to say they are coming to testify in a terrorism case, because you know, the security and safety and all this things are the upper most consideration for everybody. So if they are ready to come and testify, then you must be ready to shoulder their responsibility. The ACJA says that it is the duty of the court to foot

those bills. As soon as they come and testify, the court should reimburse their expenses. But unfortunately, the court will tell you that there is no budgetary allocation. At the end of the day, it will be case of a child with too many mothers. While mother A will be thinking that mother B would feed it, mother B would have thought that mother A had fed it. So at the end of the day he goes hungry. That is the situation. Most times you have some of these cases being frustrated on account of inability of witnesses to come to court and testify due to lack of necessary funds to take care of issues like this (Interview, Abuja, 16 August, 2016).

Thus, the high cost of investigation and prosecution was often a factor that stalled the progress of trial. Most of the very high profile cases relating to terrorism often required quite a number of evidence and witnesses. Indeed, providing the needed evidences as well as facilitating the presentation of witnesses are very costly and lack of proper funding of such issues hampered effective prosecution of cases.

Acquiring the right evidence to prosecute such cases also proved very difficult. In some cases, witnesses are afraid to come forward and testify or provide information for fear of being attacked by the terrorists. Even where such evidences existed, suspects could go the whole length to either destroy them or ensure that they are rendered useless or ineffective in the court of law (Interview, Abuja, 10 August, 2016). In a public lecture delivered at the *Nigerian Bar Association annual conference in 2016, Special Assistant* to President Buhari on Prosecution, Okoi, *Obono-Obla, equally observed that* terrorism suspects, who in most instances, were well-heeled, sophisticated individuals would go to any length to conceal or destroy evidences that could hurt them. Under such circumstances, either the information/evidence is destroyed or watered down in such a manner that it will not be useful to law enforcement agencies. Also, it is often the case that whole files or relevant parts of them, containing incriminating materials disappear.

4.3.6. The challenge of addressing socio-economic problems and other drivers of violent extremism

The benefits of economic counterterrorism or counterinsurgency can only be experienced by the local population in the long term, but it requires a minimum level of security to be instituted. Dealing with the socio-economic issues and other systemic problems in the North East, both in the short, medium and long term have been hampered by the

unfavourable security situation in the study location. Rebuilding of schools, hospitals, markets, churches, mosques, bridges, homes and general security remained a challenge.

Field investigation showed that public infrastructures and basic social amenities which were destroyed by Boko Haram terrorists were yet to be rebuilt. In addition, although a number of internally displaced persons had returned to their villages and communities, many were still being housed in internally displaced person's camps. It was also observed that that those who had returned to their communities were unable to recover their lost means of livelihood, including farms, businesses and homes. Although the PCNI and other intervening bodies/agencies were largely able to provide the victims with food and non-food items, very little was achieved in terms of providing the victims with the most crucial support: money and agricultural facilities to enable them reconstruct or rebuild their homes, resume their farming activities and generally restart their normal lives.

Despite the gains made against Boko Haram in the military operations, Boko Haram-induced insecurity remained a threat to food security and general socio-economic development in the region. Incessant and often devastating asymmetric attacks against civilians and other target have limited the efforts of government and other local and international agencies to address the developmental challenges in the troubled area.

Without achieving a certain level of military security, it will remain difficult for the non-military strategies that deal with the socio-economic issues in the region to be very effective. It was for this reason that the government decided to give priority, first and foremost to ending the war as a prelude to more effective handling of the humanitarian crisis and then the implementation of a solid peacebuilding plan of reconciliation, de-radicalisation and reconstruction of social and physical infrastructure.

However, the stabilization and peacebuilding strategyaimed at reversing the devastating conditions created by Boko Haram crisis, including the short term measures of providing humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and resettlement of affected communities have been tarnished not only by insecurity, but also by corruption and mismanagement of the process. Efforts to resettle those affected by the crisis have been fraught with allegations of corruption while there were reports of relief materials including foodstuffs being diverted and stolen by camp officials and security agents. Such reports also suggested that women

and young girls, including widows were subjected to sexual assault and other gender-based violence. Women, having parted with all their belonging, had to reluctantly offer sexual gratification to camp officials and others just to have access to basic items such as food, water, soap and sanitary pad and the freedom to move in and out of internally displaced persons camps (Reuters, Tuesday September 27, 2016).

Frustrated by the situation, IDPs, on a number of occasions, staged several protests in Maiduguri accusing camp officials, security agencies and politicians of stealing food rations and other items meant for the victims. This situation inadvertently fed into the cycle of violence by fuelling local support for the terrorists. It was also said to have made it easier for Boko Haram members who had infiltrated IDP camps to persuade and recruit IDPs as suicide bombers, informants and intelligence agents for Boko Haram. The role of the new converts, guided by Boko Haram infiltrators within the camps equally facilitated smooth access to such camps for suicide bomb attacks (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016).

Besides the short term measures of humanitarian rehabilitation and resettlement, the long term measures aimed at addressing systemic challenges in the studied area were equally confronted by a number of challenges. In particular, government's almajiri education programme aimed at countering radicalism and violent extremism not only faced the problem of funding, but also, the challenge of proper coordination and sustainability. Umar (2013) rightly observed that although the almajiri school project was widely considered as one of government's functional strategy of counter-radicalization, poor strategic planning meant they were largely sited elsewhere in the Nigeria's northern region rather than focusing more in the states which constituted the main conflict theatres. Furthermore, the project suffered slow rate of construction. Lack of proper funding meant that the original plan to equip the schools with modern boarding facilities was not realised. These and other challenges constituted militating factors against the right incentives to attract the children to the schools.

Consequently, the almajiri school programme suffered the problem of low turn-out of pupils. This was complicated by other bureaucratic bottlenecks such that even in areas where the school was fully constructed and handed over to the local authorities, they failed

to attract almajiri kids and to keep them off the streets and away from the teachings of radical clerics.

