THE POLITICS OF FERTILISER PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION IN BENUE STATE, NIGERIA, 1999-2020

Abstract

Fertiliser procurement and distribution in Benue State has become synonymous with politics due to the prolonged involvement of government in the sector. While previous studies acknowledge the political elements of fertiliser policies, the effects of official intervention on fertiliser procurement and distribution in Benue State have not been sufficiently examined. This study was, therefore, designed to examine the effects of official intervention, the determinants of the choice of fertiliser policies and the social relations between the political elite and smallholder farmers on fertiliser procurement and distribution in Benue State, Nigeria. The political economy theories of Structural Violence and Primitive Accumulation provided the framework while the descriptive survey design was employed. Purposive sampling technique was used to select nine Local Government Areas (LGAs) with the largest farming populations. A sample size of 400 participants comprising farmers, traders, artisans, farm labourers and wage/salary earners was determined from the nine LGAs using the Taro Yamane formula. This sample was proportionally drawn from each LGA and administered with structured questionnaire: Katsina-ala (64), Ukum (63), Vandeikya (51), Gboko (68), Gwer-East (44), Gwer-West (30), Agatu (18), Oju (32) and Otukpo (30). Structured questionnaire was also administered to 34 staff of the Agricultural Department of the state Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. In-depth interviews were conducted with two past commissioners of agriculture and one fertiliser dealer. The quantitative data were analysed with descriptive statistics, t-test, Pearson Correlation Coefficient and ANOVA at 0.05 level of probability while content analysis was utilized for qualitative data. From the data, 243 respondents (64.5%) were farmers, 197 (56%) earned below ₦200, 000 yearly, 257 (68.2) were aged 40 and below, 372 (98.7%) cultivated between 1-4 hectares, and 375 (99.47) used simple tools in cultivation. Official intervention in the form of universal subsidy (1999-2011) was characterised by direct participation of government in procurement and distribution. Under the targeted subsidy (2012-2015), government withdrew from procurement and distribution of fertilisers but retained subsidies. For the zero-subsidy method (2016 to 2020), government participation and subsidies were eliminated and private fertiliser markets were expanded. There was no significant difference in the effectiveness of forms of intervention (t-0.398), a positive correlation was found between quantity of fertilisers distributed and quantity obtained by farmers (r-0.834), a significant difference in the quantity of subsidized fertiliser desired and quantity obtained by farmers (t-12.59). ANOVA showed a significant difference in access to fertilisers between associated and non-associated farmers. The objective determinants of fertiliser policies such as market failures and the need to increase fertiliser consumption produced policies with inherent potentials for efficient distribution of the product. However, subjective factors such as political and pecuniary aims of securing and legitimising elective office, rent-seeking and arbitrage circumscribed the efficiency of fertiliser distribution. The involvement of government in the fertiliser sector created networks for rent-seeking and arbitrage which led to uneven distribution of fertilisers. Efficiency in the distribution of fertiliser could increase with the government keeping to its policy defined role of regulation and a further expansion of private fertiliser markets.