Weak political commitment also constituted a challenge to government's soft power approach to counterterrorism through initiatives that were aimed at countering Boko Haram ideological narratives and promoting the idea that terrorism is un-Islamic, counterterrorism operation is not against Muslims, encouraging and empowering Muslims to speak out against terror and ensuring effective use of Muslim-Christian collaborations to prevent or stop Boko Haram's desperate goal of igniting a religious war. Although the approach was right, the government did not display the necessary zeal to utilise, in particular, existing community structures including traditional, religious and community leaders and several interfaith committees/groups within the affected areas to deliver its targeted programme of counter-radicalization and stemming inter-religious tensions that fuel terrorism. These initiatives were not properly funded, poorly managed and largely left to civil society organisations—local and international, to sponsor. For example, inter-religious committees across the three North Eastern States of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe would have been more effective had the government provided the right leadership to compliment the efforts of civil society organisations that commendably channeled considerable funding and other resources into peacebuilding activities in the studied locations.

Thus, in addition to the above, ending endemic poverty and youth unemployment in the North East remained a major part of the challenge that confronted the government in dealing with the Boko Haram crisis. True enough, poverty permeates every region in the country; however, Boko Haram terrorism left in its trails grave human security issues in the North East. The region was already considered the poorest in Nigeria before the emergence of Boko Haram. Demographically, it not only constituted the bulk of Nigeria's population, it lagged behind others in various human development indices including the number of out-of-school children, adult literacy, maternal mortality, infant mortality, income per capita, unemployment and so on. The unenviable position of the region made the Emir of Kano, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi to conclude that the North-East is among the poorest parts of the world (*Punch*, April 6, 2017). Reversing the devastation to the pre-Boko Haram era remained daunting let alone improving on it.

The challenge of tackling poverty and youth unemployment in the region was further compounded by the problems of funding, corruption and weak political commitment amongst others. The implication was that the Nigerian government was not able to effectively implement its non-military strategy of addressing the infrastructural deficits and other broad socio-economic, religious and political issues in the North East which serve as underlying causes of the Boko Haram crisis.

4.3.7. The difficulty of dialoging with Boko Haram

There were a number of challenges that confronted government's non-adversarial strategy of dialogue with Boko Haram. These included inconsistent strategy on the part of the government, the activities of fraudsters who intended to profit from the process, Boko Haram suspicion of government's intent as well as the division within its own ranks.

The prospect of dialogue achieving the right result was already narrow from the moment the idea was officially mooted. This is due to the inconsistent strategy that the Nigerian government adopted in dealing with the sect members. Although experts in military strategy contend that force and persuasion can be applied simultaneously in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operation (Masellis, 2012), its application requires finesse and deep understanding of how to blend both strategies, otherwise, it will create trust deficit. Yet, trust is the lubricant that greases the tense atmosphere of conflict and reduces friction.

Advocating dialogue at the same time that government's coercive apparatuses of state were being deployed gave the impression of government's adoption of a contradictory strategy. Former President Jonathan's "declaration of war" through the state of emergency and the subsequent deployment of troops against Boko Haram at the same time the government's dialogue committee was exploring avenues of negotiation with the sect had the effect of complicating the government's pursuit of dialogue to end the violence. Corroborating this view, former commissioner of police, Abubakar Tsav contended that imposing emergency rule while the dialogue and reconciliation committee was being asked to reach out to Boko Haram membersamounted to a bad and counterproductive approach. According to Tsav, "The state of emergency will hamper the work of the amnesty committee because it will now make it inconvenient for Boko Haram to come out and dialogue with the committee

for fear of being arrested or killed .... The measure sends conflicting signals to Boko Haram on government's sincerity in negotiations" (cited in ICG, 2014: 36).

Additionally, there was the challenge of Boko Haram suspicion. The group viewed the government asbeing insincere with the dialogue process.Boko Haram believed that government could not be trusted and only "dangled" dialogue as bait to arrest its members. One particular incident played out in 2012 which suggested Boko Haram did not view the government as trustworthy.In January 2012, the SSS arrested one Abul Qaqa in Kaduna said to be Boko Haram spokesman. However, Boko Haram issued a reply claiming that the person arrested was Abu Dardaa, who the sect sent to Kaduna to facilitate a peace meeting with the government. According to a Boko Haram statement on February 2, 2012,

> The arrest of Abu Dardaa is an outrightdeception and betrayal by the Nigerian government and security agents. They proclaimed dialogue and are doing the opposite. His arrest has proven to us that they were waiting for us to avail (sic) ourselves so that they can arrest us (*Daily Trust*, 3 February 2012).

It accused the government of betraying its decision to participate in the dialogue process. Added to this was the sect's view that the peace process was supposed to proceed secretly without public attention. For the group, the government failed to keep the process secret, leaking vital details about the peace meeting to the press, an act it considered as a betrayal. According to the intermediary, Ibrahim Datti Ahmed,

> To our shock and dismay no sooner had we started this dialogue [then] Nigerian newspapers came out with a lot of the details of the meeting held. This development has embarrassed us very much and has created strong doubt in our mind about the sincerity of the government, as the discussion is supposed to be very confidential to achieve any success. In view of this unfortunate and unhelpful development, we have no option but to withdraw from these early discussions (cited in Agence France-Presse, 17 March 2012).

Further reacting to the arrest of its spokesman, Boko Haram on August 22, 2012 announced: "Since the Federal Government lured and arrested one of our leaders, Abu Dardaa, who was sent to dialogue on our behalf and also frustrated one facilitated by...Dr Ibrahim Datti, we have foreclosed any possibility of talks with the government" (cited in ICG, 2014: 37). ICG (2014) further noted that Boko Haram's suspicions of government's insincerity were strengthenedwhen the government on 21 June 2012 designated its leader, Shekauand others as terrorists. Further efforts at dialogue between the Presidential

Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee and Boko Haram occurred in May 2013 somewhere in Côte d'Ivoire, to which it was reported that Shekau showed considerable interest. However, any positive result was foreclosed when on June 4, the Nigerian government outlawed Boko Haram and its splinter group, Ansaru; a day after the United States had placed a $7 million reward on Shekau.Consequently on 13 July, Shekau released a short video clip, in which he ruled out any further talks with the Nigerian government (*Daily Trust*, 9 October, 2013).

The difficulties in dialoguing with Boko Haram also arose from internal divisions among the group. The dynamics of the group made it very difficult to know who exactly to deal with. While a faction was willing to negotiate with the government others blatantly refused to (Interview, Abuja, 7 October, 2016). In the past, members who were amenable to dialogue were brutally attacked and even killed by those who were against it. Corroborating this view, ICG (2014) argued that Boko Haram leadership has also had difficulties in agreeing and coordinating on common positions which undermined dialogue.In one example, it was said thatformer National Security Adviser Col. Sambo Dasuki (Rtd.), soon after his appointment in June 2012, made overtures directly to Shekau through a phone call. Shekau appeared interested but requested time so as to consult with the Shura—Boko Haram's decision making council. That body could not reach a consensus and Shekau reportedly informed the NSA that the negotiations with the government would not be possible.

The involvement of fraudsters who planned to capitalise on the call to dialogue to profit from the process was anotherimpediment to the success of the dialogue approach. After the government confirmed its intention to pursue dialogue with the sect, a number of individuals emerged pretending to be Boko Haram members or representatives of the group. These people presented fake peace proposals to the federal government and deceived the government into believing that it was actually negotiating with the true representatives of Boko Haram. In 2014, the Department of State Services (DSS) arrested an aid to Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno State, Junaid Iddrissa Khadi alongside six others-Abubakar Yusuf, Saleh Ibrahim, Abdullahi Saleh, Nurudeen Ibrahim, Mubarak Adamu and Mustapha Maidugu. They were said to have collected millions of naira from the government while pretending to be member of the sect (Chinwe, 2014). In turn, Boko

Haram also disowned several shadowy individuals who claimed to be speaking on its behalf.

The deceit was not only perpetrated by private individuals, it was observedthat government officials seeking to make private gain were equally involved in the conspiracy to deceive the state. These officials allegedly sponsored impostors to pose as peace negotiators.There were allegations that these conflict profiteers also deliberately sabotaged government's efforts to end the violence. According to the ICG (2014), they included government officials, security chiefs and contractors supplying military hardware who had pocketed substantial sums from defence and security appropriations.

4.3.8.Limitations of government's media and propaganda strategy

Perceived inexperience or weakness of the handlers of government media infrastructure presented some challenges to the effectiveness of government's media strategy against Boko Haram. Especially, poor public relations management of the Presidency affected government's media and propaganda strategy against the sect. The tendency to always play the victim gave credibility to Boko Haram inadvertently positively impacted on its recruitment (Interview, Abuja, 16 August, 2016). On several occasions, confusing narratives from the government were peppered with series of accusations against a variety of groups leaving the public rather confused about the true picture of things.

Rather than properly leveraging on wide international acceptance of Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation to seek global support, the government resorted to blaming the United States and the international community of insufficient support in its war against the terrorist group. Describing Boko Haram's escalated attacks as the machinations of political opponents and publicly blaming regional elites for lack of support as well as the latter claim that Boko Haram had infiltrated the government, only served to suggest that the government was not on top of the matter. Even if the accusations were true, the mode of presentation and the tone they often took raised believability issues as it failed to adequately pass across the intended message leaving the government to grapple with legitimacy issues.

A series of media gaffes further accentuated the challenge of poor media management of Boko Haram terrorism by the government. There was the case where the handlers of President's media refused to comment on the massacre that occurred in Baga, while simultaneously lending its voice to the international criticism that greeted the Paris attacks on satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*. Many media and communication experts felt the government shot itself in the leg by being quick to condemn international terrorism and extremely slow to even confirm, rather than condemn worse attacks perpetrated by its home-grown terrorist group—Boko Haram (Magnowsk and Onu, 2015).

The activities of the Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG) group through its social media campaign *#BringBackOurGirls* and the international media attention it garnered equally constituted a challenge. It served to magnify the inactions (or slow action) of the Nigerian government whose credibility took a huge hit afterwards. The government had somehow insisted that the Chibok girls abduction was an elaborate hoax, refusing to present a response until series of popular protests were held in the capital city Abuja. Furthermore, the Nigerian army demonstrated its own confusion by issuing a false statement claiming it had liberated more than 100 of the girls, only to latter, embarrassingly, retract the statement (Abubakar, Karimi and Almasy, 2014).

In a 2016 seminar lecture series on the #BBOG activism, Professor Olawale Albert of the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies of the University of Ibadan also observed that, with all its positive sides, the activities of the BBOG group constituted a challenge to the Nigerian government as it has continued to give a black eye to government's media and propaganda warfare against Boko Haram. Former President Jonathan and his wife, First Lady Dame Patience Jonathan aggravated the issue with their catastrophic public relations management. St-Pierre, (2015) beautifully described how, indeed, the President openly blamed parents of the kidnapped girls for their lack of cooperation, while his wife had one of the mothers of the abducted Chibok girls arrested because she felt "slighted" and like the President, accused some of fabricating the abductions as a political move to discredit her husband's government.

There was also the problem of over-politicisation and playing to the gallery. In a bid to score cheap political point, and apparently mindless to the implications, former President Jonathan and the then ruling Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) media team would later re-

adjust the slogan of the BBOG protesters for his re-election campaign. While the former insisted that the government "Bring Back Our Girls", the Jonathan campaign recommended to the electorates to "Bring Back Jonathan". These poor media management served to paint the Nigeria government in a bad light leading many to doubt the seriousness and sincerity of the government in addressing the Boko Haram terrorism (Interview, Abuja, 23 September, 2016).

Lastly, respondents also observed that government's media and propaganda outreach was not aggressive and far-reaching enough in terms of scope of coverage and depth (Interview, Maiduguri, 28 December, 2016). Government's public enlightenment and rural information programmes and other measures to counter-Boko Haram media strategy did not permeate all critical avenues. Particularly, it failedto reach the vulnerable population and the neglected periphery in the studied location. Thus, the approach was limited in reducingBoko Haram's influence and regenerative capability in the region.

CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1.1.Summary

The study examined the dynamics of Nigerian government's conflict management strategies in addressing the Boko Haram terrorism from 2009 to 2016. Specifically, it identified the various conflict management strategies employed by the government in addressing the crisis, the effectiveness of the strategies and as well as the challenges that confronted each of the conflict management strategies.

Paul Lederach's (1995) conflict transformation theory was utilised as the framework of analysis with particular focus on the deployment or utilization of problem-solving conflict management strategies that directly address the structural root causes of the conflict. The tenet of the theory was useful in making recommendations on how the actors in the conflict theatres in the North East can move from chaos to harmony essentially by focusing on the management of the socio-economic perspective and other underlying factors that triggered and exacerbated the Boko Haram violence.

Furthermore, a combination ofcase study and exploratory research designs provided a blue print for data collection and analysis. The main focus of the study was on Maiduguri

(Borno), Damaturu (Yobe) and Yola (Adamawa) largely considered as the main theatres of Boko Haram terrorism. Maiduguri in particular, is widely viewed as the birthplace of the Boko Haram sect. Thus, the capital cities of the three selected states constituted the study locations.A total of 33 in-depth interviews were purposively conducted with officials of theTheatre Command, Operation Lafiya Dole (Maiduguri); the Nigerian military; Multinational Joint Task Force; Nigeria Police; Office of the National Security Adviser; National Defence College; traditional rulers; religious leaders and Civilian Joint Task Force. Other respondents includedthe Chairman, House Committee on Interior, National Human Rights Commission, Federal Ministry of Justice, Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, National Orientation Agency and Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (1). Books, journal articles and reports from government and non-governmental organisations constituted secondary sources of data. Data got from field investigation was content analysed using descriptive and narrative styles. A summary of the major findings, conclusions and recommendations are presented in this chapter.

The study identified a number of conflict management strategies adopted by the Nigerian government in addressing the Boko Haram terrorism which could be classified broadly under three layers of strategy—*hard, soft* and *smart power*. The hard power strategies included the establishment of a joint task force (comprising personnel of various security agencies), declaration of state of emergency, military operations including through international military cooperation, as well as the involvement of the Civilian JTF. The soft power strategies largely involved the deployment of anti-terrorism legislations such as the TPA (2011 and 2013), dialogue and amnesty proposal, addressing systemic/socio-economic problems in the region including poverty, youth unemployment and illiteracy. Others included efforts at building bridges through inter-religious dialogue, development of a media and propaganda infrastructure and de-radicalisation programmes. To address the socio-economic aspect of the crisis, the VSF, PINE, NERI and NEDC were all established as interventionist agencies and coordinated by the PCNI (Presidential Committee on North East Initiatives.

However, government's initial response was avoidance as it basically treated the sect as an outlaw and a malfeasance. This perception of the sect largely influenced the use of police

action against its members. As the group metamorphosed into a vicious insurgent and later, terrorist group, government also recalibrated its response strategies. Yet, these strategies were deployed in no particular coherent sequence in addressing Boko Haram terrorism. The study discovered two main reasons for the inconsistency and incoherence in government's response to the crisis. The first had to do with the relative inexperience of the government regarding how to prosecute an irregular warfare of this magnitude which the country was faced with for the first time. Second, the difficulty to evolve a coherent counterterrorism strategy in response to the Boko Haram issue largely emanated from the fluidity and adaptability of the sect to the conflict environment in the North East.

Government's initial response to the eruption of Boko Haram violence in 2009 was effective to the extent that it successfully contained the violence and suppressed the group's activities for about a year. However, the poor handling of the aftermath, especially the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the group's leader, and the indiscriminate violation of human rights and alleged extra-judicial killings became the motivation for the re-emergence of a more brutal, merciless and devastating Boko Haram terrorist organisation.

The deployment of hard power strategies was also effective to the extent that they successfully contained Boko Haram terrorism both in intensity and spread. Although it began to achieve some measure of success from the last quarter of 2014, military operations became evidently effective from late 2015 and this is attributable to the emergence of the Muhammadu Buhari administration which reinvigorated the counter-terrorism operation against Boko Haram. In particular, the movement of military high command, the rejigging of the MNJTF, better military equipment and so on, resulted in the territorial displacement of Boko Haram, recovery of territories, rescue of kidnapped victims and the general weakening of the group's capabilities and overall threats to national security.

Furthermore, the Civilian JTF, especially in Borno State, made very important contributions to military successes against Boko Haram in four major areas: it acted as a local guide for the military through difficult terrains and forest regions in the North East. The CJTF provided useful intelligence and information to security forces on Boko Haram hideouts both in the forests and within the local communities. They also participated in repelling Boko Haram attacks and assisted in liberating or recapturing territories that were

under Boko Haram attacks. Lastly, they acted as local security for communities that were deserted by Nigerian security forces including soldiers.

The non-militarised strategies also yielded some level of success. In particular, the legal frameworks on terrorism helped in the arrest, prosecution and conviction of some Boko Haram members, the high point being the conviction of Mustapha Umar, the bomber of *This Day* newspaper publishing firm. On the other hand, government's PR campaign yielded mix results. While the reorganisation of Defence Information Unit, the media unit of the presidency and the establishment of the National Information Centre to coordinate government's information dissemination on the Boko Haram crisis contributed, to some extent, to improving the image of the Nigerian government, it was largely unable to change broad public opinion that government's media and propaganda campaign was bested by those of the terrorist group.

Although commendable, government's strategies and initiatives to address the socio-economic problems of the North East yielded minimal positive outcomes. Very little had been achieved through the various development initiatives. Apart from providing the victims of Boko haram terrorism relief items such as food stuff, household items like matrasses and occasionally, free medical check-ups and so on, these initiatives did not address the real issue of rebuilding the Boko Haram-ravaged communities and providing security and other concrete incentives that would allow the internally displaced persons return and restart their lives.

The study also discovered that the dialogue option was viewed by a considerable number of respondents a useful tool only for mitigating Boko Haram terrorism since the group had in the past showed the willingness to dialogue with the government. While it did not reduce Boko Haram attacks, it resulted in the release of some Chibok school girls who were kidnapped by Boko Haram in 2014. Inconsistency in terms of approach on the part of the government, the activities of fraudsters who intended to profit from the process, Boko Haram suspicion of government's intent as well as the division within its own ranks militated against the dialogue process between the government and Boko Haram.

Finally, on a general note, the study found out that Nigerian government's conflict management strategies were beset with some challenges such as operational inexperience

of the military in dealing with unconventional warfare, political interference and mismanagement of funds meant for counter-terrorism operations, accusations of human rights violation by the military, poor media and propaganda strategy, difficulty of dialoguing with Boko Haram, challenges of prosecuting terrorism-related cases as well as the challenge of addressing socio-economic problems and other drivers of violent extremism such as poverty, unemployment and the rebuilding of communities destroyed by Boko Haram terrorism.

1.2.Conclusion

Government conflict management strategies though achieved some measure of success in addressing Boko Haram terrorism, were still beset with a lot challenges. In terms of the successes, the military approach successfully decimated the sect's capacity to continue its terrorist activities. It also resulted in the territorial displacement of the group and limiting its activities to certain areas of Borno and Yobe States. In the past, Boko Haram had the capacity to attack far-flung areas beyond the studied locations. It easily perpetrated its terrorist activities in places like the Federal capital territory, Abuja, Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Gombe, Bauchi, Kogi and even operated in the southern parts of the country. The military strategy, especially after 2015, was largely successful in reducing the threat and destroying the group's capabilities. Also, the combination of internal and sub-regional security forces from the Lake Chad region under the platform of the Multinational Joint Task Force helped to decrease Boko Haram's deadly assaults and transnational reach.

However, much as the military approach successfully decimated Boko Haram and eliminated the risk of Boko Haram terrorism in many and strategic parts of the country, its limitations made it unsuitable for countering Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. There is a consensus in literature that military actions generally, do not help to address deep-rooted underlying causes of conflict. In the same vein, Nigerian government's confrontational approach, though useful in reducing the violence, did not address the underlying/structural socio-economic, religious and political grievances that contributed to the emergence of a radical Islamist group called Boko Haram. As former American Secretary of State, John Kerry noted: "eliminating the terrorists of today with force will not guarantee protection from the terrorists of tomorrow and no matter how many terrorists we bring to justice, those groups will replenish their ranks" (cited in Sewall, 2015). Also, the pervasive high-

handedness and other human rights issues allegedly committed by the military contributed to increased cooperation and intelligence gaps between the military and the local population.

Thus, the adoption of non-militarised conflict management approaches to complement the use of force showed the government's understanding and appreciation of the fact that exclusive military actions would not yield the desired results. Boko Haram's history and ideology is deeply entrenched in socio-economic, political and religious contestations—dynamics that military actions, with all the inadequacies, would not have been able to confront successfully. Therefore, the government's adoption of a comprehensive and multipronged conflict management approach that involved military and non-military strategies is commendable.

Beyond the military operations, there was the need to address issues of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, ethno-religious and political tensions and other developmental issues in the area. However, Boko Haram's regenerative capacity should not be underestimated by the government. The history of its insurgency has shown that every time the group had been emasculated by government's counter-response, it always managed to adapt and re-emerge with more ferocity. Thus, as former Commander of Operation Lafiya Dole, Major General Lucky Irabor noted: after the war, there is the need to win the peace. It is in the light of these that the study makes the following recommendations below.

1.3.Recommendations

Military operations in the North East need to be improved upon. To do this, the military should be adequately funded to enable it successfully complete its operations against Boko Haram. Also, there is need for continuous training of the military in counter-terrorism operations. The right weapons, ammunitions and other equipment should be adequately provided for the operation. Also, no soldier for example, fights on an empty stomach or with low morale. Remunerations, allowances and entitlements of the troops should be paid and in regular fashion. Injured soldiers and families of those who died in the counterterrorism operations should be provided considerable level of support by the military authorities. This would contribute to addressing the problem of low morale and troop unwillingness to sacrifice when it matters the most.

There is need to actualise government's soft approaches in addressing Boko Haram terrorism. Endemic poverty, unemployment and the near-absence of basic amenities need to be addressed in a more committed manner. Poverty, unemployment and lack of development created severe human security crisis in the North East. Rebuilding of communities that were destroyed by Boko Haram should form part of government's priority projects in the region. Additionally, Communities in the heart of the conflict need to be properly carried along in the efforts to address the issues of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and provision of basic social amenities and other developmental infrastructures. It is not enough to identify the problems, but structures need to be put in place to ensure that the victims of Boko Haram insurgency and terrorism make direct input into government's economic counterterrorism.

The media has immense capacity to make a lot of difference in the fight against Boko Haram. Therefore, the government should properly engage the media. Government's media and propaganda infrastructure should target framing Boko Haram terrorism in a way that effectively demystifies the group's supposed invincibility. Government can reduce Boko Haram fear factor by telling Nigerians in clear terms the action it has taken to reduce the sect's threats; show vivid images of military victories rather than constantly displaying or portraying pitiful images of Boko Haram attacks which unwittingly plays into the hands of the group by helping to spread Boko Haram's message of fear. The handlers of government media and propaganda apparatuses should preach courage to the citizens and not fear or helplessness. Just as fear is contagious, so is courage. To achieve this, the government should effectively collaborate with the media to ensure conflict-sensitive reportage of both government and Boko Haram activities. Government's efforts should be reported in a way that inspires and conveys a sense of courage, confidence and security in its audience. This could be complemented by telling the citizens what measures they could also take to aid government's efforts such as advising and encouraging the public to report any suspicious or unknown persons to the nearest security agencies.

There is the need to build capacity in terms of investigating and prosecuting terrorism-related cases. Boko Haram terrorism is a recent phenomenon and not until 2011 (with the passing of the TPA) that investigators and prosecutors began to acquire some forms of training in the art of prosecuting terrorism-related cases. Capacity building is important as

prosecution of terrorism-related cases require special kills considering the fact that it is a distinct crime. Also, it is widely agreed that an otherwise good case can be destroyed by the incompetence of a prosecuting counsel, who is either professionally incompetent or, has compromised himself in order to defeat the trial. Proper training for prosecutors will boost the fight against terrorism. In addition, training of judges in the handling of terrorism-related cases should be prioritised. Closely tied to this is the need to ensure adequate funding for the purpose as investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases is cost intensive.The high cost of investigation and prosecution is often a factor that slows down the progress of trial. Most high profile terrorism cases require quite a number of evidence and getting the witnesses to cooperate is very costly.Lack of proper funding of such matters prevents the smooth running and success of trials

Concrete steps should be taken on de-radicalisation. Attitudes are malleable and susceptible to change. Individuals have the potential to go through the whole process of radicalisation, de-radicalisation and re-radicalisation. There is need to totally understand how the individual became radicalised in the first place. This involves recognising and appreciating the need of the jihadist and those things that effectively shaped his belief, motives and reality. Then there is need to develop a narrative, not one that condemns the individual but that acknowledges and appreciate his need for relevance and respect. This should be followed by providing a non-violent means to address that need including provision of vocational education, financial assistance, employment and even wives or husbands depending on what the legitimate needs are. Additionally, government also needs to recognise the social network within which the individual is embedded as this is crucial to the process of radicalisation or de-radicalisation. As it has been observed, people's attitudes and beliefs are crucially embedded in the shared reality of their group. Just as radicalisation takes place in a social context that is shaped by family, friends and "leaders", de-radicalisation also cannot take place in a social vacuum. Families, friends and repentant jihadists could be deployed also to exert moderate influence on those that have been rehabilitated to help prevent their slide back into extremism or terrorism.

Closely following the above is that Government's counter-radicalization programme and counter-narratives against Boko Haram ideology need to improve. It should include total reorientation about Islamic syllabus in Islamic and almajiri schools and in the teaching of

the religion. Specifically, the almajiri school programme needs to be energised. It holds great potential for keeping millions of street kids away from the prowls of Boko Haram terrorists and apologists in the form of radical preachers. The plan should also seek to integrate thousands of local mallams in the region under whose tutelage many children, including those who are not almajiri, are taught Islamic education. Incorporating these teachers and religious guides into the counter-radicalization plan could be very useful in disabusing the minds of the children and teaching them the right Islamic knowledge, especially those of peace, good neighborliness and inter-religious tolerance. They could help to re-order some of the negative religious practices and de-emphasise religious intolerance. For the second recommendation to be very effective though, the government needs to marry it to a very proactive and sound campaign against radical Islamic teaching and preaching.

Besides the usual rhetoric, concrete actions need to be taken to monitor and regulate the activities of Islamic preachers and teachers perhaps, by a body of eminently qualified and respected Islamic leaders/rulers in the area. Efforts should also be made within this framework to monitor and prevent external religious influences. Dealing with Boko Haram and other radical ideologies requires adequate attention on foreign groups and teachers who hide under the guise of teaching the religion of Islam to perpetrate radicalism and fundamentalism. Government should be able to identify those who preach peace and others who preach violence and hold them for their actions.

Perhaps, the most immediate issue that needs addressing is the issue of suicide bombing perpetrated by Boko Haram terrorists. While it is fair to say that it may be difficult to totally eradicate suicide bombing, the phenomenon can be drastically reduced to its barest minimum through aggressive and comprehensive intelligence network. Therefore, the military should expand the scope and sources of its intelligence. Within this context, there has to be improved interagency collaboration between the military, the DSS, police, NSCDC and others. Greater cooperation will help security agencies, in a timely manner, to identify, locate and destroy the terrorist hideouts and locations where IEDS are made and where would-be suicide bombers are being prepared. Added to this is that information and intelligence gathering may not yield the desired result without the involvement of the local population. Thus, security agencies should also develop better working relations with the

local people who have great potential to provide them with solid information that can help in ensuring suicide bombers do not beat the various observation posts and check points or get to the point of detonation that will cause harm to the public.

Government also needs to place emphasis on justice for victims of Boko Haram terrorism and military highhandedness. Victims of unfair profiling, beatings, sexual abuses, extortion and other forms of human rights violations should be afforded justice by the military authorities and the government. Punishment should be meted out to those who have committed human rights abuses. The government should also extract a clear commitment from the military authorities to ensure that its personnel appreciate and adhere to human rights norms and principles in its engagements in the North East region. Failure to get justice for victims has the potential to further stoke individual and community grievances against the military and the government which would only serve to benefit the terrorists.

The role of the Multinational Joint Task Force needs to be strengthened. The strategy has been useful so far; but it does not have to be largely reactive to the actions of Boko Haram. The MNJTF needs to be proactive or better still offensive, in ensuring that Boko Haram does not create a terrorist safe haven within the Lake Chad region. To this end, cooperating nations should endeavour to adequately fund the body and address other structural and institutional problems facing the MNJTF to enable it effectively perform its functions. A virile and prepared MNJTF will be effective in protecting the Lake Chad region and cutting off Boko Haram from its supplies, including, food, movement of funds, arms and other logistics. Reducing Boko Haram's access to these within the region can help to isolate the group from the needed oxygen to continue to operate.

Closely tied to this is the need for effective border management which is crucially important for Nigeria's national security. Borders are often considered the first line of defence against terrorism and the last line of a nation's territorial integrity. There is need to properly administer Nigeria's porous borders especially along the Lake Chad basin. The government should boost the presence of security and law enforcement officials and ensure they are well remunerated, trained on border security management and provided with the right operational equipment.

The Civilian JTF has been of tremendous help to Nigerian government's efforts in addressing Boko Haram terrorism. Yet, the fear remains if not properly managed, could become another security threat to the country. The government has already absorbed a number of its members into the military and other security agencies. But beyond this gesture, the C-JTF should be formed into local community watch groups to provide local security assistance to the regular security agencies. It could function within the framework of community policing (which is a global practice) and help to watch out for crimes and other suspicious behaviours and report same to the police and others. It is a strategy that can help provide the military and local law enforcement with additional eyes and ears to watch out for Boko Haram terrorists and all other criminal activities thereby promoting community security.

Lastly, in terms of strategy to effectively defeat Boko Haram, the government needs to adopt the hybridised conflict management strategy which has three broad objectives: coerce, deter and induce. The military strategy has to be deployed in a simultaneous and coordinated manner with the political and other non-militarised conflict management strategies to compel, deter and persuade Boko Haram terrorists to end the conflict on terms favourable to the government. While the military approach is deployed to decapitate the group, the socio-economic, religious and political approaches are equally deployed in the troubled area to wean the group of local support while addressing the myriad deep-rooted causes of the conflict. Critical to realising these three aspects of the hybridised strategy is coordination and synchrony.

1.4.Contribution to knowledge

The study contributed to the debate on effective management of Boko Haram terrorism. It not only empirically analysed the various conflict management strategies adopted by the Nigerian government in addressing the issue; it also identified the challenges affecting the adopted strategies and made adequate recommendations for addressing them in a sustainable manner. Of note, the study does not only subscribe to the use of non-militarised strategies or soft powerin addressing the sect's terror activities, it adequately explains how the government should go about it, especially as it relates to inclusiveness and local participation in addressing the root causes of the problem.

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APPENDIX

List of interviewees

S/N	Name	Designation	Place of Interview	Date of Interview
1	Alhaji	Vice Chairman 1, Muslim	Yola	December

	Gambo, Jika,	Council of Adamawa		26
2	Iheme Richmond,	Assistant Director, Investigations, National Human Rights Commission.	HNRC, Abuja	August 17, 2016
3	HRH, Shehu Hashimi II, IBN Umar El Kanemi	Emir of Damaturu	Emir's Palace, Damaturu	December 27, 2016
4	Barrister Charles Nwoji	Deputy Director, Planning/Focal Person for Counterterrorism and Strategies, National Orientation Agency	Abuja	August 18, 2016
5	Reverend Yohanna Buduwara	CAN Secretary, Borno State Chapter	Maiduguri	December 28, 2016
6	Steve Agbana	Director/ Head, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Centre, Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA)	ONSA, Abuja	October 7, 2016
7	Mustafa Aminu	Galadima of Adamawa	Yola	December 26, 2016
8	Major	Theatre Commander,	Theatre	December

	General Lucky E.O. Irabor	Operation Lafiya Dole	Command Headquarters, Maimalari, Maiduguri	28, 2016
9	Group Captain Ayodele Famuyiwa	Director for Public Relations and Information, Nigerian Air Force	Defense Headquarters, Abuja	August 18, 2016
10	Alhaji Ismaila Modibo	Commandant, Muslim Aid Group, Adamawa State	Yola	December 26, 2016
11	Tijani Modu	Programme Officer, Jama'atu Nasir Islam Borno State	Maiduguri	December 28, 2016
12	Muhammadu Abdullahi Gana	Commandant General, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps	NSCDC Headquarters, Abuja	August 10, 2016
13	Salisu Baitu	Assistant Secretary, Jama'atu Nasir Islam (JNI), Yobe State	Damaturu	December 27, 2016
14	Dr. Salihi I. Ateegu	Treasurer, Centre for Islamic Thoughts (CIT), Yola	Yola	December 26, 2016
15	Hon. Adams Jagaba	Chairman, House Committee on Interior, Federal House of Representatives, Abuja	Three Arms Zone, Abuja	September 29, 2016
16	HRH Alhaji (DR)	Shehu of Borno	Shehu's Palace, Maiduguri	December 28, 2016

	Abubakar Umar IBN Garbai CFR Al-Amin El Kanemi			
17	Alhaji Abdullahi Damare	Coordinator, Interfaith Committee, North East Region	Yola	December 26,2016
18	Idris Egbeyemi	Comptroller of Immigration and Principal Staff Officer to the Comptroller General of Immigration	NIS Headquarters, Sauka, Abuja	August 12, 2016
19	Bishop Mike Moses	CAN/PFN Chairman, Adamawa State	Yola	December 26, 2016
20	Sheikh Goni Mohammad Sa'adu Ngamdu.	Secretary, Jama'atu Nasir Islam, Borno State/ N/E Coordinator of JNI	Maiduguri	December 28,2016
21	Alhaji Abdullahi Hamman	Secretary, Council for Islamiyya Schools (CIS), Adamawa State	Yola	December 26, 2016
22	Abba-Aji Kalli	State Coordinator, Civilian JTF, Borno State	Maiduguri	December 28, 2016
23	Brigadier General Rabe Abubakar	Actg. Director of Defense Information, Defense Headquarters, Abuja	Defense Headquarters, Abuja	August 13, 2016

24	Bello Shehu	Bike Rider/Resident	Maiduguri	December 28, 2016
25	Barr. Bashir Tahir Yola	Assistant Secretary General, Muslim Council of Adamawa	Yola	December 26, 2016
26	Major Amadou Tchousso	Nigerien Liaison Officer to Multinational Joint Task Force	Maimalari, Maiduguri	December 28, 2016
27	Kaswe, D. Emmanuel	Principal State Counsel, Department of Public Prosecution, Ministry of Justice	Abuja	August 16, 2016
28	Reverend Father Yilar Emmanuel Apagu	CAN Secretary, Yobe State	Damaturu	December 27, 2016
29	Prof.Oshita Osang Oshita	Director General, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR)	Abuja	August 16, 2016
30	Bishop Naga, Williams Mohammed	CAN Chairman, Borno State Chapter	Maiduguri	December 28, 2016
31	Dr Onuoha, C. Freedom	National Defence College, Abuja	Abuja	September 23, 2016
32	DCP	Counterterrorism Unit,	Abuja	January

	Tunde Mabayo	Nigeria Police Force, Headquarters, Abuja		20, 2017
33	Professor Joseph Out	CAN National Vice President	Abuja	January 20, 2017

Appendix II: Interview guide

IDI guide (military respondents)

1. What specific strategies have government adopted in addressing Boko Haram terrorism?

2. How effective have these strategies been?

3. Do you think the declaration of state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states helped to reduce Boko Haram crisis? Why?

4. To what extent did the Joint Task Force succeed in dealing with Boko Haram issue?

5. Should the Joint Task Force have been disbanded by the government?

6. What was the level of cooperation among members of the Joint Task Force?

7. Did the establishment of 7[th]Mechanised Division and 8 Division yield any positive result in the fight against Boko Haram?

8. What has been the level of success of the 7[th]Mechanised Division and 8 Division?

9. The command structure of the military was moved from Abuja to Maiduguri, how has this move impacted the war on Boko Haram?

10. How has the establishment of the Multinational Joint Task Force impacted the fight against Boko Haram?

11. What specific challenges confront the Multinational Joint Task Force in its effort to contain Boko Haram activities in the cooperating countries?

12. In what ways have the Civilian Joint Task Force, Hunters' Guild and local vigilantes assisted the military in dealing with Boko Haram terrorism?

13. To what extent has the military approach generally succeeded in addressing Boko Haram terrorism?

14. What are the major factors constraining the Nigerian security forces in combating Boko Haram?

15. What would be your recommendation for the government to effectively address Boko Haram terrorism?

IDI guide (Office of the National Security Adviser)

1. What specific strategies have government adopted in addressing Boko Haram terrorism?

2. How effective are these strategies?

3. Have these strategies yielded any positive outcomes?

4. How do you think government can overcome these challenges?

IDI guide (Ministry of Information, National Orientation Agency)

1. How has the media reportage of the Boko Haram terrorism impact government's efforts in addressing the crisis?

2. To what extent is Boko Haram propaganda responsible for its continued survival?

3. What strategy is the government adopting in winning the propaganda war against Boko Haram?

4. What is government's counter-narrative against Boko Haram in the media?

IDI guide (Ministry of Justice and National Assembly)

1. Nigeria has been confronted with terrorism since 2009. Are there any legislations in place to address the issue?
2. How effective have these acts or legislations been?
3. Have the counterterrorism laws yielded any positive results?
4. What are the main challenges concerning counterterrorism legislations from the National Assembly to the Judiciary?
5. If there are, how can they be overcome?

IDI guide for institutions (Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Nigerian Defence College, Human Rights Commission)

1. What are the various government strategies against Boko Haram terrorism?
2. What is your assessment of these strategies?
3. What specific roles did your institution play in evolving these strategies
4. Does your institution have both the intellectual and practical skills to assist the government in the fight against terrorism?
5. What is the level of cooperation between your institution and the Nigerian government in the fight against terrorism?
6. What would be your recommendation for government in addressing Boko Haram terrorism?

IDI guide (religious/traditional leaders)
1. Are you aware of the various conflict management strategies employed by the government in addressing Boko Haram terrorism?
2. What are the specific strengths of each of the strategies identified?
3. Do you think the declaration of state of emergency in the state helped to reduce Boko Haram terror?
4. To what extent have the military succeed in the fight against Boko Haram?
5. Do you think military operation will bring an end to Boko Haram terrorism?
6. Do you support the use of CJTF in assisting the military operation?
7. How has their support impacted on the counter-terrorism efforts of the military?

8. To what extent are traditional and religious leaders relevant in the fight against Boko Haram?

9. In what specific ways have they supported government's efforts to address the crisis?

IDI guide (Ministry of Special Duties)

1. Do you think the government should explore the dialogue option? Why?

2. What are the likely challenges in adopting the dialogue option?

3. Government set up a committee to dialogue with Boko Haram, would you say the committee succeeded?

4. Do you think granting of amnesty to Boko Haram members will end the violence? Why?

5. What would be your recommendation for government in addressing Boko Haram terrorism?

IDI guide (Civilian Joint Task Force)

1. How has this name "Civilian Joint Task Force Evolved?

2. Who qualifies to be a member?

3. What are the specific roles of Civilian Joint Task Force?

4. What support do you receive from both the state and federal government?

5. How has the Civilian Joint Task Force succeeded in the fight against Boko Haram?

6. What specific challenges do you face?

Appendix III: Showing researcher with selected respondents

Plate 1: The researcher with Abba-Aji Kalli, Borno State Coordinator of CJTF

Plate 2: The researcher with Bishop MikeMose, CAN/PFN Chairman, Adamawa State

Plate 3: The researcher with Brig. Gen. Rabe Abubakar, (former) Actg. Dir. of Defence Information

Plate 4: The researcher with HRH Alhaji (Dr.) Abubakar Umar IBN Garbai, CFR, Al-Amin El Kanemi Shehu of Borno

Plate 5: The researcher with Major General L.E.O. Irabor, former Theatre Commander, Op. Lafiya Dole

Plate 6: Researcher with Prof. Oshita Osang Oshita, DG, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution

Plate 7: The researcher with HRH Shehu Hashimi II IBN Umar El Kanemi, Emir of Damaturu

Plate 8: The researcher with Group Captain Ayodele Famuyiwa, Director for Public Relations and Information, Nigerian Air Force

Plate 9: The researcher with Sheikh Goni Mohammed Sa'ad Ngamdu, North East Coordinator of JNI

Plate 10: The researcher with Major Amadou Tchousso, Nigerien MNJTF Liaison Officer to Op. Lafiya Dole